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THE TREND OF HISTORY 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

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THE TREND OF HISTORY 

Origins of Twentieth Century Problems 



BY 

WILLIAM KAY WALLACE 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1922 

All rights reserved 



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 






Copyright, 1922, 
By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. 



Set up and printed. Published October, 1922. 




Press of 

J. J. Little & Ives Company 

New York, V, 5. A. 



TO 

W. D. W. 

X GRATEFULLY DEDICATE 
THIS BOOK 



PREFACE 

We are standing on the threshold of an unpolitical 
age. Politics has fallen from its high estate. Since the 
floodgates of political privilege have been opened, and 
participation in political affairs has been vouchsafed to 
all, we find everywhere a progressively increasing apathy 
in matters relating to politics. The preeminence of the 
State politically conceived, has been called into question. 
Its sovereignty has been shorn of many of its mystical 
characteristics. Other forms of corporate organisation 
are pressing for recognition. We may in turn see arising 
before our eyes a new, great social institution. Like 
feudalism it is in its essence unpolitical. As Lord Bryce 
has pointed out "feudalism was a social and legal system, 
only indirectly and by consequence a political one." We 
may to-day note that "industrialism," which may serve to 
denominate this new institution, is a social and economic 
system, only indirectly political. Such would appear to be 
the trend of history. 

History is the book of life of mankind. Its function 
is primarily interpretative. Historical interpretation 
means the selection of those relevant factors out of the 
mass of past events which stand In significant relation to 
the present moment. Every age may thus be said to have 
historical ties which at first sight seem Incongruous. In 
our own times the interest in guild organisation, the as- 
sertion that occupation or function rather than geograph- 
ical distribution is destined to become the basis of more 
adequate social organisation, hark back to the Middle 



yiii PREFACE 

Ages, and are closer thereto than to the theories of 
State and the political practice which were still more or 
less universally accepted before the World War. Thus 
history must ever be written afresh, for after a few years 
such writing inevitably becomes obsolete, except as of 
literary or antiquarian interest. But history Itself Is 
never obsolete. The historical present Is the outcome of 
a past which it Is the purpose of history to trace. In 
our own times the transformation which is taking place in 
the theory of social organisation requires that the method 
of historical writing be revised. 

Hitherto history has generally been conceived In an 
exclusively political sense as a record of the res gestae, 
and of the men who brought them to pass. As long as 
politics remained dominant It was natural that history 
should have remained primarily political In character. 
But we can now perceive that political history or any 
other partial survey of events in their Isolation, such as 
Is embodied In a biography or even In a national history. 
Is no longer adequate. History must henceforth be ap- 
proached from an institutional, not from an Individual or 
national standpoint. The theoretical background of 
social practice must be Inquired Into. In this brief survey 
I would point the way to this new method of history. To 
trace through the tangled maze we call the course of 
events the logical antecedents and coefficients thereof Is to 
discover the trend of history, the process of social life. 
Such Is the purpose of this volume. 

The chaotic state of mind which exists so widely 
among all manner and condition of persons is in a great 
measure due to the fact that the relevant factors of his- 
tory, the connective tissue between the past and the pres- 
ent, are obscure. The great obsolete mass of dead matter 
incorporated In the average historical survey illustrates 



PREFACE 



IX 



significantly the point I wish to make. I would not infer 
that political data have been omitted from this book. On 
the contrary as it reviews a predominantly political period, 
in fact traces in outline the rise, maturity and decay of 
modern political practice, politics has found a large place 
therein. But I have endeavoured in so far as possible to 
present the theory of the age and illustrate it by the prac- 
tice of politics, and I trust that I may have succeeded in a 
measure in pointing beyond this theory and practice to the 
newer theory that was being developed. 

Though politics can no longer be held to be pivotal, 
in history, we cannot disregard the fact that the aim of 
politics is to arrive at some workable functioning of 
what we term social life. But in this politics has no ex- 
clusive monopoly. Religion, politics and economics are 
the three great regulative factors of human intercourse 
subsumed under the term — Society. At various epochs 
the principal emphasis has been placed now on one, now 
on another of these elements, according to a certain his- 
torically relevant relationship which may be traced. It is 
a one-sided distortion of historical truth to attempt to 
claim absolute preeminence for any one of these factors, 
though the dominance first of one and then of another is 
confirmed by a perusal of history. As a consequence the 
manner and mode of the civilisation of a given epoch, the 
cultural life of a period is colored by the dominant char- 
acteristic of the age, be it religious, political or economic. 
In this first volume I would present for your consid- 
eration the origins and background of present-day social 
phenomena. I would trace in this new historical spirit the 
course of relevant events which has led up to those of 
the epoch which we may conveniently call our own. It is 
sheer pedantry or an utter misunderstanding of the aim 
of history to declare that the events of his own times are 



X PREFACE 

too vivid, too fresh for an historian to undertake to inter- 
pret them. In point of fact the only history that is ade- 
quate is contemporary history; that is, history that is 
related to the present. All the research of historians, 
all the delvings of students into texts and yellowed parch- 
ments to eke out the minutiae of facts, which Macaulay 
nearly a century ago significantly termed the "mere dross 
of history," are in themselves worthless unless linked 
up with the current of events. 

History reveals life in its manifoldness and com- 
plexity. In order to introduce some semblance of unity, 
to take history out of the realm of chronicles, to free it 
from a parity with fiction or a disparity with romance, 
we must assure ourselves that it is made understandable 
in terms of contemporary interest and usage. History in 
this sense is not merely the book of life, it may if read 
aright become the book of wisdom of mankind. I do not 
mean to imply that it should be looked upon as a collection 
of recipes to be followed in guiding individual action, or 
that it can serve, as it is so often held, as the magister 
vitae of a person calling himself a statesman. But pre- 
senting those events which are closely related to our own 
times and showing the relationship that exists between the 
past and the present, not only may we hope to arrive at an 
understanding of the significance of the course of events, 
but we may even discern a pattern of purpose in social life. 
This purposive element is in itself only discernible a pos- 
teriori and should not be taken as implying some rigid no- 
tion of historical causality. For history which recounts 
the story of the life process in its entirety admits of no 
such notion as an efl'icient or final cause. It is nevertheless 
with these causal factors that history is primarily con- 
cerned. It is by weaving them into a unity, by setting 
forth cogently whatever may serve to explain their mean- 



PREFACE xi 

ing, that the course of events, the trend of history is 
revealed. 

In selecting the historical data used to illustrate this 
inquiry, much had perforce to be abridged, much omitted 
which might possibly have found a place in these pages. 
Thus, for example, in discussing the rise of the modern 
State, the influence of the Counter-Reformation, and the 
part played by the Jesuits in joining hands with the liberal 
movement in undermining the concept of the divine right 
of kings, and their struggle against monarchical absolut- 
ism, some might aver, should have been included. This 
very interesting episode has like others been omitted not 
only because of the need of limiting the scope of the nar- 
rative within reasonable bounds, but also because the 
Counter-Reformation and the work of its protagonists 
were historically negative. What the Jesuits sought was 
the restoration of papal supremacy in matters temporal, 
and not the positive progress of the new and more liberal 
political practice. Other omissions might be cited, but a 
careful study has led me to conclude that in the main their 
influence was negative, and had no preeminently positive 
influence on the course of history. 

W. K. Wallace 



CONTENTS 



PAGB 

Introduction i 

BOOK I 

CHAPTER I 
The Politico-Theistic Concept of the State 

Machiavelli — Bodin — The Precursors of the New Politico-Juridic 
Movement — Locke — Althusius — Grotius 17 

CHAPTER H 

The Genesis of Constitutional Government 

The Moral Attributes of the State — The Role of England — The 
Declaration and Bill of Right — Influence of the Middle Class — 
Spread of Liberalism 25 

CHAPTER ni 

The Rise of Public Opinion 

France of the Eighteenth Century — Humanity — Liberty — Progress 
— Montesquieu — Turgot — Condorcet — Rousseau 35 

CHAPTER IV 

American Independence 

Causes and Aims — Temper of the Colonists — Influence of French 
Political Theory — English Practice 54 

CHAPTER V 

The Middle Class Mind 

Free Humanity — Cosmopolitanism — Economic Interest — Influence 
of the Physiocrats — Adam Smith — Political Liberty — Economic In- 
dependence ^5 

xiii 



xiv CONTENTS 

CHAPTER VI 
The French Revolution 

, PAGE 

Foreign Influer.-ce — The New Spirit — The Tiers Etat — The Rights 
of Man — The Constitution of 1791 73 

CHAPTER VII 

The Idea of Nationalism 

The Effects of the Revolution — The New Concept of Liberty — 
National Self-Consciousness — Napoleon I — His Political Importance 
— His Historical Role 80 



CHAPTER VIII 

The Restoration 

The Spread of Constitutional Government — Sicily (1812) — Spain 
(1812) — France (1814) — Minor German States — The Destiny of 
Europe — The Congress of Vienna — The Holy Alliance — The Policy 
of Legitimacy — Aix-la-Chapelle — Troppau — Laibach — The Monroe 
Doctrine 88 



CHAPTER IX 

The Aftermath 

The Temper of the Early Nineteenth Century — New Schools of 
Politics — The Socialist Doctrine — St. Simon — The Increasing Im- 
portance of Economics 97 



CHAPTER X 

The Triumph of the Middle Class 

Greek Independence — The Revolution of 1830 — Louis Philippe, 
King of the French— The Whigs in Power— The Reform Act (1832) 
— Belgian Independence — Economics and Politics — The Competitive 
Ideal — Capitalism and Nationalism — The Business Man in Politics 
— The Case of Algeria — Portents of Decay — Chartism . ... 104. 



CONTENTS XV 

BOOK II 

CHAPTER I 
Political Maturity 

PAGE 

Comparative Methods — ^The Time Element — Metaphysical Char- 
acter of Politics — Physical Factors — Duration 115 

CHAPTER II 

The Spread of Nationalism 

Louis Napoleon — Consolidation of Middle Class Control in France 
— Comte — The Teachings of Positivism — Utilitarianism in England 
— The Situation in Germany — The Zollverein — Fichte — ^Racial In- 
fluences 122 

CHAPTER III 

The Awakening of Germany 

The Influence of Hegel — His Political Ideas — Their Widespread 
Acceptance — Comparison of German, French, and English Theory — 
The Accession of Frederick Wilhelm IV — Economic Development 
— The New Nationalism 133 

CHAPTER IV 

I 830- I 848 

Louis Philippe — Economic Factors — Attitude of the Middle Class 
— The Right to Vote — The Extension of Suffrage — Revolutionary 
Outbreaks of 1848 — Causes — Italy — France — Germany — Austria — 
Historical Motives 143 

CHAPTER V 

Communism 

The Manifesto of 1848 — The Marxian Theory — Historical Ma- 
terialism — The Influence of Hegel — Economic Interpretation of 
History — Opposition to Democratic Doctrines — Revolutionary Tac- 
tics 157 



xvi • CONTENTS 

CHAPTER VI 

The Nation-State 

PAGE 

The French Constitution of 1852 — The Second Empire — The Cen- 
tralisation of Authority — Colonial Expansion — The British Empire 
— Industrial Exhibitions — Prosperity and Politics 172 

CHAPTER VH 

Napoleon HI 

His Nationalist Policy — Relations with Foreign Powers — The Posi- 
tion of Russia — Pan-Slavic Movement — The Crimean War — The 
Role of England — The Congress of Paris — Russophile Tendencies . 181 

CHAPTER Vin 

The New Nationalism 

Survey of the International Situation — Relations between States — 
Napoleon III and Italian Unity — The War with Austria — Villa- 
franca — Effects of Union of Italy — Poland — Franco-Russian Ten- 
sion — The Mexican Expedition — Bismarck and the War with Den- 
mark — Annexation of the Danish Duchies — Prussia and Austria — 
Sadowa — The Treaty of Prague — The North German Confederation 
— The Collapse of the Mexican Empire — The Luxemburg Incident — 
The German Menace — The War of 1870 — Sedan — The Foundation 
of the German Empire 190 

CHAPTER IX 

Realpolitik 

The Motives of Public Policy — Neo-Machiavellianism — Morality 
and Politics — The Personalised Nation-State — Definition of Realism 
— Philosophic Background — The Influence of Pessimism — Schopen- 
hauer — Decline of the Politico-Juridic Theory of State — The State 
as Power — Volitional Factors 209 

CHAPTER X 

The Politico-Economic Theory of State 

Term Defined — The End of the State — Role of the Individual- 
Union of the State and Its Members — Phases of Transition — Classi- 
fication of States — New Functions of the State — Education — Public 



CONTENTS xvii 

PAGE 

Welfare — Economic Enterprise — Motives of Public Policy — The 
New Absolutism — Survey of the Contribution of the Middle Class to 
Political Theory 223 



BOOK III 

CHAPTER I 

The First International Movement 

The Decline of Nationalism — Quantitative Values — Imperialism 
and Internationalism — The Part of England — Organisation of In- 
ternational Movement — Its Character — Rapid Growth — The Con- 
gress of Basel — The Paris Commune — The Attitude of the Middle 
Class . 245 

CHAPTER II 

Imperialism 

Relation to Capitalism — Role of the Proletariat — Megalomania 
of the Epoch — Processes of Decay — Influence of Pessimism . . . 256 

CHAPTER III 

The Rise of the Proletariat 

Dualism in Politics — Principles of Public Policy — Disraeli — His 
Place in History — Leader of Imperialist Movement — His Affinity 
with the Proletariat — Aristocracy, Middle Class, and Proletariat — 
Interpretation of their Political and Social Theories 263 

CHAPTER IV 

The New Europe 

Relative Position of the Powers — The Predominance of Germany 
— The Dreikaiserbund — The Rapid Recovery of France — The Crisis 
of 1875 — The Situation in the Balkans — British Foreign Policy — 
England and Turkey — Plans for the Pacification of the Balkans — 
The Suez Canal Incident 



272 



CHAPTER V 

The Eastern Question 

Conflicting Influences — ^Reforms a la Turque — The Programme of 
the Three Emperors — The Berlin Memorandum — Firm Attitude of 



xviii CONTENTS 

PAGE 

England — War in the Balkans — The Reichstadt Agreement — Bul- 
garian Atrocities — Abdul Hamid — The Constantinople Conference 
— The Porte Proclaims a Constitution — Efforts to Keep the Peace 
— Russia Declares War — British Threat of Intervention to Pro- 
tect Constantinople — Austria and the Western Balkans — Plevna — 
Bismarck and German Interest in Balkan Affairs — Russia Vic- 
torious — The Treaty of San Stefano 283 

CHAPTER VI 
The Congress of Berlin 

Objects of the Congress — Treaty of San Stefano Revised — Dis- 
tribution of Territory — Erection of Independent Balkan States — 
Bosnia and Herzegovina — Cyprus — The New Orientation in Foreign 
Affairs — Maturity of Nation-States — Plans of Expansion — The Euro- 
pean Viewpoint 295 

CHAPTER Vn 

The State as Power 

Bismarckian Doctrines — Relation to Marxism — The Interpretation 
of Treitschke — Objective Concept of Power — Church and State — 
Berlin and the Vatican — The Significance of the Kulturkampf — So- 
cial Problems — Bismarck's Programme of Social Welfare — Disraeli's 
Attitude — England and Germany 301 

CHAPTER Vni 

International Politics 

Results of the Congress of Berlin — Crisis in Egypt — British Oc- 
cupation — A Scientific Frontier — The Afghan War — Russo-German 
Tension — ^The Balkans Again — Austro-German Alliance — England 
and the Alliance — The Temper of the Times — The Passing of 
Pessimism — The Super-Man and the Super-State — Tunis — Franco- 
Italian Rivalry — An Imperialist Comedy — The French in Tunis . 314 

CHAPTER IX 
The Triple Alliance 

The Civilising Mission of the State — The New Basis of Competi- 
tion — Tendency to Coalition — Position of Italy — Foundation of the 



CONTENTS 



PAGB 



Alliance — Its Historical Significance — The Role of Austria and of 
Italy — Economic Factors — Peaceful Penetration — Supernationalism — 
Politics Subservient to Economics — Social Benefits — The Theory of 
Exploitation 323 

CHAPTER X 

The Super-State 

The New Economic Basis of the State — Bismarck as Minister of 
Commerce and Industry — Protective Tariffs — Markets — Communi- 
cations — The Reinsurance Treaty of 1884 — Its Economic Motives 
— Armed Peace — Colonial Expansion — France — England — Italy — 
Germany — Leopold II of Belgium — The Congo — Berlin Conference 
— First Participation of the United States in a European Con- 
gress — The Partition of Africa — The New Era 330 

CHAPTER XI 

Salus Populi 

Estimate of Bismarck's Historical Mission — The New Ethics of 
Government — The Justification of the Use of Force — Cultural Su- 
periority 34Z 



THE TREND OF HISTORY 



THE TREND OF HISTORY 

INTRODUCTION 



IN periods of historical transition, the stress of new 
ideas is greater than can be equably borne. The pass- 
ing of the old order is attended by upheavals and disturb- 
ances which are in themselves manifestations of this 
overburdening, and must not be confounded with the 
positive progress of the new tenets. The natural con- 
servative forces, latent in all living matter, render smooth 
transition difficult. Reactionary principles remain 
dominant, relatively intact, until the crumbling process 
is accelerated and new and more appropriate theories 
find spontaneous acceptance. 

It no longer suffices that the political philosopher, 
the doctrinaire sociologist, or the ethically-minded 
economist should seek to discover and array in his- 
torically accurate, logically sound argument the factors 
which contribute to the ideal governance of society. It 
no longer suffices that the historian, after a minute in- 
quiry into the episodes and events in the life of a people, 
should present those relevant details which may appear 
to have led to the rise, grandeur, and fall of empires, so 
that we may profit by the experiences of the civilisations 
which have preceded our own. The time is past when 
the mission of the historian is to arouse the patriotic 
fervor of his compatriots as a spur to national unity or 

[I] 



2 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

political independence, which influenced so much of the 
historical writing and the so-called philosophy of his- 
tory during the 19th century. Theories of the siimmum 
bonum, politically arrived at, or panaceas based on worn- 
out political creeds into which the historian would seek 
to breathe a breath of new life can no longer be accepted. 

Western civilisation, and in its train that of the rest 
of the world, has entered upon a new historical epoch. 
If we are to be in a position to interpret aright the sig- 
nificance of the course of events, to understand the mean- 
ing of the historical moment we call the present, we 
must be equipped to view dispassionately and without 
prejudice the origin and growth of the State as we know 
it, and trace the decay of its present constitutional form. 
To do this we must inquire with greater precision into 
the plan, investigate with clearer insight the principles 
upon which the social organisation of our epoch has been 
built. A new method of historical inquiry, a new his- 
torical viewpoint is required. 

When, after the barbarian invasions, the political or- 
ganisation of the Roman Empire was disrupted, men 
turned in disgust from the secular world and found what 
solace they could in the contemplation of the glories 
of the "City of God." In the West, politics in its proper 
sense disappeared and we have the period known as 
the Dark Ages, devoid of history. In the course of these 
centuries, roughly from the end of the 5th to the loth, 
the Church entrenched itself firmly and filled the whole 
life of the individual. 

During the long continuance of the domination of the 
cultural life of Europe by the Church, its control had 
become so absolute that in order to emancipate mankind 
from what had come to be recognised as an intolerable 
servitude, it was felt that a new theory of social organ- 



INTRODUCTION 3 

Isation was required. Whereas religion may assure a 
primitive stability to society and make possible a rudi- 
mentary form of social organisation, with the growing 
complexity of social life secularisation invariably ensues, 
which awakens a fresh interest in politics. 

In contrast to the religious instinct common to man- 
kind, we find among civilised peoples what we may term 
political consciousness. Religion has to do with the life 
and conduct of the individual; politics with the life and 
conduct of the State. Religion is primarily moral; poli- 
tics primarily ethical. Religion demands conformity to 
creed; politics conformity to law. Religion is static; 
politics dynamic. 

The social order of the Middle Ages which bore a 
religious imprint was essentially immobile. Society was 
established on a permanent, hereditary basis. Its hier- 
archy was fixed, apparently indissoluble. The interde- 
pendence of the various social orders was secondary only 
to their independence as a class. Each class, according 
to the measure of its strength, looked out for its own 
welfare, endeavored to safeguard its own interests; in 
some instances even maintained its own armed force, and 
provided and paid for its own representatives in the 
Diets. The gradual decay of this social system, in which 
the dominant position of the Church was everywhere 
recognised, was primarily due to the reawakening of 
political consciousness, and in a far less degree to the 
abuses and corruption of the Church. To overthrow 
the authority of the Church in secular affairs involved 
the displacing of religion as the focal factor in society 
and the introduction of a new pivotal interest. It meant 
that religion was to give way to politics; that the guid- 
ance of mankind by transcendental revelation was to be 
replaced by an empirical rationalism. 



4 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

The substitution of the State politically conceived for 
the Church, which had in the past performed the dual 
function of spiritual and social supervision, meant not 
only the usurpation by the State of many of the func- 
tions formerly performed as religious rites but, what 
was to prove more important, the assertion of the pre- 
eminence of the secular world. 

Whereas the Church had left a wide latitude to the 
individual in regard to his political beliefs, and had 
loosened the bonds of his allegiance to the State, that 
intolerable servitude of antiquity the tradition of which 
still survived, the Reformation, by wresting the con- 
trol of the social order from the hands of the Papacy, 
introduced the concept of nationality in ecclesiastical af- 
fairs, raised the political status of the individual, and 
revived with renewed intensity his interest in his al- 
legiance to a secular state. It must be acknowledged 
that these were merely incidental consequences of the 
process of rehabilitation of the Church, undertaken by 
the champions of the Reformation, and were not con- 
sidered by them as the objectives which they strove to 
attain. One need but call to mind the inquiring attitude 
of Erasmus, the shrewd fearlessness of Luther, the un- 
compromising severity of Calvin, as they surveyed the 
world of their day. The ulcer of society as they clearly 
saw it was the decadence of the Church. The longings, 
the strivings of men were directed towards the planning 
of a new era, a new relation of man to his God and in- 
directly of man to man. The time was ripe for a new 
social order. The sun of theism still glowed in the 
West with effulgent splendor. The aim of those who 
were destined to bring about its eclipse was not to ex- 
tinguish its beneficent rays, but rather to dissipate the 
clouds of superstition, vice, and ignorance which ob- 



INTRODUCTION 5 

scured It. They were In the first instance solely con- 
cerned with the reform of the Church, its purification, 
its strengthening, and its reaflirmation as the dominant 
force in society. Nevertheless, the first fruit of the 
teaching of the Protestant reformers not merely resulted 
in undermining the doctrine and dogma of the Church, 
but at the same time awakened an unquenchable in- 
terest in the theory and practice of political affairs. The 
disciplined faith of Catholicism, which had bred a spirit 
of obedience and orderly acquiescence in the existing 
social structure, was to give way to private judgment, 
based on private conviction which was soon extended 
from religious to secular affairs. 



II 

It Is In the nature of human affairs that the Instru- 
ments man uses to attain his objects survive long after 
the objects themselves have been attained and disappear. 
The ideal is the goal towards which man's striving is 
directed. It is usually held, and sincerely so, as a better- 
ing of the existing, its improvement, rather than a sub- 
stitution by something radically different or new. Such 
was the case when religious interest gave way to political 
enthusiasm at the opening of the modern epoch. 

Historical Inquiry appears to confirm the fact that as 
religion was supplanted by politics as the pivotal Interest 
of civilised man, almost by way of accident in so far as 
fixed motives were concerned, so politics will in turn 
be supplanted by the Instruments made use of to re- 
generate it. It is by the clear-visioned acknowledgment 
of these probable consequences, by a careful examination 
thereinto, that it will be possible to discern with in- 
creasing accuracy the trend of historical development. 



6 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

For the tome of social history must not be conceived, as 
it has been hitherto, as bound between its board covers, 
complete in its form and content^ — however admirable 
these may seem — to which a new volume is added from 
time to time; but rather like a loose-leaf ledger in which 
fresh pages are to be inserted as the new is uncovered, 
as the old is outworn. This does not mean continued 
compromise, or work half done; it does not mean that 
the negative will never be inserted where the positive 
held sway, owing to a passing change of mood. It means 
that the course of history need not be held to be in proc- 
ess of continuous disruption; nor yet that the growth 
of the newer forms of social organisation need be re- 
tarded by the apparent finality of its existing form. It 
means that there is a possibility for perpetual renova- 
tion, naturally and smoothly arrived at; the old no 
longer encumbering the new. It is on this economy that 
the polity of the future must be built. 

By an acceptance of this view we can with more 
simplicity reach an understanding of what is meant by 
that perplexing term, "progress"; we can conceive the 
plausibility of perfectibility. We can understand prog- 
ress in its essential nature, not as an end in itself, as it is 
so often held to be, but merely as an incidental factor 
in human affairs, to be made use of in the manner and 
with the ease with which an outworn page can be re- 
moved, and a new page can be inserted. The elemental 
principles have been determined, bound by the nature of 
man, but the infinite variations, progress and regress, 
stretch on before us. 

I have given this brief outline in order that it may be 
clear that when, after the Reformation, religion came to 
be supplanted by politics as the pivotal factor in social 
life, the theistic concept, long held the fundamental 



INTRODUCTION 7 

tenet in Western Europe, was introduced into political 
life. It need, therefore, excite no surprise, as it was 
a logical development, that we should find a Hobbes 
proclaiming the State the "Mortal God." We see here 
the transference of allegiance from the theistic to the 
political Godhead. Machiavelli in Italy and Bodin in 
France had, before Hobbes, exalted the supremacy of 
the State, and their political doctrines had found a ready 
acceptance among the very limited number of men in 
a position to comprehend the true nature of politics. 
Looked at from this standpoint, it is not difficult to trace 
the growth of monarchical absolutism in Europe, which 
led to the introduction of the concept of the divine right 
of kings. 

From the i6th to the i8th century absolutism was 
the commonly accepted theory of government. The 
divinity of the will of the monarch, his direct responsi- 
bility to God, his irresponsibility towards man, was the 
common creed. The King was God's anointed. To his 
support rallied his subjects. Papal Rome was over- 
shadowed by Paris, London, Madrid, and a number of 
German centres, each of which had set up a political 
Godhead. Religion was relegated to the sphere of spec- 
ulation. Politics became the primal preoccupation, and 
with it rose the empirical mind, which tested and in- 
vestigated the tangible. In an ever-widening circle 
the field of experimentation was extended, and brought 
within the realm of the human mind useful and prac- 
tical solutions of all manner of problems, which had 
never hitherto been investigated. Civilisation had en- 
tered upon the path of perfectibility and progress. Such 
was the work of the Reformation. Who shall say that 
it was consonant with the aims of its initiators? 

In a futile attempt to arrest the decay of religious 



8 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

ascendancy the Papacy had sanctioned a system of per- 
secution of the heretical adherents of the Reformation, 
more terrible than that suffered by the early Christians 
at the hands of the Romans. In the ferocity of the 
methods used, and in the number of victims resulting 
therefrom, it far distanced its earlier prototype. For 
a century and a half Europe was racked by internecine 
religious wars and persecutions, which spared no man, 
no land. Throughout the 17th century these convul- 
sions continued. Civil wars in England, the Thirty Years' 
War in Germany, the Dragonnades in France, the In- 
quisition in Portugal and Spain, the massacres in Hol- 
land — all had as their apparent motive the suppression 
of Protestant heresy. In reality they were phases of 
a bloody struggle for the supremacy of a new ideology. 
The latent forces of politics had pushed upward. Politics 
was about to supplant religion as the motive-force of 
social life. 

From the positive worship of one immortal God the 
attention of men had been diverted. Religious worship 
was not abolished, but it became avocational. The vo- 
cation of men was henceforth political. Their energy 
was no longer engaged in religious strife. Finally, the 
Papacy itself realised the irrevocable character of the 
new trend, and sought to retain at least a loose-woven 
spiritual hegemony. It no longer excommunicated and 
fulminated, no longer insisted on asserting its temporal 
sovereignty on the field of battle, but associated itself 
with, and lent the sanction of its approval to, the rule 
of temporal sovereigns favorable to its religious creed, 
and thus assisted actively in the creation of a politico- 
theistic organisation of society. 

The State as embodied in its sovereign had become 
the Mortal God. But in the eyes of the more educated 



INTRODUCTION 9 

it could not fail to be a god divested of many of the 
sacred attributes which had awed past generations. Re- 
ligion implies implicit obedience. Politics demands no 
more than explicit allegiance. Religion relies on the 
utilisation of the primitive psychic phenomena, faith, 
which readily accepts the prospect of infinite reward in 
the future, in return for the patient bearing of infinite 
hardship and toil in the present, coupled with the threat 
of eternal punishment in case its tenets are violated. 
Pohtics attempted to refashion this doctrine, in that it 
claimed to insure a more real present worth, without 
much regard for the remote future, and exacted no se- 
vere accounting for omissions. Furthermore, politics 
left as much of the religious doctrine intact as did not 
interfere with its fundamental requirement of allegiance. 
The Church remained, but it became in theory the sub- 
servient tool of the State. Such, in brief, was the basis 
of the new political ideology. 



Ill 

Two centuries had not elapsed since the day when 
Luther aflixed his ninety-five theses to the gate of the 
church at Wittenberg (15 17). Louis XIV, the ex- 
emplar of kingly divinity who had proclaimed "L'Etat, 
c'est moi," and had coupled it as a maxim of govern- 
ment with that of the divine right of kings, was at the 
end of his long reign (17 15). The divinity of king- 
ship was already beginning to be called into question. 
Present worth, in its political aspects, was proving no 
more satisfactory, and actually more oppressive than 
it had under theistic overlordship. The sovereign and 
his court had absorbed all the benefits derived from 
the politico-theistic system of statehood. In the new 



lo THE TREND OF HISTORY 

strongly compacted national states, such as France and 
Spain, the long arm of taxation reached out to the 
most remote confines, and drew to the coffers of the 
capital the funds needed for the support of royal ex- 
penditure. This system was carried to its greatest per- 
fection most rapidly in France, and served to consoli- 
date and unite the various provinces, already bound by 
linguistic and social bonds. The State — the Mortal God 
— was expanding into a system of political polytheism, 
wherein the national spirit was aroused, and national 
jealousies were fostered, based no longer on creed, but 
on political allegiance. The politico-theistic system had 
endowed the State with a divinely anointed sovereign. 
Now thoughtful men came to recognise for the first 
time that the State is in reality composed not merely 
of the governing, but also of the governed. Here 
we have the genesis of the social contract, which was 
the cause of fierce conflict in England between Parlia- 
ment and the Crown during the greater part of the 17th 
century, and was to be so emphatically emphasised by 
Rousseau and his disciples a century later. It wa>s this 
struggle to secure the recognition of the contractual 
relation between the governing and the governed which 
resulted in the violent overthrow of the principle of 
the divine essence of statehood. 

The Bill of Rights of 1689, which limited the power 
of the sovereign in England, and the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man of 1789 are complementary docu- 
ments. Divinity implies hierarchy in governance, but 
it also recognises the equality of all before the throne 
of the Deity. As long as kingship was able to identify 
itself with, and mark off for itself, the exclusive control 
of sovereignty invested with supernatural attributes, its 
absolute authority was assured. But once the State was 



INTRODUCTION ii 

divested of this theistic fiction, once it came to be be- 
lieved that the State is composed, not alone of the sov- 
ereign, but also of the people, each individual sharing 
in the greatness, power, and pomp of the State, the 
sacrosanct, noli me tangere characteristic of kingship was 
destined to vanish. 

The equality of men before the Deity, which poHtico- 
theistic society sought to imitate under monarchical ab- 
solutism, had been warped by prejudice of caste and 
privilege. The new political ideology of the i8th cen- 
tury proclaimed the sovereignty of the people, as a legal 
obligation. The relation of the individual to the State 
lost its theistic bias, and gained in breadth of concep- 
tion. Henceforth it was to be declared with growing 
insistence that the State is made up of its citizens, who, 
in theory at least, should all have an equal share of 
rights and privileges. Political control was to rest on 
a juridical basis. The power to enact, or enforce arbi- 
trarily, the sovereign will was to be withdrawn from 
the monarch. Parliaments, representative of the politi- 
cally enlightened elements of the population, now came 
to be regarded as the proper repositories of political 
power; law-making and amending came to be held their 
principal function; the assent thereto the function of the 
sovereign or executive. The contractual relation be- 
tween the governed and the governing, partnership in 
the government of the State, was to be established. 

The smooth working of such a system was incompati- 
ble with the politico-theistic thesis of government. It 
meant the substitution of the juridical for the theistic 
relation. The new ideology made steady progress. Ra- 
tional inquiry affirmed the absurdity of the older prin- 
ciples; over-emphasised the benefits to be derived from 
the new; adduced a priori an ideal social order which 



12 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

required, it was alleged, only the sancti-on of the people 
to bring it into being. Peaceful adjustment was no longer 
possible. When the oppressed feel the hand of the 
oppressor growing unsteady; when the man in the saddle 
makes way for the man on foot; when the potentially 
strong gives way and concedes to the apparently weak, 
social leavening is inevitable. 

The leavening of society seems to follow certain fixed 
laws; relatively as fixed as those of the physical world. 
"Leaven, the primitive ferment, is simply a portion of 
moistened flour or dough in which the putrefactive agen- 
cies have begun to work. When brought in contact with 
a new portion of flour and water, and incorporated there- 
with by kneading, it very quickly acts as a ferment, and 
develops partial fermentation in the whole. Hence it 
is that where leaven is used it is customary to retain a 
portion of leavened dough for the next baking." So runs 
the old explanation of the use of leaven in bread-making. 
I have reproduced it here for two reasons : one to point 
out that when putrefactive agencies, which have begun to 
work, are brought in contact with the healthy mass and 
incorporated therewith they act quickly as a ferment; the 
other, that a portion of this new, partially fermented 
mass, when set aside, acts as the future leaven. It is per- 
haps not unnecessary to add that fermentation is the 
change which occurs in one organic substance when in- 
fluenced by another in a state of decay. 

The social order is fundamentally organic: both physi- 
cally and psychically subject to change. It is more than 
mere metaphor when we speak of social ferment; its 
processes are in many respects analogous to the action 
of ferments outlined. Every substance which putrefies 
becomes a ferment, and in this condition acquires the 
properties of setting a-going the processes of fermenta- 



INTRODUCTION 13 

tion. What are the forces of social fermentation? What 
are the integral ingredients of social leavening? To 
examine their characteristic manifestations, to test their 
dynamic potency, to discover what elements have been 
kneaded into social life and what elements have been 
set aside for future leavening will render more intel- 
ligible the hitherto occult processes of social development 
and historical evolution. 

The French Revolution eliminated theism from poli- 
tics, and though politico-theism survived in form for 
a prolonged period, its substance had been sapped, and 
the "grace of God" was no longer held to be a vital 
political asset. Politics, clad in its new juridic dress, 
shorn of Its theistic elements, rationalised, was to be- 
come the bearer of a new ideology — nationalism. 

We must here pause to consider the elements of this 
politico-juridic concept of the State. We must trace 
its course of development and final flowering in the 
Nation-State. 

I have hitherto sketched very briefly, with a few rough, 
broad strokes, the background of the historical changes 
which grew out of the Reformation. It now becomes 
necessary to inquire more minutely into the fundamental 
political principles which have influenced the growth 
of the new theories of State and of social organisation. 
We must at times retrace our steps, and go over the 
ground, using historical data not so much as guide as for 
illustration; drawing our conclusions synthetically, mak- 
ing use of theory and practice, which may serve to il- 
lumine our Inquiry. It is by following such method that 
we may hope to arrive at a constructive under- 
standing of the political history of our own times; 
neither confined to mere abstraction, nor subjected to 
too rigid and stilted empirical tests; neither disregard- 



14 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

ing the ideal side of politics, nor exaggerating its realist 
manifestations. Pursuing our inquiry in a philosophical 
mood, without perverting history, or distorting theory, 
we can reasonably expect to be in a position to formu- 
late conclusions which will approach nearest to truth 
as unfolded to us in our era. 

Truth is the keystone of the arch of history, based 
on the two supporting pillars of accuracy and veracity. 
Truth is composite : veracity is its ideal, accuracy its 
real element. To determine truthfully implies a harmo- 
nious union of the real and the ideal. It is by patient in- 
quiry, by slow-moving processes of investigation, by the 
refraction of the known factors Into their elements, as 
light Is refracted, and then by presenting the fruits of 
our research, as pictured objects seen through a stereo- 
scope possessing but two dimensions are seen not as 
plane representations, but as possessing solidity and re- 
lief, that we may hope to arrive at a true understand- 
ing of the trend of history. 



BOOK I 



CHAPTER I 

The Politico-Theistic Concept of the State 

MACHIAVELLI — BODIN ^THE PRECURSORS OF THE NEW POLITICO- 

JURIDIC MOVEMENT — LOCKE — ALTHUSIUS — GROTIUS 



WHILE the spiritual leaders of the Reformation 
were engaged upon the work of church reform, 
and by their active propaganda had brought about the 
overthrow of Papal supremacy, theories of State were 
being evolved upon which to build the new social struc- 
ture. The theory advanced by Machiavelli early in the 
1 6th century — influenced as he was by the anarchical 
condition of Italy so abhorrent to him, and familiar with 
the ways and means made use of so successfully by the 
Papacy to heighten the domination of theistic absolutism 
— vested in the Prince all authority in the State. His 
Prince was omnipotent and arbitrary, above all law, civil 
or canon. His State was non-moral; its head bound by 
no code. We see in this project the desire of its author 
to substitute not merely the authority of the State for that 
of the Church, but the omnipotence of the Prince for that 
of God. 

It was left for a Frenchman, Jean Bodin, to formulate 
logically and legitimatise the doctrines of Machiavelli. 
In his well-known treatise, Les Six livres de la Republique, 
published in 1576, Bodin, after discussing the theory and 
essence of sovereignty, postulated it as the source of all 

[17] 



i8 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

authority In the State, which he vested In the Prince, the 
vitalising factor and only real power In the State. He 
gave substance and form to the doctrine of absolutism, 
based on the admixture of political and theistic theories 
which he reconciled In a manner satisfactory to his times. 
It became the accepted basis upon which the governments 
of his day were modelled. 

Though the polltlco-thelstic concept of the State, as we 
would tersely denote the political theory underlying 
monarchical absolutism, which sanctioned the supreme 
authority of the Prince, was outwardly adhered to by 
the majority without question throughout the i6th and 
17th centuries, already In the minds of some this ill- 
defined and irresponsible basis of sovereign power ap- 
peared to be monstrous. It was soon perceived that, 
though the King might by analogy be endowed with the 
attributes of divinity, in reality he was able to enforce 
his will towards his subjects only by threats of punish- 
ment, and that In his relations with other sovereigns he 
was powerless unless he had recourse to the use of armed 
force. 

In this dilemma men sought for another basis of 
sovereignty consistent with the rapid spread of liberal 
views concerning the value and dignity of man. It Is of 
interest to note that this new thesis was first formulated 
by a Dutchman at a time when the Dutch Provinces were 
still struggling for their independence against Spain, and 
stoutly maintained their adherence to the religious tenets 
of the Reformation. 

The theory of State advanced by Althuslus in his 
Politica Issued in 1603, for the first time set forth that 
sovereignty Is an attribute, not merely of the Prince, but 
of the State as a whole, which is held to be an indivisible 
unit made up of Prince and people. Furthermore 
Althuslus maintained that the State is endowed with dis- 



POLITICO-THEISTIC CONCEPT OF THE STATE 19 

tlnct moral attributes, and subject to moral law. Grotius, 
his younger contemporary, expanded this idea, and out- 
lined a code which was to regulate the intercourse of 
States, both in peace and war, by the enforcement of 
certain rules of conduct, which, he maintained, States 
would willingly accept as binding. It was but a step 
forward when the first professor of what has since come 
to be known as International Law, Pufendorf, taught at 
the University of Heidelberg, during the closing years 
of the 17th century, that the State was possessed of 
ethical characteristics, similar to those of an high-minded 
individual who recognised his moral responsibility, and 
that under given circumstances, the State could be ex- 
pected to act, and would act, just as an honorable man 
would act. 

At about the same time Locke, in his Treatise on Civil 
Government (1689), propounded the opinion that the 
authority of the State rested primarily on the consent of 
the governed. The State, according to Locke, is not the 
arbitrary creation of some supreme authority, but an 
evolution arising out of the social needs of man, which 
require not merely the establishment of fixed rules, but 
that these rules or laws should be administered uni- 
formly by an authority which men would willingly con- 
sent to recognise. 

The State created in the image of God, the politico- 
theistic State, had led to the abuses of absolutism; the 
State fashioned in the image of man, the politico-juridic 
State, as the new theory may be called, was the doctrine 
which was to gain authority and acceptance. 

We have thus traced in brief outline the early phases 
of the transition from the politico-theistic to the politico- 
juridic concept. The close correlation between the de- 
cay of the theistic concept of the State and the rise of 



26 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

the juridic could be emphasised at great length. It 
suffices, however, to note that the growth had been logi- 
cal, and followed the trend of spiritual speculation, lag- 
ging behind the more bold emancipators of the Church, 
but destined, when the fresh earnestness of the religious 
reformation had so rapidly spent itself, to usurp the field 
and make what appeared to be unprecedented progress. 
In order to arrive at a rational understanding of this 
progress, and gain a proper insight into political organi- 
sation in our own times, it is essential to point out that 
the thesis of the unity of the national State, in its ac- 
cepted form, is a result of an analogy, which was drawn 
by a few 17th century thinkers, between the body politic 
— the State — and that of man. This analogy, at first 
tentatively presented, was seized upon a century later, 
posited as fundamental, and led to the rampant indi- 
vidualism and its correlative, nationalism, of the 19th 
century. 



II 

It is characteristic of the human mind to seek to ex- 
plain by analogy. In order to make an explanation lucid 
it is the practice to choose such subjects which, whether 
they fit exactly or not, can by the consonance of sound, 
phrase, and image, and the skilful use of emphasis, be 
rendered acceptable. An analogy in the first instance 
implies nothing more than partial agreement between 
things in other respects different. But, as some defini- 
tion is essential to arrive at understanding, it is not 
difficult to perceive that in endeavoring to set forth the 
characteristics of so intangible a concept as the State, 
the most broad and simple analogy should be pressed 
into service. 



POLITICO-THEISTIC CONCEPT OF THE STATE 2t 

In setting up the theistic concept of the State and es- 
tablishing its absolutist principles, Machiavelli, Bodin, 
and Hobbes had dealt with analogies altogether compre- 
hensible at the time. To understand clearly the coher- 
ence of the doctrines they set forth, a glance at the 
social organisation of the Middle Ages is necessary. 

During the mediaeval period the State was looked upon 
as an organisation of laymen altogether beneath the 
Church. "The basest and most corrupt clerk, in virtue 
of his order, stands high above the most eminent and 
virtuous layman, as gold Is above iron, or spirit above 
the body." ^ Secular laws were not binding on the clergy. 
The priesthood had the right to inquire into their validity, 
and to determine in how far they saw fit to submit vol- 
untarily to the jurisdiction of these laws. The ques- 
tion of the obedience of the clergy to the legal restric- 
tions established by secular authority was never raised. 
Whenever the Interests of the clergy were Infringed 
upon, whenever It appeared as though the privileges 
or Immunities of the Church were about to be threat- 
ened, the clergy categorically refused to recognise any su- 
perior authority and disregarded, unmolested, all secular 
enactments. While refusing to submit to any restraints 
Imposed by lay authority, the Church claimed implicit 
obedience to its edicts. As a natural consequence canon 
law was placed above civil law, and the right of secular 
courts to Intervene, even in criminal matters In which 
the interests of the Church or Its ministrants were con- 
cerned, was denied. Paying no taxes, exempt from bear- 
ing arms, the clergy insisted on levying heavy contri- 
butions for the support of their establishments, and re- 
quired the secular authorities to lend armed assistance 
for the maintenance of the prestige, power, and author- 

^J. K. Bluntschli, The Theory of the State (authorised English trans- 
lation), p. 125. 



22 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

ity of the Church, which in turn was accountable only 
to God.i 

God, the sublime and absolute, was an active partici- 
pant in the everyday life of the times, whose indulgences 
were peddled from door to door, whose penalties were 
suffered, and blessings praised. The omnipotence and 
omnipresence of God in secular as well as spiritual life 
were universally acknowledged. There was a constant 
intercourse between man and the Almighty, familiar and 
direct through the medium of the clergy; though the 
chasm which separated man from his God, a chasm which 
only the clergy might bridge, was insistently em- 
phasised. 

But soon the priesthood, no longer content with their 
purely spiritual dominion, under the pressure of increas- 
ing secular influence and nascent political consciousness, 
began to take an active part in worldly affairs. The Pope 
acquired the sovereignty of the territory immediately 
adjoining Rome, and by degrees increased the Patrimony 
of St. Peter. By wars, alliances, and intrigues, suc- 
cessive Popes throughout the 15th century and the early 
years of the i6th extended their possessions and played 
a chief role in the countless struggles which racked Italy. 
In Germany ecclesiastical princes received extensive do- 
mains and territorial sovereignty, and it was not long 
before the clergy became a separate, privileged political 
order in the new politico-social organisation throughout 
Western Europe. Thus the Church still combined spirit- 

^The bull Unam Sanctam of Boniface VIII (1302) sets this forth very 
clearly: "The Church possesses two swords, the spiritual and the tem- 
poral — one for its own use, the other to be employed in its service by 
the kings and warriors of the earth. The spiritual power as much sur- 
passes in dignity and nobility every terrestrial power, as things spiritual 
excel things temporal ; the spiritual power has the right to judge the 
temporal power, but the spiritual, at least in its highest expression 
which is the Pope, can be judged only by God." 



POLITICO-THEISTIC CONCEPT OF THE STATE 23 

ual and temporal authority, though now in distinctly 
separate spheres. We may trace the close connection 
between the assumption of secular dignities and honors 
by the clergy and the loss of their mediaeval immunities. 
Their immiscence in secular affairs served to undermine 
their spiritual authority, and brought out clearly the 
corrupt practices which were to prove the outwardly 
manifest causes of the Reformation. 

As we have seen, Machiavelli and his followers, in 
their eagerness to find a firm basis for the authority of 
the Prince in the newly created State emancipated from 
church control, laid hold upon so natural an analogy 
as the supreme authority of God. Here we have the 
genesis of the politico-theistic system : the State in the 
image of God — not the spiritual Godhead, worshipped 
by millions of devout persons with sincerity, but the God 
of whom an Alexander VI or a Julius II were typical 
representatives. 

It is but a further example of this use of analogy 
in an effort to arrive at an understanding of the true 
nature of the State that when, as has already been pointed 
out, the active participation of God in worldly affairs 
was no longer given credence, when the Deity was rel- 
egated to a purely spiritual realm, when men came to 
take cognisance of their own strength, in their desire 
to outline a new and more satisfactory concept of the 
State, they should have looked to man. Man it was 
claimed is ruled by laws, is amenable to justice, has a 
moral sense, has his family, his relations, his friends, and, 
above all, his interests, his property. Man's whole life 
is made up of a series of compacts and contracts which 
to be valid without continuous warfare must have the 
sanction of a legal code. Thus man in society is a juridic 
animal bound by laws which make possible the smooth 



24 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

working of social relations and prevent anarchy. It ap- 
peared a very rational use of analogy to present the State 
as patterned after the image of man. It seemed so self- 
evident that it immediately gained axiomatic acceptance 
among the more liberal-minded, throughout the West- 
ern World, and became the basis of all of the new 
theories of State. It thus becomes necessary for us to 
enter into a closer examination of this analogy; to trace 
its growth, its spread, perversion, and decay, as a useful 
theory of social relations. 



CHAPTER II 

The Genesis of Constitutional Government 

THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE STATE — THE ROLE OF ENGLAND 

— THE DECLARATION AND BILL OF RIGHT — INFLUENCE 

OF THE MIDDLE CLASS SPREAD OF LIBERALISM 



THE politico-juridic concept of the State which en- 
dowed it with moral responsibihty was a distinct 
cultural advance. Under the older politico-theistic doc- 
trine the question of the government of the State was 
rarely if ever broached. The State as an entity inde- 
pendent of its sovereign was not conceived of, as the 
complete fusion of these two elements was the basis of 
that doctrine of Statehood. When, however, the thesis 
was presented that the State was in reality to be held the 
projection of the personality of the individual, and the 
action of the State manifestations of its will as an inde- 
pendent moral organism, the question arose how this will 
should be controlled; in short how the State was to be 
governed. 

The political theorists of the 17th century found no 
difficulty in devising programmes of government and 
probing into the essence of Statehood. Man Is moral, 
therefore the State created in the image of man, by man, 
for men, must be a moral organism. A compact is bind- 
ing, a contract valid between two men, therefore not 
only contracts between the governed and the govern- 

[25] 



26 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

ing must be binding, but compacts between States must 
be valid. 

It would be difficult to outline with any degree of ex- 
actness the limits of the moral responsibility of the 
State. Morality as such eludes precise definition. Its 
categories embrace all higher human aspirations or what 
may better be called sentiments. The transfer by analogy 
of the moral attributes of civilised man to civ- 
ilised States raised questions which admitted of no sat- 
isfactory solution. It was an insufficient explanation 
to declare that the State was bound by certain implicit 
obligations to limit its action, or to assert that, as the 
primary natural object of the State was to provide a 
form of government to enforce law and order, the State 
— in itself a component of law and order — was func- 
tionally moral. It is difficult to perceive how such a 
sophistical explanation should have been deemed ade- 
quate, the more so as at the same time it was as- 
serted that the State, being sovereign and independent, 
recognising no superior authority, bending to no law, 
amenable to no court, was responsible only to itself. 

There is here a striking similarity of argument with 
that implied in the attitude of the clergy during the 
Middle Ages to insure their exemption from secular con- 
trol. The social chaos which eventually resulted from 
this duality failed to serve as a warning to the framers 
of the new theories of State. 

It was soon found that whereas the State, still uncon- 
scious of its national strength, might in its international 
relations be left to rely on a system of moral responsi- 
bilities in so far as its internal government was con- 
cerned, a labyrinth had been entered upon in the at- 
tempt to formulate a workable code applicable to the 



GENESIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 27 

growing complexity and vigor of political life. The 
rationalists of the i8th century sought a more satisfac- 
tory formula. By glossing over the moral attributes of 
the State, they fixed on the analogy between government 
and the constitution of man, which met with ready 
acceptance. 

Constitutional government, the fine fruit of modern 
political theory, the basic manifestation of the politico- 
juridic organisation of the State, was a tangible analogy. 
The constitution of man implies in the first instance his 
health, manly vigor, possibilities of development. It 
implies inheritance from the past, source of activity in 
the present, promise of increase in the future. It implies 
birth, growth, vigor, decay, carried on through succeed- 
ing generations. It is the organic basis of mankind. 
So the constitution of the State became by analogy the 
organic law, the fundamental principle upon which the 
new political system was built. 

The establishment of constitutional government ^ 
marks the enthronement of the politico-juridic theory of 
State. To be sure, Montesquieu, who labored so in- 
defatigably to define and illustrate the juridic basis of 
society as expressed in constitutional government, goes 
so far as to point out that the first beginnings of con- 
stitutional monarchy are to be found as reported by 
Tacitus, among the ancient German tribes : Ce beau 

* "The fundamental defect of the policy of antiquity," Mommsen tells 
us, "was that it never fully advanced from the urban form of constitu- 
tion to that of a state or, which is the same thing, from a system of 
primary assemblies to a parliamentary system. The sovereign assembly 
of Rome was what Congress would be if, instead of sending representa- 
tives, all the electors should meet in a Parliament; a body neither able 
to take a comprehensive view nor form a resolution; a body which, 
save in a few cases, a couple of hundred or thousand individuals acci- 
dentally picked up from the streets of the capital, acted and voted in the 
name of the burgesses." — History of Rome, Vol. Ill, p. 332. 



28 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

systeme a ete trouve dans les hois.^ Bluntschli, writing 
a century later concerning the rise of constitutional mon- 
archy, which he held to be the final and perfect form 
of government, declare: "It is the end of a history 
of more than a thousand years, the completion of the 
Romano-Germanic political life, the true political civi- 
lisation of Europe," ^ There is much truth in both these 
assertions, were we to confine ourselves to an inquiry 
into the evolutionary forms and stages of constitutional 
government. Nevertheless, we can with precision fix 
on the historical event which marks the establishment 
of constitutional government as a working political 
principle. 

The Revolution of 1688, which resulted in the calling 
of William and Mary to the throne of England, was the 
outcome of the desire to put into practice this constitu- 
tional principle which was henceforth to become the 
guiding precept of government. The Declaration and 
Bill of Right was drawn up so as to secure the "liberties 
of the nation." It was a man-made document, and 
affirmed that man is the supreme arbiter. It rejected 
the concept of the divine right of kings, patterned the 
monarchy on the constitutional basis, as sanctioned by 
man-made laws, and recognised in Parliament the su- 
preme authority, the expression of the ultimate will of 
the people. Monarchy was shorn of its vested priv- 
ileges. The power of suspending, or dispensing with, 
law by regal authority was declared illegal, as was the 
levying of money for the use of the Crown by preroga- 
tive without grant of Parliament, and the raising and 

* De I'Esprit des Lois, Book XI, Chap. VI. In the next paragraph 
Montesquieu pointedly adds: "As all human things have an end, the 
state we are speaking of will lose its liberty, will perish. Have not 
Rome, Sparta, and Carthage perished? It will perish when the legisla- 
tive power shall be more corrupt than the executive." 

*0p. cit., Chap. XIV, p. 396, 



GENESIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 29 

keeping of a standing army in time of peace, except with 
its consent. Parliament further asserted its right to 
grant taxes, regulate the royal household, control the 
executive authority, secure free speech and freedom of 
the press. These are the principal provisions of this 
epoch-making document. The Lords and Commons 
thereupon resolved that William and Mary should be 
King and Queen of England for their joint and separate 
lives. 

We cannot fail to recognise the jubilant satisfaction 
with which this great experiment, the putting into opera- 
tion of this new theory of State, must have been greeted. 
Men for the first time had deliberately created the 
State in their own image. They took fresh courage in 
their achievement. It opened what appeared to be the 
smooth path of indefinite development; it broadened and 
made plausible the arguments of legality; it widened 
and prepared the way for the emancipation of man- 
kind from political oppression, and broke the last re- 
maining shackles which held science enslaved. Man 
seemed to hold firmly in his hands the chart of his destiny. 
He dared examine it in the light of his own experience, 
test his conclusions by practical experimentation, satisfy 
himself of the tangible reality of his achievement. His 
reason guiding his strength had created the State, en- 
dowed its government with individuality and personality, 
stamped it as his own. 



II 

It was particularly fortunate that in Locke, England 
should have found a man able to express in lucid lan- 
guage the basis upon which this new political ideology 



30 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

was founded. According to his doctrine, government is 
not primarily a contract entered into between the gov- 
erned and the governing, for the protection of inter- 
ests, but a contract made for the protection of rights. 
Man, according to Locke, is by nature endowed with 
certain rights : the right to live, the right to work, the 
right to enjoy in peace the fruits of his labor. Before 
governments were established each man had to defend 
these rights as best he could, and as so much time was 
taken up with their defence little was left to provide 
a more ample store than for his immediate needs. Con- 
ceiving that, by the establishment of some organisation 
which would provide for this defence, man would have 
more time to devote to the useful tasks of production, 
he promised to obey the government established as long 
as this government in return protected his inherent rights, 
but no longer. Man in society does not surrender any 
of his inherent rights, but confers on the government 
the sanction of authority similar to that which he had 
availed himself of in protecting his own rights. This 
authority is expressed in the constitution, which is the 
source of the legality of government. When the con- 
stitution is violated, men have the fundamental right 
to overthrow a government which purports to continue 
without their sanction, and establish a new government 
conforming to their needs. In other words, the govern- 
ment of the State rests on the consent of the gov- 
erned. Locke did not have in mind a written constitu- 
tion, but rather a verbal agreement. The propositions 
set forth in the Declaration of Right embody the tenets 
upon which such a constitutional government was to rest. 
The Magna Carta (1215) had sought to establish 
the supremacy of the aristocracy over the King. The 
Declaration of Right proved that the sanction of con- 



GENESIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 31 

stituted authority was now vested in the Middle Class. 
The Magna Carta had been exacted of the sovereign 
by a powerful coterie of barons. The Declaration of 
Right was the work of the Commons, who conferred 
some of the attributes of sovereignty upon the prince 
whom they had selected, retaining the full power in their 
own hands. 

Constitutional government in England was the crea- 
tion of the dominantly puritanical Middle Class, ^ which 
had risen to power in the wake of a decaying aristocracy 
— a Middle Class, whose character had been hardened 
by a long series of civil wars and religious disturbances. 
It was made up of men who, in a single generation, had 
executed a king and raised a commoner to sovereign 
power, and in a reactionary moment had recalled to the 
throne a dissolute prince of the dynasty they had so 
dramatically deposed. They had tolerated his excesses, 
and finally in exasperation at the infringements of his 
successor, James II, upon the established rights of Par- 
liament, had driven out the latter, and called in a prince 
from the Low Countries to be their sovereign. Such 
men were not in a mood to be influenced by irrational or 
extremist theories of State. Their principal concern was 
to establish a form of government planted on the solid 
foundation of toleration and moderation. It was the 
work of stern men, whose political zeal had In It all 
the elements of a religious fervor. Men, many of whom 
had fought in the field for their religious convictions, 
had defied the established Church and their king, and 

*The term Middle Class when applied to England does not mean the 
same thing as the bourgeoisie as it is known on the Continent. In the 
first instance the Commons were made up of representatives of the lower 
nobility and of the municipalities. It was not until the early years of 
the 19th century that the term "Middle Class" in England can be con- 
sidered to correspond more or less accurately with the continental 
bourgeoisie. 



32 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

won a twofold battle, of religious toleration and political 
freedom. As Lord Morley has observed:^ "Passion 
and logic are the two great working elements of revolu- 
tionary change." The passion had burned itself out 
during the innumerable disturbances of the half century 
preceding the establishment of constitutional government. 
Cold, calculating logic — in so far as an assembly of men 
may be said to act logically — seems to have inspired the 
framing of the new principles of government. 

Modern constitutional government as first established 
in England was tempered by the fires of Puritanism. Its 
founders were guided by an intense realism, a materialist 
insight Into what they conceived to be their rights. The 
form of government they wished to establish and did 
establish secured the recognition of the principle of 
representation as the basis of all authority in the State. 
This new theory of State was tolerant rather than lib- 
eral. It recognised the importance of man-made laws, 
but the tendency was soon manifest in Parliament to 
arrogate to itself many of the arbitrary powers formerly 
exercised under absolutism. Parliament made it plain 
that it would tolerate no check nor hindrance to its au- 
thority. It asserted for itself the right to change the 
constitution, alter the succession to the throne, confined 
"neither for persons or causes within any bounds." ^ 

^ Life of Oliver Cromivell, p. 48. 

^As Blackstone has commented: "It (Parliament) hath sovereign and 
uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, 
abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning mat- 
ters of all possible denominations: ecclesiastical or temporal; civil, mili- 
tary, maritime, or criminal; this being the place where that absolute 
despotic power which must, in all governments, reside somewhere, is 
intrusted by the Constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and 
grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course 
of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. . . . 
It can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible to be 
done; and, therefore, some have not scrupled to call its power, by a 
figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament." 



GENESIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 33 

These factors must be borne constantly in mind in con- 
sidering the subsequent development of the constitutional 
system. 

The creators of representative government desired not 
merely to safeguard the liberties, but to affirm the priv- 
ileges and prerogatives of the Commons, the growing 
Middle Class. Their successors were intent on the one 
hand in extending the sway of parliamentary control as 
exemplified by the Act of Union with Scotland (1707), 
which brought that realm under the direct government 
of Westminster, and on the other in promoting peace 
and affording an opportunity for the development of their 
material wellbeing. They paid little heed to such novel 
theories as the "Rights of Man," the ''Sovereignty of 
the People," or to the more liberal equalitarian political 
ideology which was rapidly growing up throughout con- 
tinental Europe, 

This liberal movement manifested itself markedly to- 
wards the second half of the i8th century. From Eng- 
land the example of the practical working of constitu- 
tional government had spread and inspired not merely 
political philosophers but statesmen and princes, to accept 
with enthusiasm various programmes and theories of po- 
litical reformation, "There was scarcely a throne in 
Europe which was not filled by a liberal and reforming 
king, a liberal and reforming emperor, or, strangest of 
all, a liberal and reforming Pope; the age of Frederick 
the Great, of Catherine II, of Joseph II, of Peter Leo- 
pold, of Benedict XIV, of Ganganelli, of Pombal, of 
Aranda; when the very Bourbons of Naples were lib- 
erals and reformers." ^ 

If we were to seek for the cause of this phenomenon 
we would find it in the ever-widening interest in political 

^J. S. Mill, Representative Government, Chap. I. 



34 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

affairs which had seized hold of mankind. The minds of 
men were in a ferment, intoxicated by their own newly 
revealed strength. It was the dawn of political enlight- 
enment when the rising sun of political freedom illumined 
not only statesmen and philosophers, but even absolute 
sovereigns, who participated eagerly in furthering the 
new theories, unaware of the anomaly of their position. 
The liberalism which could arouse the enthusiasm of a 
Frederick the Great or a Catherine II was no doubt 
purely philosophical; yet the new ideas of political free- 
dom, of progress, of equality and humanity ushered in in 
the wake of representative government, were spread- 
ing resistlessly. 



CHAPTER III 
The Rise of Public Opinion 

FRANCE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY — HUMANITY — LIBERTY 
PROGRESS — ^MONTESQUIEU TURCOT — CONDORCET — ^ROUSSEAU 



THROUGHOUT the 17th centuiy, while in England 
Parliament was engaged in its successful struggle 
against the Crown, on the Continent absolutism still 
held undisputed sway. In France the State, guided by 
men of genius, served by soldiers and administrators of 
superior ability, exalted by poets and philosophers of rare 
talent, had under Louis XIV produced the most brilliant 
civilisation of modern times. The example of the French 
King was imitated throughout Europe. In England, 
when James II had wished to follow the general trend, 
it had led to his overthrow; while the petty princes of 
Germany were ruining themselves in their desire to fol- 
low the lead of the Great King. 

It was not until the Regency (17 15-1723) that a more 
liberal spirit began to make itself felt in France. Its 
first manifestation is to be noted in the gradual rise 
of what has since become known as "public opinion." 
This new social force was an outgrowth of the empirical 
temper which had come into the affairs of men upon 
the establishment of constitutional government in Eng- 
land. We no longer find merely factional interests, or 
opinion dominated by the sovereign, but a public opin- 

I35J 



36 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

ion on matters of general and social interest which re- 
flected and expressed the thought of the general mind, 
as constitutional government in England, it was believed, 
expressed its rights. As the latter was representative 
government, so the former was representative opinion. 
An acute student of the philosophy of history has re- 
marked that it is a mistake to suppose that the French 
philosophers produced the spirit which caused the Rev- 
olution; they were its products, its propagators. Already 
early in the i8th century a public opinion had grown up 
which reflected and expressed the general mind, and 
became the most potent factor in national life. "It dis- 
turbed the judgment, arrested the will, unnerved the 
arm of the ruler; rendered every speaker or writer 
formidable, and the collective influence of the intelligent 
and literary portion of society enormous. Never was 
the connection between philosophy and public opinion 
closer. The latter dominated, and made the former its 
handmaid." ^ 

The philosophy of the i8th century was essentially 
empirical and rational; it despised metaphysical niceties, 
and was bent on expressing cogently the confused opin- 
ions nascent in the general mind. Its philosophers were 
eager to proselyte, and found ready to hand enthusiastic 
disciples willing to undertake to reform society, and suf- 
fer martyrdom in its behalf. They believed in progress, 
justice, toleration, liberty, fraternity, the sovereignty 
of the people, the rights of man, and humanity, not 
merely abstractly, but concretely as concepts which were 
to be realised in the immediate future by the introduc- 
tion of political reforms. These were the topics which 
public opinion had seized upon. These were the doc- 

* Cf. Robert Flint, History of the Philosophy of History in France, p. 240 
et seq. 



THE RISE OF PUBLIC OPINION 37 

trines which the rationalist philosophers preached to a 
docile multitude. They reflected the opinions, voiced 
forcibly the arguments which had received the sanction 
of public opinion. In order to understand the real sig- 
nificance of the fervid enthusiasm of the epoch, to gain 
an insight into the causes of the energy displayed by 
political agitators, and the Influence of doctrinaire 
philosophers, who were able to stir the minds of men 
to such depths that on the one hand peers like Lafayette 
and Rochambeau were Induced to undertake the task of 
helping to free the American Colonies, and to establish 
a democratic government based on the theories of a 
Montesquieu, and on the other to account for the fa- 
natical excesses of the French Revolution, It is essential 
to Inquire briefly into the elements of which this public 
opinion was composed. 



II 

Since the earliest times there have been certain funda- 
mental concepts such as humanity, liberty, unity, which 
are words used to express the desire of men to grasp 
at and secure for themselves the permanent benefits 
of social wellbeing. Every epoch in history has con- 
tributed its share in building up this ideology, which 
forms the groundwork of our social structure, and bounds 
social life. 

The basic concept which has been held firmly by suc- 
ceeding generations of men, with varying degrees of 
emphasis. Is that the foundation of society is humanity. 
Humanity implies unity of all human beings; the belief 
that a bond of mutual relationship unites mankind. It 
Is expressed In the doctrine of brotherly love of Christ, 



38 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

as it was taught by Mlh-Telh ^ in China five centuries 
before the Christian era. 

In remote antiquity, in spite of the difficulty of com- 
munications and the fact that only a relatively limited 
category of individuals were held to be free men, the 
advantages and desirability of intercourse between the 
different races and peoples appear to have been rec- 
ognised, and the unity of mankind may reasonably be 
supposed to have been understood, if not expressed. This 
would appear to be proved negatively by the pains taken 
by the Brahmins to deny the truth of the unity of man- 
kind and establish the caste system. Buddhism, the 
natural reaction against the perversions of this system, 
taught a doctrine of charity embracing every living crea- 
ture. In Persia under the Great Kings, and in the 
Empire established by Alexander, we find the first actual 
attempt* made to realise a form of political unity under 
the sceptre of a single sovereign. 

Few traces of a feeling of humanity, or even of a more 
limited notion thereof such as national unity, are to be 
met with in Greece. During the days of its greatness 
the prejudice against the foreigner persisted. It was 
shared by Plato and Aristotle. Whatever tendencies to- 
wards national union may have existed were based, not 
on elements directly political, but on games and art. 
"The contests at Olympia, the poems of Homer, the 
tragedies of Euripides were the only bonds that held 
Hellas together." 

It was not until after the disintegration of the empire 
of Alexander and the subjugation of Greece by Rome, 

^ Cf. James Legge, The Chinese Classics — The Opinions of Mih-Teih: 
"It is the business of the sages to effect the good government of the 
empire. They must examine therefore into the cause of disorder and 
when they do so they will find that it arises from the want of mutual 
love." — Vol. II, p. 104. 



THE RISE OF PUBLIC OPINION 39 

that the idea of universal citizenship came to be rec- 
ognised. The sense of the brotherhood of man which 
arose at this time was the result of despondency and 
disillusion, rather than of a hopeful, optimistic attitude. 
"The Greek ideal of unity was essentially negative, 
abstract, empty, unreal. Men took refuge in the thought 
of being citizens of the world because actual citizenship 
had everywhere lost its dignity." ^ 

The Romans by the surrender of their individuality 
and of their personality gained a feeling of love of coun- 
try and patriotism unknown to the Greeks. Nevertheless, 
in spite of the conquests of Roman arms, the unification 
of the known world under Roman laws, and the extension 
of Roman citizenship even beyond the confines of Italy, 
there is no evidence which would Induce us to conclude 
that the Romans even during the late Empire possessed 
a deep feeling of the solidarity or of the fundamental 
unity of mankind. To be sure, the Stoics had taught that 
all men must be regarded as members of one great com- 
munity who have need of each other, but there was no 
wide application of this point of view which may be held 
to have been of practical significance. 

When Alexandria became the moral capital of the 
Empire, the more rigorous, brutal, and commonplace 
utilitarianism ^ of the Romans was moderated by the in- 
fluence of the teachings of Hellenistic philosophy, more 

'Cf. Flint, op. cit. 

* "Every nation of antiquity which attained internal unity strove either 
directly to subdue its neighbors as did the Hellenic States, or at least 
render them innocuous as did Rome. . . . The policy of . ome vas not 
projected by a single mighty intellect and bequeathed traditionally from 
generation to generation; it was the policy of a very able, but somewhat 
narrow-minded deliberative assembly, which had far too little power 
for grand combination, and far too much of a right instinct for the 
preservation of its own commonwealth, to devise projects in the spirit 
of a Caesar, or a Napoleon." — Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. II, pp. 
521-522. 



40 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

especially by Neo-Platonism, which combined the ration- 
alism of the Greek with the mysticism of the Egyptian 
mind, a blending of Platonic ideals with the teachings 
of Oriental philosophies, in an effort to erect a more 
satisfying religious system. Neo-Platonism taught a 
striving after unity, intellectually understood, a mode of 
thought rather than of feeling, and as a result was un- 
able to cope with the overpowering, emotional appeal 
of Christianity. The teachings of Christ emphasised the 
Stoic doctrine of universal brotherhood, though they also 
took into account the eclecticism of the Greeks, and the 
feeling of awe borrowed from the Oriental cults which 
had become familiar to the Western World, Christianity 
owed its success in a great measure to the fact that it 
was the happy fusion of all that was vital and viable 
in the Italo-Greek philosophic systems which had sur- 
vived. Like all truly profound religions, it concerned 
itself more with "modes of feeling than modes of 
thought." This assured for it final triumph, and kept 
alive and gave renewed vigor to the concept of humanity. 
After the official acknowledgment of Christianity by 
the Empire the idea of the unity of mankind was again 
vaguely apprehended. The barbarian invasions checked 
its growth, and introduced the new and aggressively rest- 
less elements of freedom and self-reliance : of diversity. 
Even after having embraced Christianity, the barbarian 
invaders tenaciously defended their national indepen- 
dence. The separation of the Church and State, which 
grew gradually, was only effected after a prolonged 
struggle between the Pope and Emperor. The Church 
gained a spiritual ascendancy which had in it elements 
of unity, while the world ruled over by the Emperor 
was composed of a heterogeneous number of states which 
only paid a nominal allegiance to him as their overlord, 



THE RISE OF PUBLIC OPINION 41 

and were to all Intents and purposes independent. The 
establishment of feudalism seemed to prove conclusively 
that the barbarian concept of diversity, the Germanic 
Ideals of self-dependence and self-determination, had tri- 
umphed over the Christian ideal of world unity. 

It was not until the close of the nth century that we 
find a fresh reawakening of the idea of humanity. The 
Crusades which continued through two centuries (1091- 
1295) brought the peoples of continental Europe in 
contact with each other; united priest and peasant, lord 
and serf in a common enterprise, and taught men to look 
beyond the narrow boundaries of their own interests, 
and give their lives for an ideal. 

The subsequent development of the concept of human- 
ity down to our own times has been slow, but continu- 
ous. It was first cogently set forth during the Renais- 
sance, when the ideal of classical antiquity, of a World 
State, was grafted upon the concept of the Church Um- 
versal. The period of industrial and commercial expan- 
sion, the discovery of the New World, the opening up 
of new trade routes to the East, the invention of print- 
ing, the growth of political consciousness and social sol- 
idarity, contributed to strengthen and diffuse the feeling 
that all men are members of a common family. Though 
arrested in its growth, and held in abeyance at vari- 
ous periods, during the i8th century the Idea of hu- 
manity, conceived as a broad cosmopolitanism, became 
the rational goal towards which, it was believed, man- 
kind was striving. 

Liberty has been an object of man's ceaseless preoccu- 
pation. Since the dawn of history, liberty in its various 
modes and interpretations has been recognised as the 
mainspring of moral, political, and social life, though the 
methods used to attain it and the value attached to its 



42 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

benefits have varied greatly during succeeding epochs. 
It would lead too far afield to outline even in meagre 
form the ideological transitions of the concept of liberty 
which are so intimately bound up with the nature of 
man. It may be sufficient to note that the idea of lib- 
erty has never been entirely lost sight of, and the ideals 
of political liberty have always been rekindled when- 
ever civilised mankind has allowed itself to sink to 
a level of servitude. Political history is a record of 
the striving of men to secure the liberty to express not 
merely their judgment, but their will; to safeguard their 
private interests, and insure their public welfare. Ex- 
pressed in terms of liberty, equality, and fraternity, this 
new interpretation of the concept of humanity during the 
latter half of the i8th century came to dominate the 
general mind, and found its fullest expression and its 
deepest inspiration in the concept of perfectibility, in 
progress, as the motive-force of society. 



Ill 

The contribution of the Middle Class to political 
philosophy and social theory may be summed up in the 
word "progress." Though in our times progress is so 
often taken for granted, it is not generally recalled that 
it has only very recently come to be held a fundamental 
ideal of mankind. Yet when we look through the pages 
of world history down to the most recent times, or ex- 
amine the philosophy and modes of thinking of Oriental 
peoples, we will find that progress was either unknown, 
discounted, or emphatically denied. 

During classical antiquity the idea of progress played 



THE RISE OF PUBLIC OPINION 43 

no part, either in speculative philosophy or in practical 
life. On the contrary, its opposite, regress, was accepted 
as the fundamental law of life. A careful search through- 
out the writings of Greek and Roman philosophers and 
historians fails to reveal any passages which would in- 
dicate that progress was held to be an idea either of 
value or importance, or that perfectibility, which is im- 
plied in progress, was entertained. Empedocles makes 
an obscure reference to it, and Cicero alludes in pass- 
ing to philosophy as progressive, but there are no in- 
dications that progress in itself was deemed of sig- 
nificance. The Roman world in general subscribed to 
Seneca's belief In the inevitable corruption and decay of 
humanity. 

While Christianity developed the ideal of hope and 
expectation, which had been borrowed from the Jews, 
it contributed very little to the belief that progress was 
possible by man's own efforts. On the contrary, the 
Church discouraged every attempt which may have been 
made by man to apply to secular affairs the doctrine 
of man's capacity of perfection by grace. 

It was not until the 13th century that we discover any 
traces of the conviction that development and growth 
are inherent In all living phenomena, and that history 
might afford a proof of progress. Roger Bacon (1214- 
1294) made a tentative effort to demonstrate the plausi- 
bility of progress In the life of man. He stands forth 
alone during this period as pointing the way to Intel- 
lectual emancipation by experimental Inquiry, which lent 
an atmosphere of progressiveness to his speculations 
rather than that he may be believed to have considered 
progress as an end in itself. However, the idea aroused 
little interest. More than three centuries were to elapse 
before Bodin, Francis Bacon, Descartes, and Pascal 



44 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

indirectly called attention to the idea of progress as 
a guiding principle in seeking solutions for the difficult 
problems which were harassing the minds of men. 

Bodin (1530-1596) was the first to point to the prog- 
ress made in science which had revolutionised man's re- 
lation to the universe. The mariner's compass, the inven- 
tion of gunpowder, the discoveries in astronomy, he main- 
tained, far surpassed the achievements of the peoples 
of classical antiquity and indicated the progressive tend- 
ency of the human mind. But he failed to draw there- 
from the conclusion that in the future similar improve- 
ment would in all probability take place. Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626) sought the increase of the "happiness of 
mankind" in the progress of science. He, also, con- 
demned the ancients for not "assisting mankind" to im- 
prove its status, and presented the thesis that the classical 
world was not in reality the ancient world, but must be 
held the youth of the world, which in his day was ap- 
proaching old age, and therefore the world of his day 
was, he maintained, far wiser, and its teachings far more 
worthy of credence than those of antiquity. Though he 
entertained the idea that there might be improvement, 
progress as an end in itself was apparently never actually 
considered by Bacon. He was interested in the material 
wellbeing of man, and believed that the sole object of 
science was to assist in securing and increasing the store 
of this wellbeing. He prepared the soil in which the 
seed of progress was soon to be planted. 

Descartes (1596-1650) had imbibed Baconian wis- 
dom and completed the breakdown of the influence of an- 
tiquity which held man a slave to old outworn ideas, em- 
barrassed his philosophical speculations, and arrested his 
scientific initiative. At the time when rationalism as a 
philosophical doctrine was growing vigorously, soon to 



THE RISE OF PUBLIC OPINION 45 

burst forth, Descartes broke definitely with the past, and 
sought to build from the ground up a new philosophical 
and scientific system, the foundations of which were 
reason and the invariability of the laws of nature. It 
was Descartes, who by his searching analysis based on 
rational methods which he himself had devised, was to 
clear away the detritus of theistic influence, and, affirm- 
ing the supremacy of reason over providence, emanci- 
pate man from the tryanny of traditionalism, thus pav- 
ing the way for the acceptance of the idea of progress 
and its corollary, perfectibility. It is not, however, to 
be apprehended that Descartes himself or any of his 
immediate followers discovered in progress a distinc- 
tive characteristic of man as a rational being. They 
merely indicated the pathway of progressive develop- 
ment which the men of the i8th century were to assert 
was the ultimate incentive of the human mind. 

The history of the rise of the idea of progress is in 
a large measure the history of the struggle of the Mid- 
dle Class for ascendancy in the State. Progress, the 
outgrowth of a rational mode of thought, is inextricably 
linked with the historical development of the Middle 
Class, just as the concept of providence was the basis 
of the aristocratically organised society of the Middle 
Ages.^ 

The idea that man can improve himself by his own 
efforts, can realise his own destiny by his own strength, 
was an offshoot of the same spirit which induced men 
to establish constitutional government as the State 

^ It may be of interest to suggest that the idea of progress is alien to the^ 
proletarian mind. Has the idea of progress as a useful incentive for 
human development run its active course? Is it about to be placed 
alongside of providence as an avocational idea? Is it not probable that 
the idea which may serve to rally the nevir order will in the first in- 
stance be interpreted by a word less metaphysical than providence and 
more human than progress, possibly by prevoyance or foresight? 



46 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

moulded in their own image. As a speculative idea, 
progress preceded the active political propaganda which 
led to the transformation of the State and the over- 
throw of the existing social order. Men believed that 
they had at last found the solution of the riddle of social 
organisation. Progress, whether consciously expressed, 
or subconsciously understood as the source of perfect- 
ibility, became the foundation of general opinion, the 
source of social optimism. "The human race," Pascal 
had declared, "is a man who never dies and always ad- 
vances towards perfection." Now by a sort of philo- 
sophical alchemy the leaders of public opinion during the 
second half of the i8th century came to regard progress 
as an end in itself, as the source of the greatest good 
to mankind. The idea of progress included that of the 
gradual enlightenment of man's nature, the evolution 
of his intelligence, the expansion of his moral sense, the 
improvement of his physical wellbeing; in brief, the 
spread of what had come to be the recognised ideals 
of humanity. 

To men such as Turgot ( 1727-178 1) progress was 
the great First Cause. All the activities of man — 
morals, religion, science, art, government — were subject 
to the laws of progress based on the development of man. 
Turgot did not deny that progress was often interrupted 
and delayed; its aims violated by the moral debility of 
man, by his intellectual slothfulness, but in spite of these 
checks to growth, these impediments to progress, he ex- 
pressed full confidence in the perfectibility of mankind. 
Other French writers advanced similar theories of in- 
definite perfectibility. Condorcet (1745- 1794) applied 
the test of progress to current ideas of equality, and 
claimed that a recognition of the essence of progress 



THE RISE OF PUBLIC OPINION 47 

leads to the destruction of Inequality, not merely between 
classes, but between nations. He maintained that man 
is capable of indefinite progress and improvement, not 
merely because of the fact that the accumulated labor, 
the wealth of the past remains in a large part for his 
enjoyment, but because intellectual acquisitions do not 
pass away, and are increased and improved during suc- 
ceeding generations. 

We can discover in this new doctrine of progress the 
elements which armed man with an intellectual and moral 
vigor that he had hitherto not possessed. His atten- 
tion had been called to progress. Progress, which sig- 
nified perfectibility in which man was not only the agent 
but the beneficiary, was illustrated and explained ap- 
parently with such incontrovertible authority and aptness 
that it became the basis of speculation, the mainspring 
of action, the groundwork of public opinion. Not 
content with viewing the successive stages of progress 
historically, or merely accepting the Idea as worthy 
of consideration. In the alembic of public opinion It was 
transformed Into an aggressive agency subject to the rea- 
son of man. Here we have the source of the exuberant 
energy which expressed itself in the humanitarian doc- 
trines of the rights of man, the sovereignty of the peo- 
ple, and the watchword of the French Revolution — lib- 
erty, equality, and fraternity. 

This brief historical survey will, I feel, suffice to show 
how the politico-jurldic ideology which resulted in its 
first phase in the establishment of representative gov- 
ernment In England, under the Influence and domination 
of nationalism and its corollary, legality, spread to con- 
tinental Europe, and by public opinion was to be spread 
from there throughout the world. 



48 THE TREND OF HISTORY 



IV 

It was inevitable that when the thoughts of men had 
for a long period been engaged upon theoretical specu- 
lation, they should desire to see the practical applica- 
tion of their theories. The assertive nature of the ra- 
tionalism of the 1 8th century must be borne in mind if 
the logical sequence of events, the growth of the politico- 
juridic theory of the State fashioned in the image of 
man as a rational being, is to be apprehended. It was 
not the arbitrary taxation of the English Government, 
nor the denial of the right of representation, nor the al- 
leged despotism of the rule of George III that brought 
about the revolt of the American Colonies. It was not 
the burdensome oppression of the poor, nor the 
profligacy of the aristocracy, nor the tyranny of the sov- 
ereign that were the causes of the French Revolution. 
A true explanation is to be found in the ferment aroused 
by the active inquiry of intelligent investigators into 
the nature and essence of political doctrine. It was in 
a large measure due to the conviction that man ought to 
be governed by 1-aws of his own devising, that he could 
by his own efforts modify and improve these laws, and 
that it was his duty to do so. Men no longer believed 
in Providence as the first cause. They had lost faith in 
miracles, in effects without a cause. They sought for 
the interpretation of events, not in revelation but in the 
opinions of their fellow men, in public opinion. The at- 
tention of man had become rivetted on his political status, 
as a hundred years before it had been engrossed with his 
religious liberty, and as a century later it was to be con- 
cerned principally with his economic condition. 

Liberty, equality, fraternity, justice, and other watch- 



THE RISE OF PUBLIC OPINION 49 

words of the times were the diverse expressions of the 
same aspiration, which it was believed could be realised 
by political liberty. As Montesquieu expressed it: "The 
political liberty of a citizen is a tranquillity of mind aris-. 
ing from the opinion each has of his own safety. In 
order to have this liberty It Is requisite that the govern- 
ment be so constituted that one citizen be not afraid of 
another." ^ Montesquieu had devoted twenty years of 
untiring labor to inquiring Into the nature of laws and 
institutions. He had pursued his investigation In what 
was considered at the time a scientific manner, and he 
was careful not to advance a priori theories of govern- 
ment. In the main he followed Aristotle ^ though he 
developed and emphasised for the first time the Im- 
portance of the necessity of separating the three major 
functions of constitutional government — the legislative, 
executive, and judicial. 

"When the legislative and executive powers are united 
In the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, 
there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, 
lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical 
laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 

"Again, there is no liberty. If the judiciary power be 
not separated from the legislative and executive. Were 
it joined with the legislative the life and liberty of the 

^De I'Esprh des Lois, Book XI, Chap. VI. 

'"Now there are three things in all States which a careful legislator 
ought well to consider, which are of great consequence to all, and which 
properly attended to, the State must necessarily be happy; and ac- 
cording to the variation of which the one will differ from the other. 
The first, of these is the public assembly; the second the officers of the 
State, that is, who they ought to be, and with what power they should 
be entrusted, and in what manner they should be appointed; the third, 
the judicial department." — Aristotle, A Treatise on Government, Chap. 
XIV. 

Or as Montesquieu has it: "In every government there are three sorts 
of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on 
the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend 
on the civil law."— 0/>. cit., Book XI, Chap. VI. 



50 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the 
judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the 
executive power the judge might behave with violence 
and oppression. 

"There would be an end of everything were the same 
man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the 
people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting 
laws, that of executing public resolutions, and of trying 
the causes of individuals." ^ 

Montesquieu gives numerous reasons why he believes 
that the powers of government should be distinct 
and separate, and be given scope to develop by specialisa- 
tion of function. He sets forth his observations in a 
logical manner, which he Illustrates by ample and often 
recbndite episodes drawn from history. 

Rousseau adopted the opposite method. Impatient 
alike of the restraints of history, and of logical exposi- 
tion, he contributed little that was sound to the political 
practice of his time.^ However, by his forceful delinea- 
tion of the sufferings of man, by his acute understanding 
of the mentality of the multitude, as well as by the 
vehemence of his language, he became the most Influ- 
ential mouthpiece of public opinion In that he gave body 
to its desires and voice to Its longings: 

* Ibidem, Book XI, Chap. VI. 

^ I can find no satisfactory evidence that his thesis of the actuil pre- 
dominance of the general will and its union with the will of all as the 
basis of sovereignty was adequately appreciated or had practical sig- 
nificance in his day, though his phraseology was widely copied. It is, 
however, of importance to note that Rousseau, with his characteristic 
vision, and suspicion of rationalism, rejected the accepted dogma of 
progress as havmg no part in a volitional scheme of social organisation 
of which he may be said to have been the precursor. Both Hobbes and 
Locke had insisted upon the importance of the will. As Bosanquet has 
pointed out: For Hobbes "political unity lies in a will which is actual 
but not general; while for Locke it lies in a will which is general but 
not actual." Rousseau conceived of a "will at once actual and general." 
— Cf. Philosophical Theory of State, Chap. V. 



THE RISE OF PUBLIC OPINION 51 

"Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains. 
A man believes himself the master of others, but is for 
all that more a slave than they. How is this brought 
about? I do not know. What could make it legitimate ? 
I think I can answer this question. 

"If I considered force alone and the effects derived 
from it I should say : As long as a people is compelled 
to obey and obeys, it does well; as soon as it can shake 
off the yoke, and shakes it off, it does better: for, re- 
covering its liberty by the same right by which it was 
taken away, either a people is justified in recovering its 
liberty, or there was no justification in taking it away." ^ 

And further we may advisedly quote : 

"The body politic like the body of man begins to die 
from its birth, and carries within itself the causes of its 
destruction. Both may have more or less robust con- 
stitutions which may preserve them for a longer or 
shorter period. The constitution of man is the work 
of nature; that of the State is the work of art." ^ 

The simplicity of his arguments made them acceptable 
to the masses who were beginning to acquire political 
consciousness. It was coming to be felt that political 
liberty was a need not only of the more enlightened 
classes, but one in which the people {"le peuple") were 
to have a full share. 

Rousseau in his Discourse on the Origins of Inequal- 
ity among Mankind, declared : 

"It follows from this survey that there is scare any 
inequality among men in a state of nature; all that we 
now behold owes its force and growth to the develop- 
ment of our faculties and the improvement of our un- 
derstanding, until at last it becomes permanent and law- 

* Contrat Social, Book I, Chap. I. 

* Ibidem. Book III, Chap. XI. 



52 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

ful by the establishment of property and laws. It like- 
wise ensues that moral inequality, authorised by any 
merely positive right, clashes with natural right as often 
as it does not combine in the same proportion with phys- 
ical inequality; a distinction which sufficiently deter- 
mines what we must think in that respect of that kind 
of inequality which obtains in all civilised nations, since 
it is evidently against the law of nature that a child 
should give orders to an old man, folly conduct wis- 
dom, and a handful of men should be gorged with super- 
fluities, while the famished multitude want the common- 
est necessaries of life." ^ 

The arguments he advances in behalf of the State 
organised on the basis of contract " show it to be a form 
of collective despotism, not unlike that which Hobbes 
advocated as monarchical despotism. Rousseau substi- 
tuted the sovereignty of the people, the rule of the ma- 
jority for the older arguments of the Leviathan. 

Montesquieu and Rousseau summed up the French 
politico-juridic thesis of State, which was to have so 
deep an influence on its subsequent development. Their 
methods and modes of thought were radically differ- 
ent, yet they are so complementary that it would be 
impossible to gain an understanding of the Revolution- 
ary period without a clear appreciation of the place 
which they occupied. This may be more precisely in- 
dicated by calling to mind that the Declaration of In- 

^ Concluding paragraph. 

'"'To find a form of association which shall defend and protect with 
the public force the person and property of each member, and by means of 
which each, uniting with all, shall, however, obey only himself, and re- 
main as free as before.' Such is the fundamental problem of which the 
Social Contract offers a solution. The clauses of this contract are so 
determined by the nature of the act, that the least modification would 
render them vain and of no effect; so th"t, although they may perhaps 
never have been formally enunciated they are everywhere the same, 
everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised until, the social compact being 
violated, each enters again into his first rights and resumes his natural 
liberty — thereby losing the conventional liberty for which he renounced 
it." — Rousseau, op. cit.. Book I, Chap. VI. 



THE RISE OF PUBLIC OPINION 53 

dependence of the American Colonists of July 4, 1776, 
reflects the grandiloquent generalities, the impassioned 
truisms of Rousseau, whereas the Constitution, adopted 
by the United States in 1789 after successive failures to 
form a "natural" confederation, bears the unmistakable 
stamp of the influence of Montesquieu. 



CHAPTER IV 

American Independence 



CAUSES AND AIMS TEMPER OF THE COLONISTS INFLUENCE OF 

FRENCH POLITICAL THEORY — ENGLISH PRACTICE 



THE political capacity of the various peoples of the 
West is difficult to appraise. The chauvinism of 
politico-philosophical inquirers during the 19th century 
has led many of them to claim for their countrymen a 
monopoly of those characteristics denoting political sa- 
gacity which were apparently deemed essential to lead 
a people to political preeminence. It would appear un- 
necessary to dwell upon such comparisons, the more so 
as every nation which has constituted itself into an in- 
dependent State could no doubt find among its members a 
relatively equivalent number of men endowed with those 
moral and ethical qualities without which the good gov- 
ernment of a community as it was currently understood 
would be unrealisable. Nor can it be admitted that any 
one people should possess a monopoly of these qualities. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the fact that in 
France political affairs should have exerted so great an 
influence on the intellectual life of the people would 
seem to indicate that the abstract philosophy of human 
rights, as expressed in terms of political liberty and con- 
stitutional government, had there a meaning altogether 
different from that given thereto by the theory and prac- 

[54] 



AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 55 

tice of Englishmen, Germans, Italians, or Americans. 
Political ideology has suffered greatly from defective 
translation, or rather from the reliance placed upon the 
faulty interpretation occasioned thereby. It is not our 
object to set forth here in detail this major defect of 
politics, in that while its terminology remains a con- 
stant its interpretation continues a variable, so that in 
reality the essential meaning of political terms can be 
arrived at only by association of ideas, and for that 
reason politics lacks a sound basis of universality. 

For purposes of classification and in order to render 
understanding easier, it is habitual for man to permit 
the association of ideas to perform the function of search- 
ing inquiry, and thus to bridge the chasm between facts 
and ideas. The more complex the groundwork of facts, 
the more dogmatically association performs its function 
of representation. Whether the representation leads 
back logically to its source and can be so traced de- 
pends upon the intellectual capacity of the individual. 
The more acute his perception, the more difficult it will 
be for him to accept a representation which appears il- 
logical or irrational. Political theory depends for its 
acceptance and spread primarily upon such association. 
Bearing this in mind, it may be noted that political ide- 
ology as it passed from people to people was destined 
to develop new forms, consonant with local characteris- 
tics, so that what is meant by constitutional government 
when speaking of England, means something very differ- 
ent from what is meant when this same terminology 
is applied to the States of continental Europe or even 
to the United States. 

It is a good example of the apparent logical sequence 
of historical evolution which the philosopher of history, 
or those interested in formulating the laws of history, 



56 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

would seize upon with avidity, that the men who first 
instituted and developed the two main branches of con- 
stitutional government — Constitutional Monarchy and 
Constitutional Democracy — should have belonged to the 
same race. The setting up of an independent and sov- 
ereign state in America, composed of former British 
colonies, was the outcome of a conviction that an in- 
dependent state is to be regarded as that form of human 
society in which men are best fitted to work out problems 
of political liberty, and are destined to realise their 
highest cultural aims. The establishment of a consti- 
tutional democracy by the United States was, however, 
an entirely new experiment in statecraft, which must be 
signalised as a further development of the politico-juridic 
theory and therefore requires some analysis. 



II 

Constitutional government in England had been estab- 
lished as the result of an effort to reconcile government 
with social institutions: to substitute a comprehensible 
political system for an absolutist regime, which had be- 
come irreconcilable with an everyday life in which ma- 
terial prosperity, perfectibility, and progress were about 
to engross the full attention and best energies of a large 
class of society. Yet it must not be lost sight of that 
it is characteristic of the empirical temper of the Eng- 
lish people to defend tradition against the encroachments 
of interested theory. They are inflexible in the main- 
tenance of established right which practice has sanc- 
tioned against the most plausible arguments of theorists, 
however admirably they may be presented. Thus the 



AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 57 

political rights for which Englishmen struggled, and 
upon which their constitutional system was founded, did 
not, as might have been expected, lead them to abolish 
the monarchical form of government, as in the past it 
had proved itself a strong arm of defence against the 
abuses of an arrogant aristocracy. On the contrary con- 
stitutional government in England made use of, and em- 
bodied in its system, those ancestral laws and customs 
and that machinery of government which had grown up 
with the people, had been modified by circumstance, 
tested by practice, and improved by experience. 

As upon the rediscovery of the Justinian Code ( 1 176) 
England did not imitate other European countries, and 
send her lawyers to Bologna to be trained in the method 
and practice of the codified Roman law, but undertook 
the reform of the administration of the law by the 
establishment of circuit courts of her own devising, and 
the introduction of trial by jury, thus affording a refuge 
from the oppression hitherto exercised by the caprice 
of the feudal lords, so in establishing constitutionalism, 
England maintained her characteristic attitude of in- 
sularity, and constructed her system of government out 
of the elements already at hand, revamped in consonance 
with the spirit of the age. It was men of this same 
race who had settled the American Colonies — English- 
men trained to trust to their own strength, who, trans- '^^ ' "^' 
planted to the bleak New England coast, had created [/(X-^^^t/lOi 
for themselves a condition of relative wellbeing. These ,/f 

early settlers had cared little for citizenship in a secular 
State. They were trained by the Calvinist creed to 
an unworldly way of thinking. Their object in coming 
to America had been to be free to worship their God 
unmolested. Less tolerant, but no less fearless than 
those of their breed who remained behind to fight for 



58 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

political freedom, and whose sons were to establish con- 
stitutional monarchy in England, these Puritan pilgrims 
in America had not neglected to educate their sons in 
the ways of freedom, and accustom them early to self- 
reliance as a first step towards self-government. When 
a century later the peoples of the American Colonies 
sought to establish a government conforming to the so- 
cial institutions which had grown up in America, the 
constitutional system which they set up accommodated 
itself to the materials it found at hand. 

For the American Colonists of 1776 were of a differ- 
ent stamp and character from their forefathers. The 
1 8th century had witnessed a growth of material pros- 
perity throughout the Western World. In this the Amer- 
ican Colonies had had an ample share. The guidance 
of public affairs was no longer in the hands of the clergy, 
who had led the way to the New England shores and 
for the time being were able to maintain their ascendancy 
in secular as well as spiritual matters, by establishing an 
even more intolerant type of politico-theistic absolutism 
than had been possible in Europe. Towards the middle 
of the 1 8th century the current of liberalism had swept 
away the last vestiges of Puritan theocracy. The politi- 
cal life of the Colonies had come under the control of 
men who, more especially in New England, by their com- 
mercial skill and enterprise were responsible for the 
material prosperity which the Colonies enjoyed. Having 
few traditions, save those of self-reliance and self-govern- 
ment, the more radically-minded Americans had not been 
averse to absorbing the teachings of the French ration- 
alists. Men such as Franklin typified the new material- 
ist tendency of the age. Their minds were engrossed in 
furthering their economic wellbeing; in making use of 



AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 59 

that fund of energy and common sense with which 
they had been endowed, to prosper in business and 
to regulate political questions so as to promote their 
personal prosperity. They were broad-minded enough 
to look a^out them and to turn to good account what- 
ever came their way. Local self-government, inherited 
from their forefathers, was pursued with diligence, in 
this new spirit of alertness. At the same time the high- 
sounding phrases of French political philosophy did not 
fail to dazzle those among the colonial leaders who 
dared to look, forward to the day when, by putting its 
precepts into practice, a political millennium might be 
reached. 

However, the heady French political theories did not 
immediately affect the feelings of the Americans who 
still regarded France as their traditional enemy. It 
was not until after the battle of Quebec (1759) had 
assured the dominance of the English on the North 
American continent, that the American Colonists felt free 
to consider ways and means to be rid of their over- 
seas suzerain, and declare their independence. The ac- 
tive armed assistance rendered by the French in further- 
ing the plans of the Colonists, the presence of French 
officers in the field on the side of the Americans, no 
doubt contributed to increase the debt felt towards 
France; but more important than these the abstract po- 
litical philosophy of human rights so characteristically 
French, combined with the English doctrine of the juridic 
relation as a basis of rational human intercourse, were to 
have a deep influence on American public opinion and 
public policy during this formative period. 

Constitutional government, as established in America, 
was thus a compromise, in that it grafted French theory 



6o THE TREND OF HISTORY 

upon English practice, and evolved American principles 
of government.^ 

The Americans borrowed from England awe of an- 
cestral precedent and its legal system; from France, sub- 
servience to public opinion and a radical rationalism. 
Subsequent development was to show that while the ele- 
ments contributed by French ideology were to grow 
stronger, and the rule of public opinion, as expressed 
in the sovereignty of the people and the tyranny of the 
majority, was to become more deeply rooted, the older 
fundamental principles of English constitutional prac- 
tice, the belief that the record of experience is the test 
of true right, were never to be lost sight of. 



Ill 

English constitutional monarchy and American consti- 
tutional democracy were thus the work of men of similar 
temperament and historical tradition. Both belonged 
to the Middle Class,- both had a closely related religious 

* Thus an English observer a century- later could write with much 
complacent satisfaction: "No people except the choicest children of 
England, long trained by the practice of local self-government at home 
and in the colonies, could have succeeded half so well." — Cf. Bryce, 
American Commonivealth. Whereas de Tocqueville noted with equal 
satisfaction what he found to be the salient characteristics of the political 
creed of the American people: "To evade the bondage of system and 
habit, of family maxims, class opinions, and in some degree of national 
prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of information, and exist- 
ing facts only as a lesson to be used in doing otherwise and doing better; 
to seek the reason of things for one's self alone; to tend to results 
without being bound to means, and to aim at the substance through the 
form; — such are the principal characteristics of what I shall call the 
philosophical method of the Americans." — Democracy in America, 
Part II, Book I, Chap. I. And again: "The civilisation of New England 
has been like a beacon lit upon a hill, which after it has diffused its 
warmth immediatelv around it, also tinges the distant horizon with its 
glow."— Part I, Chap. II. 

'It is true that in England the aristocracy played a part in moulding 
constitutional monarchy. Yet we cannot fail to recognise the fact that the 



AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 6i 

background, both sought to foster the conception of the 
importance and dignity of the individual as expressed in 
the desire for self-determination and self-expression 
which was primarily utilitarian, an outgrowth of a puri- 
tanical, subjective mode of thought. The moral earnest- 
ness resulting from this manner of viewing life had bred 
a confidence in the ability of the individual to mould 
his own destiny, measured in terms of success, which 
could find its most immediate expression in commercial 
and industrial enterprise. 

Further inquiry leads to the discovery of divergences 
equally important which mark off American constitutional 
practice as distinct, not merely as a form of government, 
but as a theory of State, which has fulfilled its historic 
role side by side with that of the monarchical form, 
and that of other constitutional governments which have 
since arisen. The fact that the United States adopted 
a written constitution, whereas England had not, is not '7 

of itself of vital importance. Cromwell had attempted 

to give England a written instrument of government, 
but had failed in that it was alien to the political genius 
of the English people. The authority of precedent was 
so fixed in the English mind that Parliament required 

Middle Class, the Commons, were the ultimate source of power in the 
State. 

In the same way in America, Virginia and the adjacent colonies bore 
an aristocratic imprint. They were settled by a very different type of 
men than those of New England — wealthy land-owners, adventurers, 
free-booters, with a later admixture of vagabonds and criminals trans- 
ported overseas by the London police. These settlers, who had accepted\0 
episcopacy, concerned themselves little with questions of religious ory *- 
public welfare, and were interested only in personal profit. However, 
it is of interest to note that the attempt made to provide Carolina with 
an English-made constitution, drawn up by no less an authority than 
Locke (See Constitution of Carolina) in 1669, though liberal in tone, 
never gained wide acceptance, and was abolished in 1693. In spite of the 
influence of foreign elements in the Pennsylvania proprietary colony 
and of the Dutch along the Hudson, the scheme of colonial organisation 
of the colonies was that of which middle class Massachusetts is the best 
and leading example. 



62 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

no stabilising factor to support its authority, and would 
have found its freedom hampered by a written constitu- 
tion which would require incessant amendment, or at 
least interpretation.^ 

In the United States, on the other hand, the weakness 
of constituted authority rendered it essential that a fixed 
formula of government should be at hand which would 
act as a stabilising factor among the anarchical tendencies 
of the newly formed political life. A written constitu- 
tion could best perform this function. The Colonists, 
by their charters, had long been accustomed to written 
limitations to public authority and precise definition of 
its powers, which it was natural for them to wish to 
continue. 

Yet it was only after repeated failure and long delay, 
thirteen years after the Declaration of Independence, 
that a written constitution was adopted. The American 
Constitution adopted in 1789 was the first attempt in 
modern times to subject the government of an independ- 
ent state to a fixed written code; to restrict sovereignty 
of the State by requiring compliance and concordance 
with principles set down and defined. Whatever the 
drawbacks of a written constitution may be, the con- 
stitution adopted at Philadelphia by the Constitutional 
Convention which had labored for two years to frame 
a comprehensive statement of the basis of popular 
sovereignty, must be looked upon as an important mile- 
stone in political development. Exactly a century had 
elapsed since, in the Declaration of Right, the Parliament 
of England had bound itself to insure the protection 

^In England the constitution comprises the whole body of public law, 
consuetudinary as well as statutory, which has grown up during the 
course of centuries, and is being continually modified by the action of 
the general will, as interpreted and expressed by Parliament. — Cf. Rudolf 
Gneist, The History of the English Constitution. 



AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 63 

of civic liberty by representation. During this period 
constitutional government in England, while steadfast 
in practice, remained in theory a vague doctrine, and 
the powers of government lacked the precision of con- 
cise definition. In England constitutional government 
had been grafted upon older practice so that to the 
student of politics it remained an amorphous structure. 
The United States adopted the radical course of defining 
sovereignty and analysing its functions. The separation 
of government into three branches — executive, legisla- 
tive, and judicial — as advocated by Montesquieu, and the 
checks and balances it sought to introduce, led to the 
acceptance of the theory that the final expression of au- 
thority in the State, its code of sovereignty, is set forth in 
the articles of the Constitution as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court of the land.^ It was the desire to insure 
permanence and order which had led the Americans to 
the unqualified acknowledgment of the State as a juridic 
organism in which the mechanism of government sought 
to assure strictly legal relations, not merely between citi- 
zens, but between the governing and the governed. Con- 
formity to the letter and spirit of the Constitution was to 
become the principal test of validity. 

Subsequent practice left to the executive and legislative 
branches of the government a very broad field of activity; 
especially in matters relating to foreign policy the execu- 
tive was left relatively unhampered. However, the 

'Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States reads: 
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting am- 
bassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States 
shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between 
a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; 
between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of differ- 
ent States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, citizens or subjects. 



64 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

theory of State which can be adduced from the American 
example, though never definitely formulated by the f ram- 
ers of the Constitution, asserts the principle that it is 
the juridic relation which makes possible the smooth 
functioning of organised society. The chief object of the 
State is to assure, within legal limits, the growth of in- 
dividual liberty and national freedom; self-help and 
self-government.^ 

It will be necessary, when discussing the question of 
the end of the State, to return to a more ample review 
of the American theory. It may suffice for the present 
to note that the American practice had a far-reaching 
repercussion, and reacted directly on the trend of public 
affairs in Europe. 

^ All subsequent constitutions, both democratic and monarchical, were set 
forth in a written document, signifying the importance attached to the 
American precedent. Yet except for the slavish imitation of Central 
and South American republics, regardless of the fact that the United 
States theory of State was, in many cases, wholly unsuited to the men- 
tality of the people of these countries, no other nation, with the possible 
exception of ^he Helvetic Republic, has so literally adopted the juridic 
theory. 



CHAPTER V 

The Middle Class Mind 



FREE HUMANITY — COSMOPOLITANISM — ECONOMIC INTEREST — IN- 
FLUENCE OF THE PHYSIOCRATS ADAM SMITH PO- 
LITICAL LIBERTY — ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE 



THE struggle for Independence and the setting up 
of an independent State by the American Colonists 
evoked great enthusiasm among the ruling classes in 
France, not merely, as might be expected, because they 
saw in this event the just retribution for the loss of 
their own Canadian provinces, but chiefly because the 
age was one during which the idea of "free humanity" 
played so predominating a role. The last quarter of 
the 1 8th century witnessed the fruition of those theories 
of liberty, equality, humanity, sown so lavishly during 
the preceding decades. The common bond of mankind 
was the thought uppermost in the minds of men. Na- 
tionalism and patriotism were unknown. Cosmopolitan- 
ism as expressed in the phrase ubi bene, ibi patria was 
widely acknowledged as a reality which rational men 
had attained. Plans to establish leagues for the assur- 
ance of perpetual peace were actively pushed. Men 
such as Kant sought to devise a plan which would make 
possible the organisation of a State universal, to formu- 
late a political constitution which would insure concord 
among men. A host of other politico-philosophical In- 

[65] 



66 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

quirers, following in the steps of Rousseau, were simi- 
larly engaged in seeking for a system of government 
which would reduce to a minimum all political inequalities 
and would eventually lead to the elimination of all differ- 
ences and anomalies among men. It was fervently be- 
lieved that a state of social harmony could be arrived 
at in which civil institutions would serve the progress and 
welfare of mankind. Man would, in the near future, 
enter upon his rightful heritage and enjoy as his inalien- 
able right "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 
Not merely philosophers of authority and political think- 
ers of great originality, but all rationally-minded men 
readily acknowledged the advantages to be derived from 
these plans of political reorganisation and social better- 
ment. 

It must not be lost sight of that it was the middle class 
mind which offered the golden mean as the golden rule 
of life,^ and never conceived of the possibility that a 
different mentality might exist among other classes of 
society. 

There was nothing extravagant, nothing unreasonable 
in the programmes of reform outlined, as long as this 
middle class manner of viewing life was adhered to. 
It was apparently never considered that the over-simple 
solutions offered for the difficult social problems were, 
in spite of their rational moderation, liable to irrar 
tional and extravagant interpretation. There had grown 
up in the varjous capitals of Europe a coterie of middle 

*Even Montesquieu who was an original thinker could not escape from 
the influence of his times, so that we find him, in discussing the measure 
of political libertj^ enjoyed by the English, declaring: "Neither do I pre- 
tend by this to undervalue other governments, nor to say that this extreme 
political liberty ought to give uneasiness to those who have only a 
moderate share of it. How should I have any such design? — I who think 
that even the highest refinement of reason is not always desirable, aiid 
that mankind generally find their account better in mediums than in 
extremes."—!)^ I'Esprit des Lois, Book XI, Chap. VI. 



THE MIDDLE CLASS MIND 67 

class philosophers, political innovators and reformers, 
whose philanthropic speculations never induced them to 
abandon their theoretical viewpoint. There was a con- 
stant interchange of ideas among them, and this cosmo- 
politan atmosphere was favorable to the growth of the 
most liberal theories. But their authors had lost sight 
of a very important factor, in that they looked out upon 
life with a strongly tinged middle class bias, and never 
conceived of the practical application of their pro- 
grammes except by men of their own stamp. The sin- 
cerity of their views cannot be called into question. 
Whether we look to Berlin, to Konigsberg, or Geneva, 
to Paris, London, or Edinburgh, everywhere we find 
this same benign cosmopolitanism. 

The Western World was in an inquiring mood. Men 
asked all manner of questions, and the rational mind 
felt itself competent to find a satisfactory solution. What 
was the value of art, of science, of religion, of politics, 
of the family, of the State? Men dealt in generalities. 
They looked upon life in a broad manner, which led 
them to despise the lessons of history and tradition, and 
to seek to solve all questions by applying the power of 
the mind. The ultimate test was, "What is conducive 
to happiness?" Is man happier under a free or despotic 
government? Is civilisation a benefit? Is inequality 
necessary? It was believed that by simplification, by 
the breaking down of barriers between classes as be- 
tween peoples, by restraining the impetuous and urging 
on the laggards, an ideal civil society would result, in 
the creation of a middle class cosmopolitan World State. 
It is necessary to emphasise this domlnantly liberal, phil- 
anthropic, middle class point of view in order to gain 
an understanding of the subsequent reaction. 

It was no longer necessary to apologise for an in- 



68 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

terest In the wellbeing of the "people," as Vauban had 
done when in 17 17 he declared that to enrich the people 
was the only way to enrich the King.^ The French 
Physiocrats,^ influenced no doubt by the fact that the 
luxury of the court and the artificial civilisation which 
it fostered had brought the country to the verge of ruin, 
advocated a return to nature, by setting forth in logical 
argument that a "state of nature" was the only rational 
mode of life. They conducted an active inquiry into 
the nature of wealth, not as had been the practice in 
the past, in order to devise means for filling the empty 
royal exchequers, but with a view to ameliorating the 
condition of the poorer classes. They were the first 
to enunciate the principles of freedom in industry and 
commerce, and their doctrines of laissez-faire, which 
meant that anyone should be permitted to make what 
he likes when he likes, and that all trades should be 
open to everybody without government interference, and 
laisser-aller, which maintained that persons and goods 
should be allowed to travel freely from one place to an- 
other without the restrictions of tolls, taxes, or vexatious 
regulations, introduced the concept of liberty into eco- 
nomic enterprise, and gave a vital impetus to the new 
science of political economy.^ 

Constitutional government was the contribution of 
the middle class to political practice which had inspired 
confidence in its capacity and fitness to control the 
body politic. The middle class now added to the store 
of speculative theory certain fundamental doctrines of 
economic liberty, as correlative with man's political 

' Cf. "Pauvres paysans, pauvre royaume, pauvre rot." 

' Cf. Dupont de Nemours, Physiocratie ou Constitution naturelle du 

gouvernement le plus advantageux du genre humain, 1768. 

^ Cf. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, Appendix B. i., in which 

he gives an interesting survey of the growth of economic science. 



THE MIDDLE CLASS MIND 69 

liberty, which it was believed were essential to his well- 
being. 



II 

It was in the same year (1776) in which the Western 
World was engrossed with the perusal of the Declara- 
tion of Independence of the United States, and the middle 
class humanitarians all over Europe learned of what 
seemed to them the fulfilment of their fondest dream, 
that a people almost in a "state of nature" had adopted 
the noblest formulae of social organisation, and were 
about to set up a government, based on current political 
platitudes, of the rights of man and sovereignty of the 
people so cherished by the cosmopolitan mind of the 
epoch, that Adam Smith published his Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 

Adam Smith was a respectable, middle class Scotch- 
man, who had resided for a prolonged period in France, 
and had been in personal contact with the French Physio- 
crats. He was a good example of a leader of the cos- 
mopolitan intelligentsia of the age. A man of keen 
vision, deep insight, and great capacity for painstaking 
inquiry, it has been said of him in our own day that 
"there is scarcely any economic truth now known of 
which he did not get some glimpse !" ^ Concerned as 
he was with the social aspects of wealth, Adam Smith 
developed and expounded with great precision the French 
doctrine of free trade. It was in harmony with the 
spirit of his times that he declared that economic de- 
velopment must be free, and with no little skill he brought 
proof to bear in showing that government interference 
hinders trade, and that even the most selfish enterprise 
^ Cf. A. Marshall, op. cit. 



70 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

of the individual is of greater benefit to the community 
than the best-intentioned supervision or control by the 
State. His other very significant social contribution was 
that he suggested "value as a measure for human mo- 
tive," and made money the standard of this measure. 

Up to this time the motive of human conduct had been 
held imponderable. By the Church motive was believed 
to be measured by man's adherence to moral law, which, 
it was averred, he would willingly obey. By the State 
it had come to be held the acknowledgment of ethical 
considerations, as expressed in the laws and statutes of 
civilised communities, which obligated the individual to 
forego certain liberties, which might be injurious to 
others, in return for the numerous benefits of protection 
afforded by the State. But the factors which compelled 
compliance were, in either case, of necessity difficult to 
measure. They were essentially personal, variable, tem- 
peramental, and as such distasteful to the middle class 
rationalists, who were confident that a measure of motive 
which might act as the norm of social life could be dis- 
covered. Adam Smith, by methods of diligent inquiry 
and analysis, had arrived at the conclusion that it was 
demonstrable that the motive of man's action was in a 
( greater number of instances economic, and could be meas- 
ured on the one hand by the desire to obtain wealth, 
and on the other by the efforts and privations which 
would be endured to produce it. Money, he argued, 
could be taken as the fixed standard of measure. Eco- 
nomic freedom was, therefore, as essential to man as 
political freedom. In order that man could have fullest 
scope to develop, to be free, it was altogether as 
important that governments should not hamper individ- 
ual freedom to trade, and should assure to all men en- 
gaged in commerce and industry the same liberty and 



THE MIDDLE CLASS MIND 71 

protection which constitutional government had secured 
to them as members of the body politic. 

We henceforth are to find two manifestations of the 
concept of liberty — political and economic. Both were 
to increase the stature and importance of the individual. 
The Middle Class had attained political liberty. It 
now drew attention to economic liberty, in the first in- 
stance with the magnanimous generosity of the cosmo- 
politan, humanitarian point of view, which was later 
narrowed down by adversity, and degenerated into a 
new form of absolutism as the lower classes, pushing 
upward, sought to dispute with the Middle Class the 
benefit of this newly formulated economic liberty. 

The contribution of Adam Smith to the ideology of 
liberty has possibly not been as fully acknowledged as 
it deserves, though his work as the founder of economic 
science has been over-emphasised. Hume and Stewart, 
his contemporaries, to say nothing of the French Physio- 
crats, had contributed largely to the storing up of that 
fund of information of which Adam Smith made so ex- 
cellent a use. But what Adam Smith did do was to 
issue a declaration of economic independence, when he 
asserted that free trade and the freedom of the economic 
man are a vital necessity in a free State, the aflfirmation 
of true liberty. Economics, as a separate branch of 
social science, was declared co-equal with politics. 

However, this declaration of economic independence 
remained for the time little more than a declaration; 
though the questions Adam Smith raised attracted the 
attention of a number of sympathetic and industrious in- 
quirers.^ Numerous historical and descriptive treatises 
concerning economic conditions, particularly among the 
working classes, drew attention to the poor, who hitherto 

* Cf. works of Young, Eden, Tooke, McCulloch, and Porter. 



72 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

had remained outside the scope of speculative inquiry. 
Economics, like politics, was dealt with in a philosophical 
spirit, and reflected the inquiring attitude of the middle 
class mind, which had had so large a share in influencing 
public opinion. 

It must not be lost sight of in considering the state of 
public opinion in Western Europe on the eve of the 
French Revolution, that the men who were giving form 
and substance to the new political and economic theories 
were leading recluse lives. They were primarily con^ 
cerned with theory rather than practice, with doctrine 
and dogma rather than with useful solutions to the prac- 
tical problems which they had raised. Constantly formu- 
lating new hypotheses, opening new vistas of progress, 
they were interested mainly in exploring the new path- 
ways. As a rule they were men devoid of psychological 
perception, apparently blind to the ferment they had 
aroused among the masses. Separated by a wide chasm 
from everyday life, they sought refuge in reason rather 
than in action. The vigor of their intellect far outran 
their power of decision. Busied with bold schemes of the 
liberty, equality, and fraternity, of humanity, and perpet- 
ual peace, they believed that they had solved the riddle of 
the universe, or at least that it was solvable by pursuing 
the course opened up by their rational methods. 



CHAPTER VI 

The French Revolution 

FOREIGN INFLUENCE — THE NEW SPIRIT THE TIERS ETAT — ^THE 

RIGHTS OF MAN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1 79 1 



IT is beyond the scope of the present volume to pursue 
further the streams which fed the stagnant pool of 
political and economic oppression in France on the eve 
of the Revolution, which overflowed and rushed onward 
like a torrent, bearing the scum on its uppermost crest. 
It has, however, been essential to outline briefly the char- 
acter of the epoch immediately preceding the Revolution, 
in order to comprehend the full sweep of the work of 
demolition it accomplished. 

The revolutions and civil wars in England during the 
17th century were the work of "men of action and men 
of God" ; men who fought rather than men who thought; 
men who desired to regulate rather than innovate; men 
of quick decision, but slow deliberation; men whose field 
of vision was limited, but whose purpose was distinct, 
whose task was narrow but well-defined. They were 
in close touch with the spirit of the age which had been 
long in maturing. To them liberty was the essence of 
man, and moral law fixed beyond phenomena. At the 
same time there was a constant and close intercourse 
between the men of action and the men of theory; the 
latter followed rather than preceded, formulated the 

[73] 



74 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

accomplished rather than posited the potential, or con- 
founded it with the actual. 

The establishment of constitutional government in 
England was thus not the result of revolutionary acci- 
dent, but of political evolution. The Middle Class had 
come into power without violently displacing the aris- 
tocracy, which remained strong enough to assert for it- 
self a share of authority in the government of the land, 
and even to restrain the hand of the Commons when 
needful. The peerage was, however, being constantly 
renovated by accessions from the best brains of the Mid- 
dle Class. Thus while the aristocracy in England re- 
tained many of its outward insignia of a privileged caste, 
already towards the close of the i8th century^ it had 
become largely middle class in its interests and point of 
view, and in politics had begun to adopt a middle class, 
timid, conservative policy, totally alien to the true temper 
of boldness, independence, and social responsibility which 
distinguishes a vigorous aristocracy as a distinct force in 
the State. Middle class ascendancy had grown to ma- 
turity by a process of internal assimilation so character- 
istic of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. 

As has been pointed out, the American War of Inde- 
pendence may, though the connection is slight, be looked 
upon as preliminary to the French Revolution in that 
it put into practice in part the political ideology of 
the French theorists. Here men for the first time drew 
their swords ostensibly for the sake of abstract rights, ! 
as outlined in the Declaration of Independence of! 
1776. 

But the American experiment was one of State building 

^During the period 1700-1800 no less than 34 dukes, 29 marquesses, 
109 earls, 85 viscounts, 248 barons were created. 



THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 75 

on a small scale, where there was no work of demolition 
to be accomplished. The Americans had to look only 
to the present and needed to give little heed to the past 
or even to consider the future. In America the revolu- 
tion had been practically wholly constructive. It had 
been weakly and inadequately opposed, and had tri- 
umphed more by accident than by design. Its underlying 
motive was chiefly economic, and as a political event it 
was even to those concerned of secondary importance. 
The men who carried through the revolution in America 
were men who had long enjoyed the privilege of personal 
freedom and knew the value of liberty, understood its 
necessary limitations, and appreciated that its benefits 
could be enjoyed only by a strict adherence to law and 
order. 

How different were the circumstances in France in 
1789 ! For more than two generations the Middle Class 
had been asserting itself. It had gained control of the 
channels of trade, of industry, of science, of philosophic 
inquiry, of public opinion. Disgusted with the conduct 
of the monarchy, which had let slip the reins of govern- 
ment, and with the aristocracy, which had sunk to a low 
level of effeminate incompetency, the Middle Class in 
France, though conscious of its strength as the most 
vigorous and important element in the State, had no share 
in shaping its political destiny. One hundred and seventy- 
five years had elapsed since the Tiers Etat — the Com- 
mons — had last been summoned (1614), when, owing 
to the desperate financial situation of the country, and 
the failure of successive ministers to raise the necessary 
funds, Louis XVI, as a last resort, was induced to call 
for elections to the States General (1789). 



76 THE TREND OF HISTORY 



II 

The members elected to the Tiers Etat of 1789 were 
of a different stamp from those who had humbly ad- 
dressed their sovereign on bended knee at the last ses- 
sion of the States General early in the 17th century. 
Now these lawyers, farmers, doctors, journalists, and 
pamphleteers who had been elected to represent the great 
Middle Class knew themselves to be the real power in 
France. At last the day had come when the theories of 
the rights of man, the sovereignty of the people, pohtical 
liberty and equality were to be put into practice. The 
Middle Class suddenly found that it had rallied to its 
support the great mass of the population, the lower 
classes, whom the majority of middle class political theor- 
ists had never considered as possible participants in po- 
litical freedom. This sudderr and unexpected accession 
of strength must be held in view in estimating the chaos 
which ensued. Except possibly for the harangues of 
Rousseau, no voice had been raised in behalf of the 
political enfranchisement of the lower classes. Logical 
historical development seemed to demand that the Middle 
Class of France, the lovers of law and order, of modera- 
tion and of peace, should have a chance to reform the 
body politic, and establish a constitutional monarchy 
which would be relatively no more radical than that set 
up by Englishmen of this same class a century before. 
Such was the programme of the Tiers Etat. Excluded by 
force of arms from participating in the States General 
with the nobility and the clergy, the Tiers Etat thereupon 
constituted itself into a National Assembly, and invited 
the two other orders to join it. 

The situation soon got out of hand. The Middle 



THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 77 

Class had formulated the theory, the lower classes under- 
took the execution, and we have the storming of the 
Bastille and the sacking of the chateaux of the nobles. 
Then followed such episodes as that of August 4th, when 
the abject political worthlessness of the aristocracy was 
made evident. These supporters of a rationalised abso- 
lutism, ostensibly the strong arm of law and order in the 
land, voluntarily surrendered their political privileges and 
immunities in a fit of helplessness, hoping by this act of 
sacrifice of something they knew they could not hold, 
to save something which they hoped that they could. 

Then came the famous statement of the Rights of 
Man, August 18, 1789, which we may for a moment 
compare with the Declaration of Right of 1689. Here 
we find the teachings of the middle class philosophers 
of the 1 8th century embodied in a document of State, 
solemnly adopted by the National Assembly, and later 
ratified by the King. 

The "Rights of Man" set forth that all men are orig- 
inally equal; that the ends of social union are liberty, 
property, security, and resistance to oppression; that 
sovereignty resides in the nation, and that all power 
emanates from it; that freedom consists in doing every- 
thing which does not injure another; that law is the ex- 
pression of the general will; that public burdens should 
be borne by all the members of the State in proportion 
to their fortunes; that the elective franchise should be 
extended to all; and that the exercise of natural rights 
has no other limit than their interference with the rights 
of others. 

In spite of the success of the Revolution the Middle 
Class, with characteristic moderation, clung to its cher- 
ished plan of a constitution, and we find the National 
Assembly transforming itself into a Constituent Assembly 



78 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

(January 1790) for the purpose of framing a constitu- 
tion, which was to make a place for the King, and even 
a House of Peers. Thereafter constitution-making pro- 
ceeded, and in 1791 a constitutional monarchy was de- 
creed in writing, as unlike the English model of constitu- 
tional monarchy as the declaration of the Rights of Man 
is unlike the Declaration of Right. The Constitution of 
1 79 1 showed clearly the influence of Rousseau, and his 
theory of the two powers — legislative and executive — in 
government, combined with that of the three powers 
adopted by the United States two years before. The 
Constitution of 1791 was believed by its framers to be a 
masterpiece of political wisdom. It was in effect a com- 
promise, an effort to amalgamate monarchy with the prin- 
ciple of the sovereignty of the people. While it made 
the King the servant of the will of the people, it put him 
in an untenable position in that he had no share in form- 
ing this will. 

The Constitution of 1791 had set up an irreconcilable 
opposition between the legislative and executive branches 
of government and rendered the smooth functioning of 
government impossible. The only way out of the diffi- 
culty was for one or the other to surrender its authority. 
The King felt that he could not; the Assembly would not. 
Thus the principle upon which the Constituent Assembly 
had framed its constitution, "le nation veut, le rot fait" 
soon proved itself inadequate.^ Whether consciously or 
not, the Middle Class had by this time abandoned its 
intended moderation, had lost its grip, and was for the 
time being becoming submerged by the rapidly rising 
influence of the masses. The Legislative Assembly which 

* Mirabeau, who was the President of the Constitutional Convention, in 
speaking of sovereign princes exclaimed: "Vous etes les salaries de vos 
sujets, et vous devez subir les conditions auxquelles vous est accorde ce 
salaire sous peine de le perdre," — Essai sur le Despotism, Vol. II, p. 279. 



THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 79 

undertook to govern In conjunction with the King, accom- 
plished nothing. It was swept aside by the National 
Convention, which abolished the monarchy, and decreed 
the death of the King in 1793. 

Immediately a fresh constitution was drawn up. It 
aimed at a representative system, following the American 
plan, republican in form, radical in content. The Reign 
of Terror ensued, and when the storm had subsided still 
another constitution was framed (1795). It provided 
for a democratic system of two councils, one of five 
hundred, the other of two hundred and fifty members; 
the former with the privilege of enacting legislation, 
the latter with the right to veto it. The executive au- 
thority was entrusted to a Directory of five; each director 
to be its president for three months. The Revolution 
was at an end. The Directory survived for four years, 
to make way for the Consulate, the dictatorship of 
Napoleon, and the Empire. 



CHAPTER VII 

The Idea of Nationalism 



THE EFFECTS OF THE REVOLUTION — THE NEW CONCEPT OF LIB- 
ERTY — NATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS — NAPOLEON I 

HIS POLITICAL IMPORTANCE — HIS HISTORICAL ROLE 



THE Revolution in France had made a clean sweep of 
the old institutions, had destroyed all political bar- 
riers between classes, and had left standing neither cen- 
tral nor local authority. Middle class public opinion had 
triumphed. The Middle Class had come to feel itself 
the ruling power in the State, In spite of the excesses 
committed in the name of the sovereignty of the people 
and the rights of man, these concepts survived as political 
catchwords. They were more precisely defined in the 
new political theories. Political freedom had been trans- 
ferred from being an attribute merely of the individual 
to that of the State. The individual will had fused itself 
with the national will. The State was no longer held a 
geographical expression, or even a sum of racial affinities, 
but an imponderable, intangible composite of opinion. As 
public opinion, so enthusiastically led by the proselyting 
political philosophers of the mid-i8th century, aroused 
the individual to cast off the yoke of constituted authority, 
and displaced the centre of gravity in the State from the 
governing to the governed, thus realising individual 
liberty, so now the French people, conscious of their 

[80] 



THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM 8i 

national vigor, were anxious to bestow upon adjoining 
States the benefits of political liberty, which they believed 
that they alone enjoyed. A crusading zeal had seized 
hold of the French. They felt it to be their mission to 
free the world from the burden of monarchical absolutism 
and divinely sanctioned kings, if need be by force of arms. 
They were convinced that they would be welcomed en- 
thusiastically by neighboring peoples. They outlined and 
carried into effect plans for the incorporation of the terri- 
tories of the latter in France, so that they might be satis- 
fied that the full privileges of "freedom" would be 
assured. 

It is in this spirit that the Convention of 1792 voted 
to render aid to all oppressed peoples, and to liberate 
them from their rulers. Instructions in this sense were 
issued to French commanders in the field, and we find 
French forces penetrating the Rhenish provinces, Bel- 
gium, and Savoy. By plebiscites carried through after 
campaigns of intense propaganda, these areas were in- 
corporated and made over into French departments. By 
1795 the frontiers of France had reached the Rhine. 
Such were the conquests carried out in the name of po- 
litical liberty. There is no evidence to show that up 
to this time the motives of action were other than un- 
selfish, though the methods used were in many instances 
arbitrary. 

Throughout this period French national feeling con- 
tinued to be strengthened. National self-consciousness, 
national dignity had become political factors of determin- 
ing importance. It is no surprise to find that it was in 
France that this sense of militant nationalism was first 
attained. The State fashioned in the image of man had 
been endowed with self-consciousness, and just as the 
Individual seeks new fields of activity, more room to 



82 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

grow, so the State — a composite, articulate, organic, 
individualised body politic — must be permitted to grow, 
to progress. 

Such was the first tangible result of the putting into 
practice of the theories of progress, of liberty, of hu- 
manity, which had been the daily gospel of Europe dur- 
ing the three preceding decades. With naive intensity the 
people of France proclaimed It not only their right, but 
their duty to impose political hberty upon those who they 
felt would not otherwise accept the new doctrines. 

The constructive phase of revolutionary propaganda 
had begun. Middle class cosmopolitanism had developed 
Into national egotism In an astonishingly brief period. 
The bolder ideas of cosmopolitanism seemed to offer 
no tangible possibility of successful materialisation. They 
were historically premature. The long road of national- 
ism had to be laid behind before international concepts 
could gain ground. 

The first flowering of unselfish abstract nationalism, 
the spreading of political liberty to all peoples, and the 
awakening of national self-consciousness, matured under 
such unusual circumstances, withered rapidly. By 1798 
France had abandoned her policy of political altruism; 
the proselyting zeal had spent itself or rather had 
been transformed into an inordinate lust for territorial 
conquest, which was to find in Napoleon the leader 
needed for such enterprise. 

Though the restless energy of Napoleon was Ill-suited 
to brook the harassing burden of a system of balances 
and checks, inseparable from the politlco-jurldic concept 
of the State, as expressed in constitutional government, 
yet he realised that this was the mould into which the 
State of his times must be fashioned, and he made use 
of it. He acknowledged that the people were the source 



THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM 83 

of all power, and embodied in himself their professed 
sovereignty. He opened the path of preferment to the 
individual and made fullest use of intelligence and merit 
to consolidate his position, and thus established a democ- 
ratised despotism.^ Napoleon's conception of his true 
historical mission was too strong to permit anything 
to stand in the way of its accomplishment. He bent his 
full energy to carry on the work of the Revolution, to 
secure the consolidation and the unification of greater 
France into a conscious national unit, and as a corollary, 
the hegemony of this national unit in Europe. He mo- 
nopolised for himself and directed this national conscious- 
ness and embodied the newly-created national egotism, 
which rendered France irresistible when faced by peoples 
whose national consciousness had not been awakened. 
As Louis XIV ^ had believed himself the embodiment 

*"To sum up the imperial system, it may be said that its basis is 
democratic, since all the powers are derived from the people; whilst all 
the organisation is hierarchical, since it provides different grades in 
order to stimulate all capacities. 

"Competition is opened to 40,000,000 souls ; merit alone distinguishes 
them; different degrees of the social scale reward them." — Napoleonic 
Ideas, Chap. Ill, written by Prince Louis Napoleon, later Napoleon III. 

"According to the doctrine set forth by Louis XIV in his own words: 
"The King represents the whole nation; all power vests in the King, 
and there is none other in the Kingdom but such as he decrees. The 
nation is of no importance {ne fait pas corps) in France, it is entirely 
absorbed in the person of the King. Kings are absolute monarchs, and 
have by the nature of things fullest authority and control over all the 
chattels and effects belonging not only to the laymen but to the clergy. He 
who has given Kings to the world willed it that they be respected as 
His lieutenants, reserving for Himself the sole right to examine their con- 
duct. It is His Will that whoever is born a subject should obey without 
question." — Quoted from C. Thibaudeau, "Histoire des Etats Generaux," 
Vol. Ill, p. 218. 

It is of interest to compare this with the Napoleonic theory: "Napoleon 
was the supreme chief of the State, the elect of the people, the represen- 
tative of the nation. In his public acts, it was the Emperor's pride to ac- 
knowledge that he owed everything to the French people. When at the 
foot of the Pyrenees, surrounded by kings, and the object of their homage, 
he disposed of thrones and empires, he claimed with energy the title of 
first representative of the people, a title which seemed about to be given 
exclusively to members of the legislative body." — Cf. Napoleonic Ideas, 
Chap. V. 



84 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

of the State — the patrimony of France, the country and 
its passive populations — so Napoleon during the years 
of his ascendancy embodied the newly-roused national 
consciousness of the active, participant people. Here 
we can see the source of his power, the spontaneity of 
his success. Had he confined himself to the single pur- 
pose of the national consolidation of France, it is possible 
that he would have modified the course of history and 
accelerated the smoother evolution of nationalism. But 
the distant conquests which he had undertaken at the 
behest of the Directory had tested the new-found strength 
of the State and awakened its sense of power in the pur- 
suit of difficult enterprise. The campaigns in Italy and 
in Prussia had made it plain to Napoleon that a closely- 
knit national State with conscript armies must inevitably 
conquer the older State organisation, where the morale 
had become debilitated, and the spirit of nationalism 
had not yet kindled a patriotic fervor. 



II 

No new contribution was made by Napoleon to the 
theory of State; no real progress in political practice is to 
be found during the years of his rule. He regulated and 
systematised the loose ends of Revolutionary policy, and 
restored a semblance of order and discipline to the newly- 
formed, conscious national will. He invented little, but 
borrowed copiously and judiciously: from the bees for 
his coat of arms from Chllperic to the ceremonial of 
his court from Charlemagne; from the Pandects of Jus- 
tinian for his code of laws to the ideas of Rousseau for 
public pronunclamentos.^ Most significant of all, he 

^ Cf. the interesting study by Rene Johannet, Le Principe des Na- 
tionalites. 



THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM 8s 

adopted in so far as he was able the cardinal tenet of the 
programme of government of the dethroned Bourbons, 
their family policy, allying himself with the House of 
Austria by marriage, and placing his relatives on the 
thrones of adjoining States as outposts of the power of 
France. In his wars of conquest he sought elbow room 
for the growing national State. The discipline of these 
conflicts served to consolidate France into a strongly cen- 
tralised Nation-State. 

The more one inquires into the conscious political role 
of the first French Emperor, the more one realises how 
deep was the impress of middle class influence on his char- 
acter. To him power was the rational attribute, the log- 
ical objective of the individual. He conceived power in a 
subjective sense and his point of view remained to the end 
that of a confirmed middle class individualist. He was 
dazzled by the concept of cosmopolitanism, while he made 
himself the missionary of nationalism. It would seem as 
though he believed that by his successful wars, carried on 
with conscripted, national-service armies, he could realise 
the middle class ideal of a federated, cosmopolitan World 
State. Napoleon was never able wholly to shake off the 
incubus of the doctrinaire teachings of pre-Revolutionary 
days. He sought no blending of national groups, no fu- 
sion of peoples on a basis of equality. Himself appar- 
ently devoid of a feeling of patriotism, by birth, tradition, 
and temperament an Italian, he had placed himself unre- 
servedly at the head of the French, as the people that had 
first attained national consciousness.^ He apparently 
never looked beyond the hegemony of France in a fed- 
erated European State. Here we find the motive which 

* Years later at St. Helena we find him exclaiming: "If I had been 
born a German I would have united the thirty million Germans under 
my sceptre . . . and they would have remained faithful to me." 



86 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

impelled him to endeavor to unite the congeries of Euro- 
pean peoples; Swedes, Spaniards, Prussians, Danes, Ital- 
ians. Tsardom and the Papacy, absolutists, monarchists, 
republicans, all were called upon to play their part. 

Not content with imitating the Bourbon family system, 
Napoleon openly sought to erect a World State with 
France as the head, and the other States as the subor- 
dinate members of the body politic. Engrossed though 
he was by the mirage of a cosmopolitan World State, 
Napoleon was to the end of his reign conscious of the im- 
portance of national unity as the basis of the political re- 
generation of the various peoples of Europe, as he had 
been in the days when, in accepting the crown of Italy, 
he declared to the deputation which waited upon him: "I 
have always had the intention of creating a free and 
independent Italian nation. I will accept the crown, but 
for only so long as my interests require it." 

History offers few such examples of inflexible irony. 
For it is difl'icult to accept the view that Napoleon had 
not the breadth of vision or political acumen necessary 
to foresee that by carrying the torch of nationalism so 
high — in Germany, in Italy, in Spain, wherever his armies 
penetrated and remained — the spirit of national self-con- 
sciousness would be aroused, and would grow until these 
peoples, in turn becoming nationally conscious, would 
struggle to secure national independence and ultimately 
compass his overthrow. He thus became the most active 
agent of his own downfall. As Lamartine has expressed 
it, "ayant souleve les nat'tonaUtes, les nationalites Ven- 
gloutissaient." 

Europe as Napoleon found it was strewn with the 
wreckage of decayed political systems; there was little 
that was glorious or sacred left standing, save a rich fund 
of high political ideals; a real and vigorous faith in 



THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM 87 

political liberty. It would have been too great a task even 
for a Napoleon to have erected a World State out of 
the peoples of Europe who, for centuries politically pas- 
sive, were just awakening to national and political con- 
sciousness. His reign was, therefore, of necessity ephem- 
eral. He had built his State out of a patch-work of de- 
crepit absolutisms, into which he had sought to breathe 
the breath of national life. 

However, it may be said of Napoleon with even greater 
truth than it has been said of Caesar that when "fresh 
nations in free self-movement commenced their race to- 
wards the new and higher goals, there were found among 
them not a few in which the seed sown by Caesar had 
sprung up, and which owed, as they still owe to him, their 
historical individuality." ^ 

^ Mommsen, History of Rome, closing paragraph. 



CHAPTER VIII 

The Restoration 

THE SPREAD OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT SICILY (1812) 

SPAIN (1812) — FRANCE (1814) — MINOR GERMAN STATES 

— THE DESTINY OF EUROPE THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 

THE HOLY ALLIANCE — THE POLICY OF LEGIT- 
IMACY AIX-LA-CHAPELLE TROPPAU LAI- 
BACH THE MONROE DOCTRINE 



PATRIOTISM, which during the French Revolutionary 
period had evolved out of compatriotism, ^with which 
it may be held synonymous, the binding of men in a 
strongly-knit social group by ties of family, of kinship, 
of interest, the cockade of faction, the conviction of party, 
and lastly by an awakening of national consciousness, had 
served to render France dominant in Europe. Political 
unity had hastened the evolution of this patriotic national 
self-consciousness in France. Now national self-con- 
sciousness easily learned, zealously pursued, fanatically 
practised, was to lead to political liberty and national 
independence among other peoples, in the first instance 
in their emancipation from the control of their French 
initiators, as the preliminary to a long struggle for con- 
stitutional freedom. 

While France was engaged in carrying out Napoleon's 
programmes of cosmopolitan aggrandisement and na- 
tional enlightenment, England remained steadfastly aloof, 
relatively untouched by the influence of revolutionary 

188] 



THE RESTORATION 89 

policy. For the people of England remained impervious 
to the blandishments of French political doctrines, which 
they looked upon with mistrust and suspicion. They 
sought to combat the French political theories of national 
self-consciousness with their own more cherished principle 
of individual liberty. The ruling Middle Class in Eng- 
land, thoroughly frightened by the excesses of the French 
Revolution, not only became increasingly conservative, 
but also exerted its whole strength and resources to check 
the progress of French political propaganda. The doc- 
trine of nationalism, or national consciousness, as the 
basis of an independent State, was thoroughly distasteful 
to the English, who relied on the united strength of the 
various peoples — Scots, Welsh, Irish, as well as English 
— to support the fabric of the State. We can here trace 
the causes of the reactionary influence which led to the 
further tightening of the reins of parliamentary control, 
as exemplified by the abolition of the Irish Parliament 
after the disturbances of 1798 afforded the desired op- 
portunity of making Ireland an integral part of the 
kingdom (1801). This anti-nationalist policy at home 
did not prevent England from fostering nationalist propa- 
ganda on the Continent, and cooperating actively with the 
Spaniards, Italians, and Prussians in their plans for na- 
tional independence to drive out the French and crush 
Napoleon. 

As England during the Middle Ages had on the whole 
remained outside the great leavening influence of the 
Crusades, and, though bound to participate in European 
policy, yet had evolved her own peculiar political insti- 
tutions, so now the country felt only indirectly the effects 
of the sudden growth of nationalist principles which was 
to shape the political destiny of the peoples of Europe 
during the 19th century. For a time it appeared as 



go THE TREND OF HISTORY 

though this destiny was to depend solely upon the will of 
France, and the retrenchment of England had in it many 
of the characteristics of despair. Nevertheless when 
after 1808 it became evident that Napoleonic plans were 
unrealisable, we find English emissaries abroad urging the 
advantages of British constitutional liberty, as against the 
Napoleonic plans of cosmopolitan despotism, at the same 
time making good use of the patriotic ferment aroused 
by French nationalist theories. 

Thus we find that it was the English Minister to Sicily, 
acting under instructions from his Government, who 
brought about the framing of the first constitution on the 
English model to be adopted on the Continent (18 12). 
The Sicilian constitution was built on a modernised Eng- 
lish plan. While it provided for a Lower House and a 
Chamber of Peers, the King remained a separate power, 
outside of Parliament, though parliamentary sanction was 
made obligatory for most of his acts. All feudal privi- 
leges and immunities were suppressed, and the influence 
of the French doctrine of the rights of man was recognised 
as underlying the attempt to amalgamate revolutionary 
theory with English monarchical principles, the latter pre- 
vailing in form. 

In the same year in Spain, with a great part of the 
country still under the rule of the French, a very complete 
constitution was drawn up, which recognised the constitu- 
tional monarchical principle, provided for a King, but 
included only a single Chamber or Cortes, with no House 
of Peers, and made the King subservient to the will of 
Parliament. Neither of these attempts to establish a 
constitutional system survived the reaction which set in 
upon the downfall of Napoleon. On the day when Na- 
poleon set sail for Elba (May 4, 18 14) the restored 
King of Spain, Ferdinand VIII, celebrated the circum- 



THE RESTORATION 91 

stance by abrogating the constitution, and it was not 
until 1836 that absolutism was overthrown; and only 
after prolonged revolutionary struggles was constitutional 
monarchy at last established (1875). 

In Sicily a similar fate befell the constitution, and 
the heavy hand of Austrian despotism prevented the 
realisation of a constitutional regime until the coun- 
try was liberated by Garibaldi and united to Italy 
(i860). 

If we look through the pages of the history of the 
struggle for constitutional government throughout Eu- 
rope we meet everywhere with the same vicissitudes. In 
France Louis XVIII granted a charter (June 4, 18 14). 
It shows traces of the influences of English principles, 
but left more power in the hands of the King, aflirming 
"that all authority in France rests in the King." This 
charter provided for two Houses, but electoral privilege 
to the Lower House did not take into consideration the 
great mass of the population which had become politically 
conscious, and had played such an important part in the 
affairs of State during the revolutionary period. Thus 
the charter acted as an irritant, and served to foment the 
discontent, which manifested itself in the revolutions of 
1830 and 1848. 

So it was in Germany. When the days of the Napo- 
leonic regime had passed, and the Wars of Liberation had 
freed the country from foreign occupation, the reaction- 
ary forces were still too strong to permit the establish- 
ment of more liberal political institutions. Particularist 
influences had not been sufficiently overcome to allow the 
national consciousness, which had been so spontaneously 
aroused during the period of Sturm und Drang, to en- 
trust the conduct of public affairs to a strong central au- 
thority. Some of the minor German princes did grant 



92 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

limited constitutional rights: Nassau in 1814, Baden and 
Bavaria in 18 18, Wurttemburg in 18 19, and others later. 
But as long as the larger states, Prussia and Austria, re- 
mained under absolutist control, these minor efforts were 
without immediate political significance. 



II 

The Revolution had awakened the spirit of national- 
ism, the Restoration did all in its power to suppress it. 
The Revolution, the work of the Middle Class, had 
spread liberalism among the peoples of Europe; the Res- 
toration made it its duty to drive these peoples back 
under the yoke of absolutism. The Revolution and the 
Napoleonic regime had been a period of conscious na- 
tionalist expansion, of growth, of action. There was cur- 
rent a broad faith in political liberty and a fervent con- 
viction that man possessed certain imprescriptible rights. 
Now there ensued a period of nervous unrest and irrita- 
bility throughout Europe. For the time being the ex- 
hilarating principle of nationalism was to be supplanted 
by a political subterfuge, well suited to the petty temper 
of the Restoration. 

It is claimed that Talleyrand, in order to save France 
from partition, at the Congress of Vienna advanced the 
principle of legitimacy as the test of rational political 
practice. The idea in itself has little to commend it. It 
is a natural resultant of war-weariness; a desire to restore 
the regime of days gone by; as such it is an historical 
anachronism, and is inevitably doomed to failure. But if 
put into practice, such a political doctrine can and does 



THE RESTORATION 93 

retard the natural flow of historical development. While 
it never leads to great events, it keeps men stirred up and 
disaffected until finally it is eliminated by the force of its 
own ineptitude. It may thus be looked upon as a para- 
sitic doctrine, of which there are numerous examples in 
history. 

Legitimacy as a political doctrine claims that authority 
in the State is not founded on power, but on accepted prac- 
tice and high antiquity. As Pascal has remarked: "Jus- 
tice is that which is established, and thus all of our laws 
which are established will be held of necessity to be just 
without being examined, for the reason that they are 
established." ^ 

The bastard rule of Napoleon and his satellites was an 
offence against the social order, which had to be wiped 
out. The legitimate rulers must again be seated on their 
thrones, and the old institutions restored. Incidentally 
the principle of nationality was to be suppressed; national 
aspirations were to be crushed. Such was the doctrine 
which was to be the mainspring of all political combina- 
tion and manoeuvring. The Congress of Vienna, which 
spared France from spoliation on legitimatist grounds, 
undid the constructive work initiated by Napoleon, again 
dismembered Italy and Germany, establishing there a 
number of petty sovereign States; partitioned Poland 
afresh, and, as if to show its contempt for the principle 
of nationality, provided for the forcible union of two 
racially and religiously antagonistic peoples in the patch- 
ing up of a single State out of Belgium and Holland. 
At the same time a Grand Alliance composed of the 
legitimate sovereigns of the five great States of Europe 
was formed to regulate the relations of the States of 

* Cf. Pensees sur la Morale. 



94 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

Christendom, "on principles of Christian charity." ^ It 
proved to be, as was to be expected, a combination of 
absolutist monarchs bent upon assuring the maintenance 
of the status quo ante on the basis of the territorial settle- 
ment of 1 8 15. The Bourbons were everywhere to be re- 
stored to their ancient royal occupations, and by a special 
article of the text of the Alliance, the Bonaparte family 
was excluded forever from occupying a throne. 

Legitimacy was henceforth to be the sole test of fitness, 
not merely in the administration of affairs of State and in 
politics, but religious questions, educational matters, even 
scientific research and philosophic speculation were to be 
subject to legitimatlst supervision and censorship. The 

* It is to be recalled that this alliance (November 20, 1815) brought 
within the realm of practical politics the vague evangelical generalities 
of the treaty signed by the Emperors of Russia and Austria and the 
King of Prussia, known as the Holy Alliance (September 1815). Here 
is set forth "in the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity" a 
basis for establishing a European policy: "conformably to the words of the 
Holy Scriptures which command all men to consider each other as 
brethren, the three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds 
of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and, considering each other as 
fellow countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend 
each other aid and assistance." And further that "the three allied 
Princes looking on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to 
govern three branches of the One family, namely, Austria, Prussia, and 
Russia, thus confessing that the Christian world, of which they and their 
people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign than Him to whom 
alone power really belongs, because in Him alone are found all the 
treasures of love, science, and infinite wisdom; that is to say, God, our 
Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life." Here 
• was an attempt to enunciate a new t> pe of mystical cosmopolitanism 
which would justify any reactionary policy pursued to check the spread of 
Revolutionary propaganda. All European sovereigns (except the Pope 
and the Sultan) were invited by the three Emperors to sign the Covenant 
of the Holy Alliance and with the exception of the Prince Regent of 
England did so. Even the English ruler let it be known that it was only 
owing to constitutional disability that he refrained from appending his 
signature, as he agreed fully with the principles set forth in the treaty 
and intended to be guided by its "sacred maxims." Though the Holy 
Alliance never had any practical application as a diplomatic instrument, 
yet the name came to be applied to the reactionary policy pursued by 
European cabinets during the ensuing decade, and fixed itself firmly in the 
public mind as a conspiracy of kings against the attempts of their sub- 
jects to gain political liberty. 



THE RESTORATION 95 

Cabinets of Europe were now kept busy with their new 
Inquisitorial functions, repressing and checking spiritual 
Insubordination and political heresy. Government degen- 
erated into purely police functions; politics, to police- 
court transactions. 

Few periods In history ^ offer so sorry a spectacle as 
this decade (18 15-1825), filled with the machinations, 
schemes, and intrigues of the miscellany of diplomatists 
whose naturally limited horizon had found in legitimacy a 
policy well suited to their talents. The Congresses of 
Aix-la-Chapelle (18 18), Troppau (1820), Laibach 
(1821), and Verona (1822), called to consider ways 
and means to enforce legitimatlst policy, proved how 
hopeless the task had become of attempting to govern 
without the consent of the governed. At Troppau, Rus- 
sia, Austria, and Prussia had issued a circular note setting 
forth the principle of joint armed intervention in any 
State in which revolutionary movements might arise. No 
longer able to keep order within their own boundaries, 
the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian sovereigns agreed to 
render to one another mutual assistance. England was 
the first to withdraw from the legitimatlst coalition by 
refusing to be a party to such a compact. The prin- 
ciple of legitimacy was already beginning to be under- 
mined. Canning gave it a further severe blow when he 
actively supported the contention of President Monroe 
of the United States that any attempt to extend the 

*An interesting comparison might be drawn between this period and 
the decade which began in 1919. Then it was agreed "to renew at 
stated intervals meetings sacred to the great common interests and to the 
examination of the measures which in each of these periods shall be 
deemed most salutary to the peace and prosperity of Europe." The idea 
was to make these congresses a regular institution through which the 
Great Powers should control Europe and watch France. — Cf. Seignobos, 
A Political History of Contemporary Europe, Part III, Chap. XXV. By a 
slight change of names of States we may ascertain the historical back- 
ground of much that appears enigmatical in present-day history. 



96 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

European system to the Western Hemisphere, as threat- 
ened by the Holy Alliance (1823) in its plans to restore 
the revolted Spanish Colonies in America to Spain, would 
be viewed by the United States as dangerous to their 
peace and safety, "an unfriendly disposition towards the 
United States." The Holy Alliance thereupon desisted 
from its plan of intervention in American affairs. 

The ruling princes of continental Europe, concerned 
solely with their coterie policy, took little account of 
practical political problems. They had never been in 
contact with public opinion, which they pretended to de- 
spise. No longer directed with skill, nor assessed at its 
real value by the existing governments, neglected except 
when it expressed itself obnoxiously in the press, public 
opinion found itself without leadership, out of sympathy 
with public policy, and again passed under the control 
of the Middle Class, who for the time being deprived of 
political rights, was to make use of this instrument to 
gain control of power in the State. 

Legitimacy as a political principle had, as was to be 
expected of so rococo a doctrine, failed to gain the sup- 
port of the great body of politically-enlightened men, 
who had been taught by the lessons of the Revolution to 
take an interest in political affairs. Thus, in spite of the 
rigorous and unabated persecution and irritating repres- 
sion resorted to by the legitimatist Governments, a new 
and vigorous public opinion was spreading, undermining 
absolutism at every turn. 



CHAPTER IX 

The Aftermath 



THE TEMPER OF THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY — NEW 

SCHOOLS OF POLITICS — THE SOCIALIST DOCTRINE — ST. SIMON 

— THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMICS 



THE temper of the 19th century was already beginning 
to show itself radically different from that of the 
T8th. The i8th century had been concerned with 
generalities, had dogmatically asserted the omnipotence 
of human reason and the supremacy of the individual. 
It had exalted liberty and equality; sought to frame gov- 
ernments on principles, and deduce political programmes 
from theory. This ideology had covered France with 
ruins, had drenched Europe in blood, dislocated society, 
and brought about a reaction so violent that it had 
strengthened the hand of monarchical absolutism, and 
plunged the peoples of continental Europe, including the 
Middle Class, into a condition of political servitude more 
vexatious and harassing than that experienced under the 
old regime. The Restoration had taught caution. It 
was now felt that too much trust had been placed in the 
individual; too much confidence in high-flown generalities 
and in a priori theories. Those holding the most diver- 
gent opinions, the fiercest opponents of the Revolution as 
well as its apologists, agreed that the criterion of political 
theory and practice must be sought, not in the individual, 

[97] 



^8 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

but in the nation. In brief, individualism, the keynote of 
political speculation during the i8th century, which had 
made possible the career of a Napoleon, was to give way 
to nationalism. Private judgment was denounced as 
fallacious; the judgment of the majority believed to be 
more reliable than the wisest council of kings. 

We now find in France, on the one hand, a so-called 
theocratic school of politics springing up. Its followers 
claimed to have discovered in tradition the source of all 
historical truth. They rejected the doctrine of perfectibil- 
ity and progress as an illusion. They held that faith, not 
reason, and submission to constituted authority must gov- 
ern social relations; for "sovereignty in the secular 
sphere corresponds to infallibility in the religious sphere." 
In spite of their outward adherence to the doctrines of 
the ancien regime it was the leader of this movement, 
Joseph de Maistre, who was among the first to proclaim 
the new nationalist thesis, when he declared : "There is no 
man in the world. I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Rus- 
sians, but as for man I declare I have never met him in 
my life." At the opposite extreme a frankly radical so- 
cial theory was being evolved by a group of politico- 
social innovators who became known as Socialists. 
Though they accepted progress and maintained that his- 
tory cannot turn back a page, yet they viewed with ab- 
horrence the middle class doctrine of unfettered personal 
liberties and a social order based on maintaining in- 
dividualist theories. According to their view, the in- 
dividual is to be held of secondary importance. Society 
is not to be regenerated by man, but man by society. It 
was not the abstract man of pre-Revolutionary days, but 
a nationally conscious individual who felt himself a mem- 
ber of a definite social group. The individual, shorn of 



THE AFTERMATH 99 

all of his insignia of rank and political prerogative, de- 
personalised, was by the Socialists considered to be of 
value merely as a social unit. 

The first broad forecast of Socialism is to be found in 
the works of St. Simon. ^ He claimed that neither the 
Church nor the State had been able to fulfil its true social 
mission and that therefore a new social order was neces- 
sary, based on socialist principles "scientifically" arrived 
at.^ Though it was left to his followers to systematise 
his ideas, it is clear that St. Simon had in mind the erec- 
tion of an industrial State, scientifically managed by those 
who were engaged upon the production of the good 
things of life. He aimed at the elimination of the 
consuming class which had hitherto ruled the State, 
confident that this would lead ultimately to the aboli- 
tion of war. The chief importance of St. Simon as a 
precursor of Socialism lay in the fact that he was 
among the first to insist upon limiting the scope of the 
unfettered individualism which had been left as a heri- 
tage by the Revolution. 

Political emancipation had always been the objective of 
the Middle Class. The politico-juridic concept of the 
State, which in everyday practice became known as con- 

* Socialism in its present historical sense is a product of the 19th century. 
Though what may be termed socialist views were held by many i8th 
century philosophers and pamphleteers, yet they were generally vague 
and Utopian in character. During the Revolution, Noel Baboeuf, a polit- 
ical agitator, propounded a definite scheme of a socialist society which 
had considerable influence during the early years of the 19th century. He 
advocated a fantastic plan whereby the State was to inherit all property 
and sought to outline a rigid code in order to arrive at social equality. 
In his view the aim of society is the happiness of all, and "happiness 
consists in equality." It is significant of the temper of the Revolution 
that Baboeuf was executed for taking part in a conspiracy to establish 
a. government which would carry out his principles. Many of the doc- 
trines later advocated by Fourier and others are traceable to Baboeuf. 

'' Cf . Du Systeme Industriel (1821) and Le Nouveau Christianisme 
(1825). 



100 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

stitutional government, was a middle class creation. In 
establishing this form of government, the middle class 
political theorists and politicians had relied on what they 
believed to be the innate moderation of man, the convic- 
tion that man is born good, that evil springs from his 
social environment, and that the reform of society can 
be effected only by the reform of the individual. The 
Revolution had strengthened this individualist bias. In 
a measure it served to transfer this individualism from 
the individual to the State, and Invest the State with those 
privileges, characteristics, and prerogatives which It was 
believed belonged to the Individual. The epoch which 
followed was to fix more firmly, and at last lead to the full 
triumph of the middle class principles of the politlco- 
juridic organisation of the State. However, a new and 
increasingly numerous group of men, followers of St. 
Simon and later of Karl Marx, was to take up the strug- 
gle against these principles, not so much In the first In- 
stance for political liberty as for economic independence 
as a stepping-stone to social equality. 

For the time being public opinion remained Infinitely 
less self-confident than it had been during the i8th cen- 
tury, less ready to jump at conclusions, determined to test 
theory In the crucible before putting it Into practice. This 
was in a large measure due to the fact that the average 
man who had prospered during the later days of the 
Revolution and the Empire had grown accustomed to 
concern himself little with his rights, and to confine his 
attention to the care of his interests. It would be Impos- 
sible to arrive at a conception of the spirit of the new 
age, and gain an understanding of the causes which led 
to the facile triumph of the Restoration, without in- 
quiring into the preponderating part played by economic 
expansion. 



THE AFTERMATH loi 



II 



Economic freedom appeared less difficult to secure, 
less vexatious to safeguard, its benefits were found to be 
more tangible, its influence more peaceful, its results more 
immediately satisfying to the individual, than the hard- 
ships which had to be endured to secure so incommensur- 
able a benefit as political freedom. The desire for polit- 
ical emancipation had led to the wars of the Revolution- 
ary and Napoleonic era, which had' devastated Europe, 
had squandered the wealth of nations, and left the people 
burdened with taxation and misery. It is not to be won- 
dered at that peace, even at the cost of political servitude, 
should for a time be welcomed. The lesson which the 
Napoleonic interlude had taught was that great men, 
who employ their talents in affairs of State, disturb the 
social fabric and confer few benefits. Like natural laws, 
they are violent and often vicious. Whereas the applica- 
tion of genius in producing mechanical inventions, the 
harnessing of steam for motive power, for example, which 
further industrial enterprise and increase material well- 
being, alone can confer lasting good and accelerate prog- 
ress. The study of mathematics and physical sciences had 
led to such inventions. The use of new machinery and 
motive power in industry, and the consequent industrial 
and commercial expansion, had given added influence to 
the Middle Class, and assisted it in consolidating its 
control of the means of production. This gave a fresh 
impulse to competitive expansion, which reacted on the 
political life of the period. 

The Middle Class, while retaining its distinctively 
undisciplined, individualist attitude which found expres- 
sion in competition, was alert to the political possibilities 



I02 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

of the new industrialism, which might assure for it as- 
cendancy in the State. It was perceived that material 
wellbeing and wealth would afford the Middle Class the 
leisure necessary to pursue the struggle for political power 
with greater efficacy, and that the industrial movement, 
which was developing rapidly into the discipline of the 
factory system, might best afford the social security which 
it craved. 

It was from England, where the control of the body 
politic by the Middle Class had been long and steadily 
evolving, that the industrial system had spread to the 
Continent. Free competition, which was the outcome of 
the middle class individualist doctrine, as expressed in the 
terms of "a fair field and no favorites," or again "chacun 
pour sot et Dieu pour tous," rejected cooperation as an 
antiquated survival of the guild system. Labor was held 
to be a commodity; the workman an economic coefficient/ 
of mechanical development. The possibility of the ma- 1 
terial or social improvement of the condition of the work- J 
ing classes was not considered. That the mein who 
composed it should receive political rights for their bene- 
fit as a class, or even to ameliorate their economic con- 
dition, was held presumptuous. Human nature was dis- 
regarded. Economic laws were formulated in which the 
profits of the middle class employer were calculated in 
relation to wages as fixed quantities, the bare minimum to 
sustain life, wherein the wage-earner as a human being 
was not taken into consideration. The Middle Class, en- 
grossed with economic questions which it endeavored to 
reduce to equations as rigid as those of mathematical 
science, paid no heed to questions of social development. 
Small enterprises, controlled by the workers themselves, 
a survival of the older system, were being rapidly ab- 
sorbed by middle class capitalists, who organised their 



THE AFTERMATH 103 

business on a large scale, and acquired an efficiency and 
economy in production which it had hitherto been im- 
possible to attain. 

As a result the working classes were constantly receiv- 
ing into their midst members of the Middle Class who 
had been forced down by the competitive system, which by 
a process of selection stimulated the strong elements to 
increased activity and wealth, and cast out into the great 
mass of unorganised workers those who had not, for one 
reason or another, been able to prosper. On the one 
hand the middle class capitalist, by enforcing factory 
discipline, was preparing the way for the rise of class 
consciousness among the workers, and on the other, as 
a result of the ruthless individualism of the competitive 
system, the working classes were receiving a better edu- 
cated, more intelligent, but embittered leaven from the 
lower Middle Class. Such were the immediate effects of 
economic expansion, when the Middle Class on the Con- 
tinent felt itself strong enough to seek political con- 
trol in the State, which it now considered its rightful 
possession. 



CHAPTER X 

The Triumph of the Middle Class 

GREEK INDEPENDENCE THE REVOLUTION OF 183O — LOUIS 

PHILIPPE KING OF THE FRENCH THE WHIGS IN POWER — 

THE REFORM ACT (1832) — BELGIAN INDEPENDENCE 

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS — THE COMPETITIVE 
IDEAL — CAPITALISM AND NATIONALISM — THE 

BUSINESS MAN IN POLITICS THE CASE OF 

ALGERIA PORTENTS OF DECAY — 

CHARTISM 



LEGITIMACY, which had succeeded in forcing national- 
ism temporarily into abeyance, declined after 1825, 
and nationalism once more came to the fore. The right 
of intervention, formulated at the Congress of Laibach, 
was seized upon by the Nationalists as an entering wedge. 
It was now declared that such intervention was "legiti- 
mate," when it supported the principle of nationality. 
Here was a doctrine which was to lead far afield during 
later periods. At the time it found immediate application 
in the affairs of the Greeks, who for six years had been 
struggling to emancipate themselves from the control of 
the Porte and set up an independent national State, when 
at last in July 1827, France, England, and Russia de- 
cided to intervene. The motive which stimulated these 
governments to action, in spite of their marked distaste 
for nationalist principles, was neither the pressure of 
public opinion nor coordination of policy. Each State 
that participated was inspired by its own individual 
policy, consonant with its aims. The naval battle of 

[104] 



THE TRIUMPH OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 105 

Navarino, which by the destruction of the Turkish fleet 
brought about the success of the Greek cause, and the first 
practical application of the nationalist principle, also wit- 
nessed the first use of steam vessels in warfare. In both 
senses it was a distinct triumph for the Middle Class. 
The result was the creation of an independent Greek State 
(1829), and nationalism was firmly fixed in the public 
mind as the new guiding motive of public policy, which 
middle class publicists took great pains to exploit to 
advantage. 

Nationalism as a political principle is the natural 
corollary of middle class individualism. Both depend 
directly on the competitive ideal. Both are antagonistic 
to cooperation. In its simplest form nationalism would 
seem to indicate that "every people has the right to form 
an independent State," but in reality it came to mean that 
"every people has the right to form an independent State 
which can as such survive." Competition was to become 
the basis of political liberty as it was that of economic 
independence. Henceforth trade principles were to pre- 
vail in politics. The Middle Class felt that it had dis- 
covered the secret of economic wellbeing in free compe- 
tition, and that by applying these methods to politics it 
could secure the reins of government and further its 
personal fortunes. Politics and economics were linked 
together; political motive was given a semblance of life 
in nationalism ; economic design as a political incentive, 
though present, remained concealed for a prolonged 
period. 

II 

The first historically successful experiment which the 
Middle Class made in gaining the seats of sovereignty 



io6 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

in continental Europe came in France in 1830, when the 
opportunity was offered by the blind policy of Charles X, 
to whom even the Restoration seemed too progressive. 
The coup d'etat which drove him from his throne was 
accomplished with such facility that the middle class 
leaders were not prepared to handle the crisis unaided. 
It is typical of future method that they had no desire 
to overthrow the monarchy, but merely to gain control 
of the government. So that when the revolution had 
accomplished its purpose and brought the Middle Class 
into power we find a Paris banl<:er, Lafitte, proposing 
the crown of France to Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, 
who had taken no part in the revolution, in terms re- 
minding one of typical business methods. "You are to 
take your choice between a crown and a passport," the 
new middle class king-maker is said to have remarked. 
On August 9, 1830, Louis Philippe was established on 
the throne, not as King of France but as King of the 
French. This subtle distinction of title was to prove of 
importance for future nationalist development. It im- 
plied the acceptance of the principle that sovereignty had 
been conferred upon the Prince by the French people, or 
rather by their self-appointed middle class representa- 
tives. The old idea of France, the country and its people, 
the passive inarticulate property of kings, had for all 
time given way to the newer principle of the nation, 
the French people, who were represented as sovereign 
by the title of their King. Louis Philippe showed that 
he felt himself the enthroned representative of the Mid- 
dle Class. He called upon his banker-sponsor to form 
a cabinet, cultivated amicable relations with foreign 
States, repressed extremists, and inaugurated the juste 
milieu policy of moderation, so pleasing to the bour- 
geoisie. 



THE TRIUMPH OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 107 

The year 1830 is of much importance in the annals 
of the struggle of the Middle Class for political ascend- 
ancy. It marks its definite control of the State, the 
beginning of a new practice in politics. French political 
theory and English economic practice were to be the 
impelling motives in the evolution of the new theory 
of State. Both bore a distinctively middle class im- 
print. Nationalism and capitalism were developing hand 
in hand. 

Four months after the Middle Class in France had 
gained control of the State, in England the Tory Gov- 
ernment, headed by the Duke of Wellington, resigned 
(November 1830), and the Whigs, or middle class lib- 
erals, came into power and carried through the Reform 
Act (1832). By this act their representation in Parlia- 
ment was extended, and their actual control of policy, 
which was inspired chiefly by economic motives, was 
secured. 

Profiting by the occasion of the French revolution of 
1830, Belgium had revolted, seceded from Holland, and 
established an independent government, which the Brit- 
ish and French in conference at London undertook to le- 
galise. The Dutch objected to the terms proposed and 
resorted to arms to regain the lost territory. The French 
thereupon occupied Antwerp, and a joint British and 
French fleet blockaded the Dutch coast. In 1833 ^ 
definite treaty of separation was signed, and Belgian in- 
dependence was assured. 

The new middle class government of France, while 
opposed to war with a people of equal strength and 
economic development which might interfere with trade 
and dislocate industry, and therefore anxious to cultivate 
friendly relations with strong, immediate neighbors, 
viewed in an altogether different light the possibility of 



io8 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

absorbing weaker and more backward States.^ As busi- 
ness men held that the absorption of weaker competitors 
who were not exploiting their industries with sufficient 
energy was their legitimate and natural right, so for the 
first time this thesis was held to apply in the field of 
political expansion. 

Across the Mediterranean lay a rich, unexploited coun- 
try, Algeria, It had been for a long time a weak though 
annoying neighbor. The Algerians molested French 
traders and hampered French business enterprise, more 
especially those engaged in the coral fisheries off Bona. 
The French Government had an outstanding loan with 
certain Algiers bankers, which had been the cause of 
friction and dispute. These pretexts were now for the 
first time held ample motives for armed intervention. 

Under Charles X the French Government had, since 
1827, kept up a desultory blockade of Algiers, but had 
taken no definite aggressive steps when, on April 30, 
1830, in a final attempt to placate the rising discontent 
of the Middle Class by acceding to its insistent de- 
mands for more vigorous action in Algeria, an imposing 
French force was landed on the African coast, and 
Algiers was occupied. Three months later Louis Philippe 
and the middle class government came into power. No 
time was lost. The campaign to subdue the country was 
energetically pushed. The drastic methods adopted by 
the French, such as the massacre of an entire Arab tribe 
at El Uffia, and the execution of Arab chieftains who 
had been invited to Algiers under a French safe-conduct, 
the plundering of rich estates, the desecration of ceme- 

* It was probably part of the French programme to prepare for the 
annexation of Belgium on nationalist grounds, but the veto of England, 
the hostility of Prussia, and the opposition of Austria prevented the 
accomplishment of this design at the time, and Belgium was neutralised, 
so as to be placed beyond the absorptive aims of French expansion (lisg). 



THE TRIUMPH OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 109 

teries and holy places, indicate sufficiently the methods 
adopted by the Middle Class in power of which one may 
find so many examples during the later years of the 19th 
century. These methods were altogether in keeping with 
current theories prevalent in competitive business, where 
the weak were considered natural prey, to be blamed 
rather than pitied for their misfortune. 

The influence of the business man in politics had led 
to the exploitation of foreign policy by business methods, 
and the example set by the French in Algeria was to be 
followed later on by all great States. It is necessary 
to bear in mind the inauguration of this policy under the 
newly created middle class government of France in 
order to keep clearly in view the close parallelism between 
nationalism and capitalism.^ 



Ill 

As during the i8th century, certain members of the 
aristocracy had held what were then considered advanced 
views and helped to further the spread of the new middle 
class doctrines of political liberty and progress, to the 
great detriment of their own interests as members of the 
ruling class, so now we find a group of middle class think- 
ers for the first time occupying themselves with the inter- 
ests and needs of the working classes. It was in England, 
where the industrial movement had grown most rapidly 
and the working classes had been gaining in strength, 

^ The exploitation of India and other English colonial domains had 
been granted under charters and was carried on through the medium 
of companies avowedly as commercial enterprises. The occupation of 
Algeria, by an armed French force in behalf of business interests, was 
the first instance of its kind undertaken directly and officially by a 
government. It is therefore deemed advisable to give a few salient 
details as of historical importance in showing the new methods of 
colonial enterprise subsequently adopted by all the Great Powers. 



no THE TREND OF HISTORY 

that as early as 1825 trade-unions had been legally sanc- 
tioned for certain specific purposes. The organisation 
of trade-unions had awakened a new sense of class 
solidarity among the workers and had led to a rapid 
growth of political consciousness, which found its first 
expression in Chartism. 

Some explanation of the real nature of the Chartist 
movement is required, in order to mark the various phases 
of political development which are being outlined. As 
a result of several years of continued bad harvests ( 1835- 
1837), of food shortage and general industrial depres- 
sion, accompanied by the closing of factories, the posi- 
tion of the greater mass of the industrial workers in 
England had grown unendurable. The opinion became 
current among the more intelligent workingmen, as well 
as among a few of the more open-minded of the Middle 
Class, that as the workingman was excluded from all 
participation in the affairs of government, his interests 
were not safeguarded, nor was his welfare promoted. Six 
members of Parliament joined with six workingmen in 
framing a bill which was to be presented to Parliament, 
providing for the extension of suffrage to every male of 
sound mind who had reached the age of twenty-one, or 
if foreign born, who had resided for at least two years 
in the country. 

This was the principal demand of the so-called "Peo- 
ple's Charter" of 1838. It contained other provisions 
for parliamentary reform along democratic lines, includ- 
ing: no property qualification for members; vote by 
ballot; equal electoral districts; annual sessions of 
Parliament; and payment of members. These proposals 
were held at the time to be extremely radical. 

Mass-meetings took place throughout the country to 



THE TRIUMPH OF THE MIDDLE CLASS iii 

agitate in favor of forcing Parliament to grant the ex- 
tension of suffrage to the working classes. The Middle 
Class, though having only recently (1832) acquired full 
control of the government, held its ground firmly, and 
refused concessions. The more turbulent among the 
Chartists advocated a resort to arms, while the leaders 
of the movement attempted compulsory tactics, and even 
considered a general cessation of work (the first time 
the idea of the use of a general strike for political pur- 
poses was advocated). In June 1839, a petition bear- 
ing approximately one and a quarter million signatures, 
demanding consideration of the Charter, was presented 
to Parliament. The Middle Class in power, with an in- 
stinctive perception of the strength of its position and 
of the historical immaturity of Chartism, refused to 
yield, in spite of renewed agitation, which did not die 
down altogether during the ensuing decade. 

During the height of the Chartist agitation plans for 
the complete reorganisation of society were made, in- 
cluding nationalisation of land, remodelling of the cur- 
rency, and state loans to laborers who desired to be- 
come capitalists. This last provision shows clearly the 
true nature of the movement. The Chartists had little 
sympathy with socialist views which were already spread- 
ing abroad. There is no evidence of a desire to sub- 
ordinate man to society, and the doctrine of individual 
rights, the bulwark of the middle class theory of state, 
was faithfully adhered to by the great majority. 

On the return of more prosperous times, after the re- 
peal of the corn laws, and the extension of free trade, 
the Chartist movement died down. The subsequent par- 
liamentary reforms, which were eventually to include all 
the demands of the Chartists, were not granted as the 



112 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

result of such methods of popular pressure. The Middle 
Class in England, strengthened politically by the firm at- 
titude it had assumed in repressing Chartism, was now 
free to turn its full attention to problems of trade de- 
velopment, industrial progress, and colonial expansion. 



BOOK II 



CHAPTER I 

Political Maturity 



COMPARATIVE METHODS — ^THE TIME ELEMENT — METAPHYSICAL 
CHARACTER OF POLITICS PHYSICAL FACTORS — DURATION 



POLITICAL history among civilised peoples is in a great 
measure a critical survey of the course of their so- 
cial development. The phases of this development can 
best be placed in cogently related order by methods of 
comparative analysis. The fact that the human mind can 
of itself form no distinct image of time, though the suc- 
cession of historical events takes place in time, makes it 
the more difficult to perceive the direct sequence of events 
or, as we say, the cause thereof. By accumulating corre- 
lated events side by side, regardless of their time ele- 
ment, we may hope to arrive at a clearer, more systematic 
conception of their true relations. Some even go so far 
as to claim to be able to discern certain laws of historical 
periodicity. 

Thus the comparative method in history is one of 
simplification; a short cut to a clearer presentation of 
what at first sight appears as a complex and complicated 
series of historical phenomena. By placing the Declara- 
tion of Right of 1689 side by side with that of the Rights 
of Man of 1789, a certain correlativity is arrived at. We 
might add to these the Constitution of the United States, 
also of 1789, and without great difficulty incorporate 

[115] 



ii6 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

these three important political landmarks in one series, 
and deduce therefrom a composite historical concept of 
the development of the constitutional theory of govern- 
ment. History affords a great number of such related 
episodes, from which the time element must be eliminated 
in order to arrive at an understanding of their proper 
significance. It is a most useful contribution of his- 
torical research that it affords the possibility of such 
comparative analysis by the elimination of the time ele- 
ment, which to the human mind is irrelevant, but which 
is the guiding factor in the application of political ideology 
to practice. Such research may further render the very 
good service of assisting us to determine what may be 
called political maturity. 

It is naturally not by the mere juxtaposition of events 
recorded in history of what appears to be political de- 
velopment, that one may be expected to arrive at a pre- 
cise knowledge of the actual stage of development at a 
given time. Nor can the duration of such a stage be fore- 
cast with any degree of accuracy. That a given cause 
has a tendency to produce a given effect is all that can 
be vouchsafed. But a more profound inquiry than has 
hitherto been attempted into the psychical as well as 
the physical factors of political motive will lead to the 
formation of hypotheses which need take no more for 
granted than do the more exact sciences or logical spec- 
ulation; for politics no less than philosophy must con- 
struct its own subject-matter. Its manifestations are not 
independent of the human mind, as the events in history 
are not independent of the human will. To select any 
particular phase of human experience or natural features 
of environment, climate, fertility of the soil, or even 
ethnic character of a people, as has so often been done, 
and attempt to deduce therefrom the causes of the forma- 



POLITICAL MATURITY 117 

tlon of a given political complex Is merely a partial anal- 
ysis. Politics in Its true sense Is the vigorous expression of 
the assertive characteristics of the complete man. Politi- 
cal theory and practice in their broadest application are, 
during a period of maturity, to be interpreted as the ra- 
tional expression of the cultural development of a peo- 
ple. Politics cannot be understood unless looked upon 
as the sum total of all the factors of human experience, 
all the motives of human action, of the applied energy, 
virility, and Intellect of man; his ideas and ideals, dogmas 
and doctrines; their practice and resultants, which when 
viewed from the heights of history in perfect balance 
show the picture of a rationalised social life. 

One might be inclined to conclude therefrom that 
epochs of what we may call political maturity are pro- 
longed for long periods when once social progress has 
come to fruition. Active Inquiry fails to confirm such 
an hypothesis. Periods of political maturity are ex- 
tremely brief. In the life of the Greek peoples, whose 
intellectual ascendancy continued dominant through many 
centuries, political maturity, as it is sought here to de- 
fine it, continued at the most for sixty years. In that 
of the Romans, the age of the first Caesar culminated in 
less than a generation, though its effects were felt dur- 
ing the next two thousand years. 

It would be impossible to calculate with any degree 
of mathematical exactitude the period during which any 
given form of government may be expected to survive. 
Historical research might afford some grounds for com- 
parative computation, but It would be of no great ad- 
vantage, as the process of political evolution is not de- 
termined or limited by the prevalence of any particular 
form of government or theory of State. Looked at in 
this light, kingship, one of the earliest forms of consti- 



ii8 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

tuted authority, as well as pure democracy, and the later 
forms of monarchical absolutism or liberal representative 
government which, with various modifications, have pre- 
vailed throughout successive centuries as the system of 
maintaining viable social relations, are based on the\ 
assumption of the existence of a great mass of politically^ 
unconscious humanity. In the civilisation of antiquity, 
slaves represented this element, which in more modern 
times was replaced by the serfs and latterly by the 
Proletariat. 

History affords a graphic survey of the awakening of 
political consciousness in an ever-widening circle. The 
maturity of a given political movement may be measured 
in terms of political experience as manifested in the 
desire for a share of authority in the State, by a newly 
awakened politically conscious group. Thus in France 
during the i8th century political ideology outran politi- 
cal consciousness, and cosmopolitanism was speedily 
smothered by nationalism which was a politically mature 
ideology. 



II 

The question of political maturity thus resolves itself 
into an inquiry into the progressive spread of what we 
have termed political consciousness. Political capacity 
is first met with only in the most limited sphere among 
men who have attained an objective social viewpoint. 
History shows us that this has taken place in some- 
what the following order: the tyrant, the king, the 
oligarchy, the aristocracy; and only after a further awak- 
ening of political consciousness, the middle class, in our 
own times, has had a share therein. Each category 



POLITICAL MATURITY 119 

of the social hierarchy as it attained control of the reins 
of authority concerned itself with its peculiar personal 
needs or as we might say established a dictatorship. It 
safeguarded in the first instance, then strengthened and 
protected political prerogative, and proceeded to mete 
out what it considered would be just and good within 
the limits of its strength; in other words to establish a 
government. Justice gives rise to law; goodness to 
public welfare. Both conduce to the permanence in 
power of the authority which can assure them. But their 
wise distribution in turn awakens political consciousness 
among a wider group of men, who will then attempt to 
gain a share in exercising this distinctive authority. 

In this way it will be seen that the principles of 1789 
were too broad for immediate application, and the at- 
tempt made to adopt them resulted in the violent social 
upheaval of the French Revolution, whereas the political 
development of the Middle Class in England a century 
before, coming after a long and arduous trial at arms, 
manifested itself more rationally, and in closer touch with 
actual conditions, resulting in a smoother transition. The 
principles of 1689 were politically mature, and spread 
with rapidity during the ensuing century. The abstract 
humanitarian principles of 1789 were premature, and 
did not come even to partial recognition until the middle 
of the following century. In their broader aspects the 
ideals of 1789 were never realised. Amalgamated with 
the newer concepts of Communism they were systema- 
tised, transformed, and used in part to formulate the 
basis of some of the social doctrines of the Proletariat. 

It has been necessary to dwell at some length on this 
question of political maturity in order to make plain the 
political practice of the crucial decades, 1 840-1 860, which 
in point of time mark the full development of the middle 



120 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

class theory of State, and the birth of a new thesis of 
social organisation. 

A concise synthesis of the middle class concept of the 
State which reached its mature form at this time had led 
to the acceptance of the belief that the State, fashioned 
in the image of man, is endowed with a body and soul, 
and as such is born, grows, and dies. According to this 
conception, the State was held to be ( i ) A group of 
men — of indeterminate number, (2) occuping a fixed 
territory, of indeterminate size — who have sufficient co- 
herence of motive to act as a working unit in public af- 
fairs, i.e. (3) national unity. Furthermore the State 
was (4) a living organism, which had a (5) growth and 
development of its own as, a (6) moral and spiritual 
being, (7) endowed with constitutional functions, which 
determine the relations between (8) the governing and 
the governed, and as a (9) legal person between States 
and possessing (10) a national spirit and national will. 
Some political theorists of the time even went so far" 
as to insist upon determining the sex of the State, and 
declared that the State is a "moral organised masculine 
personality." ^ 

Here we have reached the height of the personalisation 
of the State. Nationalism had become the cohesive force 
in the body politic. To achieve national unity and in- 
dependence became henceforth the ambition of all the 
peoples of the West. For political ideology knows no 
national boundaries; politico-social evolution, no geot- 
graphical limits. In the end artificial as well as natural 
barriers, differences of language, geographical position, 
education, and even racial or historical divergence can 
do no more than retard the spread, but cannot arrest 
the growth of a satisfying dogma. Such a creed was 

' Bluntschli, The Theory of the State, p. 23. 



POLITICAL MATURITY 121 

nationalism. It was the most inspiriting doctrine, tlie 
mo»st powerful asset of the Middle Class, in that it united 
a people with a quasi-religious fervor in the pursuit of a 
common aim — the greatness and power of the Nation- 
State. 



CHAPTER II 

The Spread of Nationalism 

LOUIS NAPOLEON CONSOLIDATION OF MIDDLE CLASS CONTROL IN 

FRANCE COMTE — THE TEACHINGS OF POSITIVISM — UTILI- 
TARIANISM IN ENGLAND — THE SITUATION IN GERMANY 

THE ZOLLVEREIN FICHTE — RACIAL INFLUENCES 



DURING the twenty-five years which had elapsed since 
Waterloo the Napoleonic legend had been slowly 
gaining in strength. The Holy Alliance, a combination 
of kings, had for a time replaced the Napoleonic plan 
of a so-called holy alliance of peoples. "The Holy Al- 
liance is an idea stolen from me," Napoleon is made 
to declare in the graphic survey of the aims and policy 
of the great Emperor written by his nephew Louis Na- 
poleon and published in 1839. The author then adds: 
"That is to say, a holy alliance of the nations through 
their kings, and not of the kings against the nations. In 
this consists the immeasurable difference between his idea 
and the manner in which it was realised. Napoleon had 
displaced the sovereigns for the temporary interests of 
the nations; in 18 15 the nations were displaced for the 
particular interests of the sovereigns. . . . The policy of 
the Emperor, on the contrary, consisted in founding a 
solid European association, by causing his system to rest 
upon complete nationalities, and upon general interests 
fairly satisfied." ^ Such was the political policy of 

^Napoleonic Ideas, Chap. V. 

[122] 



THE SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 123 

the first Napoleon, according to his nephew, who 
was to inherit the task of carrying it to Its logical 
conclusion. 

Louis Napoleon was a man of vigorous Intellectual 
attainments and shrewd political judgment. His en- 
tire career shows him to have been the willing servant 
of the political theories which he believed had been 
created out of whole cloth by Napoleon I. Louis 
Napoleon apparently never perceived that the doctrine 
of nationalism was the basis of the middle class theory 
of State which had evolved out of the i8th century in- 
dividualism, and had been made use of by Napoleon I 
as a stepping-stone to world power which he identified 
with cosmopolitanism. Louis Napoleon's horizon was 
more limited. He was so engrossed with the idea of 
carrying on the nationalist policy begun by his uncle that 
he repeatedly marred his prospects by his inability to 
wait upon opportunity. As early as 1830 we find him 
taking part in a nationalist rising In the Papal States, 
which ended in a fiasco. 

The influence of the Napoleonic name, which exalted 
Louis Napoleon as the natural heir of the "greatest cap- 
tain of all ages," was reviving throughout Europe. It 
was not surprising, therefore, that In the following year 
the leaders of the Polish Insurrection in their national 
rising against Russia should have offered to Louis the 
command of their forces and the crown of Poland. This 
was a direct challenge to the edict of the Holy Alliance. 
However, the Polish outbreak was crushed before he 
could avail himself of the offer. 

In 1832 the Duke of Relchstadt died, and Louis Na- 
poleon henceforth considered himself the rightful heir 
to the French throne, the standard-bearer of nationalism. 
His prestige in France was growing. He had written 



124 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

several essays on political subjects which had won for 
him marked consideration. Unwilling even now to await 
a favorable occasion whereby he might hope to win 
a sure following in France, or at least prepare and ma- 
ture a plan which might have some chance of success, 
we find him intriguing with a colonel of artillery to 
subvert the Strassburg garrison. As was to be ex- 
pected, the attempt failed and Louis was banished from 
France. 

In the meantime public opinion in France had seized 
hold of the idea of nationalism with renewed vigor. It 
had come to be recognised that the glory of France had 
been raised to a higher level under Napoleon I than 
during any other period in her history. Nationalism, 
as exemplified by Napoleon I, had endowed the nation 
with patriotic consciousness, had made possible the ac- 
ceptance of a rational nationalist ideology, and had 
spread the prestige of France throughout Europe. It 
was in response to the insistent demands of public opin- 
ion, as a recognition of the great services rendered by 
the Emperor, that the ashes of Napoleon I were brought 
from St. Helena back to France (1840). Louis Na- 
poleon, with his usual impetuosity, sought to make cap- 
ital out of this event by effecting a landing at Boulogne. 
Again he failed in his design, was captured, sentenced 
to imprisonment for life, and confined in the fortress of 
Ham. 

Nationalism, henceforth the dominant poHtical motive 
in France, consolidated middle class control, and came 
to be associated with the name of Napoleon in spite of 
the grotesque part Louis had played at Strassburg and 
Boulogne. 



THE SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 125 



II 

If we attempt to summarise the political position of 
France in 1840 we find that a new spirit was manifest- 
ing itself. The ascendancy of the Middle Class had 
given rise to a more compact social organisation. The 
older, more brutal, and arrogant individualism was 
dying out. It was felt that, unchecked, it weakened the 
social fabric. A new sense of discipline was being in- 
troduced which led to middle class bureaucracy in the 
State, and more efficient organisation by division of labor 
in industrial enterprise. It was during this period, when 
nationalism was gaining fervent adherents in continental 
Europe, and the Middle Class was tightening its hold on 
the body politic, that Auguste Comte was engaged with 
his lectures on Positive Philosophy (i 830-1 842). 

Positivism, though a direct outgrowth of St. Simonian 
Socialism, appears in the light of its true historical per- 
spective as an attempt to formulate a precise middle 
class theory of State, which would reconcile existing 
anomalies and eliminate the disruptive individualist bias 
of middle class ideology by substituting therefor a rigid 
yet rational social discipline. 

The middle class juridic concept is the basis of Pos- 
itivism : "Life and conduct shall stand wholly on a basis 
of law." At the same time it was asserted that the in- 
dividual has no rights except to do his duty. After sur- 
veying the history of European civilisation, Comte came 
to adopt the view suggested by Condorcet that the va- 
rious peoples pass on the torch of progress as if they 
were one single people. In his law of the three stages 
— theological, metaphysical, and positive or scientific — 
he claimed to have discovered a satisfactory norm for 



126 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

the Interpretation of history. Comte declared that Eu- 
rope was on the threshold of the third or positive stage, 
and made it his mission to give scientific precision to 
social phenomenon, to establish social science, sociology, 
on the basis of law, just as natural science was being 
codified. He attempted to prove that social phenomena 
are subject to variations, the causes of which are race, 
climate, and political action. But underlying these causes 
of variation is the main current of historical develop- 
ment of progressive growth. Comte's voluminous 
denunciation of equality, sovereignty of the people, of 
the rights of man, was essentially In keeping with the 
new spirit of his time, though he was not deterred from 
making use of arguments so favored during the i8th 
century in support of his own theories. Comte's plan 
to reorganise society, and the methods he proposed to 
create a new social order by giving to man a fixed, im- 
movable place in the social hierarchy such as prevailed 
during the Middle Ages, as well as his self-conferred title 
of "Fondateur de la Religion de I'Humanite," need not 
detain our attention beyond our noting in Positivism 
what appears as an attempt made to counterbalance the 
development of the political consciousness of the Pro- 
letariat. It is not suggested that Comte definitely 
apprehended the immediate rise of proletarian class 
consciousness, but rather that he endeavored to give 
to the Middle Class so recently in power jn the State 
a formula which would make possible the development 
of a harmonious social organisation, and at the same time 
provide for the absorption of the rising Proletariat. He 
recognised the weakness of the middle class politico- 
social programme which could exploit the advantages 
of the division of labor, but had not hitherto found it 



THE SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 127 

possible to adopt them for itself. We can thus dis- 
cover in positivism an effort to bolster up middle class 
ideology, which, vigorous and unassailed, had hitherto 
relied principally on the emotional vagaries of national- 
ism as a doctrine capable of winning nation-wide sup- 
port. Comte endeavored to introduce order, discipline, 
precision, finality, to call attention to empirical method, 
to limit speculation and knowledge to observed facts, 
to reduce the intelligible to mere phenomena, and not 
advance beyond strictly scientific analysis and construc- 
tion. 

In England utilitarianism ^ which arose at about this 
time was, like positivism, of which it was an offshoot, 
though lacking the more rigid discipline of Comte's sys- 
tem, a manifestation of a similar spirit of middle class 
moderation, as incapable of self-denial as it was of hero- 
ism. Here capitalism evolved, under the influence of 
this new doctrine, that duty coincides strictly with inter- 
est, and that a perfectly prudent man is necessarily ay 
perfectly virtuous one. "^ 

In France nationalism was to be made to serve a 
selfish, limited, political philosophy. Divorced from the 
idealism which had attended upon its early development, 
it was to lead France to Sedan. Both France and 
England and following their example all other great 
States, as they attained national consciousness, were to 
accept as axiomatic in political practice that "the histories 
of ancient Rome and not a few modern States prove 

* Cf. J. S. Mill, On Liberty — Introductory: "It is proper to state that 
I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the 
idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility 
as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility 
in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a 
progressive being." 



128 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

that a career of consistent rapacity, ambition, selfishness, 
and fraud may be eminently conducive to national 
prosperity." ^ 

Up to 1840 the progress of constitutional liberalism 
throughout Europe, and the spread of nationalism and 
capitalism, had been slow. Beyond the Rhine, the Alps, 
and the Pyrenees, middle class political theory and cap- 
italist economic development had remained in a rudi- 
mentary state. In spite of the propaganda carried on 
by the more energetic young liberals, absolutism had 
retained a relatively firm grip in all of these countries.- 
In certain States in Germany even the mediaeval orders 
had been retained. The Empire had been fashioned 
by the Congress of Vienna Into a new Germanic Con- 
federation modelled on the old Holy Roman Empire 
which Napoleon had disrupted in 1806. Austria was 
again the leading State in the Confederation, and the 
Diet of Frankfort was an assembly representing the 
various governments In which none of the peoples had 
a share. In the Hapsburg realm, composed of various 
national groups, the unity of the State was based on 
the racial antipathies of its component peoples, and 
nationalism as a political principle of independence had 
hitherto been skilfully suppressed by playing off these 
antagonisms one against the other, more especially in 
Italy where the nationalist ferment was the strongest. 

In Germany proper the ascendancy of Prussia was be- 
coming increasingly manifest. The disabilities under 
which German commerce suffered as the result of the 

* Cf. Lecky, History of European Morals, Vol. I. 

*In 1836 the Queen Regent of Spain was compelled to recognise the 
Constitution of 1812. The following year a new constitution was granted 
which provided for two Houses, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. In 
1838 a revised constitution was adopted in Portueal. But in both coun- 
tries the people took little active share in political affairs, except as 
partisans of clerical reaction or of anarchical radicalism. 



THE SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 129 

fact that each of the numerous petty principalities had 
its separate custom-house, had led to the formation of 
the Zollverein, which placed Prussia in a preponderant 
position in dictating the economic policy of a greater part 
of the country. Thus the first steps towards national 
unity under Prussian hegemony proceeded from an 
economic impulse, which was quickened by the subse- 
quent development of political consciousness. 



Ill 

The political sense of the German people has been 
variously estimated. Their capacity to establish a stable, 
durable, uniform government over the great area in- 
habited by ethnically and socially related peoples is lim- 
ited by the strain of diversity in their character, which 
inclines them to particularism. We also find among^ 
them a speculative, philosophical cast of mind which pre- 
cludes a nice adjustment between the possible and im- 
possible, or an understanding of the proper use of com- 
promise, a sine qua non of political development as 
'^currently understood. 

Among no other European people has philosophical 
inquiry so completely influenced political practice. The 
absence of an individual bias, amenability to discipline 
and self-abnegation, which are racial characteristics of 
the German people, the frank striving for a spiritualised 
aesthetic, rather than a materialist ethical ideal, had pro- 
duced among them a tendency towards political idealism 
not to be met with among other races in Europe. This is 
in part to be accounted for by the fact that the Ger- 
mans have remained in a great measure outside the 
sphere of Italo-Greek culture, and In their political de- 



ISO THE TREND OF HISTORY 

velopment evolved a theory of State, outwardly pat- 
terned on prevailing models which came to them from 
abroad, yet were never thoroughly acclimated among 
them. In more recent times when the politico-juridic 
concept of the State was adopted by the Germans it was 
destined to remain alien to their national character, which 
lacked the definiteness and precision, the civility to appre- 
ciate the nice balance of parts it set up in the State. 
However, it cannot be gainsaid that the Germans of the 
North, at least, came to imitate its forms, the clockwork 
of government, with greater success than their masters, 
precisely because this politico-juridic concept did not 
interfere with the essence of Statehood, as they under- 
stood it. 

Of all the peoples In the West who have hitherto at- 
tained political consciousness, the Germans are the most 
akin to the Orientals; endowed with the fierce prejudices 
and still fiercer enthusiasms of an Eastern people. They 
brought with them into the heart of Europe their spirit- 
ual fecundity, their prolific idealism, their unsettled 
and unsettling pantheism, and above all a consciousness 
of racial purity and homogeneity, a survival of the caste 
system distinctive of their Indo-Germanic ancestry. This 
was especially true of the Prussians, who had remained 
a politically insignificant group until Frederick II as- 
cended the throne of Prussia in 1740. An acute student 
of history, he recognised the paths which lay open to him 
to increase his prestige by the use of force and awaken 
the German people to the part they might one day be 
called upon to play as arbiters of European destiny. 
Thoroughly tutored in the subtleties of French political 
theory and practice of his time, of which he made such 
good use, unscrupulous in his methods, reminding one 
of the versatile intriguers of the Renaissance, he was 



THE SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 131 

to be continuously engaged in aggrandising his country. 
During the century which had elapsed since that date, 
the people of Prussia had responded to the pressure 
placed upon them. The paternalism of Frederick II, the 
numerous wars he waged to increase the power and 
prestige of Prussia had, in his day, failed to arouse a 
sense of national consciousness among his people. This 
was in part due to the fact that the King despised his 
own language and the customs of the Germans as semi- 
barbarous, and together with the other ruling princes 
of Germany imitated the French. In part, it is to be 
accounted for by the fact that the middle class cos- 
mopolitan viewpoint, which had spread from France, 
found in Prussia many enthusiastic and sincere support- 
ers, to whom it seemed that at last by the enforcement 
of this new cosmopolitanism the Prussians, hitherto held 
a Knechtsvolk, might be admitted into the European 
family on terms of social and political equality. 

It was not until after the disastrous defeat at the 
hands of the French at Jena and Auerstadt (1807) and 
the annihilation of Prussian forces, that a voice was 
raised, by one who had been a leader in the cosmopolitan 
movement in which Hegel in his early years also took so 
prominent a part, in behalf of nationalism and political 
liberty. It was the philosopher Fichte who first called 
the attention of the Germans to their national homo- 
geneity and racial purity, and postulated the abysmal 
contrast between an Urvolk (the Germans) and a Misch- 
volk (the French) whose nationalism was the product of 
political theory, and not of racial homogeneity. The 
logical outcome of such a doctrine, which stirred to the 
depths the primitive racial pride of the hitherto sub- 
servient peoples of Germany, was shown in the battle of 
the Nations (18 13), in the triumph of those fighting 



132 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

for their fatherland over those contending for political 
hegemony. 

Henceforth a vigorous racial, as distinct from politi- 
cal, nationalism was to grow up in Europe. The nebulous 
doctrines of humanity, universality, or cosmopolitanism 
of Kantian days were to make way for the concretion 
of a theory of State in which the principal practical thesis 
was to be based on the profound conviction of the racial 
supremacy of the German people. 



CHAPTER III 

The Awakening of Germany 

THE INFLUENCE OF HEGEL — HIS POLITICAL IDEAS — THEIR WIDE- 
SPREAD ACCEPTANCE — COMPARISON OF GERMAN, FRENCH, 
AND ENGLISH THEORY THE ACCESSION OF FRED- 
ERICK WILLIAM IV — ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
THE NEW NATIONALISM 



THE new German theory of State received its ac- 
cepted formulation by Hegel. In his rather in- 
volved way pf putting it: "The State is the self-con- 
scious ethical substance, the unification of the family 
principle with that of civil society." ^ Upon this thesis 
Hegel proceeded to establish the theory that the State is 
the foundation of all social life, apart from which the 
individual has no importance, no commensurable value. 
According to his view the State is organised liberty. 
Liberty is cognisable only when the individual will is 
joined with the collective will as expressed in laws and 
institutions: "Really every genuine law is a liberty . . . 
it embodies a liberty. . . . But the more we fortify lib- 
erty, as security of property, as possibility for each to 
develop and make the best of his talents and good qual- 
ities, the more it gets taken for granted." And again: 
"A constitution only develops from the national spirit 
identically with that spirit's own development, and runs 

' Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind (translated by W. Wallace), Section 
35- 

[133] 



134 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

through at the same time with it the grades of forma- 
tion, and the alterations required by its concept." ^ 

Hegel tells us that in outlining his idea of the State 
he has not in mind any particular State. Nevertheless, 
it was impossible for him not to have reference to the 
Prussian State as it existed in his day, and the historical 
circumstances of his epoch. It was only natural that 
this precise and logical formulation of a theory of State, 
which took into consideration the peculiar genius of 
the German people, their political plasticity and growing 
national consciousness, should have been adopted by 
Prussia, and later on have been exaggerated and 
perverted into an official theory of State which the united 
energy of the nation was to seek to bring to a speedy 
realisation. 

When Hegel exclaimed that absolute government is 
divine, self-sanctioned, and not made, or that "the mon- 
archical constitution is therefore the constitution of de- 
veloped reason : all other constitutions belong to lower 
grades of development and realisation of reason," he 
was glorifying the Prussian State. Yet Hegel was not, 
as has often been maintained, blind to political progres- 
siveness; we find him declaring, "The spiritual bond be- 
tween sovereign and subject is public opinion. ... It is 
the true legislative body, national assembly, the declara- 
tion of the universal will, which lives in the execution of 
all commands." ^ 

While Hegel had no confidence in representative gov- 
ernment, he despised the old bureaucracy. He railed 
against the lifeless routine of the Prussian political life 
of his day, and asserted loudly that "everything which 



^ op. cit., Section 539-540. 
* Op. cit., Section 542. 



THE AWAKENING OF GERMANY 135 

is not directly required to organise and maintain the force 
for giving security must be left by the central govern- 
ment to the freedom of the citizens." 

Hegel conceived of the State as an organic totality, 
founded on political loyalty. He fused public and private 
duty, and erected the State into an immanent, all-pervad- 
ing power. Of the political practice of States he has 
little to say. Political functions he regarded as empty 
formulae, though he emphasised the social functions of 
the State, especially its educational system, and its cul- 
tural and social discipline. 

Many of the suggestions made by Hegel (for they are 
no more than suggestions) are altogether removed from 
the realm of the practical. We have selected from the 
great obscure mass a few of the more salient, which may 
serve to clarify the basis of the theory of State which 
was to evolve in Germany during the ensuing decades. 

It has been necessary to dwell at some length on the 
Hegelian concept of the State in view of the preponderat- 
ing influence it was to have on political development dur- 
ing the coming era. For the first time since the Reforma- 
tion, Germany was to contribute to social development 
a distinctive theory of social organisation, which was to 
find concrete application. When we compare the Hegel- 
ian theory with that which prevailed in France, absorbed 
as the French were by the struggle of the Middle Class 
for supremacy in the State and the extension of French 
hegemony abroad, or with the practice of England, en- 
grossed as were the English with questions of trade 
expansion and the development of capitalism, in both 
of which the tendency towards a purely materialist, utili- 
tarian, egoistical concept of the State was being fos- 
tered, we find that the ideal elements of the newly 



136 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

formulated German theories, in spite of their disciplinary 
harshness, gave to the State something of its former 
spiritual significance. 

Henceforth, side by side with the French theory of 
State, with its concept, equality, and its expression, na- 
tionalism, and the English thesis of individual economic 
liberty, and its expression, capitalism, we find the Ger- 
man theory of racial supremacy, and its subsequent ex- 
pression, imperialism. 

The peoples of Western Europe, under the influence of 
France, were henceforth to strive to attain national unity, 
as a forerunner of political liberty, and entrust the guid- 
ance of the body politic to the Middle Class, as most 
fitted to realise these ends. In Central Europe, under the 
leadership of Prussia, national unity was imposed by the 
authority of the State. The Germans were to gain na- 
tional unity and political independence inspired by the 
ideal of racial supremacy rather than by a conscious 
appreciation of the benefits thereof. 



II 

The influence of Hegelian ideology first began to make 
itself felt in the realm of practical affairs after the ac- 
cession of Frederick William IV. More than thirty 
years had elapsed since the Fichtian thesis of racial su- 
premacy had aroused a sense of national patriotism 
among the German people, and united them in driving 
out the French. During the reaction which followed 
after the War of Liberation in Germany, the irritating 
persecutions which accompanied the reestablishment of 



THE AWAKENING OF GERMANY 137 

absolutism had awakened a sense of disgust at the meth- 
ods of government in vogue. The men who had sacrificed 
so much for the cause of national liberty found them- 
selves enslaved by the reactionary rule of the petty 
princes, whose sole aim was to further their particular- 
ist ambitions. 

In Prussia the revival of material prosperity had been 
rapid, and the economic expansion of many German 
States was greatly facilitated by the Zollverein. It was 
coming to be felt that Prussia was the natural head 
of the German confederacy, and that Austria with her 
polyglot peoples was no longer destined to be the real 
leader in German affairs. Nevertheless, Frederick Wil- 
liam III adhered conscientiously to the tenets of absolut- 
ism, and lent his active support as a member of the 
Holy Alliance to crushing all attempts to establish more 
liberal institutions. 

It was at this juncture that Frederick William IV 
ascended the throne. He began his reign by promising 
to introduce a number of needed political reforms, and 
did actually take some steps to renovate the antiquated 
machinery of government. But he was temperamentally 
unsuited to carry out consistently any single policy and 
had little sympathy with the rising liberal movement, 
which he looked upon as an importation from abroad. 
However, he exerted much energy in fostering the spirit 
of nationalism and sentiment of racial unity among the 
German peoples. He showed by his policy and conduct, 
in spite of the mystical strain in his character and his 
naturally vacillating temper, that he was fully conscious 
of the historical importance of the movement of national 
unity. As Hegel had expressed it: "In the existence of 
a Nation the substantial aim is to be a State and pre- 



138 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

serve itself as such. A nation with no state formation 
{a mere nation), has, strictly speaking, no history — like 
the nations which existed before the rise of states and 
others which still exist in a condition of savagery." ^ 

The view of Hegel that a monarchy must concern it- 
self with social problems even more than with purely 
political questions, received the new King's full endorse- 
ment. It is not intended to convey the impression that 
Frederick William IV was a strong leader of German 
political development, but rather that in spite of his 
prejudiced views he felt compelled to take part in the 
revival of the earnest spirit of nationalism, and seek in 
its development to secure for Prussia the leadership of a 
new German confederation from which Austria was to 
be excluded. Nationalism in Germany thus became some- 
thing altogether different from what it meant when the 
term was used either by the French, or in reference to 
France. 

In France the question of race did not enter. The 
old struggle for racial supremacy between the Gauls and 
Franks had never been settled; these as well as the other 
heterogeneous racial elements which composed the French 
State had been sufficiently fused for all practical politi- 
cal purposes into a single French people. Nationalism 
in France had rapidly developed as the focus of middle 
class political theory, the motive-force of their control 
in the State, the unifying bond of public policy which 
had received the sanction of public opinion. Much of 
the enthusiasm for the establishment of States on nation- 
alist principles so current in the days of Napoleon I, or 
as when Lamartine had declared : "Ressusciter I'ltalie 
suffirait a la gloire d'un peuple," seemed to be disappear- 

* Philosophy of Mind, Section 549. 



THE AWAKENING OF GERMANY 139 

ing, and an egotistical interpretation was growing up, 
which was to influence the conduct of foreign policy. 
As capitalism in England had marked out a new orienta- 
tion of foreign affairs, so now in France nationalism was 
coming to be identified with strictly utilitarian motives. 
Both contained elements of dynamic expansion. Eng- 
land, under the pressure of capitalism, was opening up 
distant markets, acting on the assumption that every 
new British colony was to be considered a market for 
British goods, and as such a speculative enterprise which 
was worth the expense incurred in securing and govern- 
ing it. The French were not blind to the advantages 
of an aggressive colonial policy. The growing national 
self-consciousness among the peoples of Europe and the 
decreasing prestige which the French foresaw they would 
inevitably suffer thereby, led them to seek new fields 
of activity in distant lands. The dream of attaining 
the hegemony of Europe as the champions of the na- 
tional aspirations of subject peoples had, however, by 
no means died out. 

Both nationalism and capitalism frankly aimed at In- 
creasing political prestige and material prosperity. New 
outlets were needed for the growing national energy. It 
was becoming imperative to mark off for future exploita- 
tion such parts of the world as could provide the raw 
materials and cheap food supply essential to maintain 
a rapidly increasing industrial population. At the same 
time, the Middle Class, avid for gain, saw to it that its 
own material wellbeing should increase in a geometrically 
progressive proportion as between the middle class cap- 
italist and the proletarian wage-earner. 

Foreign policy, under middle class guidance, soon con- 
fused the motives of nationalism and capitalism, so that 



I40 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

in the course of time they became practically synonymous, 
and gave rise to a new single expression — imperialism.^ 

In Germany, on the other hand, nationalism was in its 
early phases a racial as opposed to a political theory. As 
has been pointed out, it was based on a belief in the 
racial purity and consequent superiority of the Germanic 
peoples. Nationalism so interpreted had in it the ele- 
ments of ideal rather than material aims. It sought 
to bring about racial emancipation, and was as such a 
centripetal force. In seeking internal consolidation and 
internal national unity, the leaders of the new national 
movement in Germany had to combat the intense par- 
ticularism or regional allegiance which was a remnant 
of the old Germanic spirit of diversity. During this 
stage, nationalism in Germany remained a metaphysical, 
as distinguished from a political motive. Yet it was 
not uninfluenced by economic considerations. It was 
felt that trade requirements demanded a more closely knit 
national state, and industrial expansion fostered this 
desire. To the Germans nationalism was an economic 
and social, as opposed to a political and rational concept. 
Nationalism thus understood may be compared to a 
natural force, which was destined to develop untutored, 
among a people who lacked political balance, and had 
little gift for social organisation. 

It was soon evident that nationalism in Germany would 
lead to a policy of territorial expansion in which the 
vigor of the strongest and most military state, Prussia, 
would make use of the only methods It understood to 
realise its hegemony — the resort to arms. 

*It is significant to record that imperialism in its Franco-English in- 
terpretation {see p. 249 note), and in its Germanic sense, the latter possi- 
bly the more politically accurate usage, should have converged, making 
conflict between the two groups unavoidable. 



THE AWAKENING OF GERMANY 141 

In considering the position of Germany shortly after 
1840 it must be borne in mind that, in spite of the 
growth of national consciousness, there was still little 
expression of national solidarity. Germany proper was 
split up into thirty-three kingdoms and principalities of 
all sizes and all shades of government, from mediaeval 
despotism to the most moderate constitutional regime. 
Among these Prussia stood forth as the strongest and 
most populous, but it lacked the moral prestige to rally 
the other states to its support, and its leaders were pe- 
culiarly unskilled in the arts of political persuasion. Pub- 
lic opinion, such as there existed, supported the idea of 
nationalism, and the concept of national unity was ap- 
proved by a great majority of the German people. How- 
ever, none of the German States was willing to sur- 
render its distinctive prerogatives, and preferred the 
loose and dispirited hegemony of Austria to the rigorous 
discipline of Prussia. 

In Austria nationalism was a disruptive force. The 
nationalist ferment among the various races was already 
beginning to threaten the life of the State. The tactics 
of playing off one nationality against the other were no 
longer wholly successful. The Hapsburgs, who had 
hitherto exerted a powerful influence in European af- 
fairs and were the leaders in the reactionary policy of 
the Restoration, still clung tenaciously to absolutism and 
were uniformly hostile to all constitutional reforms. The 
anomaly of having Austria, which was structurally op- 
posed to the principle of nationality, and whose whole 
theory of state was to be summed up in the words divide et 
impera, retain the hegemony of the German confedera- 
tion was patent to all. 

But Prussia lacked the political experience to avail 



142 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

itself of the opportunity offered In 1849 to acquire by 
peaceful means the headship in Germany. Therefore 
the final overthrow of Austrian supremacy and the 
establishment of the new German Empire were left to a 
decision at arms. 



CHAPTER IV 

1830-1848 

LOUIS PHILIPPE — ECONOMIC FACTORS — ATTITUDE OF THE MIDDLE 

CLASS — THE RIGHT TO VOTE THE EXTENSION OF SUFFRAGE 

REVOLUTIONARY OUTBREAKS OF I 848 CAUSES ITALY 

FRANCE — GERMANY — AUSTRIA — HISTORICAL MOTIVES 



IN spite of outward calm and the absence of great wars 
or Other disturbances in Europe for nearly two dec- 
ades ( 1 830-1 848), the feeling of political unrest was 
again spreading. France still remained the fountainhead 
of political liberalism, and the active restlessness of 
her politically alert people continued to influence the 
policy and political programmes of the other peoples of 
Europe. 

During these last years of French ideological hegemony, 
a change had come over the Middle Class in power in 
France. Signs of political fatigue were beginning to 
become evident. The ruling class, no longer a coterie 
or even a small group, but now expanded into a dis- 
tinct governing class which made itself felt throughout 
the land, lacked the stability of a fixed social order. 
On the one hand, the Middle Class received new re- 
cruits from among the more successful and prosperous 
of the working class ; on the other, the successful bank- 
ers, merchants, and manufacturers endeavored to buy 
their way into the socially exclusive aristocracy, of which 
a figment still remained, and withdrew from an active 

[143J 



144 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

participation in affairs. A policy of political laissez-faire 
which had resulted in the loss of a consistent course of 
action had developed a marked subservience to material 
interests. Nationalism was being transformed into an 
interest and was no longer an inspiring incentive. 

The narrow, individualist policy of retrenchment 
pursued by Louis Philippe's Government had led to a 
distrust of the growth of nationalism in Germany and 
Italy. This was not the result of any clear-sighted per- 
ception of the possible outcome of the establishment of 
two great rival States across the Rhine and the Alps. 
For no steps were taken to Interfere with the process 
of national consolidation which was there proceeding, 
as had often been done in the past in accordance with 
the traditional French policy, so successfully pursued 
especially in Germany since the treaty of Westphalia 
(1648), of weakening the cohesive strength of neigh- 
boring peoples. 

De Tocqueville has judiciously remarked: "Commerce 
renders men independent of each other, gives them a 
lofty notion of their personal importance, leads them to 
seek to conduct their own affairs, and teaches them how 
to conduct them well; it therefore prepares men for 
freedom, but preserves them from revolutions. . . . 
Violent political passions have but little hold on those 
who have devoted all their faculties to the pursuit of 
their wellbeing. The ardor which they display in small 
matters calms their zeal for momentous undertakings." ^ 
Though when writing these words he may have had in 
mind the people of the United States, they refer with 
great precision to the Middle Class in France and Eng- 
land at this time. In both instances the Middle Class 
had succeeded in establishing a limited democracy, gov- 

^ Democracy in America, Book III, Chap. XXI. 



1 830- 1 848 145 

erned as a limited monarchy. Political restraint was tol- 
erated as long as it did not exceed the minimum com- 
patible with permanence of government and public order, 
as this was held the most desirable method of maintaining 
peaceful conditions in the State, and peaceable relations 
with neighbouring States. Towards the middle of the 
century the Middle Class had adopted this conservative 
viewpoint, though it had not as yet altogether lost its 
mental elasticity. The political privileges and im- 
munities, based on tradition and birth, which had been 
enjoyed by the aristocracy under the old regime, had been 
transmuted into economic privileges and immunities as 
the basis of political rights of which the Middle Class 
held the monopoly. 

We may here trace the rise of the new thesis that man's 
chief concern in life is in reality economic, and that his 
political activity as hitherto understood was destined 
to become an avocation. In accordance with this concep- 
tion the Middle Class had come to believe that it had 
realised the ideal form of government, which technically 
vests sovereignty in the whole number of citizens or sub- 
jects; though the exercise of sovereign power is entrusted 
to a limited, politically conscious group — the electorate 
— which in turn delegates the actual business of state, 
its government and administration, to a very small num- 
ber of selected or sanctioned representatives. The elec- 
torate was thus a politically privileged class, and po- 
litical privilege was based on a property qualification, 
consonant with the interests of the Middle Class with 
which it had come to be Identified.^ 

Outside of this relatively limited group of electors, 

* The political prerogatives exercised at this period by the House of 
Lords in England, and the House of Peers in France, must be looked 
upon as survivals of decreasing importance, more especially as middle 
class views prevailed in both houses. 



146 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

there remained the great mass of the unenfranchised, 
who contributed to the creation of the material prosperity 
of the State and made possible the economic expansion 
and material wellbeing upon which middle class ascend- 
ancy rested. It is not intended to suggest that the Middle 
Class had as yet become parasitical, nor that there had 
grown up within it that capitalistic oligarchy which 
was later on to seek to control public policy. But the 
Middle Class, still essentially individualistic, had lost 
whatever energetic political cohesion it had possessed. 
The rank and file were already beginning to lose in- 
terest in affairs of State. The majority were content 
to entrust to their selected and sanctioned representatives 
the conduct of public affairs, relying on the vigor of 
public opinion to act as a corrective should the need 
arise. In surveying the state of mind of this ruling 
class, it is readily discerned that it had come to neglect 
moral agencies in political practice. The Middle Class 
was henceforward to depend more and more upon the 
triumphs of science and inventions as applied to indus- 
trial enterprise. It was to be its principal preoccupation 
to have at hand an abundant supply of cheap labor, 
trained to serve the newly-created, highly-specialised in- 
dustrial machinery, and rich sources for raw materials, 
rather than to concern itself with problems relating to 
the well-ordered functioning of the body politic. 

It had come to be accepted by the majority of the 
Middle Class, and historical precedent was cited to 
confirm the current conviction, that "the happiness and 
welfare of mankind are evolved much more from selfish 
than from virtuous acts, and that the prosperity of 
nations and the progress of civilisation are mainly due 
to the exertions of men who, while pursuing strictly their 



1 830- 1 848 147 

own interests, were unconsciously promoting the interest 
of the community." ^ 

II 

It was during this epoch, when the character of com- 
merce and industry was being transformed, when skilled 
workmanship as a conscious and absorbing interest of 
the worker was giving way to purely mechanical labor, 
and the working classes, no longer absorbed in their 
tasks, were pursuing their occupations more by reflex 
than by the continuous use of their faculties, that po- 
litical self-consciousness along new and independent lines 
began to manifest itself among them. The example set 
by the middle class electorate, whose will was expressed 
by a numerical majority, had led to the question whether 
the will of the majority in the State, as Rousseau had out- 
lined it, might not better be arrived at by an expression 
of the political convictions of the actual numerical ma- 
jority of all the citizens. Would not the removal of all 
political disabilities which still subsisted and kept a 
greater section of the adult male population in subjection 
to the enfranchised classes, be of immense advantage to 
the working classes? 

The demand for the extension of the suffrage was 
thus an attempt on the part of the masses to secure a 
share in government which, under the constitutional sys- 
tem, had developed altogether to the advantage of the 
Middle Class. The politico-juridic concept of the State 
had evolved out of the theory of the legality of con- 
stituted authority, which had set up a contractual re- 
lation between the governed and the governing. It had 

* Cf. Lecky, History of European Morals, Vol. I, p. 38. 



148 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

created an opposition between these two elements in the 
State in which self-identity was not at first realised by 
the Middle Class. 

By a process of dilution of authority, inevitable under 
a representative system which was essentially democratic, 
the electorate had come to feel itself the most powerful 
factor in the State, and looked upon constituted authority 
as the servant of the individual will. The functions of 
government had come to be performed by delegation, 
and all authority not specifically delegated was held to 
remain vested in the politically conscious class — the elec- 
torate. But this electorate was an elite whose numbers 
were relatively limited. The suffrage so understood was 
an expression of sovereignty. Theoretically, such sov- 
ereignty must correspond to the political status of the 
person exercising it. The extension of the suffrage was 
thus the demand for partnership in sovereignty in the 
State by those who believed they were entitled to par- 
ticipate on a basis of equality with the existing electorate. 
Both in England and France the question of the exten- 
sion of the suffrage had been, and was to continue to be, 
agitated. By a minimum of concession, judiciously 
granted, in many instances to further the political de- 
signs of the party in power, electoral reforms that were 
carried through in England satisfied the more insistent 
demands; so that throughout the 19th century fresh 
strength was, in varying doses, infused into the electoral 
body. It was less difficult to carry through such a pro- 
gramme in England, where the aristocracy had retained 
a certain politico-social significance, and class distinctions 
remained more fixed. 

In France the problem of electoral reform was more 
complex. No fixed social status had survived the Rev- 
olution. It was more difficult than in England to de- 



1830-184B U9 

fine with any degree of precision upon whom the right 
to vote should be conferred. The political value of the 
individual and what should constitute the basis of the 
right of suffrage had become a pressing political issue. 
The idea that all citizens possessed the inborn right to 
participate on equal terms In electoral privileges was re- 
pudiated even by the more liberal-minded, who sought 
to establish certain distinctive tests, useful in ascertain- 
ing the political maturity of the Individual voter, Eng- 
lish theorists suggested wealth, intelligence, social posi- 
tion. Later, education was seized upon as the best pos- 
sible test of fitness. For a prolonged period, it had been 
accepted by the Middle Class that authority in the State 
should represent the Interests of those concerned. The 
dread of the control of the body politic by mere num- 
bers, and of the domination of the State by the Illiterate, 
became widespread at this time. It was believed by 
some that such an eventuality could best be obviated by 
the extension of educational facilities, which would re- 
sult In a broader participation of a greater number of 
educated persons in affairs of State. Such were the 
developments which were to mark the progressive stages 
of the extension of the suffrage, and served to prolong 
the retention of interest In the representative system. 

For the time being, the individualist bias of the social 
structure, which had arisen with middle class control in 
the State, was too strong to permit any further partition 
of political privilege, which In France and England was 
looked upon as the distinctive prerogative of the Middle 
Class. 

The importance of the Individual elector had been mag- 
nified to such an extent that he came to consider himself 
a free agent whose influence could make itself felt in 
the State. There was an absence of political discipline, 



150 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

a lack of balance in estimating the value of the right 
of suffrage viewed from the standpoint of the individual, 
which not only made of it an important social func- 
tion, but vested in it the final expression of political 
liberty. 

The right ot suffrage was exclusive because it was 
valued, and valued because it was exclusive.^ To the 
Middle Class in power it was a patent of superiority. 
To it the sovereignty of the people was no longer a 
generic expression, understood in a collective sense, but 
was interpreted as the sum of the individual enfranchised 
wills. It was apparently unmindful of the fact that 
in practice actual sovereignty was entrusted to the control 
of the will of the majority as delegated to the duly 
elected or sanctioned representatives. As such it was 
distinctly contradictory to the doctrine of Rousseau upon 
which it was based, that sovereignty is vested in the 
general will, cannot be delegated, and is inalienable.^ 
Sovereignty, according to his theory, is the expression of 
the will of the actual majority, which is embodied in laws. 
Laws are not fixed, but subject to change as the will of 
the majority changes, and thus the majority has the 
right to resist constituted authority, if need be to change 
the constitution and make a new social contract which 
will be binding, but only as long as upheld by the ma- 
jority. Rousseau had in mind the absolute numerical 

^ No better proof of the declining importance of the suffrage as a 
measure of political motive need be adduced than its vulgarisation during 
the succeeding half century until at the close of the second decade of 
the 2oth century it had come to include not merely all males but fernales 
as well. In its early stages suffrage was a privilege with obligations; 
its spread led to perversion of its privilege and the abandonment of its 
obligations. 

^ "Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot 
be alienated; it consists essentially in the general will, and the will 
cannot be represented; it is the same or it is different; there is no mean." 
—Contrat Social, Book III, Chap. XV. 



1830-1848 151 

majority In a State in which none suffered political 
disabilities. 

But the Middle Class which had gained political power 
after so prolonged a struggle was unwilling to share Its 
control of the State, which It conscientiously believed 
worked for the greater benefit of mankind. The Idea 
that all adults should be entitled to equal suffrage, re- 
gardless of differences of wealth, sex, social position, or 
education, was held Inconsistent with the scientific basis 
upon which representative government had developed as 
an Image of the best, not of the lower average man. 

Such was the position taken by those in power In 1848 
in face of the growing political ferment which permeated 
the working classes. In France the demand for an equal 
share in sovereign power In the State, the right to vote, 
was to cause a violent revolutionary outbreak. In other 
continental States where absolutist rule still survived, 
the working masses joined with the Middle Class in de- 
manding political liberty, or, as In the case of Italy and 
Hungary, national independence. 



Ill 

A survey of the fundamental factors which led to 
the revolutionary outbreaks of 1848 reveals three causes 
of this spontaneous movement, which embraced all the 
States of continental Europe, and left such a deep Im- 
pression on subsequent political development. Two of 
these factors were closely related and Indicative of the 
strength and vigor of middle class liberalism which had 
been spread abroad by the enthusiastic exponents of 
constitutional liberty and nationalism; the third was in 



152 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

the nature of a premature expression of proletarian 
consciousness. 

It was in Italy that the first attack on surviving ab- 
solutism was made. Milan and Sicily rose in revolt. 
The movement spread throughout the peninsula. Not 
only were constitutions granted by Charles Albert in Pied- 
mont and Francis II at Naples, but Charles Albert also 
placed himself at the head of a coalition of forces, con- 
tributed by all the sovereign princes of Italy including 
the Pope, for the purpose of driving out the Austrians. 
No sooner had the plan been decided upon, than the 
lack of political perception and broader insight into the 
possibility of the success of the movement caused a re- 
action. The Pope withdrew his approval, and the 
Neapolitan forces retired. Then followed the estab- 
lishment of the short-lived Venetian and Roman repub- 
lics and the flight of the Pope from Rome. The Pied- 
montese were beaten and dispersed by the Austrians 
at Novara (March 1849). Austrian authority was re- 
established in northern Italy, and ruthless repressive 
measures were instituted. At the end of two years, noth- 
ing remained of the great enterprise in constitutional 
nation building except the constitution granted in Pied- 
mont, to which the King faithfully adhered. 

Meanwhile similar events were taking place elsewhere. 
In February 1848, Louis Philippe was dethroned as a 
result of his insistent refusal to grant an extension of 
the franchise, and the Republic of 1848 was established 
after a proletarian outbreak had been violently re- 
pressed. The government set up was based on a rep- 
resentative system which provided for and elected a 
President. 

In Prussia the popular movement demanding a con- 
stitution arose with unexpected suddenness. Frederick 



1 830-1848 153 

William IV professed that he was ready to give up his 
royal titles and prerogatives for the sake of the wel- 
fare of his people, should they demand it. He sought 
to impress upon the German princes the necessity of 
abandoning their particularist pretensions, in order to 
assist in the formation of a united German State under 
the leadership of Prussia, offering himself as candidate 
for the imperial dignity. In the meantime, he under- 
took various liberal reforms and summoned a representa- 
tive assembly to discuss and draw up a constitution. But 
the Diet at Frankfort of 1849, owing principally to the 
intrigues of Austrian diplomacy, failed to approve of 
Frederick William's plan for German unity under Prus- 
sian control. As in the case of Italy, nothing came of 
the movement at the time. The Prussian King did not 
even keep his word in regard to the promised constitu- 
tional reforms, and all of his pledges remained unful- 
filled. 

In Austria a similar wave of political unrest threatened 
the unity of the Hapsburg lands. The army, however, 
remained loyal. As a result the constitutional liberties, 
granted under duress, were never carried into effect after 
the nationalist risings in Hungary and Italy had been 
quelled. 

In an effort to arrive at a true appreciation of the 
real significance of the historical events of an epoch, too 
much importance is apt to be ascribed to episodic dis- 
turbances, revolutions, wars, on the ground that during 
such upheavals, changes are brought about which render 
it easier to trace direct translation of theory into prac- 
tice, of motive into action. Yet it would be difficult to 
discover any very real support for the widespread belief 
that during periods of disorder or of armed conflict the 
correlation of motive and action is simplified. History 



154 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

must concern itself with something more than a mere 
account of events, of action, which of itself is sterile 
unless we are able to arrive at some understanding 
of the underlying motives. Motive is the psychical, 
action may be termed the physical aspect of reality. The 
subservience of both to an identic unity is difficult of 
proof. Yet it is this unity, which when it finds ex- 
pression, impels to growth, decay, or change. In other 
words, the action or event is the execution of the motive 
which has reached maturity. It is conceivable that it 
might be possible to trace a cyclic series of motives which, 
schematically presented, would show clearly when motive 
develops into action. Or better yet, as a clock measures 
time by subdividing time into hours, minutes, and sec- 
onds and has rendered it possible for men to coordinate 
activity, to introduce order and discipline into social life, 
so it was coming to be believed that the will, the con- 
ductor of action, can in a sense be measured in terms of 
motive, and understood as action. In this way it may 
be seen that in social intercourse the will appears as the 
inexhaustible medium of energy, of dynamic life, the 
agency of behavior from which history derives its com- 
mensurable unity. It is on this foundation that the 
unity and continuity of historical processes have been 
built. History endeavors to trace the systematic de- 
velopment of this evolution: the freeing of the will from 
the trammels of the supernatural, the superstitious and 
finally the dogmatic domination of the teachings of classi- 
cal antiquity — in brief, the concept of free will which 
finds its truest expression in the term, political liberty. 
The fact that such liberty is something that can be ac- 
quired, that it is an attribute of the will rather than of 
reason, has hitherto been only imperfectly understood 
as the fundamental motive of political development. The 



1830-1848 155 

idea that the will in point of fact governs the actions of 
man rather than his reason was destined to become the 
most powerful incentive of social growth, which was to 
bring about the overthrow of the accepted concept that 
the social order is rationally sanctioned by its legality.^ 
Political society under middle class rule had established 
the axiomatic character of the rational social order; now 
the element of volition as the decisive expression of so- 
cial consciousness was to be introduced. The realisation 
of the fact that the individual as such can make himself 
free in spite of his previous condition of servitude, that 
liberty as the motive becomes the measure of the im- 
pulse, the will to action, and finds fullest expression in 
political liberty had, as is shown by the events of 1848, 
become a permanent acquisition of the peoples of Europe. 
Political consciousness thus understood was henceforth 
held the expression of a desire for liberty, the benefits 
of which were, at the period under review, only obscurely 
realised by the majority. 

The causes of the scant success which attended the 
revolutionary movements of 1848 can thus be accounted 
for. The most significant outward cause of failure was 
the absence of unity of action, organisation, and steadi- 
ness of purpose. In other words, the motive of the move- 
ment was in a great measure only vaguely realised. To 
the majority it was still a subjective desire for freedom, 
the desire of individuals who were excluded from sharing 
in something that other individuals already possessed. 
Given the organisation and preparation — when political 

*It is not to be understood that the opponents of the middle class 
thesis of State were able to perceive at the time the divergence between 
the rational and the volitional interpretation of historical development. 
Nevertheless we can now trace the first tentative application of this idea 
in Communism, which can be adequately comprehended only when viewed 
as the dawn of the volitional, rather than the twilight of rational politico- 
social philosophy. 



156 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

and national freedom had become a clear objective aim 
and was no longer merely a subjective impulse; in other 
words, when unity of motive and action was realised — 
it was destined to succeed and go beyond its original 
boundaries. This unity was achieved within less than 
three decades, for the reason that there was nothing 
radically new, nothing fundamentally different in the 
demands made for constitutional liberty and national 
independence which had already acquired the fixity and 
sanction of established practice. It was not a new theory 
of human freedom, not a new social order that was being 
demanded, but a mere extension of political practice. 
Such was the nature and general scope of the closely 
correlated movements for the spread of the accepted 
doctrines of political liberty, national and constitutional, 
in 1848. 

There was a third and new element infused into the 
conflict by a small group, which categorically denied the 
alleged benefits to be derived from constitutional gov- 
ernment or the politico-juridic concept of the State. The 
purely individualist bias of middle class political theory 
was denounced by the leaders of the new movement as 
anti-social. They denied that the principles of equality 
and legality are to be held the basis of true liberty, or 
that the State under the rule of the Middle Class, even if 
the liberal principles of representative governments were 
extended to their utmost limits, could satisfy the needs 
of the working classes; for it was not equality, political 
or social, which they sought. They frankly demanded 
the establishment of a new social order under the dic- 
tatorship of the workers, hereafter calling themselves the 
Proletariat. 



CHAPTER V 

Communism 

THE MANIFESTO OF 1 848 — THE MARXIAN THEORY — HISTORICAL 
MATERIALISM THE INFLUENCE OF HEGEL — ECONOMIC IN- 
TERPRETATION OF HISTORY OPPOSITION TO DEMOCRATIC 

DOCTRINES — REVOLUTIONARY TACTICS 



IT was in February 1848 that the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party was issued in London on the eve 
of the revolutionary outbreaks which occurred at Paris, 
Vienna, Berlin, and Palermo. For the first time the 
Proletariat as an organised group was to take an active 
part In public affairs. The more sanguine hoped that in 
Paris, at least, by overthrowing the existing government 
it might be possible to establish a social organisation 
based on communist principles. 

The "Manifesto," which contains the fundamental 
thesis of Communism, was drawn up by a committee of 
radical agitators under the guidance of Karl Marx and 
Engels. In view of subsequent developments and the his- 
torical importance of the new movement, it will be nec- 
essary to inquire into the background and evolution of 
Communism. Viewed from an historical standpoint, 
Communism presented a programme of politico-social 
reorganisation as distinctly original, and, in this sense, 
no more radical than those of 1689 and 1789, which pre- 
pared the way for the triumph of the politico-juridic 

I157] 



158 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

theory of State, and the control of the body politic by 
the Middle Class. 

Since the days of Plato's republic, through the cen- 
turies at repeated intervals, plans for an ideal social order 
have been drawn up. In more recent times, Sir Thomas 
More's Utopia and Tommaso Campanella's Civitas 
Solis had a considerable influence on the writings of the 
political philosophers of the i8th century. However, 
it was not until after the French Revolution, during the 
early years of the 19th century, that any real attempt 
was made to put into practice the so-called communist 
theories, such as the schemes of St. Simon and the 
phalanges of Fourier in France, of Owen in England, and 
others. While Marx did not deny their value he repudi- 
ated all such plans as one-sided, fantastic caricatures of 
the social order of the future, which have no counter- 
part in reality except in so far as they presage a social 
organisation in which class antagonism, class struggle 
will have been eliminated. 

The basis of Communism, according to the Marxian 
theory, is to be found in this class struggle. "The his- 
tory of every society down to our own times has been 
the history of class struggles," are the opening words 
of the body of the "Manifesto." The leaders of Com- 
munism sought to overturn the social order and to es- 
tablish new social arrangements as part of their plan 
to eliminate the unfair exploitation of, and miserable 
economic conditions prevalent among, the working classes 
which the Middle Class, since it had assumed the domi- 
nating role in the State, had merely sought to ameliorate 
by offering the panacea of constitutional liberties. The 
Communists maintained that all plans of social reform 
were to no purpose, as in the fulness of time the ascend- 



COMMUNISM 159 

ancy and dictatorship of the Proletariat was its natural 
destiny, an inevitable historical necessity. 

This element of historical determinism is the ideologi- 
cal foundation upon which Communism, according to the 
Marxian thesis, is built. As such Communism is not 
classed as an ideal or even a desired goal; it is not an 
aspiration of a group of political innovators, but is held 
to be the inevitable outcome of the process of historical 
evolution, of the class conflict which has narrowed itself 
down to a struggle on the part of the Middle Class to 
retain its control of the body politic, and of the Pro- 
letariat to overthrow this ascendancy and establish a new 
social order. 

It Is directly from Hegel that Marx borrowed his the- 
ory of growth by antagonism; of struggle as the principal 
factor of development. He transformed the Hegelian 
triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the abstrac- 
tion of growth by antithesis, into a positive historical fac- 
tor as explaining the processes of proletarian political 
action. 

Marx tells us ^ that it was while preparing a critical 
review of Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie that he came upon 
the idea which was to serve as the ground of all of his 
future speculations. As he expressed it: 

"In the production of means of existence, men enter 
upon definite relations, which are inevitable and inde- 
pendent of their will; relations of production, which are 
correlative with the stage of the development of produc- 
tive forces. The complex of these relations of produc- 
tion is the economic basis of society — that is to say, it 
is the real foundation upon which is raised the super- 
structure of political and juridical society, and to which 

* Cf. Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, Preface, pp. iv-vi. 



i6o THE TREND OF HISTORY 

the determined forms of the social order correspond. 
The methods of production of the necessities of material 
life determine in general the social, political, and intel- 
lectual processes of life. It is not man's consciousness 
which determines his existence, but on the contrary his so- 
cial life which determines his consciousness. ... A social 
system does not destroy itself before it has developed all 
the productive force which it could contain, and other 
methods of production do not take its place before they 
have been incubated in the old social order. Furthermore 
mankind always puts questions which it can answer sat- 
isfactorily, for in examining the problem closely it will 
be seen that the question is raised only after the material 
conditions which permit of its solution are at hand. . . . 
The relations of production of the Middle Class are the 
last antagonistic form of social production . . . but in 
the productive forces which are developing in the bosom 
of the middle class social order are to be found the 
material conditions necessary to resolve this antagonism." 

And Marx hopefully adds: "With this social organ- 
isation the prehistoric period of humanity comes to an 
end." 

According to this doctrine it is the inevitable, ulti- 
mate destiny of the Proletariat to succeed the Middle 
Class in control of society; a historical necessity, the filia- 
tion of which can be traced as distinctly as that of the 
rise of the Middle Class upon the overthrow of the 
aristocracy. Just as during the close of the mediaeval 
period certain enlightened men foresaw the transforma- 
tion of the social order, the rise of modern States, and 
modern political organisation under the control of the 
Middle Class which was to rest on nationalism and cap- 
italism, an outcome of the increased importance of the 
individual, so now according to this doctrine the middl? 
class regime is drawing to a close, and far-sighted per- 
sons can already perceive the signs of the dawn of the 



COMMUNISM i6i 

new social arrangements, and the domination of the so- 
cial order by the Proletariat. The moderate, liberal, 
philanthropic, individualistic, middle class ideology is 
to make way for a harsher, more dogmatic, disciplined, 
arbitrary, cooperative social theory, which in the realm 
of practical affairs will be more akin to the domination 
of the aristocracy during the feudal period. 

The social revolution advocated by Marx and his 
communist followers was, they believed, inevitable. 
Those who read aright the lessons of history, they 
averred, can trace all historical development to its 
underlying "economic substructure." 

Such is the groundwork of historical materialism, called 
by its supporters the "ultimate and final philosophy of 
history" which purports to be a scientific, as distinguished 
from an ideological, analysis of historical evolution.^ 
According to this theory it is not by their own free choice, 
but because they cannot do otherwise, that men first 
satisfy their most elementary wants, which in turn give 
rise to other more complex wants. In order to satisfy 
these new demands men invent new implements and or- 
ganise new methods of production, which precede and 
influence all subsequent growth and historical develop- 
ment. The materialist interpretation of history is an, 
attempt to reconstruct the genesis and subsequent de- 
velopment of social life, based upon the economic bias 
of all historical progress. History is merely the nar- 
rative of the struggle between those who possess the 
means of production and those who do not; a class con- 
flict in which those who are excluded from sharing in 
the benefits of the means of production seek to wrest 
them from those who possess them. Thus history shows 
three great economic epochs : slavery, serfdom, and cap- 

*Cf. Antonio Labriola, Del Materialismo Storico. 



i62 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

italist organisation. The fourth, according to the Marx- 
ian thesis, will be cooperative exploitation when class an- 
tagonism will Kave been overcome. From the Marxian 
viewpoint the Reformation is to be looked upon as a 
rebellion of the German people against their economic 
exploitation by the Papacy. Economic causes underlie 
all historical evolution, which by the modern methods of 
historical criticism have been brought to light, though the 
sequence of events is in many instances obscure. In brief^ 
there is no episode in history which does not by its origin 
refer to underlying economic factors. "At the dawn 
of traditional history economics is already operative." 
History according to this view is the work of man. 
It "is the work of man in so far as man can create 
and improve his instruments of labor and with these in- 
struments can create an artificial environment, whose com- 
plicated effects react upon him and which by its present 
state and successive modifications is the occasion and 
condition of his development." ^ Historical factors 
cannot be held the result of man's critical or rational 
faculties, but are determined solely by his external needs 
and opportunities, which serve to develop his faculties. 
Thus the course of human events is a sum, a succession, 
a series of conditions which men have accumulated in 
the course of their changing social life, and as such does 
not represent either a fixed course of action and activity, 
or a deviation from an altogether perfect and felicitous 
plan. Progress is purely empirical. Historical materi- 
alism rejects the thesis that political action, scientific 
evolution, juridic development are civilising factors which 
assist in the interpretation of history. Its supporters 
hold that historical development is to be traced to eco- 
nomic causes, and can only be fully interpreted in the 

* Cf. Antonio Labriola, op. cit., Chap. IV. 



COMMUNISM 163 

light of their true relations, and that these are pre- 
determined. 

This new economic interpretation of history was "born 
on the battle-field of Communism." It presupposed the 
appearance of a Proletariat on the scene of political ac- 
tion, it took for granted the existence of the Middle 
Class and the social order as it actually existed in Europe 
and America. It claimed to be a scientific revolutionary 
doctrine in that it alleged to have discovered the funda- 
mental causes, traced the course of action, and forecast 
the development of the revolution of the Proletariat. It 
attempted to lay bare the causes of all other social revolu- 
tions which have taken place in the past and the condi- 
tions under which they occurred, and to show at what 
point class antagonism results in the overthrow of the 
old order and its substitution by the new. 



II 

Historical materialism, the economic interpretation of 
history which Marx and his followers claimed to be the 
only rational means of preparing for the advent of Com- 
munism, was the object of much obloquy, even among 
the Socialists. Scientific Socialism, or Critical Com- 
munism as Marx called his doctrine in the Manifesto 
of 1848, took pains to distinguish itself from other 
Socialist groups. The latter were characterised as 
middle class Socialists, social reformers, and social ideal- 
ists, who sought to sow dissension among the working 
class by attempting to patch up the old social order by 
means of political and economic reforms, instead of 
assisting in breaking it down. Strong in their conviction 
of the scientific basis of their thesis, the Communists 



i64 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

boldly announced the final triumph of the working class 
over the Middle Class, and the dictatorship of the Prole- 
tariat as an historically necessary event. The Proletariat, 
they claimed, formed a distinct and separate social group, 
which it would be historically impossible to integrate 
with the Middle Class of which it was an outgrowth, 
as the Middle Class itself and the politico-juridic organ- 
isation of the State and representative government had 
grown out of the aristocratic feudal system. The Pro- 
letariat, therefore, was not destined to be absorbed, 
in spite of all the philanthropic programmes of social 
betterment which might in the future be undertaken 
by the Middle Class. The sufferings, the hardships, the 
neglect, the injustice which the Proletariat suffered and 
was destined to suffer, were to be welcomed as serving 
to consolidate and strengthen its sense of class conscious- 
ness, and endow it with class solidarity, so that when the 
time came it would be ready to overthrow the existing 
social order, and revolutionise the capitalistic system by 
abolishing middle class political and social organisation 
of classes and of States. 

The Communists rejected the doctrine of equality, the 
juridic basis of social order, the government of States 
as instituted by the Middle Class. Justice and equality 
among individuals, they declared, are illusions which no 
sophistical, juridic theory can render valid. The diffu- 
sion and widespread acceptance of this "liberal" ideology 
had made possible the rise to power of the Middle Class, 
and entrenched individualism behind the ramparts of 
so-called political liberty. The politico-juridic concept of 
the State, with its individualistic terminology and con- 
ceits, its psychological categories and its liberal profes- 
sions, had enervated mankind by placing too heavy a 
burden on the individual. The individual has no true 



COMMUNISM 165 

initiative; he is the servant of his economic status, or, 
as has already been noted, "Ideas are the reflexes of eco- 
nomic relations; methods of production first present 
themselves to the mind as representations; ideas and 
ideals are nothing more than translations of these eco- 
nomic factors." The individual is of secondary impor- 
tance, and all individualism must be suppressed to al- 
low for the fullest and most rapid development of class 
consciousness among the Proletariat. This is essential 
in order to prepare for the final struggle with the Middle 
Class, which will inevitably result in the triumph of the 
Proletariat, owing to its corporate sense and absence 
of individualist bias. 

Class antagonism, the Communists declared, must re- 
main until the Proletariat has overthrown the capitalist 
system and gained control of political power in the State, 
which will then lead to the establishment of a new co- 
operative social order wherein true equality will be 
realised. But as long as the Middle Class survives as 
the sole political power in the State; as long as govern- 
ment remains "an executive committee of the Middle 
Class," so long the Proletariat is destined to struggle to 
bring about the destruction of the existing social system. 
The growth of the wealth of the Middle Class need not 
deter the Proletariat, as it is inevitably bound up with 
the strengthening of proletarian consciousness. The in- 
crease of the means of production, the increase of the 
number of producers, the growth of capital and its con- 
centration in the hands of the capitalist class are accom- 
panied by the growth of the Proletariat in vigor, numbers, 
and class consciousness. 

Throughout the Manifesto, and in fact throughout the 
writings of Marx and his followers, the ruthless realism 
of their doctrine is everywhere in evidence. There is 



i66 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

nothing Utopian, nothing vague or extravagant in their 
programme, when viewed in its proper perspective and 
interpreted in the light of its context. It is not main- 
tained that Communism is a natural or desirable doctrine. 
It is not claimed that it is suited to all men or to all social 
conditions at all times, or that if detached from its his- 
torical setting it would not be looked upon as a wholly 
unnatural thesis of social organisation. It is merely a 
symptom of the dissolution of capitalist society; a dis- 
solving force, a destructive weapon to accomplish a work, 
of demolition and make way for a constructive social 
organisation. It is to be looked upon as a poison, violent 
and devastating, which is to destroy the middle class 
individualist exploitation of mankind and to break down 
the tissue of the "vicious circle of production," the com- 
petitive system. 

The Communists had no sympathy with the various 
forms of State Socialism, such as were advocated by 
Lasalle or Louis Blanc. State Socialism, while it con- 
tained revolutionary elements, harked back to legahty 
and equality, the right to work, the right to a living wage, 
which, in the opinion of the Marxians, is an altogether 
middle class manner of envisaging the problem of labor 
in a capitalistic and not a proletarian sense. The failure 
of the June revolt of 1848 at Paris had made plain the 
futility of such halfway measures as the so-called national 
workshops and other similar attempts to graft prole- 
tarian theories on middle class practice. 

Nor can any attempts which may be made by the Mid- 
dle Class, primarily in Its own Interest, to increase the 
efficiency of labor, by remedying the abuses of the in- 
dustrial system, by social legislation, by improving wages 
and diminishing hours of work, do more than retard the 
final triumph of the Proletariat and the socialisation of 



COMMUNISM 167 

the means of production. As a part of the natural process 
of decay of the Middle Class such social legislation is 
to be expected. It will aim, in the first instance, at se- 
curing the nationalisation of the land and the placing of 
the State in control of raw materials and the necessities 
of life. These are proposals which, according to the 
Marxian thesis, it may be expected will be offered by 
social reformers and middle class Socialists to preserve 
the ascendancy of the Middle Class by modernising the 
politico-juridic theory of State and establishing a new 
form to be called social democracy. 

But Communism will have nothing to do with democ- 
racy, which it holds essentially the product of middle 
class individualism. It is of some significance and a 
proof of its essentially destructive nature, that Com- 
munism outlined no programme to provide for the re- 
construction of the social order, and concerned itself 
essentially with the overthrow of the existing regime. 
Marx formulated no system of social reorganisation, leav- 
ing it open for the future to evolve naturally its own 
social structure.^ 

The Manifesto does, however, specifically outline a 
mode of procedure to be followed in destroying the ex- 
isting middle class hierarchy. It may be summed up in 
the single proposition: The abolition of private prop- 
erty. This is not so revolutionary a proposal as it may 
at first sight seem. Property has throughout history un- 
dergone successive transformations. The French Rev- 
olution abolished all feudal property and made room 
for the rise of middle class property. The Communists 

^Marx in a letter to the English Socialist Beesby — whom up to that 
time (1869) he had considered the only true English revolutionary 
Socialist or Communist — after having read an article published by the 
latter on the future of the working class, stated that he now realised 
that he (Beesby) was at heart a reactionary, for "whoever lays down 
a programme for the future is a reactionary." 



i68 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

urged the abolition of middle class property, as the liv- 
ing embodiment of the exploitation of the Proletariat, 
and looked upon the transfer to the Proletariat of the 
means of production merely as a preparatory stage. 
When class distinctions have been abolished, a coopera- 
tive method of production is to take the place of middle 
class individual ownership. "Communism deprives no 
one of the power to appropriate for himself his share of 
production; it merely deprives men of the power to gain 
control over the work of another." 

The abolition of private privilege is by the Communists 
to be extended to include the entire fabric of middle 
class society. Thus established religion, education, the 
family, the State, which are conceived of as expressions 
of individualism, of individual initiative in a middle 
class sense, are to be done away with. To achieve this 
purpose they discarded all accepted ethical and moral con- 
siderations. "Abolish the exploitation of man by man, 
and you will do away with the exploitation of one State by 
another." When class antagonism shall have disappeared 
in a State, hostility between nations will disappear. 

Though the Manifesto admits that workingmen have 
no country: "The struggle of the Proletariat with the 
Middle Class, although not intrinsically a national 
struggle, nevertheless has assumed the form thereof. 
The Proletariat of each country must first of all over- 
throw its own Middle Class," yet Communism con- 
centrated its entire energy in bringing about the over- 
throw of the Middle Class in each separate State, and 
did not have in mind the destruction of national States, 
but merely the placing of the Proletariat in control in 
the State, which would thus transform its character and 
social ordering without destroying its ethnic or national 
characteristics. 



COMMUNISM 169 



III 

Such is a brief outline of the main principles upon which 
Communism rested. It contained no constructive pro- 
gramme of policy. It was a symptom of the decay of the 
Middle Class, a factor of demolition of political society 
built up on nationalist principles and based on juridic 
relations. Conscious that the Middle Class had first to 
fulfil its historical role, Marx had no oversanguine hopes 
of the immediate success of Communism. He merely as- 
serted that the phase of the control of the social order 
by the Middle Class would pass in due time and that that 
of the Proletariat would take its place. It was the duty 
of the Proletariat, as part of Its historical mission, to 
hasten the overthrow of the Middle Class which should 
be no longer delayed. 

Thus in 1848 we find the Communists in France help- 
ing the social democrats and more radical liberals in their 
struggle against the conservative middle class govern- 
ment of Louis Philippe. Yet when he was dethroned, 
the Middle Class firmly held the reins of power, estab- 
lished a republic, and repressed the Communist attempt to 
carry out its programme. In England the Communists 
had lent support to the Chartist movement; in America 
to various programmes of agrarian reform. In Switzer- 
land they helped the radicals, who, though a middle class 
party, were struggling for a broadening of popular con- 
trol. In Poland, in Hungary, in Italy the Communists 
pledged their support to the nationalist movements. In 
Germany and Austria they took an active part in promot- 
ing middle class aims in the struggle against absolutism. 
But in all these various revolutionary movements the 
Communists never "neglected an opportunity to awaken 



I70 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

in the minds of the working class the consciousness of 
the inherent antagonism between the Middle Class and 
the Proletariat, so that when the time should come the 
Proletariat would be ready to take up the struggle in its 
own behalf." 

Viewed historically, Communism, as outlined In 1848, 
was a reaction against the loosely framed, vague, al- 
truistic formulae of 1789, which had professed to insure 
political liberty to mankind, but which had in reality 
brought about the economic enslavement of the majority 
of the peoples of the Western World, and the rise of a 
new class of unenfranchised workers to whom the benefits 
of political liberty, as well as of social equality, had been 
denied. It was the aim of Communism in the first in- 
stance to arouse a sense of class solidarity and political 
consciousness among this unwieldy, uneducated, unorgan- 
ised social group; to introduce a semblance of discipline 
and order, to coordinate projects of social reform, and 
above all to oppose the strong current of uncontrolled 
romanticism which had arisen among visionary and im- 
practical social workers and was manifesting itself in such 
movements as Fourierism, Owenism, Brook Farm, and 
Harmony Hall. 

Looked at from a broad, unprejudiced viewpoint, Com- 
munism appears as an attempt to transfer to the arena of 
class conflict the doctrine of might versus right, of com- 
petitive struggle for power, which had been so successful 
in fostering the growth of national States. Marx recog- 
nised what he conceived to be the practical validity of 
the Hegelian concept of the State. He wished to trans- 
form it in accordance with the scientific, historical spirit 
which had led him to formulate the materialist inter- 
pretation of history. Hegel, he remarked, had stood 
history on its head; it was necessary to stand it on its 



COMMUNISM 171 

feet again. That is to say, that to Hegel the idea was 
reality. Marx declared that reality was transformed by 
man into ideas; in other words historical materialism, 
the economic moment showed the way to be followed in 
investigating the processes of social development. 

As the control of power in the State, the moulding 
force in society, had through succeeding ages become sub- 
divided and diluted until it had been inherited by the 
Middle Class, who kept up the old forms under the new 
mechanism of democratic government and public opinion, 
so by a natural sequence of argument, the logical con- 
clusion was reached that the numerically preponderant 
Proletariat was destined some day to become the domi- 
nant group in the State. Marx, in spite of his originality, 
never emancipated himself from the strong national 
bias in his character. All the programmes he subse- 
quently set forth in the international movement betray 
this innate conviction of German racial supremacy.^ He 
never went beyond a purely national point of view. The 
cry of the Manifesto, "Proletariat of all countries, 
unite !" was made with a mental reservation. In this 
sense Marx remained altogether under the influence of 
the spirit of his times. The era that was opening was to 
pay little attention to Communist doctrines, but much to 
those of nationalism and of national unity. 

* It has been suggested that Marx, owing to his Jewish origin and more 
especially his cosmopolitan training, was in point of fact indifferent to 
questions of nationality, and that he conceived of the State as "built on the 
ruins of a hundred living polities." But that he did not have an abstract, 
toned-down sense of nationality is proved by the active support which he 
gave in later years to the aggressive policy of Prussia, in the war with 
France; his high admiration for Moltke and Bismarck, and the enthusiasm 
with which he celebrated the victories of Germany over France, to the 
great surprise of his disciples and followers abroad. 



CHAPTER VI 

The Nation-State 

THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF 1 852 — THE SECOND EMPIRE- 
THE CENTRALISATION OF AUTHORITY COLONIAL EX- 
PANSION — THE BRITISH EMPIRE INDUSTRIAL 

EXHIBITIONS PROSPERITY AND POLITICS 



THE revolution that had swept Louis Philippe from 
his throne had gone beyond the limits agreeable 
to the Middle Class. The four June days of the socialist 
rising at Paris had caused an immediate reaction. In 
the Constituent Assembly, which at once assembled (June 
13, 1848) to draw up a constitution, an unexpected fig- 
ure appeared. Louis Napoleon, who had escaped from 
his French gaolers two years before and had fled to 
England, hastened to France on the outbreak of the 
revolution in February and professed himself In full 
sympathy with the Provisional Republican Government. 
He was, however, requested to leave France, which he 
agreed to do. But on being elected a member of the 
Constituent Assembly, he took his seat. His presence 
aroused a storm of protest among a large section, who 
foresaw the possibility of his intriguing to gain control 
of the reins of government. In the face of the oppo- 
sition so openly manifested, Louis Napoleon resigned his 
seat and quitted the country. 

The prospect of the return of a member of the Bona- 

[172] 



THE NATION-STATE 173 

parte family to executive authority in France haunted the 
framers of the new constitution. The Napoleonic legend 
had grown to great dimensions. The prestige and glamour 
of the dead Emperor, whose burial-place had become a 
shrine of pilgrimage, had inflamed popular opinion. The 
majority had grown very weary of the petty, inconse- 
quential policy of Louis Philippe's government, which the 
new Provisional Government had adhered to. Louis 
Napoleon thereupon once again returned to France in 
September 1848 to take his seat again in the Assembly. 
He had been elected by five separate constituencies. 

Meanwhile, the work of constitution-making proceeded. 
The alarm of the Middle Class at the reappearance of a 
Napoleon is reflected in the form of government which 
was provided for. The power of the President was 
limited by a series of checks, which left the final authority 
in the hands of the National Assembly. 

Three months later Louis Napoleon was elected Presi- 
dent of the Republic. His Presidency, his coup d'etat and 
dictatorship of 1 850-1 851, the popular approval ex- 
pressed by ballot of his assumption of imperial dignity, 
and the new constitution of 1852 whereby Napoleon III 
was proclaimed "by the grace of God and the national 
will Emperor of the French," are to be explained in the 
light of a new orientation in political practice. 

It is necessary to go beneath the surface of the sem- 
blance of absolutism which Louis Napoleon revived. 
Napoleon III owed his title to the nation. He had been 
elected President and sanctioned as Emperor by popular 
vote. The new constitution of 1852 recognised the prin- 
ciple of universal manhood suffrage. In reality it pro- 
vided for only two powers in the State : the will of the 
majority and that of the Emperor. The will of the people 
was held to be the source of all power in the State. The 



174 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

constitution was to be submitted to them for approval. 
It provided that imperial authority derived its strength 
from their sanction. But the conduct of public affairs, 
the initiative in legislation, the control of foreign policy, 
of the army and civil service, were left unreservedly in 
the hands of the Emperor. Ministers could be dismissed 
at pleasure and served only to defend the policy of the 
Emperor before the Chamber, which could reject, but 
not improve, harmful legislation. 

It would seem as though the French people, tired of 
the endless debates and the hedging policy of a represen- 
tative assembly, when it could at last express its opinion 
by ballot, preferred to vest unlimited executive authority 
in a single man, confident that the ultimate court of ap- 
peal was the nation. Representative government in 
France had for the time being been eclipsed. Political 
privilege as expressed by universal suffrage, which had 
been extended to the adult, male population, had sought to 
give to the nation a unity and coherence which it had not 
hitherto attained. The Middle Class, at first so alarmed 
at the rise of another Napoleon, was not slow to perceive 
that in reality the new Empire did not injure its broader 
interests. There now seemed no obstacle in the way of 
the indefinite expansion of the power and wealth of a 
State which would adhere to a capitalist-nationalist pro- 
gramme. Class struggle with the rising Proletariat, which 
had begun to define itself, seemed eliminated. The nation 
appeared to present a united front. The magic of num- 
bers, the vote of the millions of citizens which had legally 
sanctioned the change in government, seemed to have 
given rise to a new sense of national power and national 
solidarity. The nation had for the first time expressed 
itself. 

It was this new form of nationalism that was to become 



THE NATION-STATE 175 

the controlling factor during the rule of Napoleon III. 
He was to take up the old programme of Napoleon I and 
make it the key of his political practice. To do this it was 
necessary to unite all authority in a single hand. The 
nation was ready and willing to grant this authority. The 
past decade had been one of vacillation and distrust. Po- 
litical theorists and idealists, men of moderate, liberal 
views, who wished to avoid entangling obligations, who 
favored laissez-faire in politics as they did in business, had 
continued in control of the government. They had grown 
hostile to the development of nationalism abroad, which, 
they seemed intuitively to grasp, would not ultimately 
be of benefit to France. The Republic of 1848 under the 
guidance of the poet Lamartine had made ample profes- 
sions of faith in favor of the nationalist movement. But 
in point of fact the Provisional Government had refused 
any real assistance to the Italians, the Poles, and the Irish. 
Louis Napoleon, upon his election to the Presidency, 
put an end to this vacillating policy. He felt himself the 
acknowledged champion of nationalism. He was ready 
to rehabilitate France in the eyes of Europe and the 
world. To do this he was to undertake to realise the dic- 
tum of the great Napoleon who had proclaimed: "The 
Government that will be the first to raise the standard of 
nationalism and proclaim itself the defender thereof will 
dominate Europe." 

II 

The Europe of 1850 was no longer that of 1830. A 
spirit of ruthless competition was beginning to control the 
relations between States. National patriotism and na- 
tional loyalty were being made to serve the ends of eco- 
nomic and political expansion. National spirit was taking 



176 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

shape and fixing itself as the formative force of great, 
strongly consolidated States. The national will hence- 
forth was to become identified with the concept of the 
State. To develop national strength, to become a Great 
Power, and if possible a World Power, was the main 
ambition of the concentrated energy of the State. 

To carry out the new political programmes, centralisa- 
tion of authority was essential. It was felt necessary 
to define and render precise the character of the State, 
to fuse all regional characteristics in one national figure. 
John Bull as England, or France represented as Mari- 
anne, were more than mere symbols for the use of political 
cartoonists. By them the State was personalised. The 
Nation-State thus conceived had come to represent and 
visualise the fusion of national energy and national ca- 
pacity, and compel attention by its overtowering strength. 
To increase this strength by expanding its boundaries 
hand in hand with its commerce and industries was deemed 
the surest and simplest method to heighten national pres- 
tige and add new power to the State. Government was 
looked upon as a mechanism which was to function for 
the purpose of giving life and vigor to the State, to excel 
In competition with other States as men sought to excel 
in competition with other men. 

The State was to become the hero of a new hero- 
worship. Liberty was translated into privilege, in politics 
as In business. De Tocqueville has pointed out that "So- 
ciety Is tranquil not when it is conscious of Its strength 
and wellbeing but, on the contrary, when it believes Itself 
to be feeble and Infirm, and fears that It will die if it 
make the slightest effort." 

The restless activity of the ensuing decades would seem 
to testify to the fact that the peoples of Western Europe 
had become conscious of their strength and wellbeing. 



THE NATION-STATE 177 

It cannot be gainsaid that there was a vigorous expansive 
energy displayed, which promoted difficult enterprise. An 
assertive outlook on life, a realist perception of what ap- 
peared to be the needs of the moment, a positivist,, 
mechanistic view of the relation of men to their environ- 
ment, a blind subservience to the tenets of competition 
had increased the nerve force and power of resistance of 
the peoples of Western Europe. The wellbeing, which 
had resulted from the tireless pursuit of economic ends, 
had translated itself into power. 

The democratic, middle class social structure of the 
19th century and the struggle for equal opportunity had 
accustomed men not to look too closely for a nice balance 
between cause and effect. There was no time for search- 
ing inquiry into the possible unforeseen results of a plan 
of action or policy which was to be entered upon. It 
was felt that if too much time was spent in plans, too 
little would be left for their realisation. Men were con- 
tent to take big risks. The success of some of the great- 
est inventions which had revolutionised the economics of 
social life had hitherto often been retarded by timidity 
and lack of faith in new undertakings. Speculative 
enterprise which produced such successful results re- 
quired an acute appreciation of the needs of the moment, 
rather than a patient inquiry into the detailed working 
out of their consequences. The industrial system had 
bred a type of man who combined caution with daring, 
thrift with initiative. The romantic, contemplative spirit 
of the generation that had been reared during the Napo- 
leonic wars had all but vanished. Men were eager for 
new enterprise, not to be undertaken in a spirit of adven- 
ture, but frankly for profit. 

It is in this new spirit that the great colonial empire, 
which England had been building up, was brought to its 



178 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

logical climax. Trading companies were no longer given 
monopolies and grants. The principle o^ free trade had 
triumphed, and the State asserted its sovereign rights by 
occupation, cession, or conquest. That the sun never sets 
in the British Empire became the boast of power, the 
incentive to fresh effort among her industrious, patriotic 
Middle Class, whose prosaic outlook on life was lighted 
up by the reflected glory of the vast World State which 
its industry had made possible, and its commerce and 
enterprise held together. The people of England now 
wished to let the world know what they had accomplished 
along the lines of trade expansion. In 185 1 we find the 
Prince Consort engaged in promoting the plans for an 
International Industrial Exhibition to be held at London; 
the first of these exhibitions which were to become so 
prominent a feature of the ensuing era. Queen Victoria 
headed the subscription list to raise the funds necessary 
to advertise to the world the progress and preeminence 
of British wares. As long since Catholicism had under- 
stood that "meme Dieu a besoin de ses cloches/' so now 
it was felt that the State had need to be known, to ad- 
vertise its power measured in terms of its products. High 
hopes were placed in these industrial exhibitions, which 
followed each other in rapid succession in various parts 
of the world. They were intended to "diffuse a love of 
industry and peaceful emulation over the whole globe," 
and while it was admitted that commerce had its weak 
and even degrading elements, it was believed that "few 
occupations of man are more humanising, or tend more 
to teach the value of peace and goodwill." Such were 
the opening scenes of the drama of nationalism and capi- 
talism, as enacted by the Middle Class, as soon as it had 
secured complete control in the State. It was not, how- 
ever, as was expected, to result in establishing peace and 



THE NATION-STATE 179 

goodwill among men, but to lead to a fierce and embit- 
tered struggle for power among States. 

Though a small orthodox-liberal group viewed with 
suspicion the increasing encroachments of the State in 
what had hitherto been considered the domain of private 
affairs, and the diversion of public attention from the 
traditional middle class policy of laissez-faire, which had 
made possible the progressive advance in national pros- 
perity, a greater majority was daily being won over to the 
new way of thinking. The State had become a living 
reality, a concrete factor in everyday life. As it was felt 
the. aim and duty of the individual to develop his natural 
capacity and prove his ability, so the personalised State 
was expected to strain its full energy, to prove and mani- 
fest its capacities, to develop its national power. It was 
coming to be believed that petty States had a very "du- 
bious and insecure existence," which they could only ren- 
der secure by seeking the protection of, or attaching them- 
selves to, stronger States. The chief recognised means of 
increasing the power of the State in competition with 
other States was by a skilful, daring foreign policy sup- 
ported by a strong army. The internal prosperity of 
the State was best fostered by affording full scope to in- 
dividual enterprise within the limits of national interest. 
The private life of the individual was subordinated to 
the needs of the State. The State arrogated to itself 
close supervision of its citizens in order to strengthen 
its authority. It now required strict adherence to the 
laws of the land which regulated more minutely than 
ever the varied activities of the individual. It demanded 
peremptorily the performance of such recognised obli- 
gations as the payment of taxes or. In some States, also 
military service. On the Continent the introduction of 
compulsory military service, the strategic disposition of 



i8o THE TREND OF HISTORY 

the chief railways, which were all constructed so as to 
pass through the capital, the telegraph system, which was 
looked upon as the nervous system of the State, con- 
tributed to render more distinct the image of the person- 
alised State. It came to be accepted that "nationality 
gives the chief impulse to public life." 



CHAPTER VII 
Napoleon III 



HIS NATIONALIST POLICY — RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS- 

THE POSITION OF RUSSIA — PAN-SLAVIC MOVEMENT THE 

CRIMEAN WAR — THE ROLE OF ENGLAND THE CON- 
GRESS OF PARIS — RUSSOPHILE TENDENCIES 



IT was during this final phase of the formative period of 
the Nation-State that Napoleon III found himself 
with a free hand to carry forward the programme of 
the nationalist expansion of France. The policy he pur- 
sued to achieve this end has been variously estimated. 
There are those who would see in the Emperor the cham- 
pion of oppressed nationalities, who kept Europe in a 
state of continuous turmoil in carrying out an altruistic 
policy which was to compass his downfall. There are 
others who claim that Louis Napoleon had a very shrewd 
perception of the best methods to be pursued to increase 
the power and glory of France, and that he undertook no 
enterprise without seeing to it that France was paid in 
full for whatever services she rendered. "It is true that 
Napoleon interested himself in a number of oppressed 
nationalities, but he never went to war In their behalf." 
He opened up negotiations with Hungarian revolutionists 
in order to urge them to war against Austria. He as- 
sisted the Italians only upon condition of their agreeing 
to the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France. He 

li8i] 



i82 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

urged Prussia to drive Austria out of the German Con- 
federation, and after this had been accomplished, de- 
manded compensation for his benevolence and good ad- 
vice in the form of the right to acquire Luxemburg. 

There can be no doubt but that there is a part of truth 
in both these points of view. Napoleon III was es- 
sentially a man of his epoch, sensitive to its moods which 
he interpreted in all circumstances as favorable to his own 
plans. It was commonly accepted in the Europe of the 
day that France represented the "principle of national- 
ity." Under the rule of Napoleon III France was to 
become the pattern of a closely-knit, homogeneous Na- 
tion-State, whose government and administration were 
looked to as worthy of imitation. He took advantage 
of every opportunity to increase this opinion by proving 
that it is by competitive methods, identical with those of 
the business world, that the State may be expected to 
rise to power, and enjoy prosperity. 

In 1850 three States besides France were counted as 
Great Powers: England, Austria, and Russia. England 
was well-known to Napoleon III. Its people had on more 
than one occasion offered him a safe refuge. As his 
nearest neighbor, who was daily growing wealthier and 
more powerful, Napoleon III felt drawn to friendly 
intercourse with England; the more so as the British 
Government, still engrossed with assimilating its newly 
acquired colonial domain, was disinterested in the affairs 
of continental Europe, and would give him a freer hand 
there and protect him from flank attack. The mistake 
Napoleon I had made in antagonising England was to 
be remedied by his nephew who, during the early years 
of his reign, cultivated the friendliest relations with the 
Court of St. James. 

Austria, with its legitimist, absolutist theory of State, 



NAPOLEON III 183 

its anti-nationalist structure and policy, was looked upon 
by French public opinion as the natural rival of France. 
The harsh methods of repression of the nationalist risings 
in Italy and Hungary had resulted in awakening a strong 
sentiment of animosity against the Austrian Government, 
which in France was now held to be "a standing menace 
to Europe." The fact that the Vienna authorities had 
already repudiated their promise, won during the days 
of the revolutionary outbreak of 1848, to grant liberal 
reforms, and had withdrawn the concession of a represen- 
tative assembly as soon as they felt strong enough to do 
.so, added to the distrust which the people of France felt 
towards the Austrian Government, and strengthened the 
position of Napoleon III in prosecuting an anti-Austrian 
policy which had the approval of public opinion. 

Russia at this time lay beyond the sphere of intimate 
contact. The Tsar maintained his absolutist regime ap- 
parently intact, untroubled by revolutionary propaganda, 
which, when it became annoying, was rapidly stamped out. 
Nevertheless, nationalism as a political incentive to ag- 
grandisement found even in the Emperor Nicholas I a 
fervent disciple. But it was a different nationalist im- 
pulse from that which prevailed in the West. It was 
wholly egoistical, and was made to promote the autocratic 
power of Russia and to denationalise her non-Russian 
subject peoples. To increase the prestige of Russia, 
Nicholas I made war on the Persians and then on the 
Turks, He initiated the Pan-Slavic movement, which was 
extended to the Balkans and to Austria in later years. He 
attempted to Russianlse all his subjects, and forcibly to 
convert the Roman Catholics to the Orthodox ritual. His 
hostile attitude towards the Poles, his conversion of that 
country into a province, and other similar activities which 
were reprobated in Western Europe, were inspired by 



i84 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

the same nationalist sentiment which had become the 
motive-force of pubHc policy there, and proved the 
political and social solidarity of Russia with Western 
Europe, in spite of the paramount interest of Russia in 
Asiatic affairs, which had hitherto contributed to keep the 
country outside the orbit of Western political progress. 
Nicholas I had remained aloof from Western European 
affairs. He viewed with suspicion the increasing prestige 
of the British in Central Asia, and watched closely the 
development of liberalism in the West. When in Poland 
liberalism had assumed the form of a national insurrec- 
tion he had repressed it with vigor. Called upon by the 
Austrians for assistance to stamp out the nationalist re- 
volt of the Magyars, he sent a powerful force into Hun- 
gary in 1849, with the result that this nationalist rising 
also was suppressed. By this act Russia had gained the 
enmity of the peoples of the West. 



II 

The real causes of the Crimean War were complex. 
The encroachments of Russia on Turkey and the ac- 
tivity the Russians displayed in Central Asia threatening 
British possessions in India were contributing factors. 
While public opinion in France would have viewed a 
war against Austria with more enthusiasm, the fact that 
Russia had assisted Austria in suppressing the struggle 
for national liberty of the Magyars, and the sympathy 
aroused for the Poles by the harsh treatment they had 
endured at the hands of Nicholas I, had made popular 
any aggressive policy which Napoleon III might choose 
to pursue against Russia. 

It was expected of Napoleon III that he would resur- 



NAPOLEON III 185 

rect the military prestige of France by a successful for- 
eign campaign. Though the memory of the galling de- 
feat of the French in 18 12 had no part in practical poli- 
tics, yet the recollection of the Moscow campaign was 
ready to hand, and was skilfully made use of to arouse 
patriotic enthusiasm for a war against Russia. The les- 
sons of the history of Napoleon I had not been lost upon 
Napoleon III. The latter realised that a well-balanced 
coalition is inevitably stronger than a single State, no mat- 
ter what the other odds may be. 

As soon as Napoleon III had consolidated his position 
at home and by the assumption of the imperial dignity 
felt this position secure, he began to venture on foreign 
enterprise. He drew closer to England and found her 
willing to listen to the arguments in favor of a campaign 
against Russia. The pretext for war was found in the 
dispute over the protection of the holy places in Palestine, 
which Napoleon III claimed for France in the name of 
the Roman Catholics, and Nicholas I demanded on be- 
half of the Orthodox clergy. 

It would appear that Russia counted on being sup- 
ported by Austria in case the situation should become un- 
duly strained. Nicholas I sent a special ambassador to 
Constantinople in February 1853 ^^ press his claims, and 
at the same time demanded the sole right of protecting 
the Orthodox Christians in Turkey. The Porte appealed 
to the Western Powers. In June a French and English 
fleet sailed into the Eastern Mediterranean. Negotia- 
tions continued until Turkey, supported by the Allies, de- 
clared war on Russia (October 5, 1853). 

A Franco-British expeditionary force was in due course 
landed in the Crimea, and the siege of Sebastopol was 
begun. Austria failed to come to the assistance of Russia, 
and as the result of diplomatic pressure even went so far 



i86 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

as to join the Western allies, though she took no active 
part in military operations. The war dragged on with- 
out decisive result. Epidemics ravaged the allied armies 
and caused more casualties than active fighting. 

The French, who had borne the brunt of the operations, 
were growing tired of the war. On March 2, 1855, 
Nicholas I died, and was succeeded by his son, Alexander 
II. The accession of the new Emperor seemed to presage 
the gratification of the French desire for peace. Nego- 
tiations were opened at Vienna to find a suitable ground 
for an adjustment, but nothing came of the attempt. 

The siege of Sebastopol was pressed with renewed 
vigor. Napoleon III made ready to proceed to the 
Crimea to take over the command of the allied forces in 
person. Then came the news of the French victory at the 
Malakoff, the fall of Sebastopol, and the destruction of 
the greater part of the Russian Black Sea fleet in its 
harbor (September 1855). 

In the meantime Napoleon had given up his plan of 
proceeding to the scene of operations, so that after the 
victory Paris witnessed a military triumph the like of 
which had not been seen since the days of Napoleon I. 
The Te Deum at Notre Dame was made the occasion of 
a magnificent military display. "All Paris turned out 
to see the procession pass, and when the gala carriage 
drawn by eight horses led by equerries on foot, in which 
Napoleon III clad in the uniform of a general had taken 
his place, appeared, a great cheer broke forth from the 
assembled crowds : 'Vive VEmpereur, Vive I'Armee.' " ^ 
The honor of French arms had been avenged. Napoleon 
III had refurbished the military glory of France. He 
was ready for peace. 

But such was not the mood of England. The news of 

* Cf. La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, Vol. I. 



NAPOLEON III 187 

the destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet was re- 
ceived with enthusiasm. The British were now anxious to 
continue the war with renewed vigor. The capture of 
Sebastopol was regarded by them merely as a preliminary 
operation. England was intent upon dispatching a fleet to 
attack, and annihilate the Russian Baltic fleet. But public 
opinion in France was tired of the war, which had been of 
little profit to the country. Moreover, the destruction of 
the Russian fleet in northern waters would have given 
England too great a naval superiority. Napoleon III 
realised that the only possible object which might induce 
the French to continue the war was the restoration of the 
Kingdom of Poland. To this project England refused to 
give its adherence. Thereupon Napoleon III, while out- 
wardly preparing for the continuance of the war, never- 
theless let it clearly be understood by Russia that he was 
ready for peace. The preliminary negotiations were con- 
ducted through Vienna. The conditions were submitted 
to Russia in the form of an ultimatum, on November 14, 
1855. The neutralisation of the Black Sea, the cession of 
Moldavia and part of Bessarabia were stipulated. After 
some tortuous negotiations and delays, Russia finally ac- 
cepted the demands (January 16, 1856). One month 
later a peace congress was convoked to meet at Paris. 
Seven European States were represented. Prussia, who 
took no part in the war, had begged to be admitted, as 
questions of international importance were to be dis- 
cussed ; while Piedmont had won the right to a seat in the 
Congress, as she had dispatched a small force to partici- 
pate in the expedition. 

The Congress of Paris began its work in earnest on 
February 28. Napoleon III soon found himself playing 
the role of arbiter between the English delegates, whose 
disappointment at not continuing the war had translated 



i88 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

itself into a desire to exact a humiliating peace, and the 
Russians, who though they had lost the war, now felt 
that they had gained in Napoleon III, if not a friend, at 
least a benevolent well-wisher, who would use his influ- 
ence in restraining any exaggerated claims which might 
be put forward by the British Government. In return, 
for these good services, Russia, the enemy of yesterday, 
was ready to support French policy as long as not incom- 
patible with her direct interests. Napoleon III, in re- 
sponse to public opinion, desired to help the process of 
the formation of national States in the Balkans. The 
protectorate of Russia over Moldavia and Wallachia 
had been abolished by preliminary agreement. France, 
in pursuance of its nationalist policy, proposed the union 
of these two principalities as the basis of the formation 
of a new Nation-State. Russia agreed; but Austria and 
Turkey violently objected to the interference of France 
in what they deemed to be the internal affairs of the 
Balkans. To avert the danger of widening the breach 
between France and her former allies, it was thought 
advisable to adjourn the settlement of this question until 
the conclusion of peace. 

Three weeks after the opening of the peace conference 
the atmosphere had become tense. "Everybody is an- 
noyed; it is time to sign," the Austrian ambassador noted, 
voicing the general sentiment of the delegates. On March 
30, to avoid further complications, peace was speedily 
signed. England and Austria were loud in their recrimi- 
nations against Napoleon III for having intervened on 
behalf of Russia and softened the terms of the treaty. 
He had in addition sacrificed Polish freedom to his new 
Russian friendship. The protocol of November 14, 1855, 
had provided for the signing of a secret treaty of alliance 
between France, England, and Austria to guarantee the 



NAPOLEON III 189 

enforcement of the terms of the treaty and the integrity 
of Turkish territory. Napoleon III took no great pains 
to conceal his lack of enthusiasm at being a party to such 
an agreement, which he was nevertheless compelled to 
enter upon (April 15, 1856). 

The new Russophile attitude of Napoleon III was in a 
measure due to the skilful policy pursued by the Russian 
peace envoy to the Paris Congress. Napoleon III was 
not insensible to the flattery implied by the deferential 
attitude of the Russian Government, which had in the 
past been the leading spirit in the Holy Alliance and the 
most implacable enemy of his house. At the same time, 
the Emperor of the French was already preparing plans 
for future aggrandisement nearer home, in which the 
neutrality, if not the active cooperation, of Russia was an 
essential element. 



CHAPTER VIII 

The New Nationalism 

SURVEY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION RELATIONS BE- 
TWEEN STATES — NAPOLEON III AND ITALIAN UNITY — THE WAR 

WITH AUSTRIA VILLAFRANCA EFFECTS OF UNION OF ITALY 

— POLAND FRANCO-RUSSIAN TENSION THE MEXICAN 

EXPEDITION BISMARCK AND THE WAR WITH DENMARK 

ANNEXATION OF THE DANISH DUCHIES PRUSSIA 

AND AUSTRIA SADOWA THE TREATY OF PRAGUE 

THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION THE 

COLLAPSE OF THE MEXICAN EMPIRE THE 

LUXEMBURG INCIDENT THE GERMAN MEN- 
ACE THE WAR OF 187O — SEDAN — THE 

FOUNDATION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 



IT has been necessary to enter in some detail into the 
situation arising out of the Crimean War and the 
Paris Congress, in order to make clear the factors of 
continental European policy, which were destined to have 
so deep an influence on political evolution. 

Russia had again been drawn into the vortex of West- 
ern European affairs and was making friendly overtures 
to Napoleon III, though the Tsar was congenitally op- 
posed to the latter's interpretation of nationalism and the 
erection of Nation-States. England had allied herself 
with France, partly with the view of avoiding the pos- 
sibility of another Napoleonic war, partly to make use of 
France in thwarting Russian expansion in Central Asia 
and if possible to involve Russia in a Western policy. 

[190] 



THE NEW NATIONALISM 191 

The old German Empire was on the eve of dissolution, 
and Prussia was pushing forward her claims to German 
hegemony, which it was beginning to be realised could be 
accomplished only by the forcible ejection of Austria from 
the Germanic Confederation. The Hapsburg realm, torn 
by nationalist dissensions, nevertheless retained a sem- 
blance of its former influence. Vienna had become the 
scene of all negotiations of Near Eastern problems. 

In the Balkans the various peoples still under the rule 
of the Turks were beginning to feel the stirring of the 
national impulse to state building. The Danubian prin- 
cipalities had acquired autonomy; the Greeks were de- 
manding the annexation of Crete; the Serbs and Bulgars 
were agitating for independence. In Italy, Piedmont had 
the same task before it as Prussia had in Germany, but 
Cavour, the leading statesman of his day, was convinced 
that the Italians were not strong enough to confront the 
Austrians unaided, and was looking for assistance. At 
the Paris Congress he had had occasion to discover that 
Napoleon III would lend a willing ear to his plans for 
the national unity of Italy under the House of Savoy, and 
he worked assiduously to assure for himself this proffered 
aid. Such was the situation in Europe during the decade 
when Western policy and Western political practice, dic- 
tated by the Middle Class, and still to all intents and 
purposes uninfluenced by the pressure of the Proletariat, 
may be said to have become pivotal throughout the world. 

In the Orient Japan was being opened to peaceful 
Western intercourse by the United States, and China was 
entering upon closer relations with the West. British 
trade With China had grown to be of great importance, 
and an occasion was soon to be found to force an enter- 
ing wedge which was to open China to Western com- 
mercial penetration. The French and British were, act- 



192 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

ing in concert in Chinese waters, and the new markets, 
of the East required, it was believed, a more energetic 
Europeanising policy, which could best be promoted by- 
securing direct diplomatic intercourse with Peking, 

In the United States the economic as well as the social 
factors of slavery had, with the growth of industrial and 
commercial enterprise, the consequent wellbeing in the 
Northern States, and the more direct and intimate inter- 
course of the latter with the South, resulted in a distinct 
cleavage of policy regarding the extension of slavery. It 
was coming to be felt that the country could no longer 
remain "half slave and half free." While the Southern 
States were essential to the industrial prosperity of the 
North, the South, with a market for its cotton in Eng- 
land, could, it was thought by some of the Southern 
leaders, have a prosperous existence as an independent 
State. Here also war clouds were gathering. 

The world had suddenly become a smaller place to live 
in. The various peoples had become dependent upon 
one another, in order to be able to satisfy their wants. 
Under the impetus of the competitive system these wants 
were continuously being enlarged, and greater efforts 
were being made to satisfy them. Commercial expansion 
had become closely linked with national expansion, and it 
had come to be believed that the strong, national States 
were the ones most fitted to promote commercial pros- 
perity and assert their position in world affairs. 

In Europe the nationalist impulse had come to dominate 
political life. England in pursuing her more selfish plans 
of capitalist expansion sought to reconcile the desire for 
national independence, in so far as it concerned foreign 
States, with her own liberal views of government in which 
democratic principles were recognised, without commit- 
ting her to any nationalist programme at home. It was 



THE NEW NATIONALISM 193 

left to France to assume the more perilous role of active 
champion of nationalism, which for the time being was 
tending to make her again the principal factor in Euro- 
pean affairs. 

In spite of the growing hostility oetween Russia and 
England, Napoleon III adhered closely to his plan of re- 
maining on good terms with England and promoting the 
alliance between the two countries. With the friendship 
of Russia seemingly assured, and with England as his ally, 
Napoleon III felt that he could safely venture to intervene 
in the affairs of the Italian peninsula. No time was lost 
in laying the foundations for this undertaking. Six 
months after the Paris Congress a Franco-British fleet 
appeared in Neapolitan waters, to remonstrate against 
what these two Powers professed to deem the misgov- 
ernment of the King of Naples. Russia, somewhat to 
the surprise of France, promptly protested against this 
action as interfering with the rights of an independent 
sovereign. The allies, posing as supporters of liberalism 
and good government, persisted in their plans. How- 
ever, Napoleon III felt that before pursuing his policy 
it would be better to come to some definite understanding 
with Russia. An era of diplomatic Intrigue now opened 
which continued uninterruptedly throughout the Second 
Empire. 

The aim of Napoleon III was to succeed, on the one 
hand, in restraining Russia from actively assisting Aus- 
tria as she had done in 1849 i" Hungary should the 
Italians seek to throw off the yoke of the Austrians; on 
the other, to insure Russian neutrality in the event of 
French intervention In Italy, and if possible secure the 
support of Russia by inducing her to mobilise a Russian 
army along the Gallcian frontier as a threat against Aus- 
tria. France further reserved for herself the right of 



194 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

territorial acquisitions at the expense of Italy and in re- 
turn promised to agree to the revision of the clauses of 
the treaty of Paris regarding the neutralisation of the 
Black Sea, which Russia deemed intolerable. These 
negotiations were kept secret and not even carried on 
through regular diplomatic channels, but by a personal 
agent of Napoleon III at the court of Alexander II, 
which serves to lend credence to the belief that in Italy 
the French Emperor pursued a purely personal policy. 



II 

Napoleon III now was free to take a more active part 
in posing as the protector of the Italian peoples and to 
champion their aspirations for national unity. The Pied- 
montese were soon to afford a favorable opportunity for 
more aggressive action. In the meantime, perceiving 
that war was inevitable, Austria turned for support to 
the States of North Germany. 

As the result of a secret agreement entered into be- 
tween Napoleon III and Cavour at Plombieres (July 
1858), Italy was, under certain eventualities, promised 
the support of French arms. Austria readily fell into 
the trap set for her. The Vienna Government dispatched 
an ultimatum to Turin and soon thereafter declared war 
(April 1859). French assistance was thus secured. The 
French won signal victories at Magenta and Solferino. 
In the midst of these successful operations. Napoleon III 
suddenly agreed to come to terms with Austria, and an 
armistice was signed at Villafranca (July 11, 1859) 
followed by a patched-up peace. The causes of this volte 



THE NEW NATIONALISM 195 

face are not far to seek. Russia, alarmed at the propor- 
tions of the nationalist rising in Italy and its possible re- 
percussion in Poland, had begun to waver in her friendly 
support. It is even suggested that, owing to her prepon- 
derant influence at Berlin, she was able to induce the Prus- 
sians to mobilise along the Rhine, or at least did not pre- 
vent them from doing so. Napoleon III was afraid that 
he had committed himself unduly. His interest in Italian 
unity was secondary to his project of carrying forward a 
profitable anti-Austrian policy, which at the time was 
immensely popular in France, and to securing adequate 
territorial compensation, which would make him appear 
as a conqueror in the eyes of his own people. 

However, the process of the unification of Italy was 
not stopped by the withdrawal of the French, The na- 
tionalist movement continued. The British lent their sup- 
port to Garibaldi in his enterprise against Naples. In 
the meantime Napoleon III again changed his attitude. 
He now threatened the Piedmontese with armed inter- 
vention should they attempt to occupy Umbria, and he 
reinforced the French garrison of Rome. 

Alexander II expressed his satisfaction at this change 
of front, and hoped that the French would carry out 
their threat. Though nothing came of it, the treachery 
of the French, as it was qualified by the Italians, left a 
deep impression in Italy, and influenced subsequent Italian 
foreign policy. 

In spite of this setback the process of the unification of 
Italy continued. The Kingdom of Italy, including all the 
States of the peninsula excepting Venetia and Rome, was 
proclaimed an independent State under the sceptre of the 
House of Savoy, and as such was recognised by the Pow- 
ers with the exception of Austria (1861). In payment 



196 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

for the part the French had played in the Italian war of 
liberation, Savoy and Nice were annexed to France; a 
very profitable compensation for a campaign which had 
lasted only nine weeks. 

Looked at in the light of its actual accomplishment, 
Italian unity appears merely as a part of the complicated 
nationalist programme of Napoleon III. In reality it was 
founded on the far deeper motive of racial homogeneity 
as the basis of state building, which at this epoch came 
to historical maturity. It was the expression of the na- 
tional consciousness of a people whose political develop- 
ment along lines of middle class liberalism had been re- 
tarded. In Italy, as in Germany, nationalism was not 
primarily a political project, but a racial requirement. 
It was currently believed by the supporters of the new 
nationalist doctrine that it was an historical necessity 
that the peoples of Italy should be united in a nationally 
homogeneous State. This consolidation could no longer 
be delayed. 

The position of Napoleon III was now preeminent in 
Europe. He was already looking for new fields of ac- 
tivity. Again the Polish question had come to the fore. 
The successful struggle for national unity in Italy had, 
as was to be expected, a direct repercussion in Poland. 
While friendly relations with Russia were highly desir- 
able. Napoleon III realised that the plight of Poland 
had aroused French public opinion to such a pitch that it 
would be useful for him to take some action. Russia 
perceived the new orientation of French pohcy and the 
tendency of Napoleon III to consider himself strong 
enough to forego conciliating Russian feelings. Alex- 
ander II drew closer to Prussia. The Berlin Government 
was called upon by the Tsar to cooperate with Russia in 
keeping the Poles in subjection. When the Polish ques- 



THE NEW NATIONALISM 197 

tlon ^ was beginning to be the cause of tension between 
France and Russia, Napoleon III became conscious of the 
mistake he had made in arousing the antagonism of the 
Tsar. He was, therefore, unwilling to resort to arms to 
assist the Poles to obtain their independence, especially 
after he had received information regarding the rap- 
prochement which had taken place between Berlin and 
St. Petersburg. He now sought to divert the attention 
of France by engaging upon an expedition on the Amer- 
ican continent. 



Ill 

The disturbed situation in Mexico had long been the 
subject of complaint of the European Powers. Profiting 
by the circumstances arising out of the Civil War, then 
raging in the United States, which left that country out 
of cause, France, England, and Spain in 1861 sent an 
expedition to Mexico for the purpose of compelling com- 
pliance with the claims presented by their respective sub- 
jects. The Mexican Government then in power became 
alarmed, and an agreement was entered into which was 
approved by England and Spain, but which France on one 
pretext or another refused to ratify. When the Spanish 
and English contingents were withdrawn the French 
remained behind, and in April 1862 Napoleon III de- 
clared war on Mexico. 

Reinforcements were sent out, and on June 10, 1863, 
the French occupied Mexico City. Napoleon III was 
now in nominal possession of a vast overseas domain. 
The United States torn by a war, which it seemed at the 

*In regard to the Poles Napoleon III is said to have declared: "J'ai 
change ma maniere de voir sur bien des points, disait il a I'un de ses 
amis, mats je pense sur la Pologne comme en 1831." — E. Olliver, Empire 
Liberal, Vol. VI, Chap. III. 



198 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

time would probably result in the splitting of the country 
into two relatively weak States, was unable to assert 
forcibly the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, which 
for forty years had served to protect the American con- 
tinents from European intervention. 

In spite of his success in Mexico, in Europe the prestige 
of Napoleon III had been shaken. He had been unable 
to procure the active cooperation of England in his project 
for securing the independence of Poland, and he had 
turned to Austria for assistance, which had been only 
half-heartedly conceded. In February 1863 the Polish 
nationalists, confident that they would receive armed as- 
sistance from the French, were carrying on a strong cam- 
paign against the Russians. France now found herself 
confronted with the alternative of declaring war on 
Russia, or of receding from her position. Napoleon III 
sought refuge in a compromise. A joint diplomatic inter- 
vention on the part of Austria, England, and France was 
proposed, which was to secure the recognition of the civil 
and religious liberty of Poland. In June a demarche in 
this sense was made, but Russia, confident that England 
would not take up arms and that Austria was loth to 
do so, refused to consider the proposals made, and France 
for the first time since the accession of Napoleon III 
found herself isolated in Europe. Public opinion in 
France was in favor of the war against Russia, and a war 
party at court urged the Emperor to take a decisive 
stand, but this he prudently declined to do, and war was 
averted. But the Franco-Russian friendship had been 
destroyed. The Polish revolt was suppressed by the 
Tsar with his habitual firmness. The animosity of the 
Russians had been aroused, and they took occasion to 
show it by cultivating more assiduously the existing inti- 
mate and friendly relations with Prussia, by favoring her 



THE NEW NATIONALISM 199 

projects for expansion, and by approving of the plan of 
annexation of the Danish Duchies. The British Govern- 
ment, mistrustful of the growing power of France»which 
had been increased by the Mexican adventure, welcomed 
the breaking off of the friendly relations between France 
and Russia. 

There is no historical evidence upon which to base the 
assumption that Napoleon III at this time entertained any 
suspicion of the ulterior designs of Prussian aggrandise- 
ment. On the contrary, he seems to have favored the 
creation of a strong Prussian state as essential to the 
balance of power in Central Europe. Deprived of the 
support of Russia, conscious of the lukewarm feelings 
growing in England, Napoleon III turned to Austria. 
Here we can perceive the motive which led to the selection 
of Archduke Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico. Napo- 
leon III hoped thereby to win the support of Austria and 
allay the suspicions of England, while maintaining a suffi- 
cient control over the new sovereign of Mexico to re- 
tain for himself a free hand in American affairs. In May 
1864 the new Emperor and Empress of Mexico landed 
at Vera Cruz. The French army of occupation remained 
in the country, assisted by an Austrian contingent and a 
Belgian legion. 

Meanwhile the situation in Europe was 'rapidly ap- 
proaching a crisis. The guidance of international policy 
was passing from the French. Prussia, strengthened by 
the proferred friendship of Russia, was making ready to 
assert her ascendancy in Europe. Bismarck had com- 
pleted his tour of duty as Ambassador to Russia and to 
France, and had returned to Berlin to put through the 
plans for the reorganisation of the army in the face of 
strong popular disapproval. In official quarters it was 
even feared that a revolutionary outbreak would result 



200 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

from the harsh methods Bismarck pursued. He grasped 
at the opportunity offered to find a happy diversion for 
national energy in a war against Denmark, With 
Austrian cooperation Denmark was easily brought to 
terms. Schleswig-Holstein was occupied; and Europe 
confronted with the fait accompli (1864). Confident in 
the strength of his newly-formed army, Bismarck was 
already preparing for the war against Austria. By his 
skilful manoeuvring Austria was led into a difficult posi- 
tion over the question of the annexed duchies. A formal 
attempt to avoid war was made by Russia, France, and 
England. Russia was not seriously concerned with re- 
straining Prussia, and France appears to have viewed the 
aggressive attitude of Prussia without undue alarm. 

The Mexican enterprise was giving Napoleon FII more 
cause for concern. In November 1865 the United States 
had addressed an urgent note to France, demanding 
the withdrawal of the French forces from Mexico, in- 
sinuating that the United States would be compelled to 
intervene in behalf of the republican party in Mexico 
in case French support was not withdrawn. For a time 
Napoleon III paid little heed to the demands of the 
American Government. He was watching the develop- 
ments of the situation in Europe. 

The struggle between Prussia and Austria for suprem- 
acy in Germany could no longer be postponed. The brief 
month's campaign led to the rout of the Austrians at 
Sadowa and the armistice of Nikolsburg (July 1866). 
Napoleon III seemed suddenly to realise the peril of the 
military superiority of Prussia. If her victorious prog- 
ress was not checked, Prussia would come to occupy a pre- 
ponderant position in Europe. Without delay he set to 
work to arrest the further rise of Prussia. The Italians, 
who had declared war against Austria simultaneously 



THE NEW NATIONALISM 201 

with Prussia, had suffered defeat, but were ready and 
anxious to continue the war. Napoleon III brought 
pressure to bear and restrained the Italians from per- 
sisting In the campaign. Venetia, which had been handed 
over to him, he turned over to Italy. Bismarck for his 
part had ulterior reasons for not pressing Austria and her 
South German allies unduly. He did not wish to throw 
them Into the camp of the Irreconcilable enemies of 
Prussia. He foresaw that the South German States 
which had sided with Austria In this war would soon be 
Incorporated in the new German Empire, which he hoped 
to revive under Prussian leadership. 

Within another month the treaty of Prague (August 
23, 1866) was signed. By it Austria was excluded from 
participation In the new organisation of German States. 
The possession of Venetia was confirmed to Italy. Prussia 
formally annexed the Danish Duchies, and various North 
German States which had sided with Austria were In- 
corporated. The new North German Confederation was 
constituted (1867). The King of Prussia thereby be- 
came the hereditary President and General of the Confed- 
eration, to whom was entrusted the sole direction of 
German foreign policy. He was assisted by a responsible 
Chancellor whom he nominated. The authority of the 
President was In a measure checked by the Reichstag, a 
representative body elected by universal suffrage, and by 
the Bundesrat which represented the governments of the 
allied States of the Confederation. To these the legis^ 
lative power and the control of the federal administration 
were entrusted. 

In Austria, also, political reorganisation had taken 
place. Since i860 the process of granting local self- 
government to the various races had been undertaken. 
By the Fundamental Law (February 1861) each racially 



202 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

distinct national group was to have its own Landtag and 
enjoy partial autonomy, while all were to elect members 
to a common Reichstag, which was to control the Imperial 
Government and enact the general legislation of the 
realm. However, Hungary had consistently refused to 
send representatives to this Reichstag. After the treaty 
of Prague, Vienna made renewed attempts to conciliate 
the Magyars, who demanded that the Hungarian Con- 
stitution should be acknowledged, and the laws of 1848 
and the virtual independence of Hungary be recognised. 
This was finally agreed to by Vienna. It meant the 
restoration of the dualist system whereby Austria and 
Hungary, though ruled over by the same sovereign, was 
each to have a separate Parliament and separate Min- 
istries. The two appointed a joint Assembly or Delega- 
tions, which was to act with Ministers common to both 
States in matters concerning foreign affairs, finance, and 
war. 

The outcome of the Austro-Prussian War left no 
doubts in the mind of Napoleon III as to the policy of 
expansion which Prussia would soon embark upon. The 
prospect of having to carry on a war with the United 
States over Mexico had become serious, owing to the 
firm attitude of Washington. Therefore, soon after 
Sadowa the Emperor ordered the recall of French troops 
from Mexico. He realised that the cause of the Imperial 
Government in Mexico was lost, and he urged Maximilian 
to abandon his throne. This Maximilian refused to do. 
The evacuation of the French was spread over a period 
of six months. Finally in February 1867 it was com- 
pleted. As was to be expected, the Mexican republicans 
took up arms, and in May the Empire was overthrown, 
the Emperor was taken prisoner, and executed (July 
1867). 



THE NEW NATIONALISM 203 



IV 

The position of Napoleon III was now seriously im- 
paired. His foreign policy was violently attacked in the 
Corps Legislatif. His autocratic rule was beginning to be 
felt to be irksome. The docility with which the nation 
had followed and supported his various foreign enter- 
prises had changed into an attitude of resistance. The 
Emperor found himself compelled to make concessions 
to the popular demand for the return to a more liberal 
constitutional regime. Various decrees were issued dur- 
ing the early months of 1867 modifying the constitution 
in this sense. These were carried out during the next 
two years. Both Houses were granted the right of initiat- 
ing legislative measures. Ministers were permitted to 
become members of Parliament, and were to be held 
responsible to the Senate. 

In order to retrieve his waning fortunes, Napoleon III 
now sought to obtain adequate compensation for his 
benevolent neutrality towards Prussia during the war of 
the latter against Austria. At first it had seemed plau- 
sible to the Emperor to seek this compensation in territory 
along the Rhine, and he actually did present demands for 
the left bank, including the city of Mayence (August 
1867). The Berlin Government was unwilling to listen 
to such proposals, and Napoleon III cast his eyes upon 
Belgium and Luxemburg. Before proceeding further 
with these negotiations he sought to sound Alexander II 
and secure the views of the Russian Government, which 
he hoped would possibly be willing to lend its assistance in 
pressing his demands amicably in order to avoid friction 
with Prussia. But he found the Russian Emperor im- 
passible, and received no encouragement from that source. 



204 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

Meanwhile Napoleon III had determined to secure the 
approval of Berlin of the purchase of Luxemburg from 
the King of Holland. Negotiations were entered into 
and met with apparent success, both at the Hague and 
Berlin. Satisfactory progress had been made, signatures 
were about to be affixed to the final documents of transfer, 
when on April i, the newly assembled Reichstag voiced 
its disapproval and demanded that the German Govern- 
ment see to it that negotiations be stopped and the sale of 
Luxemburg to France be prevented. It was the first time 
that the new united Germany had spoken, yet its demand 
was not to be disregarded. Russia warned Napoleon III 
of the probability of war should he persist in his project. 
To save his face the Emperor was compelled to agree to 
the neutralisation of Luxemburg, and a congress was con- 
voked to meet at London to adjust the matter. 

After the Luxemburg incident it was evident to shrewd 
political observers that a war with Prussia, which had 
just been so narrowly averted, could not be long delayed, 
especially since it was evident that Russia seemed little 
inclined to restrain Prussian ambitions. The Tsar took 
every occasion to tighten the bonds of his relations with 
Prussia, and resisted the repeated efforts now made by 
France to detach Russia from her Prussian alliance. For 
some years past Russia had been held by France a negli- 
gible quantity. Now Napoleon III realised that an un- 
derstanding with Alexander II was essential if the po- 
litical equilibrium of European States was to be main- 
tained. Externally relations with Russia had greatly im- 
proved since the crisis caused by the Polish question. Na- 
poleon III endeavored to point out to the Russian Em- 
peror that the continued, unchecked growth of Germany, 
the fostering of the new nationalism based on racial 
unity, would inevitably result in an attempt on the part 



THE NEW NATIONALISM 205 

of the Prussians to incorporate all German-speaking 
peoples, from Courland to Alsace, in one vast empire.^ 
But he was unable to detach Alexander II from his 
German affiliations, and the Tsar took the occasion of an 
interview with the King of Prussia to agree upon a 
friendly policy which Russia would pursue in the event of 
a war between France and Prussia (June 1870). 



The increasing influence of the Hohenzollerns in inter- 
national affairs had been shown by the election of a 
prince of the elder branch of the house as Prince-Regent 
of the Danubian Principalities. Having been successful 
in placing a HohenzoUern prince on the throne of a rising 
Balkan State, the Berlin Government, now for the first 
time conscious of its political ascendancy and desirous of 
asserting its newly-acquired strength, put forward the 
candidature of another HohenzoUern, the elder brother 
of the regent of the Principalities, Prince Leopold, for 
the vacant throne of Spain (February 1870). 

France suddenly found herself confronted by what ap- 
peared to be a serious menace. The spectre of the re- 
vival of the Empire of Charles V seemed to haunt French 
public opinion. The threat of German hegemony in 
Europe had become a reality. Napoleon III, the de- 
fender of nationalism, the instigator of national unity, 
who had sought to dominate Europe by the creation of a 
number of satellite Nation-States, now found himself 

'Before proceeding to his post at St. Petersburg (October 1869) 
the new French Ambassador, General Fleury, received the following 
special instructions from Napoleon III: "Le General Fleury fera com- 
prendre le danger que fait courir a I'Europe I'idee germanique qui si 
elle continue a grandir, doit naturellement englober en sa sphere d'action 
tons les pays qui parlent allemand depuis la Courlande jusqu' Alsace." 



2o6 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

faced by the new racio-natlonally united Germany, whose 
vitality and aggressive power seemed to destine her to 
supplant France as the dominant State on the Continent. 

Nationalism, as interpreted by the Germans, was not a 
political principle which was merely to be made use of to 
serve diplomatic intrigue, but a dynamic social force, 
which was to sweep the French thesis aside. Racial unity, 
controlled and disciplined, was to be the corner-stone 
of the new state building. Nationalism, as understood 
in Germany, was a physical as well as a political need. It 
was born of a combination of racial and intellectual pride, 
which promoted the belief that everything was possible 
which strong men dare to undertake. It was a nation- 
alism bred of the absolute spirit of the preceding gen- 
eration; neither personal nor individual, but racial, col- 
lective, and social. The German people felt ready to 
shape their own destiny. 

Europe had watched with interest the rise of Prussia 
and the successive stages of her political evolution. It 
had applauded the outcome of the Austrian campaign, 
and the rebuff administered to France in the Luxemburg 
affair was looked upon as a manifestation of the vigour 
of German national consciousness, which was greeted 
without undue censure by the other Powers. England, in- 
terested chiefly in the maintenance of the balance of 
power, remained a somewhat cynical spectator of what 
she imagined was still the old political game that was 
being played on the continental chess-board. Austria had 
not forgotten the humiliation of 1866 and could under 
certain circumstances, it was believed in Paris, be induced 
to take up arms against Prussia. 

As the result of pressure brought to bear, the can- 
didacy of Prince Leopold to the throne of Spain had been 
withdrawn. But the difficulties which beset Napoleon 



THE NEW NATIONALISM 207 

HI still remained. Unrest at home and the continued 
financial crisis had undermined the prestige of his govern- 
ment. It seemed that the only way out was to be found 
in a successful foreign war. In spite of the great progress 
made by Prussia in her military reorganisation, the French 
armies, which had seen much fighting in distant lands 
under difficult conditions, were held superior in equip- 
ment, tactical training, and strategic leadership. The 
probability of Austria and the South German States join- 
ing the French was not to be excluded. Here Napoleon 
III would have a coalition which he was confident would 
be victorious. The nation seemed to stand solidly behind 
the Emperor in his firm attitude towards Prussia. The 
aspirations of the latter to European hegemony, the 
adoption of the favored French doctrine of nationalism 
as the aggressive factor of her foreign policy directed 
against France, had aggravated the feeling of enmity 
which had been growing up. When war could apparently 
no longer be prevented, France took up the challenge and 
declared war (July 19, 1870). 

On August 5 the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Paris 
notified the French Government that "if Austria mo- 
bilises, Russia will mobilise; if Austria attacks Prussia, 
Russia will attack Austria." With Austria ^ thus immo- 
bilised the last hope of assistance had vanished. Then 
came in rapid succession the defeats of the French armies, 
culminating in Sedan (September 2, 1870), the surrender 
of Napoleon III, the Revolution of September 4. Na- 

*It may be of interest to recall that during the early part of June 
1870 Napoleon III dispatched a confidential emissary to Vienna to ar- 
range the plans for a joint invasion of Prussia by France and Austria. 
Napoleon III also expected Italy to join in the expedition and it was 
agreed that, in the event of war, the French forces were to concentrate in 
Northern Bavaria, where they were to be joined by the Austrian and 
Italian contingents, and this great army was to march on Berlin via 
Jena. 



2o8 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

poleon III, a prisoner, disappeared from the scene. A 
Provisional Government was formed which attempted to 
continue the struggle. The enemy had invaded France. 
The German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles (Jan- 
uary 1871). Paris capitulated after a five months' siege. 
Then came the armistice and the establishment of the 
Third French Republic. Paris passed into the hands of 
the Commune, which held out for six weeks (April 2- 
May 21). Peace with Germany was signed at Frank- 
fort (May 10, 1871). The Republican regime reestab- 
lished order, and the French set to work paying off their 
war indemnity. 



CHAPTER IX 

Realpolitik 



THE MOTIVES OF PUBLIC POLICY — NEO-MACHIAVELLIANISM- 
MORALITY AND POLITICS — THE PERSONALISED NATION-STATE 
— DEFINITION OF REALISM — PHILOSOPHIC BACKGROUND—' 
THE INFLUENCE OF PESSIMISM — SCHOPENHAUER — DE- 
CLINE OF THE POLITICO-JURIDIC THEORY OF STATE 

THE STATE AS POWER — VOLITIONAL FACTORS 



THE events of the period which came to a close with 
the Franco-Prussian War have been reviewed in 
brief outline in order to recall the relevant factors in the 
historical evolution of the Nation-State. They will serve 
to call attention to the febrllity with which plans of 
aggrandisement were pursued; the energy displayed in 
undertaking distant enterprise; the speculative nature of 
the risks assumed; the desire for compensation, both for 
armed intervention and for friendly neutrality; the secret 
agreements between governments, and the rapid changing 
of partners in an alliance; the making of treaties with 
mental reservations that they might be revised, abro- 
gated, or even violated if the need should arise. An 
atmosphere of suspicion pervaded the relations even 
between friendly States. Nation building had developed 
into a routine policy. Armed assistance, or neutrality 
as the case might be, were resorted to with a view to the 
advantage to be reaped from the policy pursued. War 
and threats of war, alliances and attempts to disrupt the 

[209] 



2IO THE TREND OF HISTORY 

friendly intercourse between other States had for their 
object the hope of immediate gain rather than the affirma- 
tion of a constructive poHcy. National prestige and mili- 
tary power had come to be looked upon as assets which 
had a market value. National energy was devoted to 
the task of developing a clearly marked individuality of 
a given people; in digging a deep chasm between States; 
in stamping with an indelible imprint those national char- 
acteristics which had become the trade-mark of the Na- 
tion-State. 

After i860 interest in internal affairs, the structure 
of the State, questions of individual liberty and political 
prerogative, for the time being became of secondary im- 
portance. Foreign policy, international relations, the as- 
sertion of the national will, the extension of national in- 
fluence became the chief political preoccupation. 

Representative government, whether monarchical or 
republican in form, had in principle been established, and 
was being gradually extended in practice to all European 
States with the exception of Russia. Men had come to 
believe that the constitutional system was to be the final 
form of government, and as it seemed the best adapted 
to promote national prosperity, they accepted its limita- 
tions. A new spirit dominated political life. There was 
an absence of faith in fixed principles, a lack of con- 
viction that rights are to be regarded as inalienable, a 
growing distrust of reason, and an unhealthy deference 
to "the powers that be" and the fait accompli. 

The separation of morals from politics,^ which 
Machiavelli had first emphasised in modern times as es- 

*The Romans first distinguished law from morality and gave it a 
definite form. The State was thereby limited in that its legal character 
was defined and concerned itself less with the ethical ordering of the 
world. No one could resist the State if it uttered its will. But the 
Roman State limited itself; it restricted the province of its own power 
and its own action. — Cf. Bluntschli, The Theory of the State, Book I, p. 39. 



REALPOLITIK 211 

sential to the proper development of political responsi- 
bility and which succeeding generations had stigmatised 
as diabolical, now came to be recognised as a great step 
in advance, a factor of progress in that it had served 
to free politics from the trammels of morals, as the 
State had been freed from the domination of the Church. 

Nothing could better serve to portray the new temper 
of the times than the rehabilitation of Machiavelli as 
a political philosopher which took place at this time, and 
the efforts made to rank him with Aristotle as a master 
of political wisdom.^ The Machiavellian doctrine that 
political development cannot be made subservient to 
moral law, that in promoting the welfare of the State 
the Prince cannot be held amenable to the accepted code 
of morals, now gained the support, not merely of pol- 
iticians, but also of political theorists and public opinion. 
Politics, it was contended, is concerned solely with affairs 
of State and has in view the advantage of the State; 
morals has to do with private judgment, the good and 
the bad, with which politics has no concern. The person- 
alised Nation-State was developing a code of conduct of 
its own which had nothing in common with private 
morals. "Princes sometimes commit shameful deeds, but 
we cannot blame them when their acts are useful to 
their States, for shame is covered by advantage and is 
called wisdom." ^ 

It was not asserted that the individual was of no im- 
portance, but that his importance and greatness could be 
measured only in terms of the importance and greatness 
of the State of which he was a member. The Nation- 
State had become an entity, a world in itself, which sought 

* Cf. Treitschke, Politik {Das Verhdltniss des Staates zum Stttengesetz) , 
Book I, Chap. Ill, and Lord Acton's Introduction to // Principe, edited 
by; L. A. Burd. 

"Laurent, Etudes sur I'Histoire de VHumanite, Vol. X, p. 344. 



212 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

to absorb all the interests, all the talent, all the wealth, 
vigor, and intellectual capacity of its members, and to 
claim from them the fruits of their energy and enter- 
prise to enhance the greatness and power of the State. 
The imprint of nationality had come to be held the 
proudest possession of the individual, and to be a loyal 
Frenchman, Englishman, or German almost more impor- 
tant than to be an honest man.^ 



II 

It was during this period that realism became the 
dominant motive not merely in politics, but was reflected 
in art and literature. Romanticism which had arisen at 
the time of the taking over of the control of the body 
politic by the Middle Class about 1830 had to all in- 
tents and purposes died out. 

In politics, realism, RealpoUtik, as the Germans who 
were the first to introduce it in its modern interpretation 
called it, bases policy solely on the real, not on the 
imagined, factors in a given situation. It pretends to 
mean the scientific diagnosis of the component factors of 
a given political complex, the separation into their pri- 
mary elements of these various factors, and the weighing 
carefully the reaction of each in a given situation viewed 
purely objectively, and only thereafter determining upon 
a policy in which the margin of doubtful and unforesee- 
able elements are reduced to a minimum, if not entirely 
eliminated. A realist policy is one of scientific specula- 
tion, where the risk involved is far less than it outwardly 

* As Bluntschli, writing at this time, declared: "Der Staat ist ein ganzes 
ein Welt fur sich. Was im einzeln base erscheint ivird im Zusammenhang 
gut gemacht. Die mdnnliche Tugend des Patriotismus ist nirgends rein 
von Beimischung Leidenschaften noiig fur die Staatspraxis." 



REALPOLITIK 213 

appears. The end which it is sought to attain is always 
to be well within reach, much under the assessed strength 
of the effort required to attain it.^ 

If we examine the philosophical background upon 
which this realist political practice was etched, we will 
find that it reflected the negative pessimistic outlook on 
life which had undermined the buoyant faith of men 
in themselves. Scientific research was revealing that 
man was not, as had hitherto been believed, the privileged 
image of a Divine Being, but merely a member of the 
animal kingdom linked in close parentage with the low- 
est forms of animal life. The belief that man was spe- 
cially created for a definite purpose was thereby proved 
false. 

Perfectibility and progress, which it had hitherto been 
so difficult to reconcile with the concept of the immutable 
nature of man, now found in the Darwinian theories of 
evolution, of natural selection, and the survival of the 
fittest adequate confirmation. These new doctrines ap- 
peared to confer scientific sanction upon the competitive 
system. With the progress of the biological sciences, 
what we may call the biologic interpretation of social life 
arose, which transposed wholesale to the realm of politi- 
cal and economic life those laws of evolutionary develop- 
ment which had come to be accepted as explaining sat- 
isfactorily, purpose in nature. - 

^"Realpolitik ist ivelc/te von den ivirklichen, nicht den cingebildeten 
Bedurfnissen des Volkes ausgeht, ivelche die vorhandenen Krdfte und 
Mittel richtig schdtzt, die feindliche und freundliche Mac/it sorgjdltig 
berechnet und nur erreichbare Ziele austrebt. Nur mit dieser Poliiik sind 
Erfolge moglich." — Bluntschli, Politik, p. 322. 

* It is to be noted that these doctrines gained currency after the first 
enunciation of the communist principles of Marx. It has always been 
denied by the scientific socialists that a relevant analogy may be drawn 
between the ruthless struggle for survival in nature, and the right of 
the stronger to appropriate for himself all the benefits of civilisation, as 
social life is not to be held ruled by natural laws, but by economic laws 
which historical materialism seeks to interpret. {^See p. 163.) 



214 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

The spread of the doctrines of middle class liberalism, 
the extension of democratic ideals and of political equal- 
ity had made men independent and self-reliant, but at 
the same time rendered them conscious of their weakness 
as individuals. They had lost all sense of fixity in the 
social order. The motives of public policy, the factors 
of social development, even political liberty which they 
had struggled to acquire, now meant little to them as 
individuals. Public opinion was moulded by a corps of 
skilled specialists who expressed the aims and ambitions 
of a party or a government through the press. The in- 
crease of the means of communication, the new discov- 
eries in science, the rapid growth of large industrial cen- 
tres, the distant wars undertaken for obscure motives, 
had uprooted men from their old associations and their 
former modes of thought. An eclectic spirit had broad- 
ened their outlook. It professed to find something use- 
ful in all the various philosophies of the past, to recon- 
cile divergences, to compromise conflicting opinions. Re- 
ligious prejudice had almost wholly disappeared. Politi- 
cal controversy served to absorb the polemical instincts 
which had hitherto found an outlet in religious disputes. 
Intellectual and moral speculation were left in the hands 
of men who for one reason or another were unable to 
take part in active life. The Church remained; with- 
drawn from the world, it was daily losing ground. In- 
difference in matters of religion had become widespread. 
The scientific temper of the age increased the tendency 
towards agnosticism and scepticism, which few religious 
leaders were found able enough to combat. This was 
in a measure due to the fact that the clergy was largely 
recruited from a mediocre, uninspired type of man, unfit 
as a rule for the more exacting life of affairs. Uncer- 
tainty and doubt regarding the object and end of life had 



REALPOLITIK 215 

taken deep root. What faith there remained was no 
longer implicit, but inquisitive and critical, and found itself 
daily assailed by the self-evident truths which science 
laid bare. 

For science had attracted men endowed with the most 
eminent mental faculties who, by their inventions and new 
theories, served both philosophy and industry. Men of 
the type who in the past had concerned themselves with 
questions of the moral nature of man, and who had 
helped to build up the code of moral law which had 
made possible the development of moral faculties, now 
concerned themselves with keen investigation of the 
secrets of nature and natural laws. They sought to dis- 
cover such new truths as could, in the first instance, have a 
practical value in everyday life and only in a secondary 
way explain the ordering and meaning of the universe. 

This new scientific spirit, this rigid empirical testing of 
truth bred a critical temper which made men conscious 
of the uncertainties latent in all theories, suspicious of 
their conclusions unless confirmed by repeated experi- 
mentation. 

The dogmatic spirit of positivism was making way for 
a new critical attitude, which held that in human affairs 
probability is far more often ascerta»inable than cer- 
tainty. A finite intellect must be a fallible intellect. Man 
is a conditional being, and cannot know absolute certainty. 
"We must resign ourselves to be guided, even in matters 
of high concern, by low probabilities." 

The pursuit of wealth was becoming the principal con- 
cern of men. Industrial and commercial life absorbed 
the best energies of an ever-increasing majority. The 
discoveries of science and the intellect of men engaged 
in scientific research were capitalised as part of the new 
industrialism. Politics, however, still attracted men of 



2i6 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

virility and foresight, who found in the monotony and 
uniformity of democratic institutions a suitable field for 
their energies as leaders of a docile and increasingly well- 
disciplined multitude, which was willing to be cajoled 
or coerced in the guise of patriotism. Heroism, a love of 
glory, deeds of valour for valour's sake, a broad, disin- 
terested outlook on life, a contempt for rewards, the bril- 
liant culture of a select few, had been definitely dis- \ 
credited and supplanted by a mild-mannered, self-cen- I 
tred, close-calculating, dull, respectable, and genteel way •/ 
of life. 

Men felt isolated in an ever-growing, ever-changing 
world. They had lost their social bearings and retained 
a consciousness of their individuality chiefly through loyal 
allegiance to the personalised Nation-State. 

The doctrines set forth by Schopenhauer, which had 
for more than a generation been disregarded, now came 
into vogue with the revival of neo-classic pessimism : ^ 
"The notion of right as well as that of liberty is negative. 
Wrong is positive. The rights of man: 'everyone has 
the right to do that which does not harm another.' " 

Schopenhauer had emphatically declared that the ex- 
istence of such a body of social coercion as the State 
testifies to the innate injustice prevalent among men. The 
State, according to his view, is to be looked upon, not so 
much as a common good, as a protection against foreign 
foes and domestic dissensions. All rights are in reality 
based on the strength to maintain them. Courage is to 
be explained as a voluntary effort made to ward off a 
present danger in order to avoid a greater danger in the 
future. In politics as in life "might is right." "If you 

* "Not to be born is the happiest destiny, but after that the greatest 
happiness is, after birth, to return as soon as possible from whence one 
came." — Cf. Sophocles, CEdipus at Colonus. 



REALPOLITIK 217 

do not wish to be enslaved, enslave your neighbor in 
good time, as soon as his weakness gives you the op- 
portunity; if not he will enslave you." ^ 

Such were some of the tenets of the new pessimism, 
so alien to the spirit of initiative of Western civilisa- 
tion. This pessimistic point of view permeated deeply 
the spirit of the times. It undermined the positive vigor 
of middle class control in the State, and must be inter- 
preted as indicative of Its decay, Schopenhauer's doc- 
trine of this "worst of all possible worlds" was carried 
to its extreme by Hartmann, who, standing as he claimed 
at the nexus of the conscious and the unconscious, de- 
clared that when humanity had become intelligent enough 
to realise its misery it would destroy itself "in a last 
despairing act of cosmic suicide." ^ 

In politics, the older middle class maxims of policy, 
which had sought to assure a harmonious balance of 
power in the State, as well as between States, had been 
supplanted by a passionate partisanship, a desire to 
affirm the power of a particular party within the State, 
or of a particular State In competition with other States. 
The control of government was passing into the hands 
of an extra-legal grouping of men, a party, which defined 
and carried out the will of the majority in home affairs 
and influenced the conduct of foreign affairs. Public 
opinion was becoming the repository of public policy. 
It was no longer an opinion moulded by a free inter- 
course of ideas, or by a clear-sighted referendum to an 
educated Middle Class, but more and more was being 
made use of as the mouthpiece of a small group of party 
leaders, who by their shrewd understanding of the needs 
of the moment, by pandering to demands which they had 

* Cf. Schopenhauer, Recht und Politik. 

' Cf. Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious. 



2i8 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

been careful to create and could thus satisfy, had gained 
the approval of their followers. Public opinion was no 
longer creative; it criticised and controlled rather than 
ruled. 



Ill 

The politico-juridic theory of the State was giving way 
to a fresh concept. It was coming to be felt that the 
personalised Nation-State had a great number of other 
functions to perform, besides those of enforcing abstract 
right. A purely jurldic interpretation of the contractual 
obligations as binding the relations between the governed 
and the governing was now held inadequate. Legality 
in politics in Its stricter sense was an abstraction which 
had grown sterile. The practical, cautious, matter-of- 
fact mind, the scientific temper of the new industrialism 
precluded the frank acceptance of the jurldic concept of 
the State in its positive, dogmatic sense. As in the prac- 
tice of the law, legality had made room for equity, which 
pays due regard to circumstances, examines into the 
particular state of affairs, makes allowances for extenu- 
ating conditions, and issues a verdict in the light of events 
and the dictates of public Interest, so, under the influence 
of the new political Ideology which was growing up, the 
power of the State was to be based on internal concord, 
on toleration of divergent opinion in questions relating to 
religious, political, or social matters. This was possible 
only by a more lax interpretation of the law than had 
hitherto prevailed. Internal peace which political prac- 
tice sought to promote was not held an end in itself. It 
served to strengthen the cohesive unity of the State, so 
that it might be able to assert its power or defend its 



REALPOLITIK 219 

policy, if need be by armed force, in the competitive 
struggle with other States. 

/ The function of representative government came to\ 
be to make laws, not with any special reference to their 
ethical or moral value, but in view of their particular 
and immediate benefit to the interests of those directly^ 
concerned. The fact that these laws were made by the 
representatives of the politically conscious body, the elec- 
torate, who were believed to be in close touch with the 
needs and aims of the community, and as such able to 
give expression to its rational desires, gained for the 
laws enacted the authority and immediate sanction which 
hitherto had required long-established tradition and cus- 
tom. The laws passed by these legislators, whose term 
of office was in many instances limited, had lost all con- 
tact with any broader ethical values. They were as a 
rule enacted for the benefit of a particular group of peo- 
ple, at a particular time, and as they were liable to re- 
peal, the sanctity and majesty of the law which was 
the basis of the politico-juridic theory of State was be- 
ing slowly undermined. 

The belief in the omnipotence of the will as the dictat- 
ing force in human affairs which Rousseau a century be- 
fore had outlined,^ now for the first time received tenta- 
tive application and resulted in the further transforma- 
tion of political practice, which was to influence the con- 
duct of affairs of State. 

A well-balanced rationalism, a desire to limit and mod- 
erate the incoherent forces of nature, to dictate to them 
the discipline of the human mind, was giving way to a 
belief in the supremacy of the human will. 

The direct relation of this new interpret'^tion of the 
freedom of the will to that of pohtical liberty might 

* Cf. Contrat Social, Book III, Chap. I. 



220 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

readily be traced. Hitherto political liberty had been 
interpreted as a limited freedom, subject to the dictates 
of accepted practice, ethical standards, and moral law. 
The revival of the Machiavellian doctrine of the com- 
plete separation of politics from morals was accompanied, 
by, or rather in a large measure the result of, the newly 
awakened faith in the omnipotence of the human will. 
The theory that man if given free rein could make him- 
self what he willed was speedily adapted to apply to 
the Nation-State. It had come to be doubted that the 
course of human history, the flow and sequence of events, 
was either natural or necessary. Not only was it sub- 
ject to change, to accidents, but especially to the will of 
man, the nature of which was only vaguely understood. 
The new science of psychology attracted able inquirers 
who sought to investigate the motive of human action, to 
formulate a scientific hypothesis of the will divested of 
its moral attributes, and if possible to arrive at a clearer 
understanding of its nature. The will, independent of 
moral direction, untrammelled by moral law, was held to 
be best suited not merely to guide the destiny but 
to promote the welfare of the State. It was becoming 
the current conviction, proved by so many examples 
drawn from everyday life, that moderate mental 
faculties, inferior capacity, and even limited opportunity 
could be transformed into assets of great power by a 
firm, tenacious, persevering will. It was coming to be 
felt that the will, steeled against vacillation and weak- 
ness, could more than offset other deficiencies. The sur- 
vival of the fittest meant the survival of the strongest 
will to survive. It was not lost sight of that the in- 
dividual could often to great advantage make use of 
the negative qualities of will such as endurance, stamina, 
fortitude. But in the affairs of State the negative ex- 



REALPOLITIK 221 

pression of the will was deemed Inadequate to promote 
practical political aims, as the State had at its dis- 
posal the means of coercion based on the use of armed 
force. In other words, the State was held an expression of 
a positive will; the individual often of a negative will. 
The State must not endure ; it must act. Political power 
is to be measured by the success of the policy pursued. 
The State must outline this policy with care, and weigh 
carefully in the balance whether its object can be attained 
by peaceful methods; if not, whether it has the strength 
to secure the desired end; how it can best secure the 
necessary foreign assistance, or undermine the strength 
of its opponent, preparatory to attacking him. War ac- 
cording to these precepts is not an evil for the State, 
which enters upon it in pursuing a carefully matured 
plan; it is merely a manifestation of its will. A realist 
perception of the actual situation, a close union of will 
and intelligence, would serve to render man and the 
personalised Nation-State omnipotent. 

Power was deemed the highest aim of the State and 
had even in common parlance become synonymous with 
the word "State." It was no longer conceived that the 
end of the State, the object of political practice, was the 
maintenance of peace, but rather the prevention of un- 
premeditated war. The unknown, untamed forces of the 
human will were to be relied upon to impose a conscious 
self-restraint upon the policy of statesmen, which was 
to be cast off at a favorable opportunity if the aims 
and need of State required it. Virtues were coming to 
be held attributes of the will; of a will which could mani- 
fest itself only as force. Right knows no other agency 
than might. Even the will of God rests solely on its 
own omnipotence; and similarly in reference to the State 
the right of might is the assertion of the national will. 



222 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

Such in brief outline were the underlying factors of the 
new spirit of realism in politics, sharpened by the 
competitive spirit which was increasing among States. 
It marks the decline of rationalism and the coincident 
rise of the new volitional theories as yet only vaguely 
differentiated. 

Whatever altruism remained in public affairs was set 
down as emotionalism, a debilitating influence which 
weakened the will. The discipline of patriotism, the 
fervor of a realist nationalism, the vigorous, assertive 
vitality of the Nation-State could, it was thought, best 
be heightened and strengthened by the close interplay 
of political and economic forces. 



CHAPTER X 

The Politico-Economic Theory of State 

TERMS DEFINED THE END OF THE STATE ROLE OF THE INDI- 
VIDUAL UNION OF THE STATE AND ITS MEMBERS PHASES 

OF TRANSITION CLASSIFICATION OF STATES NEW 

FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE EDUCATION PUBLIC 

WELFARE ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE MOTIVES OF 

PUBLIC POLICY THE NEW ABSOLUTISM 

SURVEY OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
THE MIDDLE CLASS TO POLIT- 
ICAL THEORY 



IN tracing the transition of the politico-juridic concept 
of the State and the formulation of the basis of the 
poHtico-economic ^ theory which has been developing 
since 1870 a change in the object of the State must first 
be noted. 

The individualist basis of the politico-juridic theory 
of State under middle class control had led to the formu- 
lation of the thesis that the State exists merely as a 
means for promoting the welfare of the individual. 
"Societies and laws exist only for the object of increas- 
ing the sum of private happiness." ^ According to this 
typically middle class conception, the State was held to 

^By the term "politico-economic," I would seek to define the fusion of 
the elemental components of the new theory of State which was to 
evolve during the ensuing half century, as expressing most concisely the 
close alliance between political practice and economic motive. It is not 
intended to infer that economic motive had in the past been absent, nor 
that the word "politico-economic" be understood in the sense usually 
attributed to political economy. It is rather my purpose to discern that the 
State had abandoned its strict juridic personality and was no longer 
to adhere so closely to its rational, middle class individualist ideal. 

' Cf. Macaulay, Essay on Machiavelli, p. 47. 



224 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

be a collection of individuals who had adopted certain 
rules and regulations and created an artificial institu- 
tion for furthering their personal wellbeing. The State 
was not looked upon as an entity having a specific object 
and aim of its own.^ This view was no longer tenable 
when the personalised Nation-State came to be endowed 
with its distinctive national characteristics, the develop- 
ment of which has been outlined. There now seemed to 
be a tendency, more especially in continental Europe, to 
return to the classical concept that the aim of the State 
is not to serve the individual, but that the individual must 
serve the State, and that individual freedom is merely a 
part of national freedom. 

However, the classical theory of State left too little 
to the initiative of the individual, and did not make 
proper use of his energy and skill. While it came to be 
admitted that the State has an object of its own, a mis- 
sion to fulfil, a civilising function to perform which at 
times requires the self-sacrifice of the individual for the 
common welfare, yet it was conceded that the individual 
should have a wide field left to him in which to develop 
his capacities, and to further his personal wellbeing. It 
was held that it was the duty of the State not merely to 
protect but to assist him. 

There thus arose a dualism of function, both of the 
State and of the individual. The State was concerned 
with the assertion of national power — politics — the posi- 
tive national will — the individual with the creation of 

* Cf. Herbert Spencer, who declared that since the community has 
no corporate consciousness "this is an everlasting reason why the wel- 
fare of citizens cannot be rightly sacrificed to some supposed benefit of 
the State, but why on the other hand the State is to be maintained 
solely for the benefit of citizens," and again "the corporate life in society 
must be subservient to the lives of the parts, instead of the lives of the 
parts being subservient to the corporate life." — PVestminster Review, 
January i860. 



THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORY 225 

national wealth — economics — the negative national will. 
The function of the State was primarily political; the 
function of the individual was primarily economic. The 
union of the two formed the complete Nation-State. 
The individual in his private capacity was concerned 
chiefly with his economic wellbeing; as a member of 
the State he was concerned with politics. Upon the 
introduction of universal suffrage it came to include the 
greater majority of the adult male population. 

In return for the political part played by the in^ 
dividual in public affairs, in return for support of a 
party programme or a national policy, he came to de- 
mand not merely police protection and all that it implies, 
but economic assistance and benefits necessary to his 
material wellbeing. Thus the State, in addition to its po- 
litical functions in aflfirming national power, no longer 
content to confine itself merely to the maintenance of 
juridic relations, was to seek to promote economic 
development. 

Here we have the genesis of the politico-economic con- 
cept of the State. It was a cooperation on the part of 
the individual and of the State, conceived as separate 
entities, each having separate fields of activity but a com- 
mon aim : the increase of the power of the State, Politics 
was something more than the maintenance of right; it 
was a weapon of national power. Economics was some- 
thing more than the maintenance of wellbeing; it was a 
weapon of national strength. This harmonious union 
between the aims and capacities of the State and its mem- 
bers, this specialisation of function and cooperation in 
enterprise, endowed the State with a virility and energy 
which it had never possessed. 

The rise of this new concept of the State which has 
hitherto not been so precisely formulated marks the final 



226 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

phase of control of the body politic by the Middle Class. ^ 
During the ensuing sixty years the Middle Class was 
to enjoy the fruition of its long and tenacious struggle 
for political ascendancy, whose milestones in time can 
be so clearly marked — 1689, 1776, 1789, 1830, 1848, 
1870. 

II 

The Middle Class which had developed the politico- 
juridic concept of the State had raised the individual 
to a pinnacle of power to which he had never in the 
past attained. It had made possible a Cromwell and 
a Napoleon, had created the Nation-State in the image 
of man, had formulated new doctrines of liberty and 
made man beheve that he might command his own 
destiny. With success in power came the inevitable 
arrogance which accompanies power. The middle class 
concept of the social mission of man rapidly passed 
through the phases of high idealism and cosmopolitanism, 
and when finally triumphant adopted the more immediate 
and tangible utilitarian doctrines of nationalism and 
capitalism. As a result the State was no longer believed 
to be fashioned in the image of man, but was looked 
upon as the weapon of man. No longer content to bear 
the restraints of the juridical basis which had made 
possible the growth of the State, the Middle Class 
sought for a fresh symbol. It had accepted progress 
and perfectibility as axiomatic and rejected all belief in 
the importance of regress or decay. The liberalism 
which was its distinctive mark had evolved a phil- 
osophy of history, based upon the concept of the gradual 

* It is to be remarked that this new theory of State was forced upon 
the Middle Class by the rising Proletariat and was adopted more as an 
accommodation than as a result of inherent conviction. 



THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORY 227 

and progressive Improvement of mankind. But the only 
proofs of validity that could be adduced from this theory 
were to be found In the material world, In the realm of 
the production of the good things of life, In the stor- 
ing up of wealth. In the building up of Industry, In the 
expansion of commerce. In brief, the metaphysical ele- 
ments of the polltico-jurldic theory of State were in- 
evitably doomed to make way for a more materialistic 
interpretation of social life, which In its essence was 
alien to middle class dogma. In the process, moral law 
was lost sight of, moral courage had become debilitated, , 
material wellbeing was deemed all Important. ^ 

Those States which rested upon politically conscious, 
economically vigorous, numerically strong populations 
rose to power. The development of national power led 
to a further growth of world power and was accom- 
panied by a transformation of nationalism into Imperial- 
Ism, which served to mould the practice and historical de- 
velopment of the politico-economic theory of State. 

States were henceforth to be divided into distinct cate- 
gories according to the sphere of their influence. World 
Powers were States which played a preponderant part In 
political affairs throughout the world, or at least far 
beyond their national borders and continent. Great 
Powers were those which had Influence within a more 
restricted area and had not the strength to assert their 
will In distant lands, either owing to the absence of 
a strong offensive weapon such as a navy, or because 
their interests were more directly limited to their own 
continent. 

These two categories of States were essentially aggres- 
sive in action and had the power to enforce their will. 
With them the policing and peace of the world rested. 

Besides these there were the smaller States, Minor 



228 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

Powers, which took no part in the broader policies of 
plans of aggrandisement and endeavored to maintain 
their independence rather than to increase their power. 
This independence was in some instances guaranteed by 
the Great Powers.^ 

While the World Powers were already engaged in 
protecting their members abroad, and this protection was 
by degrees extended to their industrial, commercial, and 
even social enterprises — and in uncivilised and semi-civ- 
ilised countries was to have so far-reaching an influence 
on colonial development — all States were engaged in pro- 
moting national prosperity by a zealous interest in car- 
ing for, and developing the wellbeing of, their citizens 
at home. 

In order to maintain internal peace, a broad-minded 
toleration no longer sufficed. The State, it was believed, 
must assist in creating the means of the prosperity of 
its members. It must promote their industry, not merely 
by insuring the maintenance of peaceful conditions, safe- 
guarding private property and public order by the faithful 
administration of justice and general police functions, 
but by actively participating in the development of all 
resources afford every opportunity for increasing in- 
dividual ability and wellbeing. This civilising function 
of the State, it was felt, would translate itself into eco- 
nomic expansion and national prestige, which would raise 
the status of the State by improving the condition of its 
members. 

The State now earnestly concerned itself with public 
education and no longer left it to the option of the in- 
dividual, but by offering opportunities for him to acquire 

'Thus France, Great Britain, and Russia were held {circa 1875) 
World Powers; Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, the United States, 
Great Powers. Among the Minor Powers were Spain, Holland, Belgium, 
Switzerland. 



THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORY 229 

an education at the expense of the State, compelled at- 
tendance at school as part of his duty in preparing him- 
self to become a useful member of the community. In 
some countries this educational function was carried to 
great length.^ 'The spirit of scientific research was 
stimulated by State aid; the general culture of the people 
was broadened by State subsidies to theatres, museums, 
etc. The State also contributed to the welfare of its 
members by affording practical assistance along other 
lines. It undertook to establish such new enterprises as 
seemed beyond the scope of individual initiative. The 
telegraph and postal service, the construction and admin- 
istration of roads and railways, in which the twofold 
purpose of stimulating economic development and stra- 
tegic requirements was kept in view, served to place at 
the disposal of the individual additional means for in- 
creasing the field of his business activity. In this same 
spirit the State granted subsidies to shipping companies, 
and, in certain instances, for the exploitation of natural 
resources, in which immediate profit was not apparent and 
private investors were unwilling to assume the risks. 
Henceforth the State was to become a principal promoter 
of national prosperity, either by direct aid in those States 
where economic development had been retarded, or by 
a judicious and benevolent policy to protect and further 
private initiative. Free trade and laissez-faire were 
being replaced by these newer methods of State aid and 
State supervision. But in every instance the State was 
careful to leave in the hands of the individual the profit 
which might accrue to the most vigorous and enterprising, 
and favored competition which would strengthen the 
strong and crush the weak. This could not fail to in- 

* Denmark, Prussia, and France. England was the last Western State 
to adopt national compulsory education (1872). 



230 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

fluence public policy, which came more and more to be 
concerned with furthering economic design, not merely 
for the sake of individual welfare but more especially 
as the foundation of national strength. 

In theory the State remained the guardian of private 
prerogative and assured to the individual full liberty. But 
the closer identity of the individual with the State, the 
fusion of the image of the State with that of the in- 
dividual, the growing conviction that the State was not 
merely a country, but much more an association of in- 
dividuals of common national stock or bound by com- 
mon economic interests, served to gloss over, and later 
even make it appear very desirable for the State grad- 
ually to take over many of the prerogatives which had 
hitherto been believed to belong exclusively to the in- 
dividual. It is not to be overlooked that the system of 
reciprocity by which the State in a collective sense gave 
assistance to the individual in his private capacity, in 
return for the docile surrender by the latter of his per- 
sonality, resulted in a great increase in power of the State 
and in the prosperity of the individual. The menace of 
the increasing strength of the State, which thus became 
in fact a world in itself, a law unto itself, that recognised 
no curb to its will save that of force, was, if ever con-, 
sciously considered, lost sight of. 

The State engaged in the pursuit of power, the in- 
dividual in the pursuit of prosperity, had found a com- 
mon ground of action, in which the interests of the in- 
dividual became identified with those of the State. Thus 
arose the new motive of public policy, the protection and 
promotion of interests. What were these interests? 
Now that the State had assumed for itself the func- 
tion of advancing the economic wellbeing of the indi- 
vidual, it was held that political motive not only must 



THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORY 231 

not pretend solely to govern public policy, but that it 
was the duty of the State frankly and overtly to look 
to economic motives as well. It had come to be recog- 
nised that it was a primary duty of the State not merely 
to lend full protection to its members residing abroad, 
but also to secure for them the fullest advantages to 
trade in civilised as well as in uncivilised lands. This 
protection was by degrees extended to industrial and 
commercial enterprise. The State took it upon itself to 
look out for the interests of its members, or nationals, 
as they now come to be called in diplomatic language. 
By treaties and other agreements the various Western 
Powers sought to secure the most favorable treatment 
for the enterprise of their nationals. Diplomatic inter- 
course was henceforth largely concerned with adjusting 
commercial conflicts and advancing private economic in- 
terests, which were in many instances soon identified with 
those of the State. In extreme cases the State did not 
consider it beneath its dignity to make use of its full 
armed force to back up the claims of an individual, more 
particularly in uncivilised or semi-civilised regions, or in 
the Orient. It was deemed a curtailment of national 
prestige not to enforce full reparation for damage done 
to the interests of citizens resident abroad, and the State 
which could afford the fullest protection to its members 
was deemed entitled to the most respect. The function \^ 
of the State had gradually evolved from the protection/ 
^v^rights to that of the protection of interests. Interest 
had come to be held the essential element of right. In- 
terest created right. Interest required protection; right 
required enforcement, so protection of interest often 
required the use of coercive or compulsory measures. 

The complete separation of morals from politics al- 
ready referred to had resulted in the belief that the State 



232 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

was concerned in the first instance solely with increas- 
ing its own power and with promoting the wellbeing of 
its members, and only indirectly with that of humanity 
in general. The question of the justice or morality of 
a policy came more and more to be disregarded.^ The 
perversion of the moral sense, the benumbing of moral 
consciousness which the new politico-economic concept 
of the State had served to increase, was only possible 
without an immediate lapse into social anarchy, as a result 
of the stricter social discipline of the industrial system, 
and the tendency to entrust to the State the power to 
regulate the life and conduct of the individual. 

There arose at this time in France a school of thinkers 
who sought to combat the encroachments of the State. 
A leader of this movement was Proudhon who has been 
called the founder of "anarchy." Though a confirmed 
opponent of Communism he looked upon the State and 
its increasing omnipotence as incongruous, as enslaving 
the individual and acting as potently as the Church had 
in fostering superstition and prejudice which tended, so 
he alleged, to thwart the moral development of man. He 
was among the first to declare himself in favor of the 
destruction of the State as the social authority, and 
showed himself to be an avowed enemy of the principle 
of nationality. "The boundary of States is to be sought 
in the consent of the people and never In the natural con- 
figuration of land or sea." - Another ardent champion 
of the anti-nationalist movement, though not an anarchist, 
as he did not seek to overthrow constituted authority in 
the State, advocated the theory that the further growth 

*A good example, and by no means an exception to the general trend 
of policy followed by all World Powers in dealing with weaker States, 
is to be found in the attitude of the British Government in its dealings 
with China concerning the suppression of the opium trade. 

'Cf. Proudhon, Correspondence, 1859-1862. 



THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORY 233 

of the Nation-State should be checked by splitting It up 
into small provinces or basins. He predicted very 
sanguinely that within a century "from out of the ruins 
of United Britain the four kingdoms which composed 
it will be resurrected. . , , Italian unity will scarcely 
have time to establish itself firmly before it will dis- 
appear. . . . Russia — Great Russia, Little Russia, Red 
and White Russia will replace the Russian Empire. . . . 
Prussia will also be split up, and Austria will be crowded 
back into the archdukedom that was its cradle. . . . The 
unity of France will have to give way to the laws of his- 
tory, which show us that great empires are monstrous 
exceptions to the life of mankind . . . the unity of 
France which dates from yesterday, from this morning, 
has no firm roots in the past and on its ruins we will 
see arising five States." ^ 



III 

The disciplinary Influence of religion, with Its code 
of moral laws, was giving way to the more ruthless eco- 
nomic discipline with its code of material interests. The 
increasing pressure of competition required a new sense 
of social discipline, which could, it was believed, be en- 
forced by the State if exclusive authority was conferred 
upon it. The State was daily growing more absolute, 

* Odysse-Barot, Lettres sur la Philosophic de I'Histoire, p. 150 et seq. 
(Paris, 1864). The author sets out to demonstrate that society is ruled by 
force, and in support of his contention he surveys the thirty-three cen- 
turies from the 15th century B.C. to date (1861) and declares as a 
result of his researches: "From the time when in 1496 B.C. the agree- 
ment was entered upon establishing between the twelve states of Greece 
the Amphictyonic League down to the treaty of January 23, 1861, be- 
tween France and England, I have counted 8,397 treaties. In spite of 
these 8,397 solemn agreements of peace, alliance and friendship, in the 
long stretch of 3,357 years — 1496 B.C. to 1861 a.d. — there were only 
327 years of peace as against 3,130 years of war." — Ibidem, p. 20. 



234 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

It arrogated to itself the right to decide all questions 
of whatever nature, whether political, economic, or social. 
It refused to countenance any other authority within 
Its boundaries, any imperium in imperio such as the 
Church of Rome was inclined to set up, and jealously 
guarded its prerogative of sovereignty. In extending its 
sway over the individual, by serving to increase his ma- 
terial prosperity, the State now came to require the 
Implicit as well as the explicit allegiance of its mem- 
bers, and viewed with distrust any influence, even that of 
the Church, when not enlisted in promoting national in- 
terests. While technically the State was concerned solely 
with the external life of the individual, and disclaimed 
any desire to interfere with his convictions or beliefs, to 
control his abilities, or to limit his capacities — in brief 
no rights over his mental or spiritual life — yet by tak- 
ing charge of his education, by affording opportunities 
for self-development, by strengthening his sense of loy- 
alty, the State had come to be looked upon by the In- 
dividual as filling his whole horizon. In this way na- 
tional patriotism afforded the sole stimulus to an other- 
wise spiritually barren life. 

Politics as the dominant factor In social life had 
reached the high-water mark of its development. Lib- 
eralism had run its course. The State was again becom- 
ing absolute. This new absolutism was not unlike that 
fostered by the politico-theistic concept of the State, which 
Identified the sovereign with the Godhead, and led to the 
formation of national States during the i6th century. 
Richelieu and Wolsey were to find their modern counter- 
part in Bismarck and Cavour. For though the politico- 
theistic concept was not revived, and sovereignty as the 
personal attribute of the Prince had given way to national 
sovereignty, the fundamental principle of arbitrary power 



THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORY 235 

exercised over the life and conduct of the In- 
dividual citizen or subject was strikingly similar. The 
modern State was, to be sure, no longer identified with 
the Godhead. As the theistic concept had been displaced 
to make way for the juridic concept of the State created 
in the image of man, so now the State was coming to be 
conceived of no longer as the image of man with his 
natural functions and articulations, but as an invention of 
man, a tool, a weapon, a machine,^ the product of the 
collective will, man-made, and standing in the same rela- 
tion to man, as man had stood in ages past to his God. 
The belief that God had made man for a definite purpose 
had, as we have seen, as a result of scientific biological 
investigation, been proved false, and had been replaced 
by the conviction that the only strongly purposeful 
creative impulse rested with man. By abandoning any 
analogy with natural law, by confining his efforts to con- 
sidering the realist ends in view, man, it was believed, 
would be able to devise a political order which would 
satisfy the modern scientific temper. 

The new politico-economic theory of State, which re- 
vived the rigid realism of the older absolutism, was born 
in an era of pessimism, and as such was a negative, in- 
adequate concept, a groping for a new social formula, the 
result of a desire to formulate less distasteful, less waste- 
ful social arrangements, rather than to seek for a con- 
sciously better form. In other words, no strong impulse 
to growth, no strong incentive to development had led to 

^I have made use of the word "machine" merely to point to the ten- 
dency already beginning to be evident that the analogy of the organic 
nature of the State was no longer rigidly adhered to. The mutual de- 
pendence of parts distinguishes an organism from a machine; in the lat- 
ter the parts concur for a common end, to which each contributes in its 
way, but in which each does not contribute to the support of all or any of 
the rest. The State retained outwardly many of its organic characteris- 
tics, but the trend towards a mechanical interpretation was increasing. 



236 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

the formation of this new theory of State. Viewed from 
the standpoint of the Middle Class it must be looked 
upon as the completion and end, the final stage of its 
political evolution, which had its beginning after the 
Reformation. As religion had been displaced by politics 
as the moulding force in social life, as in secular affairs 
the Church had been definitely supplanted by the State, 
after a period of compromise, so the politically organised 
Nation-State was in due course to be replaced by a new 
social ordering. As religion had after the rise of national 
States become avocational, so now politics was to become 
an avocation. 

The eminent services rendered by the Middle Class 
to Western civilisation must not, however, be overlooked. 
The Middle Class was the great liberalising force in 
the world. Its social function was primarily negative. 
It was as protestants that the Middle Class exerted its 
greatest influence. It was made up of men whose vigor 
was moral and material rather than spiritual and physi- 
cal. The courage of the Crusader and the idealism of the 
ascetic were incomprehensible to them. The high-flown 
fantasy of chivalry and the pomp of Papal Rome were 
looked upon with distrust, principally because they were 
held useless and wasteful. The strength of the Middle 
Class lay in its liberalism and utilitarian viewpoint; in its 
moderation and moral courage. It stood for toleration, 
liberty of conscience, and individual freedom; self-de- 
termination, self-help, and self-government. Its mission 
in the Western World was to impose restraints ^ upon, 
to curb, the untamed passions of man, freed from a 
superstitious faith In a blind Providence and acting as a 
rational being. 

* "All that makes existence valuable to any one depends on the en- 
forcements of restraints upon the actions of other people." — J. S. Mill, 
On Liberty, Introductory. 



THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORY 237 

The Middle Class which had clothed the egotism of 
individualism in a halo of virtue did much to raise the 
dignity of man. It sought to individualise the State and 
mark it off as man's domain. It was first empirical, then 
rational, then cosmopolitan, and finally national. What- 
ever guise it assumed, its strength lay chiefly in its 
negating force. It combatted a false creed or per- 
nicious policy with tenacity; reformed, rebuilt, re- 
modelled, but lacked the boldness to strike out along 
radically new paths, and preferred to make use of the 
materials at hand. 



IV 

If we look down the long vista of centuries and re- 
view the rise of the Middle Class to power we cannot 
fail to be impressed how far below our expectation are 
the positive results obtained. The Middle Class con- 
ferred upon the world an infinite number of small bene- 
fits: It restrained the rapacity of princes and placed the 
services of the practical man above the inspiration of 
the seer. As long as there were reforms to be undertaken, 
as long as there was work to be done in raising the 
status of the individual, in arousing political conscious- 
ness, in awakening national solidarity, in transforming 
the religiously controlled body politic into a secular or- 
ganisation the Middle Class was equal to its task. Fur- 
thermore the Middle Class gave to the world a belief 
in liberty, a faith in toleration, and a hope in equality as 
expressed in constitutional government. But if we were 
to compare the achievement of the Middle Class with 
that of the last great proletarian movement, Christianity, 
or the aristocratic feudal regime evolved under the 
Influence of the Holy Roman Empire and the Church 



238 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

of Rome, we will find that the Middle Class was never 
able to realise a positive growth of its own, but was 
compelled to adapt old formulae to new requirements. 
Even equalitarian democracy, which has always been 
pointed to as the especial contribution of the Middle 
Class to modern political practice, remained in point of 
fact little more than a phrase, as it presupposed a 
privileged electoral body, beneath which there remained 
a great mass of unenfranchised humanity, by whom 
the monotonous and tedious work of society was to be 
performed. The awakening of political consciousness 
among this lower or working class forced the Middle 
Class into a position of aggressive leadership which it 
was unfit to assume. Henceforth its leaders were com- 
pelled to undertake a policy of accommodation. Politics 
became a matter of compromise. 

Class consciousness was never strongly developed by 
the Middle Class. Of all the elements which have gained 
control of the social order the Middle Class was the 
least jealous to retain the distinctive marks of its solidar- 
ity. This serves to explain the readiness with which uni- 
versal suffrage was granted, in the hope of being able 
to assimilate the masses politically and substitute com- 
petition between States for competition between classes. 

The rise of the Middle Class to power coincided with 
the rise of the Nation-State as the social unit. The 
State so conceived sought to impose its authority upon 
and to stamp as its own all of its members. This imprint 
was made to appear as emanating from the collective will 
of the people and not as class rule. Herein lay the 
strength of middle class policy. Its principal source of 
weakness is to be found in the fact that, while professing 
to exalt the individual, to secure for him the benefits of 
pohtical liberty and the prerogatives of equality, to pro- 



THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORY 239 

mote self-determination, self-assertion and self-develop- 
ment as expressed in the term "self-government," the 
Middle Class was never able to free itself from the con- 
viction that it is by imposing restraints rather than by 
affirming indefeasible rights that the body politic must 
be governed. 

John Stuart Mill, who embodied more completely than 
any other political philosopher the mentality of the Mid- 
dle Class at the highest stage of its evolution, in defining 
the relation of the individual to society in civilised com- 
munities, sets forth the principle: 

"That the sole end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively, in interfering with the lib- 
erty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. 
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient war- 
rant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or for- 
bear because it will be better for him to do so, because 
it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of 
others, to do so would be wise or even right. . . . The 
only part of the conduct of any one for which he is amen- 
able to society is that which concerns others. In the part 
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of 
right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign." ^ 

While it was still admitted that social life, scientifically 
conceived, rested on purely utilitarian foundations, this 
older individualist concept was rapidly dying out. Pub- 
lic and private morals were coming to be systematised by 
State supervision, or in those countries such as England 
or the United States where self-help and self-determina- 
tion were strongly developed, public opinion served the 

^ Cf. op. cit., Introductory. 



240 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

same purpose. The State was assuming the function 
of regulating and disciplining the moral as well as the 
physical life of the individual, in order to make pos- 
sible a collective, cohesive discipline, by affirming the 
power of the State, and emphasising the weakness of 
the individual; in turn cajoling him by the mirage of 
the greatness of the State of which he was a member, 
if need be arousing his patriotism to the sacrifice even 
of his life for the professed need of the State, or coerc- 
ing and compelling him if required. Whether these func- 
tions were assumed directly by the government, as was 
the case in continental Europe, or by public opinion, 
as was the case in English-speaking countries, the re- 
sults were identical. Wherever we look we find an in- 
creasing debilitation of moral sense, an increasing 
stultification of spiritual motive. We find the same under- 
lying tendency to consider sound credit above sound faith, 
and an empirical test the final arbitrament. It is not 
necessary to seek far for the causes of this change. 
The State was becoming professedly non-moral. That 
interest creates right, that right Is weak and unreal un- 
less backed by might, and that the State must be ready 
to defend its interests as it must be prepared to assert 
its strength, regardless of any question of actual right, 
had led to the creation of a group of national States 
whose rapacity was confined only by policy or weakness, 
and whose example remained the only norm of social 
life. 

Such was the political creed of the Middle Class on 
the eve of its dissolution as the sole controlling factor in 
the State. We may here trace the origins of the new 
politico-economic theory of State which was to con- 
fer upon the State not merely the right but the duty to 
intervene in what had hitherto been considered the 



THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORY 241 

domain of private affairs, and to identify the Interests 
of the Individual with those of the State. We may thus 
discover that the new politico-economic theory of State 
was not the handiwork of the Middle Class alone. 

The middle class theory had expressed Itself In In- 
dividualism and nationalism. The Nation-State was the 
product of this theory. With Its rise and firm estab- 
lishment the cultural mission of the Middle Class had 
been accomplished. 



BOOK III 



CHAPTER I 

The First International Movement 

THE DECLINE OF NATIONALISM QUANTITATIVE VALUES IM- 
PERIALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM THE PART OF ENG- 
LAND ORGANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT 

ITS CHARACTER RAPID GROWTH THE CONGRESS 

OF BASEL — THE PARIS COMMUNE — THE ATTI- 
TUDE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 



THE rise of Prussia had upset the balance of power 
in Europe. The defeat of France had left the 
newly-created German Empire in a dominant position 
on the Continent. The new Nation-States, Germany 
and Italy, whose unity had been won simultaneously, had 
attained their mature territorial delimitations. Austria- 
Hungary under the Dualist regime had secured for the 
time being internal peace. France though crippled had 
not been dismembered, and was left free to reorganise 
her government on the approved parliamentary model. 
The minor States had been protected by international 
guarantees or treaties. The extension of representative 
government had led to the strengthening of the hand of 
constituted authority and insured its stability. 

While the government of Russia remained that of a 
military despotism, it had liberated the serfs, which 
seemed to portend an era of more liberal rule. Though 
this was not realised, the growth of political conscious- 
ness among the Russian people made great strides, and 
revolutionary propaganda was carried on with increasing 

1245] 



246 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

zeal and activity. The situation of the economically and 
politically backward peoples of the Balkans still remained 
obscure, and this region was to become a fertile field for 
intrigue and armed conflict. The Danubian Princi- 
palities, or Rumania as they were now called, under a 
German ruler assisted by foreign capital, were being 
rapidly developed. The other Balkan peoples dreamed 
of national independence, but the difficulties which beset 
the path of its realisation seemed insurmountable, more 
particularly to the Southern Slavs, a large section of 
whom would remain under Austrian rule, even if the 
yoke of Turkey could be cast off. On the American 
continent the United States, after the ordeal of the Civil 
War, was entering upon an era of unprecedented growth. 
Their successful intervention in Mexican affairs, their 
forceful assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in protect- 
ing the continent against European encroachments, had 
served to assist in reuniting the two parts of the coun- 
try so lately at war, and aflirmed the ascendancy of the 
United States in American affairs. In the Orient, Japan 
was already beginning to look to the West anxious to 
enter into the current of political and economic progress. 

Looked at in its broader aspects, nationalism as an 
aggressive political principle seemed to be dying out. 
France, in establishing the Third Republic, had for the 
time rid herself of the incubus of the defence of the 
principle of nationality as a doctrine of political propa- 
ganda. Nationality in its German interpretation of racial 
supremacy had triumphed ; even a section of French pub- 
lic opinion came to accept the argument that race is a 
distinctive mark of the Nation-State, though the French 
were no longer prepared to wage war in defending the 
national aspirations of other States. 

In seeking for the causes of the decline of nationalism 



THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT 247 

it will be found that it was coming to be supplanted by 
a new and more all-embracing motive of policy, con- 
sonant with the growth of the power and interests of 
the State. Hitherto the strong States of Western Eu- 
rope had been principally engaged in extending their na- 
tional boundaries, in defining their national individuality, 
or in asserting their national personality. The hope 
which France entertained of succeeding to the hegemony 
of continental Europe in return for the assistance she had 
rendered to the various Nation-States then in the process 
of formation, had been frustrated by the rise of Ger- 
many. France not only was unable to assume the leader- 
ship among a group of relatively strong sister States, 
but had been forced into a position of isolation and in- 
feriority in the new competition for power, which was 
to become the sole motive of foreign policy. 



II 

The new political creed may be briefly summarised as 
follows. The State is Power, and requires power, not 
merely to exert its authority at home, but to assure the 
respect of its nationals abroad. Power in its politico- 
economic sense is most readily expressed by size of na- 
tional territory and population. The tendency to form 
great States; the impulse which drove men to urban life 
and resulted in great cities; the energy in organising 
great Industrial enterprises were the result of the implicit 
trust placed in numbers as the principal element of power, 
in quantity as against quality, in aggressive progressive 
activity instead of cautious rational development, and 
above all in the conviction which had been borrowed from 
the sphere of economics, that weakness is akin to crime. 



248 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

This new way of thinking, this dynamic interpretation 
of social phenomena and the transference of quantita- 
tive analysis to the realm of politico-social life was es- 
sentially alien to the ideals of the Middle Class, and its 
acceptance must be accounted for by acknowledging that 
the control of the State was passing out of the hands 
of this class. This is clearly indicated by the fact that 
the Middle Class now sought to identify itself completely 
with the State, and efface itself as a class by absorbing 
and uniting all classes in the personalised Nation-State. 

History affords adequate confirmation of the fact that 
before a new social order becomes ascendant and new 
social arrangements are adopted, the new forces make 
themselves felt on the old, and produce a final flowering 
of the old order. In this way we may trace the rise 
of the Middle Class at the close of the mediaeval period, 
which produced the Renaissance and the Reformation, 
both of which belong to the older order. In our own 
times the great economic expansion of the last quarter 
of the 19th century, and the cultural progress which was 
realised, were in a large measure the result of the rise 
of the Proletariat. 

It is in this light that the new motives of political 
practice, imperialism and internationalism, must be 
looked upon as the first reaction against middle class 
ascendancy — the precursory manifestations of a more 
complete change in social organisation. 

Imperialism and internationalism are directly related. 
They first arose simultaneously among the people whose 
political capacity had been most fully developed, and 
whose economic evolution was most advanced. Both are 
transition policies and have therefore remained hitherto 
ill-defined and even appeared as subversive factors of 
politico-social progress. 



THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT 249 

Imperialism may be designated as the expression of 
the Nation-State as Power, in the process of over-expan- 
sion; Internationalism, as a dissolvent of the Nation- 
State. Imperialism appeared as the logical sequence of 
national growth, and few of its middle class supporters 
realised that in supporting imperialism they were serv- 
ing a political theory alien to their continuance in con- 
trol, and perilous to the survival of the Nation-State. 
Internationalism was the first corporate expression of 
the Proletariat, which directed attention to the possibility 
of extra-national social organisation.^ 

It has already been pointed out that England had in 
modern times assumed the part of political tutor to the 
Western World. Here political liberty and economic 
independence, which led to the establishment of con- 
stitutional government and the development of the cap- 
italist system, were first declared the imprescriptible 
rights of man. It is with no surprise, therefore, that we 
must again turn to England to discover the birthplace of 
the new imperialist and internationalist movements." 

^ The various international movements which have arisen, and the 
large number of international agreements which have been entered upon 
by sovereign States, from the Geneva Convention (1864) to the Hague 
Arbitrations and the League of Nations (1919), must be looked upon as 
efforts to bolster up the old politico-juridic thesis of State, and are not to 
be considered a part of internationalism, which was more exclusively pro-<. 
letarian. However, these movements are symptomatic of the striving\ 
towards the breaking down of the rigid egoism of the Nation-State, and ) 
as such will be examined in the course of the discussion of the efforts of / 
the State to meet the requirements of the changing social order. / 

"Numerous political writers have sought to demonstrate that it was 
in Germany that imperialism was first developed. Some even go so far 
as to account for the unification of Germany on imperialist grounds. 
This interpretation would appear erroneous, as German and for that 
matter Italian unity are the products of racial nationalism. Thus Boutmy 
in his careful analysis of the psychology of political development re- 
marks: "L'imperialisme est un etat psychologique qui a commence a 
paraiire en Europe vers i860. I'Allemagne I'a eprouve la premiere ; puis 
il a gagne I'Angleterre, la France, et a enfin traverse I'Atlantique 
pour yfpanouir aux Etats Unis." — Cf. Elements d'une Psycliologie Poli- 
tique du Peuple Americain, Chap. VH. 

We might adduce much evidence to prove that whereas the theoretical 



250 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

England, which had hitherto been In the vanguard of 
political development, had during the period of nation- 
alist expansion and the growth of Nation-States on the 
Continent, fallen to a secondary position in European 
affairs. She was engaged in concentrating her energy on 
economic expansion, and had taken little or no part in 
assisting national groups in their efforts to constitute 
themselves as independent States. 

The first organised expression of Internationalism grew 
out of a visit which French workingmen paid to London 
to the "International Exhibition" held there in 1862. 
After a number of meetings with British workers, it was 
decided to organise an International Workingmen's Asso- 
ciation, which became known as the First Internationale, 
with the view of securing international solidarity among 
workingmen to promote their economic betterment. 

By 1864 the Internationale was duly organised, and 
Karl Marx was entrusted with the task of the drafting 
of its programme, which was adopted in 1866 by repre- 
sentatives of the Proletariat of the leading countries of 
the Western World. It soon recruited stanch adherents 
from the confines of Hungary to the coasts of California. 
The Internationale suddenly found itself in the front rank 
of the opposition to the existing social order. Its avowed 
purpose was to overthrow the capitalist system. To 
achieve this end it advocated the use of the most power- 
ful weapon of coercion yet devised — the international 
strike. 

basis of both imperialism and internationalism came from Germany 
their first practical application is to be sought in England. It is sig- 
nificant that the theory of imperialism and internationalism, or as we 
might call them the doctrines of Bismarck and Marx, had their first 
tryout at the hands of the English and French and only at a later date 
do we find Germany committed to an imperialist programme, while 
the principles of "German Socialism" dominated the international move- 
ment 



THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT 251 

Such was the basis of the actual organisation of the 
first international movement. In spite of the energy 
of its organisers and its rapid spread it was not to be 
expected that the International could have any very great 
immediate political influence on the Nation-State. It is 
of importance more especially as Indicating the new trend 
of social evolution. 

Though the Internationale was professedly communist 
and accepted in principle communist theories as conso- 
nant with the aims of the Proletariat in its struggle against 
middle class individualism, it included no revolutionary 
programme to bring about the breakdown of national 
States, or even any plan to establish closer political re- 
lations between the members of various States. It was 
in point of fact principally a project for coordinating 
the labor movements in various States, and for securing 
the support of the stronger labor unions, regardless of 
national aflfiliations.^ 

It is significant of the character of this first interna- 
tional movement that In drawing up its programme 
Marx abandoned many of his radical doctrines of 1848, 
which had made of Communism so trenchant a denuncia- 
tion of middle class political and economic control. Now 
we find written into the body of the declaration that 
the members of the Internationale "will acknowledge 
truth, justice, and morality as the basis of their con- 
duct towards one another and towards all men, with- 
out regard to color, creed, or nationality," which reads 
much like a favorite political platitude of the Middle 
Class. It appears evident that national allegiance and 
national patriotism were still uppermost in the minds 
of the majority of the Proletariat, and that whatever 

* The strike of the bronze workers in Paris (1867), and of the building 
trades in Geneva (1868) were successfully supported by funds contributed 
by British labor unions. 



252 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

scope was given to the feelings of international solidarity 
was secondary to that of national obedience. 

However, as an attempt to arouse class consciousness 
the Internationale Is of no little political significance. The 
concept of an international union of the Proletariat as 
a class, regardless of national affiliations, cannot be said 
to have been clearly visualised. Yet there was sown the 
seed of the conviction that the social order might pos- 
sibly exist without the need of national allegiance, with- 
out the adherence of the Individual to a national State, 
as trade might be carried on without the intervention of 
the middleman. 



Ill 

The Nation-State was engaged in patterning its mem- 
bers on one model, in eliminating all class distinctions 
and removing regional or racial disabilities in a political 
sense, by introducing fullest political equality and stimu- 
lating racial unity and national allegiance. It promoted 
competition between States for power and between in- 
dividuals for economic advantage. This competition was 
producing economic and social inequalities far more Im- 
mediate and real than the political equality the State 
claimed to vouchsafe. 

The International movement was a first feeble attempt 
to unite the Proletariat, ostensibly regardless of national 
allegiance, in its assault upon this system of middle class, 
anti-social organisation, and by pointing out the fallacies 
and injustice of the competitive system, it declared that, 
"the emancipation of labor is neither a local nor a na- 
tional but a social problem." But nationalism was still 
too strong a force, the concept of the Nation-State still 



THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT 253 

too recent a dogma, to permit of the realisation of any 
programme in which these two factors were to be 
eliminated. 

In examining into the tenets of the First Internationale 
with its vague profession of "no rights without duties, 
no duties without rights," we will find that it was a co- 
operative rather than a corporate movement. It con- 
ceived of the Proletariat as having certain interests in 
common in its struggle against capitalism, and sought to 
establish a system of international cooperation between 
labor unions, in the first Instance to strengthen labor so 
as to be able to fight on something like equal terms 
with capital, and only as a far remoter objective, to 
overthrow the capitalistic system. None of the leaders of 
the Internationale appear consciously to have envisaged 
the corporate interests of the Proletariat as requiring 
a politico-economic as well as a social organisation al- 
together different from that which existed, or the in- 
timate and inextricable affiliation of the capitalist sys- 
tem with that of the accepted tenets of government and 
the democratic organisation of the Nation-State. Even 
the most advanced sections of the Internationale sought 
to secure the control of power in the State by adopting 
the political methods then in vogue, which accounts for 
the temporising character of the charter of inter- 
nationalism. 

The growth of the international movement had been 
rapid. At the Fourth Congress, held at Basel in 1869, 
the delegate from the United States claimed to repre- 
sent 800,000 workers, while in every European country 
groups had been established, journals founded, which 
carried on an active propaganda. Already various Eu- 
ropean governments had become alarmed at the rapid 
spread of internationalism. The professions of middle 



254 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

class political philosophers, demanding fullest liberty of 
thought and amplest toleration of all social and political 
views, which had found widest acceptance as the founda- 
tion of political liberty, were for a time overlooked in 
order to stamp out the new movement. In France and 
Germany legal proceedings were instituted to dissolve 
the organisation. 

The Internationale had from the beginning rallied to 
its support all the various types of political malcontents — 
Anarchists, Nihilists, Communists — though their extrem- 
ist tendencies were tempered by their contact with the 
more level-headed labor leaders. However, the occasion 
offered by the defeat of France and the overthrow of the 
Empire was deemed by some too useful an opportunity 
to let pass, without making an effort to further the pro- 
gramme of social revolution. Though the Internationale 
as an organisation took no part in the Paris revolution 
(1871), yet many of its members joined the movement 
on their own responsibility, in spite of the fact that the 
"Commune" had little in common with internationalist 
aims.^ The failure of the Commune led to the disrup- 
tion of the First Internationale. The more moderate 
elements led by Marx endeavored to purge the party of 
its more subversive members, more especially of the 
Russian nihilist group and the Jura Federation. This 
led to the secession of the latter under Bakunin, who 

* Though Marx himself was led to endorse the Commune, it was a 
strictly political movement, and is not to be confounded with Marxian 
principles of communism. The French Communal doctrine of 1871 was 
that every commune, or at least every important city-commune like 
Paris, Lyons, or Marseilles, should be recognised as independent, and 
France a federation of such small units. This doctrine of regionalism 
was a reaction against the increasing centralisation and the uniformity 
of the Nation-State, and as such a recognition of the abuses arising out 
of the suppression of regional individuality, but it was neither a deeply 
rooted conviction, nor a carefully thought-out system of political organisa- 
tion. See p. 232 et seq. 



THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT 255 

established a rival Internationale which gained adherents 
chiefly in Italy and Spain, while the Marxists set up 
their headquarters in New York. Already the Inter- 
nationale had lost whatever political power it had gained, 
and within less than a decade the whole movement had 
to all intents and purposes collapsed. 

The only tangible result of this first effort of the Pro- 
letariat to free itself from economic bondage and as- 
sert its solidarity as a class against the Nation-State 
was the strengthening of the labor movements in the 
various States, their close association with socialism, and 
the laying of the foundation of trade-unionism as a po- 
litical factor. 

The first assault on nationalism had been launched. 
Though the progress of the concept of internationalism 
was of necessity slow, It portended changes in social 
organisation which had never hitherto been contemplated. 



CHAPTER II 

Imperialism 



RELATION TO CAPITALISM ROLE OF THE PROLETARIAT MEGALO- 
MANIA OF THE EPOCH PROCESSES OF DECAY 

INFLUENCE OF PESSIMISM 



WHILE the Proletariat was engaged in its struggle 
with capitalism, and sought economic advantages 
rather than political privileges, the State was outgrowing 
its national boundaries. Economic expansion was rais- 
ing new political problems difficult of solution, which 
were to involve the Nation-State in the pursuit of a 
policy of foreign enterprise fundamentally hostile to its 
concept. 

"Extension of the British Empire in directions where 
trading interests and investments require the protection 
of the flag" ^ is the definition of imperialism in its 
modern sense, as given by the Oxford Dictionary. This 
definition succinctly sets forth the purely economic origin 
of the new political practice. With the frank acceptance 
of imperialism, a new theory of State was required. The 
older politico-juridic theory no longer sufficed. The 
way had been prepared by the revival of Machiavellian 

^A Neiv English Dictionary on Historical Principles, edited by James 
A. H. Murray, Oxford. A note adds: "In the United States imperialism 
is similarly applied to the new policy of extending the rule of the 
American people over foreign countries and of acquiring and holding 
distant dependencies in the way in which colonies and dependencies are 
held by- European States." 

[256] 



IMPERIALISM 2S7 

theories of the complete divorce of morality from 
politics and the rise of realism, both precursors of ab- 
solutism In a new form. 

In order to explain logically the newer thesis of 
imperialism it would be more consonant with a true 
historical spirit to abandon the politlco-juridic concept 
which arose with middle class ascendancy in the State, 
and seek to Interpret the new policy by new standards 
which accompanied the rise of a new class to power In 
the State. Before proceeding further with a careful 
inquiry into the historical evolution of imperialism, as 
Illustrated by the imperialist epoch (1877-19 17) It is 
necessary to note that the vigor of capitalism, the sudden 
superabundant energy which some of the great States of 
Western Europe displayed that made Imperialism pos- 
sible, rested upon the economic vigor of the Proletariat. 
It was the ability of the workingmen to adapt themselves j 

to the new industrialism, their willingness to produce ^ cXAcX, ''^ 
more than they could consume, which created not merely Ji,,,^^,,^^,.^^^^.,^;^^ 
the increased store of wealth at home, but made possible .. ^,v , ,tr ( ,'. 
the exportable surplus and the consequent demand for 
more raw materials, In the first instance the causes of 
imperialist expansion. 

The exploitation of new machinery, the new methods 
of production, the new modes of industrial organisation, 
the new channels of distribution as applied to commerce 
and Industry, had virtually eliminated the old Middle 
Class. A careful Investigation and Intelligent examination 
of imperialism reveals that the Middle Class as such had 
little or no share therein. As long as overseas trade 
was carried on purely for profit; as long as it retained 
its purely individualist character, and remained a priv- 
ilege without obligations, having no other aim than to 
insure the wellbeing and Increase the store of wealth of 



258 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

the individual, the Middle Class enthusiastically entered 
into it. But when foreign trade assumed something more 
of a political function, when it came to entail obliga- 
tions, the moderate, limited, middle class mind showed 
itself congenitally hostile to this new development of 
national power which was to launch the State into the 
vortex of international conflict. Attention need only to 
be called to the hostility of the Middle Class towards this 
new type of colonial enterprise. The ardor with which 
it was combatted by the Manchester school, so typically 
middle class, is well illustrated by a perusal of the 
speeches of John Bright on Canada, and John Stuart 
Mill's opposition to the annexation of India. 



II 

Though the filiation at first seems obscure, it is sus- 
ceptible of proof that imperialism, like internationalism, 
was in the main a proletarian movement; not the positive 
programme of its leaders, but the first corporate mani- 
festation of the political consciousness of the masses on 
their entrance into the orbit of history. 

The megalomania of the new era; the substitution 
of quantitative for qualitative standards; the expansive 
energy of national power in pursuit of extra-national 
aims; the zeal displayed in acquiring new territory, often 
regardless of its practical value; the desire of the State 
to assert itself as omnipotent; the acceptance of the be- 
lief that nations have a civilising mission to perform, and 
that they are the appointed instruments of God to fulfil 
this destiny; the marking off of the various nations in 
their own estimation as the anointed of the Deity for 
this purpose, all indicate a mystical element alien to 



IMPERIALISM 259 

the temper of the Middle Class, but which is to be found 
at the basis of all great popular movements. 

Side by side with the intense realism which capitalism 
infused into imperial enterprise, the strict enforcement 
of the most ruthless and arbitrary demands which were 
made by European Governments in behalf of their na- 
tionals in distant lands to promote their private interests, 
we find the sentimental enthusiasm with which the Pro- 
letariat greeted the news of the conquest of remote 
regions. The masses were ready to support their re- 
spective governments in the prosecution of a vigorous 
foreign policy. This committed the State to a pro- 
gramme of foreign expansion and served to undermine 
the foundations of the narrow and limited Nation-State, 
and to prepare it to assume a super-national character. 

Territorial expansion, which was the principal im- 
perialist phenomenon, also had a practical aspect. It was 
an acknowledgment that the territorial basis of the State, 
as hitherto conceived, was too small. More elbow room 
was needed for the growing population — altogether a 
proletarian need — an expression of the desire to have a 
share of greater material wellbeing, if not at home at 
least over-seas. Thus arose the aim of the State to con- 
trol exclusively for itself as great a part of the globe as 
possible; to develop its colonial territory, not merely 
as a source of raw materials, but as a place of settlement 
for the surplus population. 

Historians of the future, in examining the political 
evolution of the epoch under review, will possibly be 
able to discern with greater acuteness the particular fea- 
tures of proletarian influence, and the diverse and re- 
condite factors of proletarian impulse to imperial ex- 
pansion, which to us are still obscured by the outward 
formal ascendancy of the Middle Class, and the survival 



26o THE TREND OF HISTORY 

in form of the politico-juridic concept of the State. 
But we can already trace the symptoms of the decay of 
the older order, upon the humus of which imperialism 
was flowering. 

The process of decay is one of insubordination. In 
order that an organism may function with smooth en- 
ergy and produce the fullest fruits, all the component 
parts must perform their allotted tasks, not merely with 
vigor, but also in rhythmic unity. As soon as one cell 
or group of cells ceases to maintain this rhythmic re- 
lation — attempts, figuratively speaking, to assert its in- 
dependence — the organism becomes diseased, and the 
process of decay sets in. Decay may thus be defined as 
the breaking down of the normal relation, the prede- 
termined functioning of the cells of an organism. Hence 
arise those anarchical relations which tend to disrupt and 
ultimately destroy it. 

Translated into terms for use in an historical analysis 
of political theory such as we are attempting to out- 
line, decadence may be said to set in when in a social 
system there arise a preponderant number of individuals 
unfit to perform their allotted tasks as parts of the 
social order. Exaggerated individualism — the super- 
man — is in this sense a symptom of decadence. It im- 
plies the tendency to decomposition of the complex social 
fabric into its unorganised, primary condition; the com- 
petition of parts replacing the harmony of the whole. 

It is in this way that we may interpret the development 
of individualism, its gradual contamination of the body 
politic, and the rise of nationalism as factors of de- 
cadence. It may be averred that this process is con- 
tinuous, as growth and decay succeed each other. It 
is beyond our purpose to deal with the imaginative aspects 
of such a problem. Nor is it of immediate concern 



IMPERIALISM 261 

whether, as is no doubt susceptible of proof, a 
civilisation at its highest point of achievement has al- 
ready entered upon the period of decadence, and that 
culture is a corollary of decay. Yet we may note that 
the social unrest which has prevailed during the last 
decade of the 19th century and the first decades of the 
20th, is symptomatic of the decay of the older middle 
class theory of State, and that the new order is already 
vigorously thrusting itself upward, so that the events 
of these years belong to the new era. 

If it were necessary to emphasise at greater length the 
process of social decay referred to, we might recall again 
the negative pessimistic temper of the period under re- 
view. Let us listen to the words of a shrewd French 
analyst, who was a university student at Paris soon after 
1 87 1, and who In the early eighties interpreted the spirit 
of his age with singular precision: 

*'A universal nausea, due to the inadequacies of life, 
fills the heart of Slavs, Germans, and Latins, and shows 
itself in the first group as nihilism, in the second as pes- 
simism, and in ourselves by solitary and bizarre neuroses. 
The murderous rage of the conspirators of St. Peters- 
burg, the writings of Schopenhauer, the furious incendi- 
arism of the Commune, the relentless misanthropy of 
realistic novelists — I choose on purpose the most dispa- 
rate examples — all reveal the same negation of the value 
of life, which with every passing day Is enshrouding West- 
ern civilisation. We are, to be sure, still far from 
cosmic suicide, the supreme desire of the theorists of 
misfortune, but slowly and surely the belief In the bank- 
ruptcy of nature Is being elaborated, which promises to 
become the sinister faith of the 20th century, If science 
or a barbarian invasion does not rescue mankind which 
has thought too much, from weariness of its own 
thoughts." 1 

*Cf. Paul Bourget, Psychologic Contemporaine, Vol. I, p. 16. 



262 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

This passage admirably reproduces the mood of the 
epoch, and may assist in the interpretation of the mean- 
ing of decadence, and throw light on the duality of pur- 
pose in the imperialist movement, wherein we may chart 
the ascendant proletarian, and the descendant middle 
class curve^ 



CHAPTER III 
The Rise of the Proletariat 



DUALISM IN POLITICS — PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC POLICY — DISRAELI 
HIS PLACE IN HISTORY LEADER OF IMPERIALIST MOVE- 
MENT HIS AFFINITY WITH THE PROLETARIAT ARIS- 
TOCRACY, MIDDLE CLASS, AND PROLETARIAT IN- 
TERPRETATION OF THEIR POLITICAL AND 
SOCIAL THEORIES 



CAPITALISM was seeking profitable fields for invest- 
ment and exploitation; the Proletariat was ready 
to support imperial enterprise with a sentimental, ill- 
defined enthusiasm which could not be measured in terms 
of profit and loss. Whereas the middle class capitalist 
could in the early stages of imperial expansion perceive 
only personal profit from foreign enterprise, the Prole- 
tariat, by its support of imperial policy, by the applause 
with which it greeted the acquisition of new territory and 
the raising of the flag in distant lands, gave the encour- 
agement needed to the leaders of governments in oflice 
to pursue their programmes of foreign expansion. 

Thus on the one hand we have capitalism still out- 
wardly under middle class control, with its narrow, anti- 
social, utilitarian motive urging imperial development on 
purely realist grounds, and the Proletariat supporting 
the same policy for idealist reasons. In other words, 
while imperialism appeared to the Middle Class in power 
as a mere extension of nationalism, a form of super- 

I263] 



264 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

nationalism, it was as supported by the Proletariat be- 
ginning to be interpreted as a social undertaking which 
engaged the State beyond its national boundaries, and 
might ultimately tend to break down the narrower in- 
dividualist interpretation of nationalism, and supplant, 
it by a broader social understanding. 

It is not to be inferred that the leaders of imperial 
expansion were cognisant of this duality which we can 
now trace. On the contrary, they appear to have been 
confident that they had succeeded in uniting the two 
hitherto antagonistic elements in the State in a common 
aim, had eliminated class struggle and secured internal 
harmony for the execution of foreign policy. 

Imperialism as the active principle of public policy 
is first to be met with in England, where it was in- 
augurated by Disraeli. Whatever estimate may be made 
of the new orientation he gave to political practice, it 
is necessary to note that by race and training he was 
incapable of adopting the individualist, middle class view- 
point, and that as the exponent of the greater England 
movement he led the attack on middle class liberalism. 

It has often been attempted to portray Disraeli as the 
leader of an aristocratic party, to imply that imperialism 
was in the nature of a reaction against liberalism in a 
retrogressive sense, a revival of aristocratic absolutism. 
This one-sided interpretation has hitherto obscured the 
true character of the latter stages of the imperial move- 
ment. At the time that Disraeli became Prime Minister 
(1874) England, as has already been pointed out, had 
for nearly a decade been committed to an inconsequen- 
tial foreign policy. She had neglected to take an 
active interest in continental European affairs, and had 
even abandoned colonial expansion, engrossed in further- 
ing the development of individual enterprise at the ex- 



THE RISE OF THE PROLETARIAT 265 

pense of political leadership and social progress. The 
sudden development of Prussia, the growing strength 
of the proletarian movement, as expressed by the First 
Internationale, brought to the fore the defects of middle 
class policy of non-intervention both at home and abroad. 

It has been argued that it was merely a fortuitous cir- 
cumstance, a "mystery," that a man of the type of Disraeli 
should at this juncture have been entrusted with the 
government, and should have launched England and in 
her train all the other States of the Western World upon 
a course of policy altogether different from that which 
had hitherto prevailed. To accept such an hypothesis 
is merely covering in deeper obscurity the true causes 
of the trend of politico-social evolution which it is the 
object of historical research to uncover, and which a 
fuller interpretation of historical events may assist in 
revealing. 

There are those who would see in Disraeli the leader 
of an aristocratic party, the representative of oligarchic 
interests. They point to the desperate struggle he en- 
gaged upon with the middle class liberals under the 
leadership of Gladstone — a typical representative of the 
best middle class mind — the frequent reversals of his 
policy, as confirming the reactionary nature of imperial- 
ism. But this conception is refuted, if such refutation 
be needed, by the transformation which middle class 
policy underwent even in England during the last decade 
of the 19th century in a final desperate attempt to adopt 
the major tenets of imperialism as a sine qua non of 
political survival. There are others who would see in 
Disraeli merely a party leader, and his struggle with 
Gladstone an example of political competition, a personal 
conflict for office and power. 

It is uncontested that Disraeli engaged England upon 



266 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

her course of imperial expansion, that he crowned Vic- 
toria as Empress of India, blocked Russia in Central 
Asia, entered upon treaty arrangements with foreign 
powers, called Indian troops to Malta for purposes of 
intimidation in Europe, or if need be for aggressive 
intervention, and was engaged upon other similar ac- 
tivities, solely on his own initiative, often without con- 
sulting Parliament. But it would be an error of his- 
torical judgment to infer that in acting in so arbitrary 
a manner, in carrying out his strong-handed policy, in 
introducing "jingoism" into political practice, he repre- 
sented merely Tory England. We can on the contrary 
perceive that as a matter of fact in inaugurating im- 
perialism, as in promoting social reform, he was act- 
ing unconsciously perhaps, but nevertheless potently, 
much more in sympathy with the Proletariat than as the 
representative of the Aristocracy. It may even be as- 
serted that in the methods, aims, and motives of his 
policy much which has hitherto been hall-marked as 
appertaining to aristocratic impulse, on closer examina- 
tion reveals its proletarian revolutionary origin. 

It cannot be left out of account in an effort to estimate 
the importance of this new orientation, and incidentally 
to explain more satisfactorily Disraeli's place in history, 
that he was the first political leader to breach the old 
order, if we are to interpret imperialism aright as a 
destructive force undermining the politico-juridic concept 
of the exclusive Nation-State. An examination of the 
character and temperament of the man affords ample con- 
firmation of this thesis. Disraeli in fact possessed many 
of the salient class characteristics of the Proletariat. For 
if we examine closely we will see that Disraeli embodied 
the eager intensity of the man of the people, rather 
than the social self-restraint of the aristocrat. Imagina- 



THE RISE OF THE PROLETARIAT 267 

tive, yet matter of fact, he combined passionate energy 
with a mystical charlatanism. Arbitrary without being 
dogmatic, vain without being vainglorious, he was en- 
dowed with a deep human sympathy and social sensibility. 

II 

It has been necessary to dwell upon the personal char- 
acteristics of Disraeli, to analyse in a measure his char- 
acter, in order to arrive at a clearer understanding of 
the special position which he occupied in the history 
of political evolution, and to reconcile the apparent 
anomalies of his career. The party which actively sup- 
ported him in Parliament, the press, and public opinion 
were directed by men who had come to look askance 
upon the unchecked development of individualism, the 
drifting trend of laissez-faire policy, the subservient po- 
sition to which the State had sunk under middle class 
rule of non-intervention. They were men who by char- 
acter and temperament placed national above individual 
interests, honor above profit, glory above scruple and 
thus represent what has been held to be an aristocratic 
temperament. 

An examination of the distinctive marks of aristo- 
cratic and proletarian motives of action will reveal a close 
similarity between the two. Unlike that of the Middle 
Class, which partaking of both, tempering both, mod- 
erating both, includes neither, the proletarian and aristo- 
cratic temperaments have so many characteristics in com- 
mon that, surprising though it may appear, it is difficult 
at the outset to differentiate between them. 

Like the Aristocracy the Proletariat places might above 
right. Both believe in omnipotence; both understand 
obedience. Both are endowed with a capacity for spiritual 



268 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

abnegatiort and mystical exaltation. The nicely balanced 
liberalism, typical of the middle class mind, its hyper- 
critical, subjective mode of viewing life, are rejected 
alike by the Proletariat and the Aristocracy, who look 
upon life objectively as an implement of social organisa- 
tion, not of egotistical, self-centred self-development. 

It is this social as opposed to individual outlook, this 
objective as against subjective mode of viewing life, 
which marks the closest identity between the Aristocracy 
and the Proletariat, and differentiates them from the 
Middle Class. 

But if we are able to trace so marked a similarity be- 
tween certain salient characteristics of the Aristocracy 
and the Proletariat, there are other factors which dis- 
tinguish the two groups from each other as clearly as 
those which mark them off from the Middle Class. 

The basis of an aristocratic organisation of society 
is the family. Its fixity is based on hereditary principles. 
Being in theory the government and administration by 
the best, it perceives neither the possibility of improve- 
ment nor the probability of decay as long as the estab- 
lished order is maintained. Its hierarchy, which derives 
supreme authority from the Deity, and by fixed stages 
descends the social scale from lord to serf, bears a 
theistic imprint. 

We have had occasion to point out in tracing the de- 
velopment of the middle class theory of State how in 
secular affairs the authority of God came to be replaced 
by the authority of man; how the individual came to be 
the important factor in the State as a human institution, 
man-made for men, and the consequent rise of equalita- 
rian democracy, which strove to prove that political 
equality compensated for whatever social or economic 
inequality might exist. 



THE RISE OF THE PROLETARIAT 269 

The Middle Class had destroyed the fixity of the aris- 
tocratic social order and introduced the concept of per- 
fectibility and progress, which gave rise to liberalism 
and toleration, and finally developed into social ir- 
responsibility in all cases where "positive harm is not 
done thereby to another." With it arose individualism, 
nationalism, the Nation-State, and the capitalist system, 
which sought to destroy class solidarity, the last remain- 
ing vestige of the orders of the aristocratic regime, and 
to substitute therefor national unity or racial homo- 
geneity as the basis of social organisation. In pursuit 
of these aims the Middle Class claimed to have discov- 
ered by scientific research as racial or national charac- 
teristics, factors which had in the past been interpreted 
as class distinctions. It was apparently oblivious of the 
fact that this same research was revealing the funda- 
mental unity of mankind, proving that the Russian Mir, 
the Javanese Dessa, the Indian, Chinese, Peruvian village 
organisation, the German Mark, the Swiss AUemend and 
the French communal system or the Scotch clan organisa- 
tion bore unmistakable marks of identity, and that eco- 
nomic development or class consciousness rather than race 
must be taken into consideration in order to discover 
distinguishing social characteristics of real validity. 

In place of the fixity and immobility of the aristocratic 
social system in Western Europe, the Middle Class when 
it came to power introduced the restless mobility and 
irresponsibility of individualism, and the personalised 
Nation-State. Rejecting hierarchic responsibility, the 
Middle Class at the stage of its highest development 
had substituted a system of individual and international 
relations, based on politico-juridic checks, restraints, and 
balances which isolated the individual in the State, and 
the State among States. 



270 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

The Middle Class in abolishing aristocratic control 
had, nevertheless, retained many of the symbols of aris- 
tocracy. While the family no longer remained dominant, 
individual worth was recognised, individual initiative 
deemed preeminent. The principle of the hereditary rights 
of political prerogative was rejected. Yet these hereditary 
rights were retained as the basis of the economic system 
which was built up along individualist, distinctly non- 
social lines. It is at this juncture, when middle class 
social irresponsibility had been carried to its extreme 
limits, that the proletarian movement arose with its so- 
cial programme, rejecting alike the political immunities 
and privileges of the older aristocratic organisation, and 
the economic immunities, privileges, and social irresponsi- 
bility of the Middle Class. 

It might be pointed out that the influence of the Aris- 
tocracy in the State had everywhere declined, and no- 
where survived the middle of the 19th century. Yet the 
aversion of modern times to aristocratic political doc- 
trines, due to the jealous ascendancy of the Middle Class, 
should not a priori exclude the possibility of their revival 
in a modified form on a broader social foundation. It is 
sufficient to note that the middle class organisation of the 
Nation-State, on a competitive non-social basis, had be- 
come an anomaly, and the only way out appeared to be 
by the disruption of the bonds of the State so conceived, 
and the transformation of the existing system. As the 

(Middle Class had destroyed aristocratic rule, and on the 
debris constructed the personalised Nation-State as a 
liberal democracy, so the Proletariat was bent upon the 
destruction of this middle class, politico-juridic structure, 
the Nation-State, in order to erect its own particular 
form of social organisation. As to the Middle Class 
at the close of the mediaeval period the aristocratic form 



THE RISE OF THE PROLETARIAT 271 

of government had appeared rigid, isolated, and ex- 
clusive, now in turn to the rising Proletariat the middle 
class Nation-State appeared rigid, isolated, and exclu- 
sive. Hence the aim of the Proletariat to replace it by 
an inclusive, corporate collective union, in which the bar- 
riers of nations — as formerly the barriers of family — 
should be eliminated. 

Such was the historical background of proletarian so- 
cial theory. Its principal object, at first scarcely realised, 
was the destruction of the middle class Nation-State as 
power. How this object was pursued, how irrevocably 
the process of disintegration of the middle class theory 
of the Nation-State was carried on, the attempts made 
to strengthen the existing concept of the State, the illu- 
sion that the Middle Class was more securely entrenched 
than ever, and that the politico-juridic concept was if 
anything more vital than it had hitherto been, are illus- 
trated by an examination of the events of the epoch which 
came to a close with the European War. Simultaneously 
we can trace the rise and spread of the influence of the 
Proletariat, and its sudden appearance in full control 
of the body politic among a people, dwelling upon the 
threshold of Europe and Asia, where no strong Middle 
Class existed, and where an enfeebled aristocratic despot- 
ism had survived, which unconsciously cooperated with 
the Proletariat by promoting imperial enterprise, and thus 
opened the pathway of its own destruction. 



CHAPTER IV 

The New Europe 



RELATIVE POSITION OF THE POWERS THE PREDOMINANCE OF 

GERMANY — THE DREIKAISERBUND — THE RAPID RECOVERY OF 
FRANCE — THE CRISIS OF 1 875 THE SITUATION IN THE BAL- 
KANS — BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY ENGLAND AND TURKEY 

— PLANS FOR THE PACIFICATION OF THE BALKANS 

THE SUEZ CANAL INCIDENT 



THE motives ^ of historical evolution He deeply sub- 
merged In the social consciousness of mankind; the 
motive-force, the levers to accomplishment are placed 
in the hands of Individuals. Those who are able to 
fathom this consciousness, to chart Its currents and prob- 
able course in a measure procure a happy union between 
motive and action which may serve to accelerate this 
evolution. The world rewards them with plaudits, hon- 
ors, and at certain epochs with hero-worship, unmindful 
of the fact that these so-called great men, the accelerators 
of history, often do no more than hasten maturity which 
leads In turn to a rapid decay. Such a man was Bis- 
marck, the founder of the new German Empire. The 
history of Western civilisation during the last quarter 
of the 19th century bears the Imprint of the Impetus he 
gave to, the quickened tempo with which he directed, 
public affairs. During few periods in history do we 
find events so closely coordinated by a single will. 

^See pp. 153-154- 

[272] 



THE NEW EUROPE 273 

Unlike Napoleon I, who was the servant of his destiny, 
who summed up an old epoch, who played a predomi- 
nantly individualist, episodic, and non-social part in his- 
tory, Bismarck's role, in spite of its outward anomalies, 
in spite of the numerous occasions in which a naturalist, 
egotistical individualism seemed to dominate, was that 
of a man of the new epoch, whose sensibility and po- 
litical perception had in them the elements of a new 
objectivity fundamentally social. This social perception, 
this objective outlook on life, which we have already 
noted as a characteristic mark of the Proletariat, as well 
as of the Aristocracy, as opposed to the subjectivity of 
the middle class viewpoint, must be kept constantly in 
mind not mterely in order to understand the social evo- 
lution of the new period, but to mark it off from what 
had gone before. 

It will be of interest to review briefly certain salient 
events of Bismarck's later career — which entails a survey 
in some detail of the political history of the two decades 
which followed the war of 1870 — in order to bring out 
clearly the well-defined nature of this objectivity and 
social sensibility. 

II 

The Franco-Prussian War had done more than deprive 
France of Alsace-Lorraine and extort from the French 
a large indemnity. It had left the country in the throes 
of civil commotion. The Commune at Paris had been 
repressed by the Middle Class with a brutality and en- 
ergy rarely to be met with in history, except at times 
when it is consciously realised by the party in power 
that it is a struggle for survival in which no quarter 
will be asked or given. A republican form of govern- 



274 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

ment, so long pressing for recognition In France, had 
again been organised, though It had not as yet gained 
sufficient strength to assert Itself unconditionally. The 
partisans of the restoration of the monarchical regime 
were numerous. Bonapartists and Bourbons alike hoped 
for a restoration. But division In their ranks gave the 
young republic a respite, and the Middle Class, more 
anxious to continue In the control of authority, more 
jealous of Its prerogatives than interested in the form of 
government, placed Increasing trust In the republic as 
Its stability became more assured. "While France was 
absent, the moment was propitious for Destiny to break 
with the past wherein she (France) had played so grand 
a part. It was the end of a Europe — the one which had 
seen the wars of Greece, Crimea, and Italy — the begin- 
ning of a new Europe. The quarrels over nationality 
or principles were appeased; wars of expansion and 
profit, of economic penetration, colonial conquest. Im- 
perialism, world politics were in preparation at the time 
when the internal struggles In France were drawing to a 
close." ^ Such is a usual French interpretation of the 
consequences of the war of 1870. 

Historians are Inclined to accept this view, even if they 
do not pay such homage to Destiny. But it was not so 
much the absence of France as the presence of Germany 
which was the characteristic feature of the new era. 
The centre of gravity of Europe had shifted. The new 
German Empire had become the preponderant power in 
the West. Berlin was to replace Paris as the political 
capital of the Western World. England for the time main- 
tained her attitude of isolation. Italy had profited by the 
embarrassment of the Pope, upon the defeat of the eldest 
daughter of the Church, to seize Rome and complete her 

* Hanotaux, La France Contemporaine, Vol. IV, p. 48. 



THE NEW EUROPE 275 

national unity. Russia had taken advantage of the situa- 
tion to force a revision of the treaty of Paris, and rid 
herself of its onerous clauses concerning the Black Sea 
(London, January-March 1871). Everyone seemed sat- 
isfied to have profited by the defeat of France, and the> 
tables were cleared, ready for a new game. 

After a war the vanquished remain for a time under 
the incubus of their disasters; the victor, on the other 
hand, must be prepared to exploit immediately the ad- 
vantages he has gained. No one understood this more 
clearly than Bismarck. He looked upon war as a po- 
litical short-cut, the advantages of which are of a pro- 
visional and temporary nature that must be supplemented 
by diplomatic guarantees. In this sense the war with 
France was merely a stage in the process of historical de- 
velopment of Prussia, concluding the series of wars begun 
in 1864, and carried through successfully in 1866 and 
1870, whereby German unity had been realised under 
Prussian hegemony. But there is no halting in political 
development. No respite is given to the growing State, 
and during this critical adolescent period safeguards must 
be found. To assure such safeguards is the first duty of 
the true statesman. Germany was surrounded by power- 
ful States, potential foes. Already before the end of the 
Franco-Prussian War, while Bismarck was sojourning at 
Meaux a few days after Sedan, he took advantage of the 
great victories won by German arms to broach the sub- 
ject of an alliance with Russia and Austria. It was to be 
a revival of the Holy Alliance, "an alliance of the three 
Emperors, with the arriere pensee that Italy would join 
them later." The declared object of the alliance was to 
combat the revolutionary republican movement which was 
at the time spreading in France. 

The Vienna Government, ready to forget the in- 



276 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

juries it had suffered in 1866, took pains to recall that 
Bismarck had not pressed the advantages gained in the 
field to exact a humiliating peace, and willingly entered 
into the alliance. Russia was at first more reserved. 
Though most intimate relations existed between the 
courts of the two countries, and Russia had given Prussia 
a free hand in her plans of aggrandisement, the Tsar 
wished to take advantage of the opportunity offered to 
negotiate certain modifications to the treaty of Paris. 
In the meantime the defeat of France had been com- 
pleted; the new imperial constitution had been adopted 
by the German States; the treaty of Frankfort had 
shackled France; Russia had gained her desired ends at 
the London Conference, and was ready to enter into the 
German scheme. The alliance of the three Emperors, 
the Dreikaiserbund, was agreed to. By the end of 1871 
Berlin had become the political centre of Europe. 

France had recovered from the effects of the war of 
1870 with unexpected rapidity. Though torn by internal 
dissensions, she had been able to pay off the indemnity to 
Germany by 1873. Already in 1872 she was in a position 
to take in hand the question of her armaments, and lay 
down the plans for the reorganisation of the army. By 
1875 she was preparing to increase her military estab- 
lishment. 

The Berlin Government watched with much concern 
the sudden revival of French military strength. The idea 
of crushing France before she had a chance to make a full 
recovery and entertain plans of revenge gained wide sup- 
port in official circles in Germany. Here was an occasion 
to use force to prevent possible future conflict, by striking 
down a potential enemy. Such would have been a logical 
application of Bismarckian realism. That it was not 
carried out was due to various causes, among the more 



THE NEW EUROPE 277 

potent being the Intervention of Russia, supported by 
England, In favor of peace. Bismarck, who was not him- 
self certain of the advantage of a war at this juncture, 
gave way under this new pressure. Hitherto he had had 
a free hand in European affairs; now he found himself 
confronted by concerted action on the part of Russia and 
England and, though he resented the interference, he was 
forced to acquiesce. The Berlin Government repudiated 
her alleged warlike intentions, and the Incident was closed 
(May 1875). But the maintenance of the peace of 
Europe remained more precarious than ever. 



Ill 

The year 1875 marks the beginning of the struggle for 
world power among the European Nation-States which on 
the surface appeared merely a continuation of the time- 
honored struggle for ascendancy, to which the newly 
formulated doctrine of the survival of the fittest had given 
a fresh impetus. "Bismarck Is really another old Bona- 
parte again, and he must be bridled," ^ was the opinion of 
Disraeli during this crucial year, and though England and 
Germany were to develop Into the chief protagonists of 
Imperialism, for the time being Russia appeared the more 
formidable foe of British Imperial plans. 

For a number of years Russia had by slow stages ex- 
tended her domain In Central Asia, threatening British 
rule in India, and at the same time was enlarging her 
sphere of Influence in the Balkans, menacing Turkish hold 
on Constantinople. The opening of the Suez Canal by 
the French (1869), ^^ ^he construction of which the 
British had refused to participate, had altered the course 

* Cf, G. E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Vol. V, p. 421. 



278 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

of the lines of comraunication with the East, and made of 
the Mediterranean the highway of the British Empire, 
which it became of principal importance to England to 
protect. 

During the course of the summer (1875) a revolt had 
broken out in Herzegovina, which was to have so far- 
reaching an effect on the subsequent course of European 
policy, and become the pretext of imperial expansion and 
the mad scramble for world influence and world power. 
A careful survey is required in order to arrive at a clear 
conception of the complex Near Eastern problem, which 
served as the pretext for foreign intrigue, and masked the 
real significance of imperialism as a new social, anti- 
national current of historical development. 

In spite of the reverses suffered during the Crimean 
War, Russia had never abandoned her plans of driving 
the Turks out of Europe and planting the Russian cross 
on St. Sophia. The Pan-Slavic movement, which hitherto 
had been carried on in a desultory fashion, had been taken 
up officially, and soon after i860 the programme of 
bringing all the Christian nationalities of the Balkan Pen- 
insula under Russian influence, though never overtly 
acknowledged, was officially coordinated and directed 
from St. Petersburg. The increasing weakness and mal- 
administration of the Porte, the chaotic conditions which 
prevailed among the various races of the Peninsula, who 
had become inflamed by the nationalist propaganda which 
had spread eastward and inspired them to demand 
national independence, offered ample opportunity for 
judicious intervention in furthering Russian designs. 

England, contrary to her best political tradition, had 
under Gladstone, who was a fervent nationalist, seen no 
cause for alarm at Russian plans to drive the Turks from 
the Balkan Peninsula, and assist the Bulgars, Serbs, and 



THE NEW EUROPE 279 

Rumanes in their national aspirations. France was after 
1870 for some years not in a position to exert much in- 
fluence; Italy, though a signatory of the Paris Treaty, 
had lost interest in eastern Balkan affairs, and was en- 
gaged with problems of internal organisation; Germany 
claimed to be wholy disinterested and, being bound by 
alliance to Russia and the Dual Monarchy, made it her 
principal concern to avert a struggle between her two 
allies, as the Dual Monarchy, being coterminous with the 
Turkish Empire, could not be indifferent to any change of 
the status quo and was ready to intervene should Russia 
show her hand and force the issue. 

Such was the position of the chief States when Disraeli 
came into power. He reversed British policy. He was 
no sympathiser with the tenets of nationalism. He 
could not conceive of it as a sound basis of England's 
foreign policy. It seemed to him wholly sentimental 
and unsound. The consolidation of the British Empire, 
the safeguarding of its lines of communication, the 
protection of its distant frontiers, and the acquisition of 
new territory or fresh spheres of influence were far more 
important to British interests, according to his concep- 
tion, than the championing of revolutionary patriots in 
their struggles for independence, which would contribute 
nothing to British power. On the contrary, he held 
that British interests would be menaced if Russia were 
to gain a firm foothold in the Balkans, which might lead 
to her acquiring the control of Constantinople, and this 
must be prevented even at the risk of war. 

The revolt which broke out in Herzegovina in July 
1875 might have readily been localised, yet the Porte 
seemed unable or unwilling to suppress it. Soon Bosnia 
was the centre of insurrection. The Serbs were by this 
time up in arms, ready to declare war on Turkey, Eng- 



28o THE TREND OF HISTORY 

land was anxious that Turkey should be permitted to 
deal with the situation herself, but Russia, Germany, and 
Austria had other plans. They had taken upon them- 
selves to decide the destiny of Turkey without consulting 
the rest of Europe, except to solicit its approval of the 
policy they might agree upon. Nor was agreement be- 
tween these partners easy. Vienna was ready to fore- 
stall any move that the Russians might make, and Bis- 
marck had on more than one occasion given proof that 
if he had to choose between Russia and Austria he would 
not hesitate to support the latter. 

In the meantime the situation in Turkey had been ren- 
dered more difficult by the default on the payment of in- 
terest on the public debt (October 1875). The efforts 
of the foreign consuls to bring about a peaceful settle- 
ment in the area of revolt had failed. At St. Petersburg 
the question of the partition of Turkey was raised. The 
Russian Chancellor, Prince Gortchakov, outlined to the 
French Charge d' Affaires a plan for a federal union of 
the Christian States of the Balkans with Constantinople, 
a free city on the German model, as its capital. The in- 
tervention of the European Powers appeared inevitable. 
Russia took the opportunity to reaffirm her alleged dis- 
interestedness in Constantinople, but was firm in asserting 
that neither England nor any other Great Power, nor 
Greece, should be permitted to occupy the city upon its 
evacuation by the Turks. 

While the cabinets of St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Ber- 
lin were endeavoring to reach an agreement concerning 
the terms of the reforms to be demanded of Turkey, 
and had not consulted England, Disraeli by a bold stroke 
showed that he wished it to be understood that no agree- 
ment respecting the Eastern Mediterranean could be en- 
tered upon without the consent of England, and that the 



THE NEW EUROPE 281 

British Government was again to be reckoned with as an 
international factor of first importance. 

Since its opening the Suez Canal had been operated as 
a private company, of which the Khedive of Egypt was 
the principal shareholder. The financial position of Egypt 
was precarious. To secure adequate funds to meet press- 
ing obligations, the Khedive had proposed to arrange with 
a group of French financiers to mortgage his holdings in 
the Canal. While these negotiations were being carried 
on, Disraeli, learning of the proposal, promptly inter- 
vened on behalf of his Government and made a more ad- 
vantageous offer to the Khedive, which after rapid 
negotiations was accepted, and England became owner 
of the latter's shares, and thus secured control of the 
Canal (November 20, 1875). 

Europe was amazed at the suddenness with which the 
scheme was put through, which gained for England as the 
result of a financial operation all the advantages which 
because of the foresight and energy the French had shown 
in building the Canal they should have reaped. Russia 
was not slow to perceive that England was preparing to 
contest the Russian advance to the ^gean and maintained 
a significant silence, while Germany and Austria ap- 
plauded the boldness of the operation. Bismarck could 
not refrain from expressing his approval of an undertak- 
ing which so successfully put into effect his own methods. 

Thus while Russia and the Central Powers were talking 
about the possible partition of the Ottoman Empire, the 
integrity of which England was making ready to defend, 
England herself was laying the foundation of her plans 
for detaching Egypt from allegiance to the Porte, and, 
through the successive stages of dual control with France, 
Intervention, and the assertion of her sole ascendancy 
— excluding France even from the hinterland — was 



282 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

finally able to include Egypt in the number of her pro- 
tectorates. 

Disraeli was watching the international situation with 
close attention. In spite of the warning of the Suez 
Canal incident, the three Emperors drew up an elaborate 
programme for the reform of Turkey, which was to be 
imposed by the Powers and carried through under their 
supervision (December 30, 1875). 



CHAPTER V 

The Eastern Question 



CONFLICTING INFLUENCES — REFORMS A LA TURQUE — THE PRO- 
GRAMME OF THE THREE EMPERORS THE BERLIN MEMORAN- 
DUM FIRM ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND WAR IN THE BALKANS 

THE REICHSTADT AGREEMENT BULGARIAN ATROCITIES 

ABDUL HAMID THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE 

THE PORTE PROCLAIMS A CONSTITUTION EFFORTS 

TO KEEP THE PEACE RUSSIA DECLARES WAR BRIT- 
ISH THREAT OF INTERVENTION TO PROTECT CON- 
STANTINOPLE AUSTRIA AND THE WESTERN 

BALKANS — PLEVNA — BISMARCK AND GER- 
MAN INTEREST IN BALKAN AFFAIRS RUS- 
SIA VICTORIOUS THE TREATY OF SAN 

STEFANO 



THE question of reform of the administration of the 
Balkans by Turkey had been repeatedly the subject 
of controversy and diplomatic wrangling. On the one 
hand there was the plan of those who favored permitting 
Turkey to undertake the reforms urged, at her own initia- 
tive, without infringing upon her sovereignty; on the 
other, the conviction that it was the duty of the Powers 
to protect the Christian subjects of the Sultan and super- 
vise these reforms. 

The traditional policy of England — the policy she 
had pursued since the Battle of the Nile and Trafalgar 
had made her a Mediterranean Power, and her support 
of the Greeks in their struggle for independence had com- 
mitted her to a more definite interest in the Eastern shores 

I283] 



284 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

of the Mediterranean — had been to assert the principle 
of the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Turkey. 
England was ready to support reforms a la Turque, 
pending such a time as it might be opportune to push for- 
ward the claims of modern Greece as heir to the ancient 
Eastern Empire. Russia, on the other hand, since the 
days of Catherine the Great and the treaty of Kutchuk 
Kainardji (1774) considered herself the champion of the 
independence of the Slav peoples of the Balkans, and had 
always pressed for active intervention and reforms under 
European supervision, as the pretext for her own pro- 
gressive advance on the Sea of Marmora. 

The joint note of the three Emperors, which was 
finally drafted, outlining a programme of reform under 
European supervision, met with little success. England 
at first held aloof, without refusing absolutely to par- 
ticipate. In the meanwhile the insurgents extended their 
incursions. By the spring of 1876 Bosnia and Herzego- 
vina were in full insurrection; Serbia and Montenegro 
were making ready to declare war, and the Bulgars, the 
especial proteges of Russia, were being stirred to revolt. 

Turkey on her part had now completed the mobilisation 
of her forces and prepared for a systematic repression 
of the outbreak. At this juncture the Tsar, accompanied 
by his Chancellor, arrived in Berlin, whither the Austrian 
Premier had been summoned by Bismarck. A fresh mem- 
orandum dealing with the Turkish situation was drafted. 
It rehearsed previous proposals, added new demands, and 
threatened that if the objects set forth were not attained, 
efficacious measures would be taken in the interests of 
peace to put a stop to the continuation of disorders and 
prevent their recurrence. 

The Berhn Note (May 13, 1876) requested the imme- 
diate adherence of the Powers. It was now England's 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 285 

turn to show her hand. She flatly refused to adhere to 
the proposals outlined on the ground that she did not see 
what they would lead to, and could not admit the right 
of the. continental Powers to dispose of the Eastern Ques- 
tion without first consulting her. To impress the Powers 
with the seriousness with which she regarded the situation 
a British fleet was ordered to Besika Bay, close to the 
Dardanelles, to be ready for any eventuality. Disraeli, 
in defending his policy, maintained that the reforms pro- 
posed were not only impracticable, but inauspicious, pre- 
luding the partition of the Ottoman Empire. England 
had withdrawn from the concert of Powers and for the 
moment stood alone. The English Prime Minister, how- 
ever, had no illusions about the situation. "Whatever 
happens," he wrote at the end of May, "we shall cer- 
tainly not drift into war, but go to war, if we do, be- 
cause we intend it, and have a purpose which we mean to 
accomplish." ^ 

The Russian Chancellor, bent on carrying through the 
terms of the Berlin memorandum, on learning of the 
refusal of England to participate, declared that the Pow- 
ers should proceed without English concurrence. With 
England no longer at hand to perform the unpleasant 
task of checking Russian ambitions, Bismarck was unwill- 
ing to proceed. He conceived it no more to the interest 
of Germany than it was to that of Austria or England to 
permit an undue expansion of Slav power in the Balkans, 
which would shut off the Austrian advance southward 
masking the pan-German, Drang nach Osten, which was 
now beginning to be considered. 

At this perplexing moment a palace revolution at Con- 
stantinople dethroned the Sultan (May 29, 1876) and a 
new Sultan, the puppet of the reform party, the Young 

* Qi. G, E. Buckle, T/ie Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Vol. VI, p. 29. 



286 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

Turks, believed to be favorable to England, was placed 
on the throne. It was a good excuse for reconsidering 
the whole question and was welcomed by Bismarck, who 
did not wish an open break with Russia. His position in 
Europe was now unique. He was playing the Powers 
off against one another, friendly towards England,^ not 
openly antagonistic to Russia, while firmly supporting 
Austria. 

To force the hand of the Powers, on June 30 Serbia 
declared war on Turkey, followed the next day by Mon- 
tenegro, while Bulgaria was already in revolt, urged on 
by Russian assistance and volunteers in support of the 
Pan-Slav cause. 

In the dilemma caused by the fresh crisis, Russia 
sought a way out, and in an interview between the 
Tsar and the Austrian Emperor, held at Reichstadt on 
July 8, 1876, to which Germany was not formally a party, 
an understanding was reached. Russia agreed to abandon 
Serbian pretensions at the request of Austria, who already 
feared that the Serbs were aspiring to become "the Pied- 
montese of the Southern Slavs," which would disrupt the 
Dual Monarchy. Russia thus sacrificed her interests in 
the western Balkans, and countenanced the possibility of 
the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. 
In return the Vienna Government undertook to remain 
neutral In case Russia should declare war on Turkey. 

The pourparlers between the Powers, the jockeying 
for position, had not delayed the march of events. The 
news of the massacre of the unarmed Christian peasants, 
the famous "Bulgarian Atrocities," now began to spread 

^ "The great man at Berlin has completely realised my expectations. . . . 
He delights in the whole affair, and particularly praised 'Disraeli's 
speeches' to Odo Russell, 'and his sending the fleet to the Dardanelles!'" 
Extract from letter written by Disraeli June 13, 1876. Op. cit.. Vol. VI, 
p. 32. 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 287 

over Europe. Public opinion was aroused. A large sec- 
tion of the British public denounced the pro-Turkish 
policy of the Government. Gladstone came out of his 
retirement and issued his passionate appeal to England 
to assist "in driving the Turk, bag and baggage, out of 
Europe." In the meantime the Serbs had been defeated 
and sought the intervention of the Powers. The Russian 
policy of direct action to avenge the sufferings of the 
Christian populations seemed fully justified. But Disraeli 
remained imperturbable. He maintained that the reports 
of the massacres spread through the press were exag- 
gerated; that civil war prevailed in Bulgaria, which was 
inevitably accompanied by bloodshed; but that, even if 
the worst reports were true, England must first consider 
her interests and could not abandon a well-considered 
policy for sentimental reasons. 

At Constantinople another revolt had brought the "old 
Turks" back into power, and they placed the resourceful, 
unscrupulous Abdul Hamid on the throne. The new 
Sultan was held to be pro-Austrian in his sympathies. 

The menace of a general European war still subsisted. 
The policy of the various governments betrayed the ner- 
vousness and uncertainty which prevailed as to the prob- 
able alignment of the combatants. Russia had in July 
signed the agreement with Austria at Reichstadt. In 
October we find her (Russia) sounding Bismarck as to 
what the attitude of Germany would be in the event that 
Russia should declare war on Austria. Bismarck, in at- 
tempting to make an evasive answer, let Russia under- 
stand that Germany could not tolerate any material weak- 
ening of Austria which might imperil her position as a 
Great Power. It was now England's turn to take the 
initiative, and she proposed an armistice between Serbia 
and Montenegro on the one hand, and Turkey on the 



288 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

other, to be followed by a peace which would maintain the 
status quo and permit of certain administrative reforms. 
To secure this end it was suggested by London that a con- 
ference of the Powers be held at Constantinople to settle 
the whole question. But Russia was not in a mood to per- 
mit England to play a preponderant part in Balkan affairs, 
and added the suggestion that it was to be understood that 
if the Porte did not accept the peace proposed, a Russian 
army corps was to occupy Bulgaria, an Austrian corps, 
Bosnia, and a joint fleet of the Powers was to enter the 
Bosporus. 

Early in November the Russians were able to compel 
the Sultan to sign a two months' armistice, while the Tsar 
declared in a speech at Moscow on November lo: 

"I am very desirous that we shall arrive at a general 
understanding, but if such an agreement is not arrived at, 
and if it seems to me that we are not securing the neces- 
sary guarantees for the execution of what we have the 
right to demand of the Porte, I have the firm intention 
to act alone." 

The day before Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield, speak- 
ing at Guildhall, had declared: 

"There is no country so interested in the maintenance 
of peace as England. Peace is especially an English 
policy. She is not an aggressive Power, for there is noth- 
ing which she desires; she covets no cities, no provinces. 
What she wishes is to maintain and enjoy the unexampled 
empire which she has built up. . . . But although the 
policy of England is peace, there is no country so well 
prepared for war as our own. . . . She is not a country 
that, when she enters into a campaign, has to ask herself 
whether she can support a second or a third campaign 
which she will not terminate till right is done." 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 289 

Russia took up the challenge, and on November 13,. 
mobilisation orders were issued, and Russia declared it 
her purpose not to desist in her plans until the "prin- 
ciples of humanity" had been vindicated. 



n 

The arrangements for the Constantinople Conference 
were, however, being put through; though England took 
the necessary military precaution. "We have a force of 
40,000 men ready," Beaconsfield wrote in his secret in- 
structions (December i ) to Lord Salisbury, who was to 
represent England at the Conference. "It is a most 
critical moment in European politics," he declared. "If 
Russia is not checked, the Holy Alliance will be revived 
In aggravated form and force. Germany will have Hol- 
land; and France, Belgium, and England will be in a 
position I trust I shall never live to witness." ^ 

Bismarck, anxious to maintain his attitude of detach- 
ment in order to be In a position to play the part of arbiter 
when the proper moment should arrive, speaking In the 
Reichstag on December 7, 1876, In reply to his critics who 
complained that the government had taken no determined 
stand, declared: "The policy which we pursue must be 
dictated solely by our own interests, and we will not per- 
mit ourselves to be Influenced by any proposal whatsoever 
to pursue any other policy. . . . I do not therefore advise 
any active participation on the part of Germany, as I do 
not see for Germany any interest which would warrant 
our sacrificing — excuse the harshness of the expression — 
the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier." 

The Porte, which had remained a docile spectator dur- 

* G. E. Buckle, op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 104. 



i^o THE TREND OF HISTORY 

ing the wrangling among the Powers, now took a step 
which was to upset all calculations. On the day the Con- 
ference officially assembled at Constantinople, a constitu- 
tion on the most approved European model was promul- 
gated by the Sultan, affording very wide civil and political 
liberties to all the peoples of his Empire. It was evident 
that the Porte desired to demonstrate that the Con- 
ference was unnecessary, as all the reforms that could 
possibly be demanded and a great many more were in- 
cluded in the provisions of the new constitutional regime 
it was proposed to set up. 

Nevertheless, the Conference proceeded with its labors 
and presented a list of demands which the Porte refused 
to accept (January 1877) ; whereupon the Conference 
broke up. War was now inevitable. Russia seemed to 
have the sanction of the Powers. Turkey was pushing 
the mobilisation of her forces with unwonted energy. 

The Tsar thereupon entered into a definite treaty with 
Austria to insure the latter's neutrality, and the winter 
months were employed in preparations. England's plan 
of a conference had been tried and failed. There was no 
alternative left but to let events take their course. The 
efforts to keep peace were sedulously pursued, but they 
were all leading directly to war, which on April 24, 1877, 
was declared by Russia. 

England maintained an expectant attitude, while the 
Russian forces steadily advanced upon Constantinople; 
though meeting with stubborn resistance in Armenia, they 
made better headway in the Balkans. When the prospect 
of a Russian entry Into Constantinople became imminent, 
England warned Russia that: "Anxious, sincerely anxious 
to meet Russian views in other matters, the occupation 
of Constantinople, or attempt to occupy it, will be looked 
upon as an incident which frees us from all previous en- 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 291 

gagements, and must lead to serious consequences." ^ On 
July 21, Beaconsfield telegraphed to Queen Victoria : "If 
Russia occupies Constantinople and does not arrange for 
her immediate retirement from it, to advise Your Majesty 
to declare war against that Power. Orders have been 
given to strengthen the Mediterranean garrisons." ^ A 
breathing space was afforded to England by the delay 
suffered by Russia in reducing Plevna, which held up her 
advance on Constantinople. 

In the meantime Austria had made it plain that she 
would not tolerate the extension of an independent Serbia 
westward, or of Montenegro northward. "If the Turks 
are able to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina so much the 
better; if not we will take them for ourselves," outlined 
the Austrian viewpoint. Thus Russia was hemmed in on 
the south and west by the threats of the Powers, yet she 
pushed military operations with increased vigor. On 
December 10, Plevna fell. Kars had been captured and 
the Turks had fallen back on Erzerum. The roads to 
Constantinople lay open. The Slavs of the Balkans all 
took an active part In the campaign, and In January 1878 
even Greece joined, and marched into Thessaly. On 
January 9 the Sultan had requested an armistice. Russia 
refused, except on the condition that peace should be 
discussed. On January 20, Adrianople fell Into Russian 
hands. In the meantime the Turkish plenipotentiaries 
had left Constantinople to discuss peace. The situation 
had again become tense; the Russians were before Con- 
stantinople. England had committed herself to prevent 
its occupation. The British fleet was ordered Into the Sea 
of Marmora, and credits were voted to increase the na- 
tional armaments. The Russians still hesitated before 

*G. E. Buckle, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 150. 
'Ibidem, Vol. VI, p. 154. 



292 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

occupying the city. England now maintained that, no 
matter what the terms of the peace between Russia and 
Turkey might be, they must be subject to revision by a 
European Congress. Austria, owing to her special posi- 
tion and her previous agreements with Russia, officially 
proposed that a conference of the six Powers be held at 
Vienna, to agree upon the necessary modifications to the 
terms of the treaty about to be negotiated between Russia 
and the Porte. 

The opportunity Bismarck had long been waiting for 
had arrived. Germany was making ready to dominate 
the future destiny of Europe. "I am not of the opinion," 
he declared in the Reichstag on February 19, "that we 
should pursue a Napoleonic policy and that we should 
wish to be, I will not say the arbiter, or even the school- 
master of Europe. Our role is more modest. I conceive 
it as that of an honest broker who wishes to put through 
a good deal." Henceforth it was evident that Berlin 
would be the scene of the Congress which was to arrange 
the affairs of Europe, launch the Powers into new paths, 
and lay the foundation of new schemes of aggrandisement 
and of world influence. 

On March 3, in spite of the menacing attitude of 
England, the treaty of peace between Turkey and Russia 
was signed at San Stefano. It provided for an enlarged, 
independent Montenegro, with two harbors on the Adri- 
atic; an independent Serbia, slightly enlarged; an inde- 
pendent Rumania, which received the Dobrudja but ceded 
Bessarabia to Russia; a vast Bulgarian State under the 
high protection of Russia, extending from the Danube 
to Thessaly, from the i?^gean to the Black Sea. Russia 
secured Batum and important tracts in Armenia and, 
among other favorable stipulations, the opening of the 
Straits in peace and war to all merchant vessels proceed- 



THE EASTERN QUESTION 293 

ing to Russian ports. The treaty was kept secret and 
only communicated to the Powers three weeks later. 

On the receipt of the news of the terms England lost 
no time. The Slav menace had become a reality. Turkey 
in Europe had to all intents and purposes been wiped out. 
Though Constantinople had not been occupied, England 
considered the terms of the treaty unacceptable. The 
reserves were called out; Indian troops were ordered to 
Malta, and it was even planned according to the Prime 
Minister to "occupy two important posts in the Levant, 
which will command the Persian Gulf and all the country 
around Bagdad, and entirely neutralise the Russian con- 
quests and influence in Armenia." On April i, in a note 
to the Powers, England outlined the reasons why she 
deemed it essential that the treaty of San Stefano should 
be revised. 

Austria, whose interests in the Balkans had been threat- 
ened by the terms of the treaty, was ready to cooperate 
with England, while Bismarck, maintaining his air of 
aloofness, pressed Russia to find out from England, not 
only what she did not want, but what she did. Accord- 
ingly negotiations were entered upon in view of a Euro- 
pean Congress which might be held. A secret memoran- 
dum, embodying an agreement between Russia and Eng- 
land, was signed May 30. It included the acceptance in 
the main of the British thesis regarding the territorial dis- 
tribution of the Balkans and eliminated the great Bulgar 
State, though it left Russia a free hand in Armenia, and 
confirmed the Russian occupation of Batum, Ardahan, 
and Kars. At the same time a secret convention was 
signed between England and the Porte (June 4) in the 
nature of an insurance treaty, which provided that if 
Russia retained Batum, Ardahan, or Kars, England would 
defend the integrity of Turkish territory in Asia against 



294 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

any further encroachments by Russia. In return for this 
service England received the right to occupy Cyprus,^ and 
a number of British military consulates were to be estab- 
lished in Asiatic Turkey, to protect the special rights and 
interests England had secured by the Convention. 

* Disraeli had spent a day at Cyprus in 1831 and had been much im- 
pressed by its long, romantic history. In 1847 in one of his novels, 
"Tancred," he had written: "The English want Cyprus and they will 
take it as compensation. They will not take charge of Turkish affairs 
again for nothing. They need new markets for their cotton goods. 
England will never be satisfied until the people of Jerusalem wear 
cotton turbans." 



CHAPTER VI 

The Congress of Berlin 



OBJECTS OF THE CONGRESS — TREATY OF SAN STEFANO REVISED 

DISTRIBUTION OF TERRITORY — ERECTION OF INDEPENDENT 

BALKAN STATES — BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CYPRUS 

— ^THE NEW ORIENTATION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MATURITY OF NATION-STATES — PLANS OF 

EXPANSION — THE EUROPEAN VIEWPOINT 



THUS after two years of repeated alarms England 
was not to go to war, and instead there was to be 
a Congress of the Powers, wherein the two principal pro- 
tagonists had in advance secretly arrived at an under- 
standing, and the other Powers were bound by interests, 
agreements, treaties, and conventions to pursue a prede- 
termined policy. The intriguing skill of the negotiator 
alone could turn the scale ; skill supported by ultimatums 
and threats of war. 

On opening the Congress at Berlin on June 13, 1878, 
Bismarck, addressing the assembly which included the 
diplomatic luminaries of the principal Powers, stated 
that the object in calling together the representatives of 
the Powers was to submit the work done at San Stefano 
to the free discussion of the governments signatory of 
the treaties of 1856 and 1871. 

Exactly one month later, July 13, the Congress finished 
its labors and closed its doors. Lord Beaconsfield re- 
turned to London, bringing back "peace with honor," 

I295] 



296 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

which included the approval of the Powers of the occupa- 
tion of Cyprus for good measure. The dismemberment 
of Turkey had been prevented. The authority of the 
Sultan in Europe still extended over 60,000 square miles 
and a population of 6,000,000 inhabitants, not including 
Bosnia and Bulgaria, which remained tributary to the 
Porte. Turkey remained the gate-keeper of the Straits, 
and thus the status quo was maintained. Russia, though 
she had to give up her plans for a great Bulgar State 
under her suzerainty, did not leave Berlin empty-handed. 
Batum, Kars, Ardahan, and adjoining territory were 
definitely ceded to her. Rumania was compelled to cede 
Bessarabia to Russia, and in return Rumanian inde- 
pendence was acknowledged and the Dobrudja added to 
the new kingdom. Serbia and Montenegro were de- 
clared independent, though the former was landlocked, 
and the latter only received one port on the Adriatic. A 
small, semi-independent Bulgar State was carved out of 
the territory in the heart of the Balkans; while Southern 
Bulgaria under the name of Eastern Roumelia remained 
under Turkish rule, with special administrative autonomy. 
Greece received merely incidental consideration. The 
question of Crete and the Greek Islands was not raised, 
and only a rectification of the frontiers in Thessaly and 
Epirus was conceded. Nor was Austria forgotten. It 
was Beaconsfield who proposed officially that Austria 
should occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bismarck at 
once seconded the proposal, and thus it was arranged 
without giving ear to Turkish protests. Throughout the 
proceedings France had played a secondary part, yet it 
seemed only natural that as favors were being distributed 
wholesale some token should be given to her as a mark 
of courteous or at least condescending approval of her 
self-effacing attitude. The protection of the Roman 



THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 297 

Catholics in the Ottoman Empire, and a recognition of 
France's especial interest in their welfare, principally in 
the "important region of Syria," was officially conceded, 
which earmarked that region in the minds of the French 
as their share when the real partition of Turkey should 
take place; while, as a balm for French indignation at 
the announcement made during the closing days of the 
Congress of the permanent occupation of Cyprus by Eng- 
land, Lord Beaconsfield suggested to France that she 
could have a free hand in Tunis. 

Bismarck also urged France to take advantage of this 
opportunity to occupy Tunis, anxious to divert French in- 
terest from the Rhine and engage her reawakened vigor 
in colonial enterprise. For Germany he requested no ma- 
terial compensation. The Iron Chancellor took a broader 
view of the needs and aims of the Empire than could 
be measured by territorial compensation. Though out- 
wardly disinterested in distant territorial aggrandisement, 
Germany had become the deus ex machina in world affairs. 
Russia had been humiliated, and her advance checked 
in the Balkans. Her attention was again directed to- 
wards Asia. Austria henceforth was to look south, and 
began the march on Salonika under the vigilant eye of 
Berlin, leaving Prussia the undisputed master in Germany. 
France was about to engage in an African enterprise 
which was to arouse the animosity of the Italians, who 
for a long period had been led to believe that Tunis was 
their special field of expansion. As the Italians were 
practically the only ones to come away empty-handed from 
the Berlin Congress, Bismarck rightly judged that they 
would feel a lasting resentment towards France, who was 
about to step in and seize their Tunisian prize. He 
further foresaw that an inevitable misunderstanding 
would arise between France and England over Egypt, 



298 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

and he pressed England to pursue a bold policy there. 
Though at the time of the Congress England refrained, it 
was only a very brief period before French interests were 
overridden, and difficulties arose which served Germany 
by enfeebling and isolating France, and gave Bismarck 
the opportunity of again playing the part of arbiter in 
the dispute which he knew how to exploit to good advan- 
tage. England, though feeling herself strong and aggres- 
sive, looked to Berlin in a spirit of friendly cooperation 
and frankly acknowledged that a good understanding with 
Germany was the soundest policy for her to pursue. 

Germany came out of the Congress of Berlin the 
ascendant State in Europe ; Austria, and in her wake Italy, 
entered directly in her orbit. England was friendly, and 
France, though isolated, apparently not ungrateful. Rus- 
sia alone had been alienated, but not only did Bismarck 
count on England to hold Russia at bay, as she had done 
so successfully during recent years, but he did not re- 
ject friendly overtures from the St. Petersburg Govern- 
ment, in spite of his avowed preference for an Austrian 
alliance. 



II 

At the time of the Berlin Congress the Nation-States 
of Europe had reached their maturity. Each of the 
Powers had outlined for itself a definite policy of expan- 
sion. Here we find the genesis of the historical develop- 
ment of the ensuing generation. Here the balance of 
power which had been upset by the rise of Germany was 
slowly coming into equilibrium. Here the Triple Alliance 
germinated. Here the seeds of the Franco-Russian Alli- 
ance and the Triple Entente were sown. Here the future 



THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 299 

conflict for world supremacy between England and Ger- 
many may be foreshadowed. 

The European States had found themselves discussing 
the destiny of peoples, the distribution of territory, no 
longer with reference to nationality, but as spheres of 
influence, as areas for penetration. The principle of na- 
tionality upon which the Nation-State had been built was 
apparently henceforth to be abandoned, except in so far as 
it served as a rallying cry for the Powers to promote their 
internal unity, to strengthen the cohesive solidarity of the 
State for the purpose of expansion. Racial and national 
homogeneity expressed in terms of patriotism was made 
use of to combat the growing social objectivity of the ris- 
ing Proletariat, who looked beyond national boundaries, 
and was breaking down the barriers which isolated the 
various States. Furthermore, the principle of a Euro- 
pean policy ^ was enunciated and firmly established by 
the Congress, which bound the Great Powers to adopt 
a European viewpoint, and was to lead to the formation 
of two groups of States, within one of which at least only 
a relative freedom of action was retained by the minor 
partners. 

The world had become a field for exploitation and con- 
quest. England had led the way, and Beaconsfield had 
given to the European statesmen their first lessons in im- 
perialism, had outlined how imperial enterprise may be 
pursued, how interests may be made use of and exploited, 
how a bold policy of intimidation and threats of war 
may be taken advantage of without actually going to war. 
The Congress had brought the Powers into close contact, 

' See the reply made by Count Andrassy, the Austrian representative, 
to the Italian delegate, who had presumed to address an inquiry re- 
garding the policy of Austria in occupying Bosnia: "Monsieur le pleni- 
potentiaire d'ltalie, dit-il, I'Aurtiche en occupant la Bosnie se place au 
point de vue europeen." 



300 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

and laid before them the fate of the world as clay for 
their moulding. The vast African continent was still 
relatively unoccupied. Great areas of Asia and Austral- 
asia, undefended by their inhabitants, who had not entered 
upon the stage of modern historical development or con- 
ceived of the State as Power, still remained to be oc- 
cupied, or at least dominated. The State had broken 
through its narrow national limits. The State as Power 
was making ready to strive for world power. The Ger- 
man people were soon to feel themselves destined to be- 
come the leaders of this new imperialism. 



CHAPTER VII 

The State as Power 

bismarckian doctrines — relation to marxism — the inter- 
pretation of treitschke objective concept of power 

church and state berlin and the vatican the 

significance of the kulturkampf — social problems 

— Bismarck's programme of social welfare — 

Disraeli's attitude — England and Germany 



AT the beginning of a new phase of historical evolu- 
tion, when a new ideology is struggling for recog- 
nition, an era of adulation of power, a Gewaltsepoch, 
often ushers in the new orientation of historical develop- 
ment. Force is relied upon during periods of uncertainty. 
Might is the only accepted basis of right when new ethical 
standards, new moral convictions, are in the early forma- 
tive stages. The sword is held a more real source of 
strength at a time of spiritual decadence than any social 
code.^ Man in this confused state loses his moral bear- 
ings, and relies on the weapon immediately at hand, a 
power of his own creating which it is hoped may afford 
tangible protection. This was especially true of the great 
transition from individualist to social standards, which 
began to define itself with much precision after 1878. 

It was upon the foundation of middle class, subjective 
individualism that national States had arisen. By Bis- 
marck national spirit had been moulded into a racial 

^ As Renan has so well remarked : "On meurt pour des opinions no 
pour des certitudes; pour ce qu'on croit et non pour ce qu'on suit. 

[301] 



? 



302 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

egotism, fanatically cultivated as a source of social power, 
which had led to Prussian ascendancy in the new Ger- 
man Empire, and to German ascendancy in Europe. He 
had adopted the Hegelian principle of "blood and iron" 
and made skilful use of the Hegelian doctrine that his- 
torical development is the result of reaction against pre- 
vailing practice : the identical doctrine of growth by an- 
tagonism which Karl Marx had adopted in developing 
his theory of historical materialism. 

If we examine closely the realism of Bismarck's policy, 
the ruthless contempt he displayed for accepted political 
practice, whether in home or foreign affairs, the avowed 
materialism of his philosophy, his distinct opportunism, 
his adulation of violence, we will find numerous points of 
contact and analogy with that of Marx. Though a super- 
/ ficial reading of history may apparently refute this thesis, 
/ yet a more profound examination will reveal that Bis- 
marck and Marx, standing as they did at the antipodes 
\ of the new social movement, were endowed with the same 
'characteristics of social objectivity of viewpoint, which; 
affirms their relationship. Bismarck havln-g in his posses- 
sion the weapons of power was able to promote social 
development by the steadier methods of evolution. Marx 
having to forge his weapons could only preach revolution. 
The Communist Manifesto of 1848, drawn up in a 
spirit of violent class Interest, based on the dictatorship 
of the Proletariat, is in many respects Identical with Bis- 
marcklan principles of the national interest of the State, 
enforced by the dictatorial power of government. Ac- 
cording to Marx, the Proletariat — the class — could brook 
no opposition; according to Bismarck, the Nation-State — 
the government — could tolerate no competition of author- 
ity within its boundaries. No consideration, no matter 



THE STATE AS POWER 303 

of what nature, whether ethically or morally sanctioned, 
could be permitted to stand in the path of the develop- 
ment of the State as power, could be allowed to divert 
the individual from his allegiance to the government of 
the State. ^ Here we may discern the basis of Bismarck's 
political practice, a radical breaking away from the old 
ideals of Statehood, and trace the influence of the resur- 
rection of Machiavellian political theory, of Machtpolitik, 
which Treitschke openly glorified and proclaimed Bis- 
marckian. 

It is to Treitschke that we must turn in order to dis- 
cover the difference between Bismarck's practice and 
Machiavellian theory: "Not that he (Machiavelli) is al- 
together indifferent to the means of power which are re- 
pugnant to us, but that to him everything depends upon 
how the greatest power may be acquired and retained, 
though this power in itself has no value ; that power 
once acquired must justify itself, that it must be used 
for the greatest good to mankind — of this in his work 
we find no trace." ^ 

To Bismarck the State was not an end in itself. It 
was power as an omnipotent social force, concentrated 
in the hands of Government : not irresponsible power, 
merely for power's sake, the Machiavellian concept, 
adapted by middle class practice purely subjectively, but 
rather unlimited power for the purpose of promoting 
public welfare. In the acquisition of power the State may 
be unscrupulous, but in its use of power it must promote 

* In the words of Disraeli: "The divine right of kings has been prop- 
erly discarded, but an intelligent age will never discard the divine 
right of government." And again, in the general preface to the edition 
of his novels in 1870: "The divine right of kings may have been a plea 
of feeble tyrants, but the divine right of government is the keystone of 
human progress." 

* Treitschke, Politics, Book I, p. 91. 



304 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

the cultural development of its people. Thus Bismarck 
in his Memoirs could with a feeling of self-righteousness 
set down : 

"The duration of all treaties between great States is a 
conditional one as soon as the question of the 'struggle for 
survival' comes into question. No great State should 
ever be compelled to sacrifice its existence on the altar of 
faithful adherence to its treaty agreements, when it is 
compelled to choose between the two." ^ 

Yet there is a wide gap between this distinctly social 
conception of the disregard of treaty obligations, and the 
favorite individualist maxim of Frederick the Great: 
^'S'il yah gagner a etre honnete, nous le serous, s'il faut 
duper soyons fourbes." In Bismarck's interpretation we 
can perceive the objective concept of power which sacri- 
fices not merely all ethical and moral practice, but its prin- 
ciples as well to a blind subservience to what it believes to 
be the good of the State. It never seems to have occurred 
to the advocates of the new political practice that the State 
is a limited portion of humanity, or that the policy of sole 
reliance on power, on might, on intimidation, would 
arouse a reaction, and lead to competition for power. The 
subservience of public policy to armed force, and the 
measuring of the ascendancy of a State in terms of 
armaments led to the neglect of all broader psychological 
and sociological considerations. 

To Bismarck and to the leading statesmen in all of the 
great States in the West after him, the State as Power 
seemed its sole destiny. The materialist temper of the 
preceding epoch, the emphasis on scientific analysis, the 
pessimism which had gained so wide an acceptance, and 
above all the ruthless competitive methods of industrial 

^ Gedanken und Errinerungen, Vol. II, p. 49. 



THE STATE AS POWER 305 

and commercial enterprise, had heightened man's re- 
liance on naked power. To the individual engaged in 
economic enterprise, wealth and the power it afforded 
were essentially non-social and as such divested of all so- 
cial obligations. To the State, power as a politico-eco- 
nomic factor was beginning to acquire certain still ill- 
defined social characteristics. But the State so conceived 
remained exclusive, and, flushed with the success it had 
achieved in moulding national consciousness, refused to 
tolerate any alien domination which might by diverting 
the individual from his allegiance to the State stand 
in the path of the fullest development of its power. 
This was the principle upon which Bismarck, acted in his 
long struggle with the Church of Rome.^ 



II 

To understand the true nature of the Kulturkampf it 
must be recalled that even the Papacy had not remained 
uninfluenced by the cult of power which had permeated 
the spiritual as well as the secular affairs of the epoch. 
Pius IX in his Encyclical and Syllabus issued December 8, 
1864, had reasserted in unequivocal terms that the 
Church and the Pope are anointed by God with supreme 
power, which recognises no limits and no bounds, and Is 
above all secular authority. In June 1868 he had con- 
voked the Council which was to pronounce upon the ques- 
tion of Papal infallibility. The Council assembled at the 
Vatican In December 1869. It represented the entire 
Catholic world, and after concluding its session solemnly 

^Bismarck ivar der verkbrperte Geist der vom Sittengesetz gelosten 
Staatsraison; er brachte ihr ganzes Wesen an den Tag, er nahm 
sich griindlich Ernst, loahrend die andern mit ihr nur spielten. — Fr. W. 
Foerster, Politische Ethik u. Politische Pddagogik, p. 219. 



3o6 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

proclaimed in the name of its 400,000,000 followers the 
infallibility of the Pope (July 18, 1870). The next day 
Catholic France declared war on Protestant Germany. 
Within three months German ascendancy in Europe was 
assured, and the temporal power of the Papacy came to 
an end (September 20, 1870).^ 

Bismarck was no narrow-minded evangelical sectarian. 
It has been said of him that his religious faith was at 
the service of his policy. At first he maintained a neutral 
attitude, which he abandoned only when he felt that the 
Church was encroaching upon the domain of the State. 
Throughout the struggle with Papal authority he kept 
constantly in view the immediate phases of the conflict, 

* It is historically significant that at the time when the temporal power 
of the Papacy came to an end the Pope should have been aljle to affirm 
his ascendancy over Catholicism, and be accredited with "complete and 
supreme jurisdictionary authority over the whole Church, not simply in 
matters of faith and morality, but also in matters touching the discipline 
and governance of the Church; and this authority is a regular and im- 
mediate authority extending over each and every Church and over each 
and every Pastor and believer" and that "the Roman Pontiff when he 
speaks ex cathedra ... is endowed with that infallibility which accord- 
ing to the will of the Redeemer, is vouchsafed to the Church when she 
desires to fix a doctrine of faith or morality; and that consequently all 
such decisions of the Roman Pontiff are per se immutable and independent 
of the subsequent assent of the Church." — Cf. C. Mirbt, Quellen zur 
Geschichte des Papstums, p. 370 et seq. Here we have the thesis of in- 
fallibility as set forth by the Vatican Council, defining the authority of 
the Pope and extending his jurisdiction over all Catholics to the ends of 
the earth. Its acceptance meant that the power was conceded to the 
Pope at any time, in any diocese, to exercise the functions of the regular 
bishop and that the clergy was shorn of its independent nationalist char- 
acter which it had so long and tediously labored to build up. It meant 
that the Church Universal, according to the newly promulgated doctrine, 
was to supersede the older idea of diocesan independence which may be 
correlated to the idea of nationalism. As such the edicts of the Vatican 
council may be looked upon as one more indication of the decay of the 
nationalist principle and a confirmation of the thesis regarding the break- 
down of the old order and the rise of the new super-national ideology. 
As was to be expected, the enunciation of the new doctrine was attended 
by important political results, not merely in Germany: Austria imme- 
diately (July 30, 1870) annulled the Concordat of 1855. France later 
revoked its Concordat of i8oi, and finally carried through the complete 
separation of Church and State. 



THE STATE AS POWER 307 

and their consequences on the political influence of the 
State. 

A strong Catholic party had been formed in Germany, 
which was well represented in the Reichstag under the 
most forceful Parliamentary leader in the Empire, Wind- 
thorst. Bismarck was not to be deterred by obstacles. To 
him the Vatican, armed with its new dogma of infallibility, 
was in possession of a weapon which, if it were permitted 
to use it, would endow the Church with power infinitely 
greater than that of the State. 

By 1872 the conflict between Berlin and Rome was 
openly declared. Bismarck took the first step and by the 
law of July 4, 1872, pronounced the dissolution of the 
Jesuit organisations in Prussia. Rome retaliated by re- 
fusing to receive a Prussian envoy to be accredited to 
the Vatican. 

Bismarck emphasised the political nature of the 
struggle. "It is," he declared in the Prussian Herren- 
haus in supporting his policy in a speech delivered on 
March 10, 1873, "the old struggle for power, as old as 
the human race, between priesthood and royalty. A 
struggle for power which was old when our Saviour came 
into this world. It is the struggle for power which Aga- 
memnon had to wage against the prophets in Aulis which 
cost him the life of his daughter, and prevented the 
Greeks from setting sail; it is the struggle for power, 
which under the name of the war between the Popes 
and the Emperors, filled the pages of German history 
during the Middle Ages up to the time of the downfall 
of the German Empire." 

The struggle with the Vatican was now carried on in 
the open. The laws by which Bismarck proposed to 
break the power of the Roman Church in Prussia were 



3o8 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

enacted. They conferred upon the State the right to ap- 
point and instruct the clergy; limited the number of their 
ministrants who, according to the new law, were to be of 
German nationality, dependent in the first instance di- 
rectly upon the State and not upon Rome; and finally 
the right of all German subjects to change their religion 
at will was recognised. 

Pope Pius IX protested against these rigorous meas- 
ures, taken, he alleged, to "discredit the religion of 
Christ." But Bismarck was not satisfied. It was a strug- 
gle for power, and the State as representing sovereign 
power could brook no rival. The laws proposed were 
stringently enforced. Recalcitrant cardinals, bishops, 
and other high prelates were prevented from exercising 
their functions, and some even suffered imprisonment. 
Bismarck stigmatised their conduct as revolutionary and 
justified his harsh measures by the need of State. All 
Germany was in a turmoil. The Kulturkampf had en- 
listed its partisans and opponents among all classes. 

The Pope in turn urged the German bishops to stouter 
resistance. Bismarck saw to it that new laws were en- 
acted (1875) to control their revenues, in order to sub- 
ject Catholic sees to more complete dependence upon the 
State. The situation remained unchanged. Bishops, 
priests, and laymen were imprisoned for violation of the 
new laws, but without effect. For five years the Kultur- 
kampf dominated the internal policy of Prussia and the 
Empire. The Catholic sees of Prussia had been dis- 
rupted; their titulars were in exile or in prison. Four 
hundred parishes were without priests, and still Rome 
preached resistance. Bismarck seemed discouraged. He 
even appeared willing to temporise. But Pius IX refused 
to yield and his death (February 7, 1878) alone afforded 
an opportunity for compromise. Another decade was to 



THE STATE AS POWER 309 

elapse before the conflict came to an end. Long before 
this Bismarck changed his attitude. He had feared the 
rise of the power of the Catholic Church in the new 
State. When he realised that his policy towards it did 
not afford the desired results, but stiffened its resistance 
and increased its prestige, he grasped at the first op- 
portunity offered by the accession of a new Pope to effect 
a compromise, which led to a reconciliation and the repeal 
of the laws of 1874 and 1875, Bismarck did not enter 
upon the struggle with Rome for any high motives of 
freeing the German people from subservience to the 
Papacy. Nor is it to be believed that he foresaw the 
nature of the resistance which the Vatican would inspire. 
But once committed to the policy he persisted in it until 
the first favorable opportunity for its reversal was offered. 
It need excite no surprise that we find him soon thereafter 
compacting a close and friendly understanding with his 
bitter foes of yesterday. 

Such was the opportunist nature of the realism of Bis- 
marck in the throes of failure. It reveals that he had no 
far-sighted, permanent constructive policy; he contended 
for no ideals, whether political or social, but made their 
formulas serve his practical programmes which he dis- 
carded when they no longer paid an immediate return. 



Ill 

It Is more than mere coincidence that the two initiators 
of the imperialist movement who first definitely com- 
mitted their governments to the policy of imperial enter- 
prise should have been the first to give greatest consid- 
eration to questions of social reform. Bismarck, in spite 



3IO THE TREND OF HISTORY 

of his horror of socialism as an organism independent 
of the government, nevertheless realised that his imperial 
designs could only be carried out in close collaboration 
with the masses. As early as 1863 we find him organising 
a commission to inquire into labor problems, to report 
on working conditions and the relations between em- 
ployers and employees. He himself had been in personal 
contact with Lasalle and other socialist leaders in an 
effort to arrive at a clear understanding of the exact needs 
of the working classes. Though the execution of his 
plans was delayed for nearly two decades, he had come 
to the conclusion that the State owes the same protection 
to the workers as it does to the capitalists. As for the 
benefit of the latter, the State undertakes to build rail- 
ways and canals, and affords shipping facilities, protection 
of interests abroad and customs tariff regulations, so the 
former must be protected by affording them adequate 
wages, decrease in the burden of taxation, and, more im- 
portant still, a complete system of State aid, insurance 
and pensions for their aged and sick must be arranged for. 
It was the duty of the State according to Bismarck to pre- 
vent the worker from worrying about his old age or from 
falling into distress as a result of unforeseen circum- 
stances. Bismarck asserted that it was not only the duty, 
but the exclusive right of the State to protect and promote 
the welfare of its workers and succor its indigent. He 
energetically repudiated the efforts of the Socialists to 
intervene in behalf of the Proletariat. The Socialists 
were to him particularly opprobrious.^ He seized every 
opportunity to suppress their organisation. For a time he 

* "They are like the veiled prophet of Thomas More, who carefully 
hid his face, for as soon as the veil was lifted his face appeared to the 
people in all its terrible hideousness. If our laboring classes saw the 
face of Mokana they would shriek in horror as they would look upon 
the face of a corpse." — Cf. Bismarck's speech in the Reichstag October 9, 
1878. 



THE STATE AS POWER 311 

succeeded in driving them out of Germany, though he 
failed to check, their rapid growth even by his extensive 
legislation of social reform, imposed by the Government 
and not in response to popular demand. Bismarck had 
embarked upon vast schemes of State Socialism, the exe- 
cution of which extended over many years, and though 
they were in essence patterned on a paternalistic sys- 
tem in which the omnipotent State conferred benefits, 
yet they afford further proof of his social sensibility, 
which has already been referred to. 

Disraeli undertook to attack the question of social 
reform in a more opportunist spirit. He believed that 
social improvement was desired by the people. The 
first two Labor members to be returned to Parliament in 
England took their seats in 1874. Disraeli had made it 
his especial care to feel the pulse of the nation, to keep 
a close watch for any symptoms which might give him a 
cue for a new policy, and then to strike out boldly, con- 
fident of support. "In legislation," he wrote in the 
autumn of 1874, "it is not merely reason and propriety 
which are to be considered but the temper of the time." ^ 
He now (1875) entered energetically upon plans for im- 
proving the condition of the people. Far less elaborate 
and complex in his schemes than Bismarck, Disraeli in- 
troduced very practical proposals for social legislation. 
He was ready to cooperate with labor representatives 
in regard to housing problems and savings banks, and 
above all the regulation of the vexed question of "master 
and man." The two laws passed in reference to this 
latter question were declared to be "the charter of the 
social and industrial liberty of the wage-earning classes." 
No branch of "social sanitation" as Disraeli was wont to 
call it was left unimproved, and the foundations were 

*Cf. G. E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Vol. V, p. 359. 



312 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

laid at this time upon which all subsequent programmes of 
social reform in England were carried out. 

In Disraeli's attitude towards social problems we may 
discover, though from another viewpoint than that of 
Bismarck, this same new spirit of social sensibility which 
contrasts so sharply with the typical middle class in- 
dividualist policy hitherto prevalent. This serves to 
explain the tenacious opposition of the Middle Class to 
his programme. It marks off the new departure in public 
policy which was to be extended beyond the realm of 
home affairs. The intuitive insight into the future role of 
the State which Disraeli conceived in a social sense, and 
which he impressed on his Government and the party 
which he led, has been strikingly summed up by one of 
his younger associates. Sir John Eldon Gorst: 

"The principle of Tory democracy is that all govern- 
ment exists solely for the good of the governed; that 
Church and King, Lords and Commons, and all other 
public institutions are to be maintained so far, and so far 
only, as they promote the happiness and welfare of the 
common people; that all who are entrusted with any 
public function are trustees, not for their own class, but 
for the nation at large; and that the mass of the people 
may be trusted so to use electoral power, which should 
be freely conceded to them, as to support those who are 
promoting their interests. It is democratic because the 
welfare of the people is its supreme end; it is Tory be- 
cause the institutions of the country are the means by 
which the end is to be attained." ^ 

Disraeli had extended the basis of government and 
sought as Bismarck was doing to bring within the sphere 
of its influence the masses who had hitherto felt them- 
selves not merely exploited by the Middle Class, but 
neglected by the State. He now proposed to affirm the 

*Cf. G. E. Buckle, op. cit,, Vol, V, p. 369. 



THE STATE AS POWER 313 

claim of England to a major share in the regulation of 
world affairs which the wealth of the country, its vast 
colonial empire, its naval supremacy, and its awaken- 
ing social solidarity seemed to justify. Disraeli has often 
been lauded for his imaginative grasp of imperial policy, 
his vision in appreciating the imperial needs of greater 
Britain. It would, however, appear useful in an effort to 
determine the more precise nature of his historical signifi- 
cance to reflect upon the close parallel between his and 
Bismarckian methods, his use of bellicose tactics in 
achieving in the international field, outside of Europe, 
what Bismarck had accomplished on the Continent. Dis- 
raeli up to the time of his fall from power (1879) ^^ 
imitating Bismarck was influenced by similar social mo- 
tives, carrying out on a much larger scale with infinitely 
more varied resources a very similar policy. As a process 
of historical evolution in creating a super-national point 
of view, and hastening the destruction of the Nation-State, 
German hegemony in Europe was to be correlated by 
English hegemony in other fields, until such a time as the 
Germans might feel strong enough to seek to supplant 
England and become masters of the world. The race for 
world supremacy had begun. 



CHAPTER VIII 

International Politics 



RESULTS OF THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN — CRISIS IN EGYPT — BRIT- 
ISH OCCUPATION A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER THE AFGHAN 

WAR RUSSO-GERMAN TENSION THE BALKANS AGAIN 

AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE ENGLAND AND THE ALLI- 
ANCE THE TEMPER OF THE TIMES^ THE PASSING OF 

PESSIMISM — THE SUPER-MAN AND THE SUPER-STATE 
— TUNIS — FRANCO-ITALIAN RIVALRY — AN IMPE- 
RIALIST COMEDY — THE FRENCH IN TUNIS 



THE Congress of Berlin had during the brief month 
of its labors undertaken to settle all pending ques- 
tions which might be the cause of friction, to refashion 
the map of the Near East, and so put an end to the 
menace of a general European war. But in point of fact 
the settlement arrived at was unsatisfactory to all imme- 
diately concerned. None of the newly created Balkan 
States were satisfied with the treatment they had re- 
ceived. Rumania was irritated at having to cede Bes- 
sarabia to Russia. Bulgaria had been cut in two — "half 
slave and half free." The Greeks were up in arms at 
the shabby treatment they had received and were mak- 
ing ready to wage war to vindicate what they believed 
to be their rights. Montenegro was vociferously de- 
manding that justice be done. In the Dual Monarchy the 
Hungarians viewed with suspicion the annexation of Slav 
territory which would increase the Slav element in the 
State. Russia felt that she had been deprived of the 

[314] 



INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 315 

fruits of her victory, and grudgingly carried out her share 
of the treaty clauses ; while Turkey refused to help in 
the settlement of minor matters, which would have ren- 
dered peaceful solutions easier. 

In Egypt a crisis had arisen. The Anglo-French sys- 
tem of dual control had become irksome to the Khedive, 
and he was anxious to be rid of it. The situation was 
difficult, as neither France nor England cared to take the 
initiative which might precipitate a conflict. Bismarck 
seized the opportunity to play the part of pacificator, and 
suggested as a way out that the Porte as overlord re- 
move the Khedive from his throne. This measure was 
taken, and so matters were settled (June 1879). Here 
Berlin again played a principal part in the mediation. 

At this time England alone of the Powers seemed 
ready to press her plans of imperial expansion. In order 
to forestall Russia, a vigorous aggressive policy to se- 
cure a "scientific frontier" for northwest India was 
brought to a "happy" conclusion. Though it led to a war 
with Afghanistan, in the end British suzerainty over the 
country was acknowledged. In South Africa England 
consolidated her hold over the recently annexed Trans- 
vaal, and found herself with a war against the Zulus on 
her hands, which after initial disasters led to pacification 
and penetration which were to become a usual method of 
imperial progress. 

By the summer of 1879 the international situation had 
again become tense. During the Berlin Congress Bis- 
marck had more than once displayed his anti-Russian sen- 
timents. Nevertheless, Russia did not give up her at- 
tempts to bolster up the German alliance. While not 
refusing these advances, the Berlin Government had made 
it clear that in case of a conflict between her two allies, 
Germany would unhesitatingly support Austria. The 



3i6 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

unsatisfactory progress in the settlement of pending ques- 
tions in the Balkans, where Russia found herself isolated 
by the alleged solidarity of the representatives of the 
other Powers engaged in adjusting the various claims, 
had, according to Bismarck, led the Tsar in a letter to 
the German Emperor to threaten that "if Germany per- 
sists in the refusal to adopt (in the affairs in the Balkans) 
the Russian viewpoint, peace cannot continue between 
us." 

The German Chancellor deemed the moment oppor- 
tune to enter into a closer alliance with Austria. He also 
sounded the British Government with a view to securing 
its adherence, in order to be prepared for any eventuality. 
While the Chancellor was himself engaged in conducting 
negotiations with Austria and had brought them to a 
successful conclusion (September 1879), the German 
Ambassador at London was instructed to seek out Bea-% 
consfield and present to him a survey of the European 
situation, and to emphasise the fact that the relations 
between "Russia and Germany are in their nature essen- 
tially unsatisfactory. . . . Russia is preparing to attack 
Austria; the peace of the world will be disturbed; it is in 
the nature of things that it will not be a localised war; 
it will be a great and general war. Peace is necessary to 
Germany; no country desires or requires peace more. 
To secure it she proposes an alliance between Germany, 
Austria, and Great Britain." Lord Beaconsfield said 
that he had always been and still was favorable in public 
affairs to the principle of an alliance or good under- 
standing with Germany.^ 

Ten days later, on October 7, the Austro-German 
alliance was signed at Vienna. With England the nego- 

* See memorandum by Lord Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria, September 
27. 1879.— Cf. G. E. Buckle, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 488. 



INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 317 

tiations were carried no further. But on October 27, 
the Austrian Ambassador, under pledge of strictest 
secrecy, informed the British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Salisbury, that a defensive alliance, having as its object 
"the maintenance of the general peace and of the state of 
things established by the Berlin Treaty," had been entered 
upon with Germany. "The two Empires had agreed that 
for the minor matters which still remained to be executed 
by the Berlin Treaty (chiefly questions of delimitations), 
they would observe a most conciliatory attitude so long 
as Russia did the same, but if for any cause Russia were 
to attack either Empire, they have agreed to treat it as 
an attack on both of them." ^ Lord Salisbury expressed 
his approval of the arrangement and stated to the Aus- 
trian Ambassador that he hoped that "if in the lapse of 
years the Turkish Empire should fall, the difficult ques- 
tions arising out of that result would be settled only after 
an intimate consultation between the three Powers." 

England had apparently committed herself to a policy 
of cooperation with Austria and Germany, while retain- 
ing her liberty of action and reserving for herself a share 
of the spoils of Turkey in the future, at the same time 
championing its integrity for the present. 

But the London Government had gone too far ahead 
of the public opinion of the nation, Beaconsfield's im- 
perialism had developed too rapidly. He had lost touch 
with public sentiment. Middle class egotism was still too 
strong. Judged by middle class standards, Beaconsfield's 
policy had been morally wrong. The State as Power, 
divorced from morality, as expressed in the new orienta- 
tion of foreign policy which had received its sanction at 
the Berlin Congress, found no justification in the eyes of 

^Memorandum by Lord Salisbury to Queen Victoria, October 37, 1879. 
G. E. Buckle, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 491. 



3i8 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

the strongly individualist majority to whom the breaking 
down of the barriers of national exclusiveness, even in 
the defence of national interests, seemed unjustifiable. In 
spite of the ascendant position in world affairs which 
Beaconsfield had secured for England, in spite of the ac- 
quisition of new territory and the security afforded to the 
lines of communications by the control of the Suez Canal, 
Cyprus, and the foothold in Egypt, his Government 
was badly defeated at the general elections (March 
1880). The Liberals under Gladstone were returned to 
office. They attempted, though in vain, to reestablish 
the old middle class policy of exclusiveness and disin- 
terestedness in foreign affairs. 



II 

The passing of Lord Beaconsfield had no material in- 
fluence on historical development. His picturesque figure 
disappeared, leaving no void. For his political philoso- 
phy, in so far as he had any, rested on a vaguely realised 
theory of State, arrived at with the intuitive vision of the 
artist rather than with the logic of the politician. This 
explains the part he played in loosing England from the 
bonds of the personalised State. By initiating the policy 
of imperialism and recognising the social obligations of 
the State, the way for the super-national, impersonal 
State was paved. "What wonderful things are events; 
the least are of greater importance than the most sub- 
lime and comprehensive speculation." ^ Here we have in 
Disraeli's own words an interpretation of the political 
conduct of the epoch. Detached from theory, oblivious 

* Cf. Coningsby. 



INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 319 

of principle, public policy was coming to be determined 
by events and the contingencies arising therefrom. 

Such was the temper of the times. Bearing this in mind 
we may trace historically the course of events, and note 
the rise of the new politico-economic theory of State, 
veiled and incoherent though it appeared even to its chief 
exponents, except as traceable as a symptomatic, social 
sensibility to which attention has been called. Here we 
may find confirmation, if such confirmation is needed, 
that the old politico-juridic theory of State had definitively 
broken down, and that the new had not yet been formu- 
lated with sufficient precision to be comprehensible. It is 
thus in the interpretation of events that we must seek to 
discover the factors of the new political doctrine. 

The Impetus given to imperialism, the assaults upon 
particularism, the centralisation of authority, the mech- 
anisation of government, appear as destructive agencies 
of the limited, personalised Nation-State. The era which 
opened was one of unconscious demolition manifested as 
conscious construction. The practice of the period was 
destroying the theory upon which the fabric of the State 
had been built. Whether we have here the secret of 
evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary change is be- 
yond our Inquiry. But it Is necessary to bear in mind 
that the men who directed public affairs had lost all 
contact with the philosophic background of politics, had 
detached themselves from principle, had abandoned 
theory, and were navigating the State by the stars of 
their destiny like a ship without a compass. 

The days of pessimism were passing; a new expansive 
optimism was about to seize hold of mankind. The time 
of the Super-Man and the Super-State had arrived. Dur- 
ing the decade (i 870-1 880) which had come to a close all 
of the great European States with the exception of France 



320 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

had increased their prestige and power and acquired new 
territory. By 1880 even France had recovered sufficient 
strength to be in a position to reassert herself in Euro- 
pean affairs. The mirage of a colonial empire was grow- 
ing. England in more remote parts of the earth was daily 
increasing her holdings, staking out new claims, pros- 
pecting new fields of expansion. It was now the turn of 
France to put to profit the lessons of the new imperialism. 
At the Congress of Berlin Bismarck had suggested 
Tunis as the field for this exploit. But even now the 
French Government was loth to commit itself to this un- 
dertaking. A case had to be made out to render the plan 
feasible. This was not difficult. There was Italy, She 
was known to have plans of her own in regard to Tunis. 
A large and prosperous Italian colony, the most im- 
portant element in the city of Tunis, had insistently urged 
the annexation of the country to Italy. By the end of 
1 88 1 Italy seemed ready to take this step. France, 
though unwilling or unable to measure herself with Eng- 
land or Germany, was not averse to testing her new 
strength with some other State. Here we have a key 
factor in imperial expansion; the State as Power, in com- 
petition for power. It may be mentioned incidentally, 
though it had no particular bearing on the plans of either 
France or Italy, that Tunis was a vassal of the Porte, 
ruled by its own Bey, and considered semi-independent. 

Unfamiliar with European financial methods, as was 
natural among a people who had remained outside the 
orbit of industrial expansion, Tunis in close intercourse 
with Europe had been compelled to accept foreign finan- 
cial advisers, while the competition for railway and other 
concessions within the country offered ample opportunity 
for political intrigue, in which the Italians and French 
competed. First the nationals of one and then of the 



INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 321 

other State would gain an advantage, as the Bey of Tunis 
endeavored to profit by the jealous competition of 
the two European States. Matters were brought to a 
head, according to French accounts, when the Italians 
secured control of the railway from La Goulette to Tunis 
(March 1881). France immediately protested and re- 
ceived concessions for her financiers to construct the line 
Tunis-Bizerte, and port privileges. The French Govern- 
ment deemed that the opportune moment had arrived to 
appear exasperated at the presumption of the Italians. 
Time for action had come. Italy must be forestalled; 
she must be confronted with a fait accompli. 

Some details of the methods pursued are of interest as 
throwing light on the new theory and practice of imperial 
enterprise. It must be borne in mind that Italy was the 
competitor and Tunis the spoil. Yet historians of the 
period gravely inform us that on March 31, Paris learned 
that a band of semi-civilised Tunisian mountaineers, 
Krumirs, had crossed the frontier into the French province 
of Constantine in the Algerian hinterland. Five French 
soldiers were killed and five wounded. The records of 
history give no details of the fate of the Krumir raiders, 
and are silent as to the countless similar raids by tribes- 
men who had not crossed frontiers. But here was a use- 
ful incident. The French Government immediately made 
representations to the Bey of Tunis, who according to 
French accounts declined to accept French proposals to 
pacify the Krumirs. On April 4 the French Premier, 
Jules Ferry, told the Chamber that France would see to 
it that such incidents would not be repeated. Credits 
were voted for an expeditionary force to be despatched 
to the scene. The Porte came to the rescue of its vassal 
and protested. But the stage was set. The imperialist 
comedy was not to be delayed. The principal spectators, 



322 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

Russia, Austria, Germany, had given repeated assurances 
of their approval, and promised not to stop the perform- 
ance. England had likewise urged France to go to Tunis 
and, in spite of the change of the government, was bound 
by this agreement. London even went so far as to under- 
take to "discourage" the Sultan from any plan he might 
have formed to assist Tunis. Italy stood alone. The 
march of events had been too rapid. She had been dazed 
by the meteoric suddenness of the French coup. An army 
of 23,000 men was sent from France, while native Alge- 
rian troops were concentrated along the Tunis frontier, 
which was crossed on April 24. The Krumirs were at- 
tacked in their strongholds, and scattered. But Tunis 
and its Bey, Sidi Saddok, were not lost sight of. A 
French squadron entered the harbor of Bizerte, and a 
corps of 8,000 troops was landed. The Bey had no or- 
ganised army. He was in no position to resist, even 
had he desired to do so. Flight or surrender was the 
alternative. Flight was unnecessary, surrender was easy, 
as the terms of the treaty proposed by the French left 
the Bey on his throne, under the aegis of France. So 
at 7 P.M. on the evening of May 12, 1881, "amid the 
tears and lamentations of the women of the seraglio, 
and the objurations of his entourage, who besought him 
to give in, Sidi Saddok, depressed, helpless, beaten with- 
out a fight, placed the Bey's seals on two copies of the 
treaty." ^ 

* Cf. Hanotaux, Histoire de la France Contemporaine, Vol, IV, p. 66i. 



CHAPTER IX 

The Triple Alliance 



THE CIVILISING MISSION OF THE STATE — THE NEW BASIS OF COM- 
PETITION TENDENCY TO COALITION POSITION OF ITALY 

FOUNDATION OF THE ALLIANCE — ITS HISTORICAL SIGNIF- 
ICANCE THE ROLE OF AUSTRIA AND OF ITALY ECO- 
NOMIC FACTORS PEACEFUL PENETRATION SUPERNA- 

TIONALISM POLITICS SUBSERVIENT TO ECONOMICS 

— SOCIAL BENEFITS — THE THEORY OF EXPLOITATION 



THUS France acquired Tunis. In the outline of its 
policy issued by the French Government it was set 
forth that, "for ourselves we gain absolute security for 
our great African colony. . . . Tunis gains all the bless- 
ings of our civilisation." Here is the new note of im- 
perialism. The conquered peoples, the annexed territory, 
are to receive the blessings of the "true civilisation," if 
need be, at the sword's point. 

The State has a civilising mission to perform, no longer 
merely within its own boundaries, in the form of social 
legislation and economic development of its own peoples; 
but these benefits, modified, attenuated, transformed to 
suit particular circumstances, are to be thrust upon alien 
peoples whose cultural background and philosophy of life 
might be and usually were altogether different. Here we 
find a first tentative application of the thesis that incom- 
petent peoples — that is, those incompetent in an industrial 
and commercial sense when measured by Western stand- 
ards — have no inalienable right to the possession of their 

[323] 



324 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

territory. Efficient exploitation was to be held a better 
test of right than mere possession. "The treasure of the 
lazy belongs to the active worker, capable of exploiting it; 
this is the law which rules our world." 

Henceforth in the course of super-national expansion 
the State was to arrogate to itself the right of sitting 
in judgment upon the fitness of a given alien people to its 
independent existence and the possession of its territory; 
while in competition with other great States it was to 
remain to the strongest to assert for itself the right 
to confer the imprint of its own cultural development, 
the benefits of its own civilisation, upon the less com- 
petent peoples, 

France in competition with Italy for Tunis had gained 
a facile triumph. The Italians had been outwitted; their 
diplomacy had been defective; their armed strength un- 
ready. The position of Italy in Europe was far from 
enviable. Bismarck had gone so far as to declare that 
he was delighted with the French occupation of Tunis and 
hoped that France "would annex Morocco." The Austro- 
German alliance had strengthened the bonds between 
these two countries, and the German Chancellor took 
pains to let it be known that if Austria should see fit to 
seek to regain its lost Italian provinces, Germany would 
not oppose such a plan, "as Italy is not among our 
friends." 

The end of the Kiilturkampf had brought about a rec- 
oncilatlon between Berlin and the Papacy, and the 
Roman question had again come to the fore. Bismarck 
appeared ready to support Papal pretensions, with the 
view to the reestablishment of the temporal power, and 
offered an asylum to the Pope in Germany should His 
Holiness deem it necessary to leave Rome. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 325 

Beaten by France, threatened by Austria, with Ger- 
many apparently hostile, the Italians turned first to Eng- 
land, but received here but scant consideration. Glad- 
stone had no desire to commit the country to any foreign 
entanglements, and England's position in the Mediterra- 
nean was at the time sufficiently secure not to require any 
support that Italy might be able to offer. 

On examining more closely Bismarck's policy, the Ital- 
ians found that in spite of his outward harshness towards 
them, the German Chancellor was not averse to includ- 
ing Italy among Germany's allies, or as he conceived it, 
her satellites. On the contrary, in point of fact, he ar- 
dently desired such a union, but he wished the request 
therefor to come from Italy. To Italy this seemed her 
only chance to consolidate her position in Europe. It 
would appear that the Italian Government had no clear 
conception of the ulterior motives of Germany. Further- 
more, Italy was in no position to be exacting, and ac- 
cepted with alacrity the suggestion made by Bismarck that 
any understanding with Germany must include a similar 
agreement with Austria. Within six months of the Tunis 
fiasco the King and Queen of Italy paid a visit of state to 
Vienna, and soon thereafter the representatives of Italy 
at Berlin and Vienna officially informed the Governments 
of the two Empires that Italy was anxious to enter upon 
a defensive alliance with them (December 1 88 1 ) . These 
proposals were not rejected, but the negotiations dragged 
on while Italy was repeatedly made to feel the inferiority 
of her position, and that her security and independence 
depended upon the will of Germany. Finally a secret 
treaty was drawn up and signed May 20, 1882., at Vienna 
between Germany, Italy, and the Dual Monarchy, which 
came to be known as the Triple Alliance. 



326 THE TREND OF HISTORY 



II 

To Bismarck, the founder of the Triple Alliance, it 
meant the revival of the Holy Roman Empire which, 
during its virile period from the loth to the 14th cen- 
tury had made Germany not merely the geographical, 
but the historico-political centre of Europe. The Empire 
had during a long series of decades maintained the gen- 
eral peace of Europe, and its decline marked the be- 
ginning of turmoil and chaos in the West. *'The origins 
of the Triple Alliance stretch back to mythical times. 
The ancient German imperial authority of the Holy 
Roman Empire extended from the North Sea to Apulia, 
and theoretically included all Italy. It is a peculiar dis- 
pensation of destiny and of divine Providence that this 
great and powerful realm of Central Europe, after it had 
been torn asunder by so many wars, should in our own 
day again have been reunited." ^ Nor is it so great an 
exaggeration to accept the view of Bismarck that the 
Triple Alliance under German leadership was in reality, 
as an historical factor, a restoration of the Holy Roman 
Empire. For it was more than a mere alliance. The 
great Central European allied State, stretching from the 
North Sea to the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, was in 
German eyes an extension of the boundaries of their Em- 
pire. For the policy of the Alliance, the Germans were 
confident, would in all cases be dictated by Berlin. The 
two Southern allies were from the outset made to feel 
that they occupied subsidiary positions. A broader and 
more loosely knit control was exercised over them by 
Germany than exercised by Prussia over the States of 
Germany proper, but their relation to Berlin was not dis- 

^Cf. address delivered by Bismarck, April, 1895. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 327 

similar. The Austrian ally was to be of more service 
than merely to keep Russia in check, and the increase of 
armaments and military efficiency, imposed upon the Ital- 
ians as a condition of alliance, was to mean more than a 
mere threat to France. For in serving to strengthen the 
defensive unity of the Central European group of States, 
the Alliance gave breadth, scope, and field for German 
economic expansion. 

As during the Middle Ages the Church had in the 
first instance served as the bond of union of the Holy 
Roman Empire, so now the great socialising forces of 
modern life, industry and commerce, were to serve as the 
unifying bond of Central Europe. Here is the basic 
feature of the Triple Alliance, which if cogently appre- 
ciated presents but one more link in the chain of evi- 
dence which we may accumulate in noting the breakdown 
of the personalised Nation-State. 

While England and France, acting under a similar im- 
pulse of economic expansion, were engaged in extending 
their dominions in Asia and Africa, Germany was pre- 
paring for a new type of imperial expansion nearer home. 
By the force of arms France had acquired Tunis, and 
England had occupied Egypt. These were the first of a 
long series of similar enterprises undertaken on the 
ground that the interest of the world demands the most 
efficient industrial and commercial exploitation of every 
part of the globe, and thus confers privileges and rights 
upon the exploiter, superior to those of mere posses- 
sion. Now Germany, by methods which came to be desig- 
nated as "peaceful penetration," was making ready to 
exploit Italy and the Dual Monarchy, and bind them inex- 
tricably to herself. Here was a new weapon of economic 
control, which was soon to prove the most powerful 
agency of political pressure which has been devised in 



328 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

modern times. Its use In this instance was deemed es- 
sential not only for the consolidation of the Triple Alli- 
ance — as history afforded so many examples of the anti- 
Ghibelline attitude of the Italians, who it was anticipated 
might again become restive — but also to give Germany 
an opportunity of putting into effect the new politico- 
economic thesis of the Super-State. 

The Triple Alliance, the vigorous revival, in fact if not 
in name, of the Holy Roman Empire, and the removal 
of its capital to Berlin, brought to a conclusion the proc- 
ess of German unity as Bismarck had conceived it. At 
the same time It marked the abandonment of the theory 
of nationalism as the basis of State building. Not that 
nationalism in the sense of race patriotism and race supe- 
riority had as yet died out. On the contrary. It was on 
the eve of bursting forth in a final flare of unparalleled 
intensity. But nationalism was no longer held a sound 
political theory. In this light the Triple Alliance as a 
super-national grouping is more easily understood. And 
though the Berlin Government never for a moment for- 
got what it held to be the economic, cultural, and racial 
superiority of the Germans over either of the polyglot 
peoples of Austria-Hungary or of Italy, for purposes of 
public policy, more especially in foreign affairs, it was 
to become customary to consider the Central Powers as 
a politically compact group of States — a Super-State. 

In tracing the deeper currents of historical develop- 
ment we will find that the Triple Alliance marks a distinct 
epoch. It has been customary to Interpret the Alliance 
as an artificial grouping of States, due merely to the dip- 
lomatic skill of a Bismarck in arraying Austria and Italy 
on the side of Germany to be prepared for an eventual 
war with Russia or France or both. This explanation Is 
in no wise adequate. The true interpretation of the 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 329 

Triple Alliance is to be sought not so much in the realm 
of higher politics, as in economics. The Triple Alliance 
was in the first instance — and this fact cannot be too in- 
sistently dwelt upon — an affair of "internal politics" to 
Germany. As the establishment of the Zollverein had 
marked the first definite step towards German unity, 
so now the Triple Alliance was to afford a foundation 
broad enough for the fuller development of the eco- 
nomic life of the new industrialised Germany, and pre- 
pare the way for the new imperial Super-State, the out- 
lines of which were at the time only vaguely apprehended. 
It was a phenomenon not confined to Germany that 
after 1880 politics had become definitely subservient 
to economics. The middle class theory of the Nation- 
State, with its more strictly interpreted politica-juridic 
code, based on compacts and contracts, was receiving 
blows under which it was staggering. The accepted 
doctrine of legal right of possession, of ownership, was 
being undermined by the new economic theories of the 
superior rights of exploitation which were being advanced 
in the form of political doctrine. The good of the world 
at large was constantly being invoked as conferring 
special privileges. The individualist viewpoint was 
being overridden by the appeal to general interest and 
general welfare. The rapacity of the methods used was 
to be atoned for by the social benefits gained. Thus 
England at this time occupied Egypt (July 1882), and 
the defenders of the British policy were careful to empha- 
sise the fact that this step was motived by the general in- 
terest of the world at large, and of Egypt in particular, 
whether the Egyptians desired it or not. Here was a 
more precise enunciation of the theory of exploitation, 
which Germany by her superior economic development 
and technical skill was making ready to put into practice. 



CHAPTER X 

The Super-State 



THE NEW ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE STATE BISMARCK AS MINISTER 

OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY PROTECTIVE TARIFFS MAR- 
KETS COMMUNICATIONS — THE REINSURANCE TREATY OF 

1884 — ITS ECONOMIC MOTIVES ARMED PEACE — COLONIAL 

EXPANSION FRANCE ENGLAND ITALY — GERMANY — 

LEOPOLD II OF BELGIUM — THE CONGO THE BERLIN 

CONFERENCE FIRST PARTICIPATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES IN A EUROPEAN CONGRESS — 
THE PARTITION OF AFRICA — THE NEW ERA 



IN estimating the part played by Bismarck in the build- 
ing up of the Central European Super-State by the ties 
of the Triple Alliance it must be recalled that the Chan- 
cellor had clearly in mind that economic factors were 
essential to its consolidation. Thus a few months after 
the conclusion of the alliance with Austria we find him 
taking over the portfolio of Minister of Commerce and 
Industry (1880). The man who had forged united Ger- 
many on the battlefield was now to forge upon the 
economic anvil the unity of greater Germany. The mo- 
ment was propitious. The intense industrial development 
of Germany which had followed upon the influx of the 
French indemnity had been succeeded by a period 
of industrial depression. This depression w?s now be- 
ginning to abate. Trade and industry were reviving. 

Production, transportation, markets are the primary 
factors of economic strength. Production must be stimu- 

I330] 



THE SUPER-STATE 331 

lated, transportation improved, new markets assured. 
These were the economic problems which Bismarck set 
himself to solve. These were the interests which pre- 
occupied him during the last years of his control of pub- 
lic affairs. These were the factors ultimately associ- 
ated with the greatness and stability of the new Super- 
State. Bismarck held that it was the duty of the State 
to protect industry and stimulate production; to de- 
velop transportation and to secure new markets and 
sources of raw materials. Though brought up as a free 
trader, he came to acknowledge the value of protective 
tariffs as the only adequate protection for infant in- 
dustry, and saw to it that laws providing for customs 
duties were enacted to achieve his purpose. Bismarck 
found the railways in a chaotic condition, and as a first 
requisite of trade is to assure proper channels of com- 
munication, he compelled Prussia to buy and link up 
the various systems; supplementing them by canals and 
waterway improvements, and affording privileges to 
shippers. The question of new markets and sources 
of raw materials was more difficult. 

Bismarck had on repeated occasions manifested his 
opposition to colonial enterprise. He was opposed to 
a dispersal of strength in distant undertakings. Ger- 
many at the time possessed no efficient navy, and would 
inevitably have found herself in competition with some 
other strong naval Power which might lead to a dis- 
astrous war. This must at all costs be avoided. Here 
we have the causes of Bismarck's apparent opposition 
to colonial enterprise. Industrial development requires 
peace. Though the preponderant strength of the Cen- 
tral Powers In European affairs and the friendly rela- 
tions with England seemed to promise that peace would 
not be disturbed, yet he knew that even a threat of 



332 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

war might dislocate the plans which he had matured for 
the economic development of Germany. 

The anti-Russian policy which Bismarck had pursued 
and the unqualified support he had given to Austria had 
been interpreted by Russia as a distinct menace. He now 
set about to devise a plan to allay this impression, and 
taking his cue from the example in the business world, 
he devised a reinsurance treaty. On March 21, 1884, 
at Berlin, the representatives of Russia and Germany 
signed a secret agreement, to be valid for a period of 
three years, which bound the contracting parties to ob- 
serve an attitude of friendly neutrality in case one of 
them should be attacked by another Power.^ Here was 
an ideal arrangement from the German point of view. 
It did not commit Germany to anything definite, smoothed 
over possible causes for hostilities between Austria 
and Russia which would have compelled intervention, 
and at the same time excluded the possibility of an un- 
derstanding between France and Russia which would 
have been a direct threat to Germany. With peace as- 
sured along her eastern frontier, the western could give 
little cause for concern. 

The Reinsurance Treaty of 1884, viewed In proper 
perspective, thus appears to have been entered upon 
primarily to permit the most rapid and undisturbed eco- 
nomic development of Germany. As such it Is of his- 
torical Importance, as marking the acceptance by the 
State of the economic value of peace as a principal fac- 
tor of public policy, though not excluding the political 

* This agreement was ratified in September of the same year at a 
meeting of the Emperors of Austria, Russia, and Germany held at 
Skiernevice, thus renewing the Three Emperors' League, Dreikaiserbund, 
which was to supplement the Triple Alliance. After 1887 Austria was 
no longer a party to the agreement, owing to the unwillingness of the 
Tsar to continue in any such arrangement with Vienna, though he renewed 

the treaty for another three years with Berlin. 



THE SUPER-STATE 333 

value of war. Economics henceforth was to dictate to 
politics the aims of policy. The function of the State 
had become avowedly economic. Its principal and often 
sole concern was frankly the acquisition of power to pro- 
tect and promote industry and commerce. As the State 
as Power had acquired national unity and political inde- 
pendence, so now this power was to assure economic pros- 
perity as the stepping-stone to super-national expansion. 
The long era of European peace which ensued was 
rendered possible by the wide acceptance of this new 
politico-economic doctrine that peace must be safe- 
guarded by the full power of the State. It was to be 
an armed peace. The State was to be so well prepared 
for war that none would dare to venture to declare 
war; and thus peace would be assured. Such was the 
German thesis which, owing to Germany's preponderant 
position in Europe, was imposed upon all the great 
States. Peace by combination of power, rather than by 
balance of .power, was Bismarck's doctrine, which he 
succeeded in enforcing. The economic prosperity of 
the country could henceforth be developed with full en- 
ergy. The spectre of war had been removed, leaving 
Germany free to expand overseas. Nor could this ex- 
pansion be long delayed if Germany was to have a 
share therein. 



II 

The territorial expansion of the European Powers in 
all parts of the globe had begun in earnest. France after 
Tunis had directed her attention to Indo-China, where 
a foothold had been gained under the Second Empire; 
she was now engaged in occupying Tonkin, outlining 
for herself a great colonial domain in that region and 



334 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

at the same time making ready to seize Madagascar. 
England, after securing Egypt and penetrating the Sudan, 
was about to lay claim to Burma. Russia was spread- 
ing out across Eastern Asia to the Pacific. Italy had 
blocked out for herself a sphere for colonisation along 
the Red Sea, which at the time, the Italians hoped, might 
include the rich Abyssinian plateau. Even the minor 
States such as Belgium, Holland, and Portugal were em- 
barking on colonial enterprise. It would seem as though 
the Germans would find the world, or at least its desirable 
portions, marked off by other States. 

In the meantime private initiative in Germany had ven- 
tured upon colonial expansion. Hamburg and Bremen 
merchants had installed themselves in Togoland and the 
Cameroon, in East and Southwest Africa, and in some 
of the Australasian Islands. At home a colonial party 
was growing up. The German navy, though still in its 
infancy, was daily becoming more popular. Bismarck 
felt that he could no longer resist the demand that the 
State participate in colonial enterprise. His treaty with 
Russia gave him the security needed. Soon thereafter 
Germany entered into competition for overseas domains. 
The methods he adopted showed that the Chancellor 
still retained traces of his inherent opposition to such 
enterprise. Colonies acquired by force of arms, merely 
for the sake of territorial expansion, he stigmatised as 
artificial. For Bismarck made it plain that he looked 
upon colonial undertaking solely as an adjunct of eco- 
nomic expansion, and stood ready to protect and assist 
German traders who had established themselves overseas. 
His dominant aim was to avoid causes for friction or 
war with States who had previously entered the field, 
and were better equipped than Germany to protect their 
interests. This prudent policy did not prevent him now 



THE SUPER-STATE 335 

from actively supporting colonial enterprise. Central 
Africa had up to that time been for the greater part un- 
explored and was still untenanted. Priority of occupa- 
tion by a European State was held the sole title to sov- 
ereignty. A number of German merchants who were 
engaged in trade in Southwest Africa had received con- 
cessions in the vicinity of the Bay of Angra Pequena, 
from a local chief. Here was a foothold that was soon 
to be developed into the German colony of Southwest 
Africa. Simultaneously Germany was acquiring sov- 
ereign rights in Samoa and Northern New Guinea, and 
seized the Marshall Islands in the Pacific, where Ger- 
man merchants had for some time been established. Spain 
laid claim to these islands. But Bismarck desired no 
disturbance of the peace, and he submitted the question 
to the arbitration of the Pope, which Spain as a Catholic 
country could not refuse to agree to. By this tactful 
act he wiped out the last traces of the hostility he had 
aroused among the Catholics by the Ktilturkampf, and 
even rallied them to his active support;^ the more so 
that when the Pope decided the question under arbitra- 
tion in favor of Spain the German Government was 
careful to observe very scrupulously the decision ren- 
dered. The Germans were permitted to retain a foot- 
hold in the Marshall group, which made it easier for 
Germany to secure the islands by purchase at a later 
date (1899). 

Once ready to commit himself to a colonial policy, 
Bismarck aimed to give to colonial affairs a breadth and 

' It is a significant example of the opportunism of Bismarck's policy that 
soon thereafter (1887) he besought the intervention of the Vatican in 
German internal affairs, and succeeded in inducing Leo XIII to bring 
pressure to bear on the members of the Centre party to support his 
military programme, to which they had hitherto been consistently op- 
posed. The Papal Nuncio in a letter addressed to the German Catholic 
leaders stated that "the Holy Father desires that the Centre shall support 
in every possible manner the project of the military septennate." 



336 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

scope suited to so potentially important a branch of in- 
ternational politics by formulating a European policy 
which, by regulating colonial enterprise on an interna- 
tional basis, would assure to Germany, though a late 
comer in the field, a prominent place consistent with her 
dignity and power. Mindful of the success achieved at 
the Congress of 1878, the German Chancellor was now 
anxious to find some suitable pretext for calling to- 
gether the Powers in another congress to assemble at 
Berlin to regulate colonial undertakings, to systematise 
and if possible check the rapacious land-grabbing of the 
other principal Powers, and thus secure for Germany 
what he deemed her proper share. 

A favorable opportunity soon presented itself. Leo- 
pold II, King of the Belgians, was a sovereign of a 
new type. He had absorbed to the full the economic spirit 
of the period. He seemed to realise that politics were 
daily becoming more subservient to economics, and that 
while parliamentary government had deprived the heads 
of States of much of their political authority, sovereigns 
might, if they wished to be something more than mere 
figureheads, by a frank acceptance of the preeminence of 
economic interests and by the exploitation of these in- 
terests, best promote their own prosperity and that of 
their country. Leopold II was a typical capitalist ^ of 
the new school, who in addition happened to be occupy- 
ing a throne. He was ready for new enterprise, eager 
to open up new fields for industrial and commercial ex- 
ploitation. He was among the very first to perceive 
the economic advantages which would accrue from 

* Capitalism was outgrowing its middle class interpretation, and from 
this time we may note a tendency of the control of capital to become con- 
centrated in the hands of a relatively small group of international finan- 
ciers who was ready to engage in distant enterprise, provided that the 
State was willing and able to support its claims. 



THE SUPER-STATE 337 

colonial operations in Central Africa. With his shrewd 
sense for business, Leopold II had as early as 1876 called 
together a group of competent technical advisers, geog- 
raphers and explorers, to formulate plans to carry on 
explorations in equatorial Africa. Soon thereafter the 
favorable reports of the English explorer, Stanley, the 
first white man to descend the Congo River, stimulated 
Leopold's plans. The African International Association 
was formed, composed of geographers, scientists, ex- 
plorers, and capitalists representative of all the European 
States. The Association outlined a plan to establish ex- 
ploring stations along the Congo River, and open up the 
great Congo Basin to European exploitation (1878). By 
1883 considerable progress had been made. The Bel- 
gian King had invested large sums in the undertaking. 
Military and trading stations were established, the navi- 
gation of the Congo was well under way, and a num- 
ber of steamers were regularly plying on the river; 
while the stations were garrisoned by a well-disciplined 
police force. In addition missionaries, chiefly English and 
French, were carrying on the fruitful work in spread- 
ing, not merely the Gospel, but also propaganda in favor 
of the nation to which they belonged.^ 



Ill 

In the meantime various States — Portugal, Holland, 
France — advanced sovereign pretensions over parts of 

^ It is to be noted that no attempt to colonise in the strict sense of 
the word was made in Central Africa. Though the word "civilise" has 
been euphemistically used to give a humanitarian tinge to the work under- 
taken to bring Equatorial Africa under European control, colonisation 
aimed primarily merely at economic exploitation. The theory had gained 
wide credence that "the starving white man must be satisfied or he will 
become ugly." These words reflect the best public opinion of the time, 
which applauded land-grabbing by the Powers, in Africa and elsewhere, 
as of the highest benefit to all concerned. 



338 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

the Congo territory. Portugal claimed priority as hav- 
ing sovereign rights over the Lower Congo, based on 
her discovery in 1484. The Dutch laid claims based 
on their trading posts, while French explorers had been 
active in their explorations and in the distribution of tri- 
color flags among the natives, as stakes of sovereignty. 
For her part England found it useful to recognise the 
Portuguese claims, and in February 1884 entered into 
an agreement which assured to Portugal the control of 
the mouth of the Congo, while England reserved for 
herself the hinterland. 

The news of this agreement raised a storm of pro- 
test among the other European States. Here Bismarck 
saw his opportunity to call a congress which, while in- 
cidentally settling the Congo question, might be made 
the occasion for formulating a European policy concern- 
ing the territorial partition of Africa, as well as re- 
garding all questions relating to the economic exploita- 
tion of that continent. 

From November 1884 to the end of February 1885 
the representatives of the six Great European Powers, 
and of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Turkey, Norway 
and Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and — for the first time in 
a European Conference — the United States,^ labored to 
devise a suitable arrangement. Under the presidency 
of Bismarck a policy was formulated which was best 
suited to assure to Germany a good share of all terri- 
tory distributed. The Congo Basin proper was put 
out of harm's way by being reorganised as a Free State 
with Leopold II as Its sovereign. Arrangements were 
made to insure the free navigation of the Congo and the 
Niger, and rules were laid down regarding the future 
occupation of the coast of Africa, but the most im- 

^ The United States did not ratify the Act of the Conference. 



THE SUPER-STATE 339 

portant clause of the Act of the Berlin Conference, 
signed February 26, 1885, was that in future any Power 
which was about to seize new territory in Africa should 
first notify the other Powers of its intention to do so, 
in order to avoid a conflict/ Here was an unparalleled 
opportunity to assert the armed power of the State to 
secure colonial possessions by the mere threat of war. 
Germany, as the head of the Triple Alliance, was 
already at this time the strongest military power in the 
world, and she had secured the right to protest against 
the colonial expansion of other States, which amounted 
to the assertion of her own preeminence. 

Berlin suddenly found herself a central figure in the 
colonial policy of the world. Hitherto England and to a 
less degree France had been able to increase their 
colonial holdings at will. Henceforth Germany was not 
only to be consulted, but was herself to become a most 
serious competitor. Confident in the ascendant position 
acquired at the Berlin Conference, Germany launched 
headlong in the acquisition of colonies. Within the brief 
space of three years Germany acquired a colonial do- 
main estimated at one and a half million square miles, 
populated by over sixteen million inhabitants.^ 

The attention of the people of Europe was hence- 
forth to be fixed beyond the boundaries of the Con- 
tinent. The world was in fact, as well as in speech, 
to become the field for their enterprise. A new gen- 

^ It is of importance to point out that here for the first time in an in- 
ternational document the matter of spheres of influence and obligations 
attaching thereto are dealt with. 

* During the ensuing fifteen years the work of the partition of Africa 
was practically completed. France strove to carve out for herself an 
African empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, but this 
ambitious scheme was blocked by England after the Fashoda Incident 
(1896). England herself planned a colonial empire which was to 
stretch from the Cape to Cairo. This plan was blocked by Germany, who 
gained for herself the position of third largest colonial Power in Africa. 



340 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

eration had grown to manhood to whom the Crimean 
War was but an historical memory, and even the strug- 
gles of Germany and Italy for national unity were 
epic events of romantic rather than practical interest. 
The gap left by the defeat of France had been filled 
by her revival as a World Power ready to pursue an 
energetic programme, which at bottom was inspired by 
dreams of a revanche, and the reacquisition of Alsace- 
Lorraine. The State as Power had grown to full stature. 
It demanded wider fields for greater exploits. A new 
wave of politico-social enthusiasm, of opportunism, was 
swelling. The older realism of Bismarck, with its nar- 
rowed horizon, its repressive limitations, had grown in- 
tolerable to the younger men. Economic expansion, 
which appeared to have been developed to such a 
prodigious extent during the past two decades, seemed 
to the rising generation merely a feeble beginning. To 
be sure, the maps of the world had been splashed with 
the flaming red of British imperial expansion; French 
green marked off vast areas, and now the German yellow 
showed that the German flag was flying in the antipodes. 
But these colonies awaited organisation and exploita- 
tion. Much had been done, but infinitely more awaited 
doing. It was beginning to be realised that the work 
to be done could not be carried through merely by con- 
tinuing the old policies. Social sensibility was crystallis- 
ing into social consciousness. Capital, which was eager 
for new and vaster enterprise, was coming to realise 
that its power and potential expansive energy In In- 
dustry and commerce rested on the skill and efficient co- 
operation of the working masses. Though Bismarck 
zealously promoted his programmes of paternal State 
social legislation, and carried through his extensive meas- 
ures of social insurance, and protection to the wage- 



THE SUPER-STATE 341 

earner, yet he repressed with unabated vigor every at- 
tempt made by the workers to promote their own in- 
terests, or develop their own class solidarity. 

During his remaining years in office, Bismarck en- 
deavored to put the last touches to his State. He realised 
more than ever that the orientation that he had given 
to German development could be maintained only by 
armed force. To increase the security and strength of 
the Empire he had founded he had employed years of 
skilful diplomacy, but he realised that in the last 
analysis it depended on the efficiency of the army. The 
necessity of preparing for war, the conviction that the 
armed strength of the State was the sole protection of 
its cultural and economic life, of its political liberty and 
position in the world, was dwelt upon more insistently 
than ever. The need to increase this strength, to de- 
velop the striking power of the State, to render it 
formidable above its competitors for power, was de- 
clared the paramount interest of the State. As a result 
increased armaments were voted by the German Reich- 
stag, after an arduous struggle in which the Chancellor 
had to come forward in person to defend his policy. 
"His Majesty, the Emperor, cannot disavow the work 
to which he has devoted thirty years of his life : the 
creation of the German Army and the creation of the 
German Empire," the Chancellor declared in the Reich- 
stag on January 11, 1887, and it is significant that he 
placed the army before the Empire. 

Bismarck's work was done. He could go no further. 
Though he renewed the Triple Alliance as well as the 
Reinsurance Treaty in this same year, he added nothing. 
He was engaged in holding together what he had built; 
for already he saw fissures in the foundations. 



CHAPTER XI 

Salus Populi 



ESTIMATE OF BISMARCK S HISTORICAL MISSION — THE NEW ETHICS 

OF GOVERNMENT THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE USE OF 

FORCE CULTURAL SUPERIORITY 



THE deeper one examines into the career of Bis- 
marck and the part he played in furthering the 
breakdown of the control of the body politic by the 
Middle Class, the more distinctly are the limitations 
of his policy, where the use of force was of no avail, 
revealed. Though skilled in diplomatic architectonics, 
unhampered by any scruples of moral responsibility or 
the accepted code of political honor in so far as affairs 
of State were concerned, the Iron Chancellor bequeathed 
no sound precepts in the art of government, no prac- 
tice in the science of politics, which might serve a later 
epoch. He distorted the moral standards, and per- 
verted the ethical sense, not merely of the German peo- 
ple, but of the civilised world. Yet who shall say that 
his dual historical mission, which was to accelerate the 
destruction of the older concepts of statehood and pre- 
pare for a new form of social organisation, was not for 
these very reasons the more thoroughly performed, that 
he sowed a storm so that the succeeding generation 
might reap a whirlwind? It cannot be maintained that 
this was his conscious role, yet we can perceive in his 
conception of power as objective the awakening of a 

[342] 



SALUS POPULI 343 

new social consciousness, the manifestation of social sen- 
sibility to which attention has been called. His success 
and the ascendancy of Germany were based on a clear 
insight into the social nature of the State, in contrast 
with the middle class individualist theory which had 
hitherto prevailed. He was the first to make use of 
the idea of disciplined cooperation. But he apparently 
failed to recognise that man must not only obey, but 
he must believe; not only /3ios but 6eos is necessary to 
a complete development of social consciousness. The 
end cannot justify the means when the end has been 
attained and the means survive. 

In asserting German claims to leadership in Europe, 
Bismarck had taken advantage of the nascent social 
consciousness of the German people, and by limiting it 
as an exclusively national discipline which required of 
the individual implicit as well as explicit loyalty to the 
State, forbade the latter to look beyond national bound- 
aries except as to a field for predatory penetration. The 
ethics and art of government were directed to support 
the contention that the State as Power can alone assure 
survival; not power reinforced by moral considerations, 
implying inhibitions and ethical restraints, but power 
whose basis is disciplined violence which can be unleashed 
at will. 

The Nation-State as Power, in the use of force had 
behind it psychical motives of a social character which 
had never been hitherto overtly accepted. The use of 
force was justified by the end in view. Not only do we 
find it reiterated with apparent finality that "the State 
is not physical power as an end in itself, but is the power 
to protect and promote the high interests of mankind. 
The lesson of power (Machtlehre) purely as an end in 
itself cannot be countenanced; it is immoral because it 



344 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

can not justify itself," ^ but the conviction had gained 
credence that though "the end of justice is peace, the 
way to attain it is by war ... all the justice that there 
is in the world was attained after a struggle ... all 
rights, the rights of a nation, as the rights of an in- 
dividual, presuppose that he who possesses them is al- 
ways ready to affirm them by the use of force." ^ Here 
we find power endowed with a social sanctity that it had 
never hitherto possessed. The use of force was thus 
not only necessary but a highly desirable attribute of 
the State. War had in the long centuries of its evolu- 
tion acquired social value. ^ The warrior instinct in 
man had by a slow process been transformed into a 
disciplined, socialised, combative sense, which found 
expression in the formation of armies organised to 
protect the civilian community from incursion, until 
at last we find a Nation-State with its young male 
population conscripted in time of peace to serve in the 
ranks, and in time of war the entire able-bodied popu- 
lation pledged for national service. War had become a 
social function; the State a heavily armed, disciplined 
weapon for war.^ 

The acceptance of the idea of the State as Power — 

' Cf. Treitschke, Politics, Vol. II, p. 543. 

'Cf. R. Ihering, Der Kampf urns Recht. 

' Cf. William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War." 

* An unarmed State incapable of drawing the sword when it sees fit, is 
subject to one which wields the power of declaring war. ... A de- 
fenceless State may still be termed a Kingdom for convention or polite 
reasons, but science whose first duty is accuracy must boldly declare 
that in point of fact such a country no longer takes rank as a State. 

This, then, is the only criterion. The right of arms distinguishes the 
State from all other forms of corporate life, and those who cannot take 
up arms for themselves may not be regarded as States but only as members 
of a federated constellation of States. . . . 

War is Politics xar' k^oxhv- 

The grandeur of war lies in the utter annihilation of puny man in 
the great conception of the State and it brings out the full splendor of the 
sacrifice of fellow-countrymen for one another. — Cf. Treitschke, op. cit., 
Vol. I, Chaps. I and II. 



SALUS POPULI 345 

the confusion of identity between what had hitherto 
been considered a function of government (the pro- 
tection of rights and interests) with that of the end 
of the State itself — had promoted the rise of an ego- 
centric, racial nationalism, which excluded any sincere 
acceptance of a broader concept of humanity. Yet 
human intercourse was daily becoming more intensive. 
The communication between peoples, already accelerated 
during the preceding period, had increased an hundred- 
fold, and was increasing in geometric progression. The 
interpenetration of ideas, the international character of 
trade and commerce, the first attempts to arrive at in- 
ternational solidarity among the working class, had 
built up a fabric of social relations which was hampered 
by national boundaries. Nevertheless the technique of 
government, the theory of politics retrenched itself more 
strongly than ever behind the barriers of the heavily 
armed Nation-State. 

In theory, the State, an organisation for peace, was 
under the control of its civilian administrators; in prac- 
tice, the State had in the militarised States of continental 
Europe come under direct, elsewhere under the indirect, 
control of its armed strength in order to be prepared for 
war. During the next forty years the threat of the drawn 
sword, the fear of a levelled rifle, their use against 
weaker States — in brief, the tactics of the highwayman, 
became the practice of States. The increase and im- 
provement of armaments, the building of great navies, 
their use in affirming world interests and asserting world 
power with a ruthless disregard of moral law, were 
justified by the convenient plea of salus populi. 

The treaties and alliances entered into, the increase of 
the potential offensive strength of the State, the as- 
sertion of privileges as rights, the safeguarding of in- 



346 THE TREND OF HISTORY 

terests, became the principal concern of politics. With 
theatric effect the doctrines of the State as Power could 
be made to apply to foreign relations, and sincere men 
accepted the view that "morals must become more po- 
litical before politics can become more moral." ^ None 
could deny in surveying the spoil accumulated by follow- 
ing the new precepts that "the statesman has no right 
to warm his hands on the smoking ruins of his country, 
and with comforting self-praise proclaim, 'I have never 
lied.' " ' 



II 

The period of expansion which followed upon the 
frank acceptance of the new theory of the State as 
Power may be compared to that of the barbarian in- 
vasions. The centripetal physical factors which im- 
pelled the barbarians westward during the 5th century, 
and lured the Goths to Rome, the Huns to Chalons, and 
the Vandals to the African shores of the Mediterranean, 
effecting the dissolution of the Western Empire, were, 
during the last quarter of the 19th century and the 
opening years of the 20th, replaced by the centrifugal 
psychical factors which impelled the Western Powers, 
basing themselves on a politico-economic code wholly 
barbaric, to spread eastward, and by rapid stages to com- 
plete the conquest of Asia, Australasia, and Africa in 
what must appear in the light of history as an attempt 
to subjugate the globe. During the 5th century the bar- 
barians in their march on Rome were armed only with 
their superior physical strength and fresh vigor. In the 

' Treitschke, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 105. 
^Treitschke, Ibidem, Vol. I, p. no. 



SALUS POPULI 347 

19th century, the European Powers felt themselves en- 
dowed with a cultural superiority which they wished to 
impose on the whole world. 

This was not the task for an effete, worn-out civilisa- 
tion such as we find reflected in sterile, middle class 
pessimism, with its decadent philosophy and its dilettante 
agnosticism, or the rapacious yet puny greed of Nation- 
States and the tortuous policy of the statesmen who di- 
rected the destiny of peoples prior to the last quarter 
of the 19th century. But looking beneath the surface 
we may uncover a vigorous, buoyant energy, an eagerness 
for action, such as the world had not witnessed. The 
new "barbarian" invasion by the European peoples, 
frankly undertaken after 1890, rested on broader founda- 
tions than those of the personalised Nation-State. 
Though in form it was directed by the Middle Class, 
and the methods of accomplishment of imperial design, 
the unmoral subterfuges resorted to in an attempt to 
reconcile the new policy with middle class standards are 
self-evident, yet at every turn we find traces of new 
influences, new elements, garbed in the old dress. It 
is for this reason that imperialism and internationalism 
with their attendant complexities and incongruities have 
hitherto been so difficult to analyse. 

The State as Power was at one and the same time 
breaking down the old middle class poHtico-juridic 
theories, rendering obsolete the older forms of limited 
nationalism, and carrying forward with the old methods 
the new super-nationalism. The State had become the 
shell, it was no longer the kernel, of social life. 



INDEX 



Abdul Hamid (Sultan of Tur- 
key), 287. 

Acton (Lord), cited, 211 note. 

Adrianople, 291. 

Afghanistan, war of, with Eng- 
land, 315- _ 

Africa, colonial exploitation of, 
335 sqq.; plan of partition of, 
by European states, 339 and 
note; European policy regard- 
ing, 339 ; Conference of Berlin 
re, 339. 

African International Association, 

337- 

Agamemnon, 307. 

Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of 
(1818), 95. . 

Alexander II (Emperor of Rus- 
sia), 186; his relations with 
Napoleon III, 194, 203, 204, 
205; and Prussia, 195, 196, 
205; and France, 195. 

Alexander VI (Pope), 23. 

Alexander the Great, 38. 

Alexandria, 39. 

Algeria, incidents of French in- 
tervention in, 108; French cam- 
paign in and occupation of, 
108; annexation of, to France, 
108, 109 and note. 

Algiers, 108, 109. 

Alsace-Lorraine, 205 and note, 
2 73,. 340. 

Althusius, theory of State of, 18; 
his Politica, 18. 

American Colonies, see United 
States. 

American Commonwealth {The), 
see Bryce. 

American Constitution, see Con- 
stitution and United States. 



Amphictyonic League, 233 note. 
Analogy, use of, in politics, 20, 

23, 24, 27. 
Anarchy, see Proudhon. 
Andrassy (Count) quoted, 299 

note. 
Antwerp, occupied by the French, 

107. 
Aranda, 33. 
Ardahan, 293, 296. 
Aristocracy, in England, 71 and 

note; characteristics of, 267; 

compared with Proletariat, 

268; fixity of social ordering 

of, 268; decline of, 31, 270. 
Aristotle, 38, 49; his Treatise 

on Government quoted, 49 

note. 
Asia, Russian advance in Central, 

184, 190, 277, 334; Russia 

blocked in, 266; Turkey in, 

293. 

Association of Ideas, in politics, 
55 sqq. 

Austria, enters the Holy Alli- 
ance, 94 note ; signs Troppau 
agreement, 95 ; nationalism in, 
144, 169; revolutions in, 152; 
at war with Italians (1848), 
152; defeat of Italians by, 152; 
as a Great Power, 182; at 
Congress of Paris, 188; in- 
volved in war with Piedmont 
and France, 194; the armistice 
of Villafranca and, 194; at 
war with Prussia and Italy 
(1866), 200; defeat of, 200; 
the effects of the treaty of 
Prague on, 201 ; exclusion of, 
from Germany, 201 ; Polish 
policy of, 198; relations of, 



349 



350 



INDEX 



with France, 199; political re- 
organisation of, 201 ; joins with 
Hungary in formation of the 
Dual Monarchy, 202 ; policy 
of, during Franco-Prussian 
war, 207 and note; as a Great 
Power, 228 note; effects of 
dualist regime, 245 ; plan of 
Alliance of Russia, Prussia 
and, 275 ; Turkish policy of, 
279; Balkan crisis and policy 
of, 281 sqq.; signs the Reich- 
stadt agreement, 286; defines 
sphere of active interest in the 
Balkans, 289; neutrality of, 
during Russo-Turkish war, 
290; at Congress of Berlin, 
296; re control over Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 286, 291, 
296; rapprochement with Ger- 
many, 316; enters alliance with 
Germany, 316; her relations 
with Italy, 325 ; concludes 
Triple Alliance, 325 ; her part 
in the Alliance, 326; her ex- 
ploitation by Germany, 327 ; 
and the Reinsurance Treaty of 
(1884), 332. 
Austria-Hungary, see Austria. 



Baboeuf (Noel), 99 note. 

Bacon (Francis Lord), 43; on 
progress, 44. 

Bacon (Roger), on progress, 43. 

Bakunin, 254. 

Balkans, nation building in, 188, 
191 ; conditions in, after 1870, 
246; national aspirations of 
peoples of, 246; Russian inter- 
est in, 277; policy of European 
states regarding, 278 ^1717.; 
the question of reforms in, 
283 sqq.; English fvolicy re- 
specting reforms in, 283 ; Rus- 
sian policy re, 284, 288 ; revo- 
lution in, 284; armistice of 
1876 in, 288; Russo-Turkish 
war and, 299 sqq.; territorial 
distribution of, by treaty of 



San Stefano, 292 ; effects of 
Congress of Berlin in, 314. 

Barbarians, invasions of, 2; 
comparison between, and Euro- 
pean economic expansion at 
close of 19th century, 346. 

Basel, Congress of, international 
(1869), 253. 

Bastile, storming of, 77. 

Batum, 293, 296. 

Beesby, 167 note. 

Belgium, relations of, with 
France, 81, 107 note, 203, 289; 
united to Holland, 93; revolt 
in, 107; independence of, 107; 
as Minor Power, 228 note; 
colonial plans of, 334. 

Benedict XIV (Pope), 33- 

Berlin, 67, 156, 203, 207 note; 
274, 276; Russian influence at, 
I95i 197 ; plans of, re Turkey, 
280; note of (May 13, 1876), 
284; Congress of, to revise 
treaty of San Stefano, 295; 
objects of Congress, 295 ; terms 
of, 296 sqq.; effects of, 298, 
314, 317; Conference of, to 
settle colonial questions (1884), 
338; act of Conference of, 339. 

Besika Bay, 285. 

Bessarabia, 187, 292, 296, 314. 

Bismarck (Prince), admiration 
of Marx for, 171 note; reor- 
ganisation of Prussian army 
by) 199 I declares war on Den- 
mark, 200; Austrian policy of, 
200, 201 ; and German imperi- 
alism, 249 note; as founder of 
the German Empire, 272; 
compared with Napoleon I, 
273 ; character of, 273 ; epi- 
sodes in career of, as history 
of Europe, 273 ; his forging of 
German unity, 275 ; his plan 
to revive the Holy Alliance, 
275 ; supports Austria, 280, 
287; his attitude in Balkan 
crisis, 280; his approval of 
Suez Canal incident, 281; 
Turkish policy of, 284 sqq./ 



INDEX 



35i 



unique position of, 286; 
quoted re Balkan crisis, 289; 
quoted on role of Germany in 
European affairs, 292; Con- 
gress of Berlin called under 
presidency of, 295 ; as arbiter 
in Europe, 300; comparison of 
his policy with Marxian doc- 
trines, 302 ; Machtpolitik of, 
303 ; his idea of the State as 
Power, 303 sqq.; on the State, 
quoted, 304; objective view- 
point of, 304; attitude towards 
Papal doctrine of infallibility, 
305 ; begins the Kulturkampf, 
307 ; details of his struggle with 
Rome, 307 sqq.; motives of his 
policy quoted, 307 ; end of 
Kulturkampf, 309 ; social pol- 
icy of, 310; his opposition to 
Socialism, 310; quoted on So- 
cialism, 310 note; plans of 
State Socialism outlined by, 
310, 311; intervenes in Eg>'pt, 
315; anti-Russian sentiments 
of, 316; he plans alliance with 
Austria, 316; England ap- 
proached by, 316; survey of 
European situation by, 316; 
concludes alliance with Aus- 
tria, 316; attitude of, during 
Tunis incident, 324; resump- 
tion of friendly relations with 
Papacy, 324; champions tem- 
poral claims of Papacy, 324; 
Italian policy of, 325 ; forces 
Italy to seek alliance with 
Austria, 325 ; the creation of 
the Triple Alliance by, 325 
sqq.; as Minister of Commerce 
and Industry, 330; his estimate 
of economic factors of policy, 
331 ; his programmes for 
stimulating industrial and com- 
mercial enterprises, 331 ; colo- 
nial policy of, 331, 334; scope 
and aims of colonial plans of, 
331; his desire for peace, 332; 
economic value of peace ap- 
praised by, 332; his Reinsur- 



ance Treaiy, 332; his appeal to 
Papacy, 335 and note; his 
plans for conference to settle 
colonial question, 336; policy 
in Congo dispute, 338; calls 
conference to discuss the par- 
tition of Africa, 338; last tasks 
of, 340; quoted, 341 ; summary 
of work of, 342 ; German 
hegemony and his part therein, 
343 ; the Nation-State as 
Power and, 343 ; his true his- 
torical mission, 343 sqq. 

Bizerte, 321, 322. 

Black Sea, question of neutralisa- 
tion of, 187, 193, 275. 

Blackstone, quoted, 32 and note. 

Blanc (Louis), 166. 

Bluntschli, his Theory of the 
State quoted, 21, 28, 120, 210; 
his Politik quoted, 212, 213 
note. 

Bodm (Jean), 7, 21; theory of 
State of, 17 sqq.; Les Six 
Livres de la Republique of, 
cited, 17 ; on progress, 43, 44. 

Bologna, 57. 

Bona, 108. 

Bonaparte (House of), 94, 173; 
intrigues of, after (1870), 274. 

Boniface VIII (Pope), Bull 
Unam Sanctam of, quoted, 
22. 

Bosanquet, his Philosophical The- 
ory of the State, quoted, 50 
note. 

Bosnia, revolt in, 279, 284; Aus- 
trian control over, 286, 291, 
296. 

Boulogne, 124. 

Bourbons, family system of, 85, 
86; restoration of, 94; intrigues 
of, 261, 274. 

Bourget (Paul), his Psychologie 
Contemporaine quoted, 261. 

Boutmy, his Elements d'une Psy- 
chologie Politique du Peuple 
Americain quoted, 249 note. 

Brahmins, 38. 

Bremen, 334. 



352 



INDEX 



Bright (John) on Canada, 258. 

Brook Farm, 170. 

Bryce (Lord), his American 
Commonwealth, quoted, 60 
note. 

Buckle (G. E.), his Life of Ben- 
jamin Disraeli quoted, 277, 
285, 286, 289, 290, 291. 

Buddhism, 38. 

Bulgaria, national aspirations of, 
278; relations of, with Russia, 
284, 286, 288; declares war on 
Turkey, 286; semi-independ- 
ence of, 296, 314, 

Bulgarian atrocities, Gladstone 
and, 287 ; Disraeli's view of, 
287. 

Bull, Unam Sanctam, 22. 

Burd, L. A., 211 note. 

Burma, 334. 



Caesar, 87; the age of, 117. 

Cairo, 339 note. 

California, 250. 

Calvin, 4. 

Calvinism, influence of, in 
America, 57. 

Cameroon, 334. 

Campanella (Tommaso), his 
Civitas SoliSj cited, 158. 

Canada, 258. 

Canning, 95. 

Capitalism, and nationalism, 107, 
109, 160, 226; evolution of, 
127; spread of, 128; in Eng- 
land, 135, 139; influence of, on 
foreign afFairs, 139; influence 
on colonial policy of, 139; ex- 
pansion of, 257; aims of, 263; 
struggle of, with Proletariat, 
256; realism of, 259; new defi- 
nition of, 337 note. 

Carolina (Constitution of), cited, 
61 note. 

Catherine II (Empress of Rus- 
sia), 33, 34, 284. 

Cavour (Count), his plans for 
Italian unity, 191 ; his relations 
with Napoleon III, 191 ; con- 



cludes the Plombieres agree- 
ment, 194; 234. 

Central Powers, see Germany. 

Charlemagne, 84. 

Charles Albert (King), of Pied- 
mont, 152. 

Charles V (Emperor), 205. 

Charles X (King of France), his 
policy in Algeria, 108; down- 
fall of, 106. 

Chartism, nature of the move- 
ment, no; programme of, no; 
results of, in, 169, 

Chilperic, 84. 

China, opening of, to Western 
influence, 191 ; Franco-British 
policy towards, 191, 192; Eng- 
land and the opium trade in, 
232 note. 

Chinese Classics, The, see Legge. 

Christianity, appeal of, 40; ideal 
of brotherly love of, 40; and 
world unity, 41 ; viewed as a 
proletarian movement, 237, 

Church of Rome, see Papacy. 

Cicero, 43. 

Civitas Solis, see Campanella. 

Colonies, English policy re, 139, 
177; see also under various 
European States. 

Comte (Auguste), political phi- 
losophy of, 125 sqq.; influence 
of positivism taught by, 126, 
215; the Middle Class and, 
127. 

Commune of Paris (1871), 207; 
doctrine of, 254 note ; incen- 
diarism of, 261 ; effects of, 273. 

Communism, Manifesto of 1848, 
157; basis of, 158; theory of, 
158 sqq.; aims of, 159 sqq.; 
economic dependence of indi- 
vidual, cited by, 165; realism 
of, 165; principal purpose of, 
167; abolition of private prop- 
erty advocated by, 167; de- 
structive programme of, 167 
sqq.; and the Middle Class, 
168; in action in 1848, 169; 
historical survey of, 170, 171; 



INDEX 



353 



cited, 232, 302; and inter- 
nationalism, 251. 

Communist Manifesto, see Com- 
munism. 

Condorcet, 46, 125. 

Congo, exploration of, 337; 
claims to, 338 ; conference of 
Berlin re, 338; Free State or- 
ganised, 338. 

Coningsby, quoted, 318. 

Constantinople, control of, 277, 
279, 280, 290, 291 ; palace 
revolutions at, 285, 287 ; con- 
ference of, 288 sqq.; constitu- 
tion proclaimed at, 290; break- 
up of conference of, 290; men- 
aced by Russia, 291. 

Constitutional Government, basis 
of, 27; in England, 28, 36, 55, 
63 sqq.; as product of Middle 
Class political theory, 31, 60, 
69, 100; Puritan influence on 
origin of, 31, 32; influence of 
Montesquieu on United States 
theory of, 53, 63; Rousseau 
and, in France, 52; influence of 
aristocracy on, in England, 60 
note; comparison of develop- 
ment of, 115. 

Constitution, of Carolina, 61 
note; of United States (1789), 
details of, 56 sqq., 62 sqq.; 
quoted, 63 note; cited, 115; 
influence of United States on 
French, of 1791, 78; French, 
of 1791, 78, of 1795, 79> of 
1814, 91, of 1852, 173; English 
model of, of Sicily, 1812, 90, 
91; of Spain, 90; of Minor 
German States, 92 ; in Pied- 
mont, 152; in Naples, 152; 
Hungarian of (1848), 202; 
Turkey (1877), 290; see also 
under separate countries. 

Consulate, 79. 

Contrat Social, see Rousseau. 

Correspondence de Proudhon 
(1859-1862), see Proudhon. 

Cosmopolitanism, 41 ; doctrine 
of, 65; Middle Class bias of, 



67, 226; and nationalism, 82, 
118; influence on Napoleon I 
of, 85, 88; in Germany, 131, 
132; decline of, 132. 

Courland, 205 and note. 

Crete, 191, 296. 

Crimean War, causes of, 184; 
pretext for, 185; negotiations 
to prevent, 185; military opera- 
tions of, 186; Sebastopol, 186; 
conclusion of, 187. 

Cromw^ell (Oliver), sought to 
give written constitution to 
England, 61 ; 226. 

Crusades, influence of, 41 ; and 
England, 89. 

Cyprus, England acquires, 294 
and note, 296. 



Danish Duchies, plans of Prus- 
sia re, 199; annexation of, by 
Prussia, 201. 

Dardanelles, 285, 286 note. 

Darwinian theories, effect of, on 
political affairs, 213. 

Decay, interpretation of, 260; 
political application of concept 
of, 261. 

Declaration and Bill of Right, 
see Right, Declaration and 
Bill of. 

Declaration of Rights of Man, 
see Rights of Man. 

Declaration of Independence, of 
United States (1776), 53, 62, 
69, 74; influence of Rousseau 
on,^ 52, 53, 62. 

De I'Esprit des Lois, see Mon- 
tesquieu. 

Del Materialismo Storico, see 
Labriola. 

Democracy in America, see de 
Tocqueville. 

Denmark, war with Prussia 
(1864), 200; loss of Duchies 
by, 200; education in, 229 
note. 

Der Kampf urns Recht, see Iher- 
ing. 



354 



INDEX 



Descartes, 43; on progress, 
44. 

Determinism, see Historical Ma- 
terialism. 

Directory (French), organisa- 
tion of, 79, 84. 

Discourse on the Origiiis of Ine- 
quality among Mankind, see 
Rousseau. 

Disraeli (Benjamin), imperialist 
policy of, 264; character of, 
264, 265; as Prime Minister, 
264 ; foreign policy of, 265 ; 
calls Indian troops to Malta, 
266; "jingoism" of, 266; pro- 
letarian characteristics of, 266; 
his estimate of Bismarck 
quoted, 277 ; anti-nationalist 
policy of, 279; attitude of, to- 
wards Balkan question, 279; 
purchase of Suez Canal by, 
281; Turkish policy of, 285; 
quoted on war policy, 285 ; 
during the Balkan Crisis, 286 
sqq.; his view of Bulgarian 
atrocities, 287 ; created Earl of 
Beaconsfield, 288 ; outlines his 
peace policy, 288 ; the Holy Al- 
liance cited by, 289; his policy 
during Russo-Turkish war 
quoted, 290; secures Cyprus 
for England, 293 and note; at 
the Congress of Berlin, 295 ; 
"peace with honor" of, 295 ; 
quoted re "divine right of gov- 
ernment," 303 note; social 
policy of, 311; his schemes of 
"social sanitation," 311; his 
super-national viewpoint, 313; 
estimate of internal policy of, 
by Gorst quoted, 312; his atti- 
tude towards Germany, 316; 
and public opinion, 317; fall of, 
318; estimate of role of, 318; 
Coningsby of, quoted, 318. 

Drang nach Osten, 285. 

Dreikaiserbund, 276. 

Dual Monarchy, see Austria. 

Dupont de Nemours, his Physi- 
ocratie cited, 68 note. 



Du Systeme Industrie!, see St. 

Simon. 
Dutch Provinces, see Holland. 



Economics, role of, ix ; rise of 
science of, 68 sqq.; influence of 
Adam Smith on, 69 ; theory of 
freedom of, 70 sqq.; effect of 
doctrine of freedom on, lOi ; 
laws of, formulated by Middle 
Class, 102, 103; linked with 
politics, 105 ; as the dominat- 
ing factor in history, 161 sqq.; 
as a source of power, 177; as 
principal factor in formation 
of Triple Alliance, 329; as im- 
pulse urging formation of co- 
lonial domains, 329; donjinant 
after 1880, 329; as controlling 
public policy, 330; value of 
peace to, 332 ; see also under 
Politico-Economic theory of 
State, Imperialism. 

Edinburgh, 67. 

Education, attitude of State to- 
wards, 227; compulsory, 
adopted. 229 and note; in Den- 
mark, France, Russia, England, 
229 note. 

Egypt, the Suez Canal incident 
and, 281 ; English policy in, 
281, 297; crisis in, 315; Bis- 
marck intervenes in, 315; oc- 
cupation of, by England, 
329- 

Elba, 90. 

Electorate, function of, 148; re- 
form of, 148; as exclusive pre- 
rogative of Middle Class, 149 
sqq. 

Elements d'une Psychologie Po- 
litique du Peuple Americain, 
see Boutmj\ 

El Uffia, incident of, 108; see 
Algeria. 

Empedocles, on progress, 43. 

Empire Liberal, see E. Ollivier. 

Engels, F., joint author of the 
Communist Manifesto, 157. 



INDEX 



355 



England, civil wars in, 8; con- 
flict between Parliament and 
the Crown in, lo; constitu- 
tional monarchy established in, 
28; constitutional government 
in, 29, 36, 56, 57, 63; influence 
on United States during forma- 
tive period of, 58 sqq.; effect 
of French revolution (1789) 
on, 88, 89; nationalism in, 89; 
and constitutional government 
in Europe, 90; Irish policy of, 
89; retrenchment of, 90; atti- 
tude of, towards Holy Alli- 
ance, 94 note ; intervention of, 
in Greece, 104; intervention of, 
in Belgium, 107; utilitarianism 
in, 127, 136; capitalism in, 
127, 136, 139, 192; extension 
of suffrage in, 148; colonial 
enterprise of, 177; free trade 
policy of, 178; International 
Industrial Exhibition (1851) 
in, 178; as a Great Power, 
182; Napoleon III and his re- 
lations with, 182, 185; in the 
Crimean War, 185 sqq.; Po- 
lish policy of, 187, 198; Chinese 
interests of, 191 ; at the Con- 
gress of Paris (1856), 187 
sqq.; joint intervention in 
Mexico by, 197 ; as spectator 
in European affairs, 206; as 
World Power, 228 note; edu- 
cation in, 229 note ; public opin- 
ion in, 239; as political tutor 
in the West, 249; as the birth- 
place of imperialism and inter- 
nationalism, 249, 250 and note; 
influence of Disraeli on trend 
of policy of, 265 sqq.; Middle 
Class policy and attitude of to- 
wards the Balkans, 278; its 
reversal by Disraeli, 279; ag- 
gressive foreign policy, 279; 
acquires Suez Canal, 281 ; and 
the menace of Russia, 281; 
aims in Egypt, 281 ; policy of, 
re integrity of Turkey, 283 ; 
orders fleet to Besika Bay, 



285; threatens Russia with 
war, 285 ; effect of Bulgarian 
atrocities in, 287 ; suggestion 
of conference at Constantino- 
ple made by, 288; acute tension 
in relations of, with Russia, 
288; attitude during Russo- 
Turkish war, 290; orders mo- 
bilisation, 293 ; attitude to- 
wards San Stefano treaty, 293 ; 
demands revision of treaty, 
293 sqq.; urges calling of Eu- 
ropean Congress, 293 ; defends 
territorial integrity of Turkey, 
293 ; at the Congress of Ber- 
lin, 295 ; secures Cyprus, 294 
and note, 296; secures special 
privileges in Turkey, 293 ; crisis 
in Egypt and, 315 ; plans of, for 
"scientific frontier" for North- 
west India, 315; at war with 
Afghanistan, 315; war with the 
Zulus, 315; her belligerent 
methods of imperialist expan- 
sion, 315; and the general Eu- 
ropean situation, 316; notified 
of Austro-German treaty of 
1879, 316; friendly attitude 
of, towards treaty, 316; occu- 
pation of Egypt by, 329; mo- 
tives to justify occupation al- 
leged by, 329; theory of ex- 
ploitation of, 329; expansion in 
the Sudan of, 334; in Burma, 
334; and the Congo question, 
338; partition of Africa and 
her share therein, 339 note; 
aim of Cape to Cairo domain 
of, 339 note. 

Erasmus, 4. 

Erzerum, 291. 

Essai sur le Despotism, see 
Mirabeau. 

Essay on Machiavelli, see Ma- 
caulay. 

Etudes sur I'Histoire de VHu- 
manite, see Laurent. 

Euripides, 38. 

Europe, cultural life of, 2 ; in- 
fluence of the Reformation in, 



356 



INDEX 



17 sqq.; position of clergy in 
mediaeval, 22 ; influence of cru- 
sades on, 41 ; Napoleon and, 
86; spread of nationalism in, 
125i 192; Western and Cen- 
tral, contrasted, 136; liberal 
movement in, 152 sqq.; in 1850, 
175; Napoleon III and, 181; 
Russia and Western, 184; 
Prussia and, 206; political 
centre of gravity in, 274, 276; 
peace in, 277 ; menace of gen- 
eral war in, 287; general pol- 
icy of, first advanced at Con- 
gress of Berlin, 299 and note; 
see also under various coun- 
tries. 
European War, see World War. 



Ferdinand VIII (King of Spain), 

90. 
Ferry (Jules) (French Premier), 

321. 

Fichte, 131, 136. 

Fleury (General), 205 note. 

Flint (Robert), 36; his History 
of the Philosophy of History in 
France quoted, 36. 

Foerster, F. W., quoted, 305 
note. 

Fourier, phalanges of, 158, 170. 

France, Dragonnades in, 8; 
early national unity of, 10; in- 
fluence of politics in, 54; in- 
fluence of, on United States 
during formative period, 59, 
60 and note; the Revolution of 
1789 in, 75 sqq.; (for details 
see Revolution) ; the Middle 
Class in, 75 ; frontiers of, reach 
the Rhine, 81; dominant in 
Europe, 88; nationalism in, 81 
sqq.; theocratic school in, 98; 
rise of socialism in, 99 and 
note; intervention of, in 
Greece, 104; revolution of 
1830 in, 106; the Middle Class 
in power in, 106; intervention 
in Belgium, 107, 108 note; the 



acquisition of Algeria by, 108; 
in 1840, 125; liberalism in, 
143 ; Louis Philippe's policy in, 
106; nationalism in, 139 sqq., 
193; the question of the suf- 
frage in, 148; the revolution 
of 1848, 152; the overthrow of 
Louis Philippe, 152; as repub- 
lic (1848), 152; Louis Napo- 
leon and {see under Napoleon 
III); as a Great Power, 182; 
and the Crimean war, 185 sqq.; 
foreign policy of, 190 sqq.; 
war of, with Austria, 194 sqq.; 
intervention in Mexico of, 197 
sqq.; intercession of, in behalf 
of Poland, 198; tension in re- 
lations of, with Russia, 198; 
and the Luxemburg affair, 
203, 205; unrest in (1870), 
207 ; war of, with Germany, 
207; overthrow of Napoleon 
III, 208; Provisional govern- 
ment in, 208; the Third Repub- 
lic, 208, 246; the Commune, 
208; peace with Germany, 208; 
as World Power, 228 note; 
education in, 229 note; organ- 
isation of parliamentary gov- 
ernment in, 245 ; international- 
ism and, 254; effect of Franco- 
Prussian war on, 273 ; insta- 
bility of Third Republic in, 
274; loss of Alsace-Lorraine 
by, 273 ; intrigues of Bourbons 
and Bonapartists in, 274; re- 
sults of Commune in, 273; and 
the dawn of a new Europe, 274 ; 
defeat of, profited by all, 275 ; 
recovery of, 276; and the inci- 
dent of 1875, 276; and the Suez 
Canal, 277 ; at the Congress of 
Berlin, 296; earmarks Syria 
as her share of spoil, 297 ; is 
urged to acquire Tunis, 297 ; 
condition of, in 1880, 320; im- 
perialist programme of, 320; 
the acquisition of Tunis by, 321 
sqq.; motives of annexation al- 
leged by, 323 ; acquisition of 



INDEX 



357 



Tonkin and Madagascar by, 
333. 334; claims to Congo of, 
337; African empire of, 339 
note ; and the Fashoda incident, 
339 note; influence of a new 
generation in, 340; see also un- 
der Africa, Middle Class, Na- 
poleon III, Nationalism. 

Francis II (King of Naples), 
152. 

Frankfort, Diet of, 128, 153; 
treaty of (1871), 208, 276. 

Franklin, 58. 

Frederick II (King of Prussia), 
33, 34; and Prussia, 130; pa- 
ternalism of, 131; maxim of, 
quoted, 304. 

Frederick William III (King of 
Prussia), 137. 

Frederick William IV, 136; na- 
tionalist policy of, 137; atti- 
tude of, during revolution of 
1848, 153. 



Ganganelli, 33. 

Garibaldi, 91 ; at Naples, 195. 

Geneva, 67, 251 note; convention 
of 1864, 249 note. 

George III (King of England), 
48. 

Germany, Thirty Years' War in, 
8 ; ecclesiastical lands in, 22 ; 
particularist influences in, 91 ; 
nationalism brought by Napo- 
leon to, 86; wars of liberation 
in, 91, 136; the Congress of Vi- 
enna and, 93 ; absolutism in, 
128; ascendancy of Prussia in, 
128; battle of Nations and 
(1813), 131; influence of 
Hegel on political life of, 133 
sgq.; position of circa 1 840, 
136, 141 ; nationalism in, 138, 
140, 169, 196; plans for new 
Empire of, 142, 201 ; founda- 
tion of North German Confed- 
eration in, 201 ; intervention of, 
in Luxemburg incident, 204; 
war with France of (1870), 



207; Empire of, proclaimed, 
208; peace of Frankfort and, 
208; as Great Power, 228 
note; dominance of, in Europe, 
245; imperialism of, 249 note; 
and internationalism, 250, 254; 
as preponderant state in the 
West, 274; relations of, with 
neighboring states, 275; in the 
Dreikaiserbund, 276; strained 
relations of, with France 
(1875), 277; disinterestedness 
in Balkans claimed by, 279; 
plans of, for reforms in Tur- 
key, 282 ; attitude of in Suez 
Canal incident, 281 ; attitude 
of, during Balkan crisis, 284 
sqq.; at Congress of Berlin, 
297 sqq.; relations of, with Eu- 
ropean Powers, 298 ; Prussian 
hegemony in, 302 ; alliance of, 
with Austria, 316; negotiations 
of, re alliance with England, 
316; and formation of Triple 
Alliance, 325 ; effect on, of 
Alliance, 326; role of, in alli- 
ance, 326; policy of peaceful 
penetration of, 327 ; the concept 
of the Super-State in, 328, 329; 
superiority of, over other part- 
ners in Triple Alliance, 327, 
328 ; economic development of, 
330; industrial prosperity of, 
330; menace of Russia felt in, 
332; the Reinsurance treaty of 
1884 concluded by, 332; effect 
of treaty in, colonial expansion 
of, 333 ; in Togoland, Cam- 
eroon, East and Southwest Af- 
rica, and Australasian islands, 
334; navy of, 334; the Mar- 
shall Islands incident, 325 ; the 
Berlin Conference and the co- 
lonial plans of, 339; as the 
central figure in colonial com- 
petition, 339; extent of colo- 
nial domain of, 339; influence 
of the new generation in, 340; 
concept of the State as Power 
in, 340; see also under Bis- 



358 



INDEX 



marck, Nationalism, and Im- 
perialism. 

Germans (The), political ca- 
pacity of, 129; racial charac- 
teristics of, 130; Western in- 
fluence on, 130; idealism of, 
130; as an JJrvolk, 131; the- 
ory of State of, 133; influence 
of Fichte on, 131, 135; national 
unity of, 136 sqq.; social con- 
sciousness of, 340. 

Gladstone, 265 ; Turkish policy 
of, 278; on Bulgarian atroci- 
ties, quoted, 287 ; return to 
office of, 318; and Italy, 

325- 
Gneist, R., The History of the 

English Constitution by, cited, 

62 note. 
Gorst, Sir John Eldon, quoted, 

312. 
Gortchakov, 280. 
Grand Alliance (1815), 93 and 

note. 
Greece, national unity in, 38; 

political maturity of ancient, 

117; struggle for independence 

of modern (1827), 104; as heir 

of Eastern Empire, 280, 284; 

England and, 283, 284; in 

Russo-Turkish war, 291 ; cited 

296, 314. 
Grotius, 18. 
Guildhall, speech of Disraeli at, 

288. 



Ham, 124. 

Hamburg, 334. 

Harmony Hall, 170. 

Hague, 204; Conference of, 249 

note. 
Hanotaux (Gabriel), La France 

Contemporaine, cited 274, 321. 
Hapsburg (House of), cited, 128, 

141, 153, 191- 
Hartmann, Philosophy of the 

Unconscious by, cited 217. 
Hegel, cosmopolitanism of, 131; 

political philosophy of, 133 ; 



idea of the state of, 133 sqq.; 
his Philosophy of Mind quoted, 
133 sqq.; his influence on 
teachings of Marx, 159, 170, 
171 ; the triad of, 159; Rechts- 
philosophie of, cited 159. 

Heidelberg, University of, 19. 

Helvetic, see Switzerland. 

Herzegovina, revolt in (1875), 
278, 279, 284; Austrian con- 
trol over, 286, 291, 296. 

Historical Materialism, Marxian 
theory of, 161 sqq.; 213 note; 
Labriola quoted on, 162. 

Histoire du Second Empire, see 
La Gorce. 

History, new method of, viii; 
truth of, 14; nature of po- 
litical, 115, 118; periodicity 
in, 115; comparative method 
in, 115 sqq.; political matur- 
ity in, 117 sqq.; objects of, 
154; the will in, 154 sqq.; 
Marxian view of, 161. 

History of Contemporary Europe, 
see Seignobos. 

History of the English Constitu- 
tion, see Gneist. 

History of European Morals, 
see Lecky. 

History of the Philosophy of 
History in France, see Flint. 

History of Rome, see Mommsen. 

Hobbes, 7, 21 ; the will in poli- 
tics, 50 note ; contrasted with 
Rousseau, 52. 

Hohenzollern (House of), 205. 

Holland, 8; united with Belgium, 
93 ; French and English inter- 
vention in, 107; as Minor 
Power, 228 note; cited 289; 
colonial plans of, 334; claims 
to the Congo of, 377 sqq. 

Holy Alliance, provisions of, 94 
note; United States and, 96; 
cited by Napoleon, 122; cited 
124, 189; plan to revive, 275; 
cited by Disraeli, 289. 

Holy Roman Empire, 128, 237; 
significance of, 327; the Triple 



INDEX 



359 



Alliance compared to, 326, 328; 
Church and, 327. 

Homer, 38. 

Humanity, idea of, 37 sqq. 

Hume, 71. 

Hungary, 151, i53> 169, 183, 250; 
Russian intervention in, 184, 
193 ; relations with Austria of, 
202; establishment of dualist 
system in relations with Aus- 
tria, 202, 245. 



Ihering, R., Der Kampf urns 
Recht of, quoted, 344. 

Imperialism, German concept of, 
136; Middle Class definition 
of, 140 and note, 249, 256 and 
note; as a political theory, 256 
sqq.; character of, 258; aims 
of, 259; origin of, 249 note; 
English concept of, 256 and 
note; economic nature of, 256; 
epoch of, 257 ; share of Middle 
Class in, 259, 263; proletarian 
influence on, 258, 259, 263; 
interpretation of, 266; Disraeli 
as leader of, 266, 299, 318; 
German, English, and Russian, 
277 sqq.; example of, in Tunis 
incident, 320 sqq.; Triple Alli- 
ance and, 327. 

India, 109 note, 258; Russian 
threat against, 184, 277; Queen 
Victoria crowned Empress of, 
266. 

Individualism, origin of, in poli- 
tics, 20; the Middle Class view 
of, 61 ; liberty and, 71 ; Napo- 
leon and, 85, 123, 227, and 
nationalism, 98, 105, 241 ; St. 
Simon on, 99; influence of the 
Middle Class based on, 100, 
102, 237, 241; decline of, 125; 
Louis Philippe and, 144; and 
the suffrage, 149; existing so- 
cial order as dependent on 
concept of, 149; Communist 
view of, 167; the State and, 
224 sqq., 230, 234, 301 ; eco- 



nomics and, 225; exaggeration 
of, 260; as factor of decadence, 
260; decline of, 239, 267; cited, 
216, 304. 

Indo-China, 333. 

Industrialism, vii, 102 ; in Eng- 
land, 109; 177, 215, 218, 304. 

International Industrial Exhibi- 
tion (London 1851), first ex- 
hibition held to advertise indus- 
trial development, 178. 

International Exhibition (Lon- 
don 1862), as occasion of 
founding of internationalism, 
250. 

International Workingmen's As- 
sociation, see Internationalism. 

Internationale, the First, see In- 
ternationalism. 

Internationalism, definition of, 
248, 249; and the founding of 
the First Internationale, 250; 
Marx and, 250; Marx dra^y■s 
up programme of, 250; rapid 
growth of, 250, 253 ; Commun- 
ism and, 251 ; moderation of, 
251; temporising character of, 
253 ; estimate of effects of, 253 
sqq.; at Basel, 253; disruption 
of, 255 ; economic aspects of, 
255; and imperialism, 258; see 
also under Communism and 
Karl Marx. 

Intervention, right of, 104. 

Ireland, disturbances in (1798), 
89; abolition of Parliament of 
(1801), 89; incorporation of, 
in England, 89. 

Iron Chancellor, see Bismarck. 

Italy, conditions in i6th century 
in, 22; Napoleon and national 
unity of, 86; effect of Con- 
gress of Vienna on, 93 ; nation- 
alism in, 128; demand for po- 
litical liberty in, 151; aspira- 
tion of people of, for national 
independence, 152; revolutions 
in, 152; engaged in war against 
Austria (1848), 152; defeat of, 
152; nationalism in, 153, 169, 



36o 



INDEX 



183, 196; war of 1859 and, 
194; unification of, under 
House of Savoy, 195 sqq.; war 
of, with Austria (1866), 200; 
as Great Power, 228 note; in- 
ternationalism in, 254; unity in, 
245; seizure of Rome by, 274; 
at Congress of Berlin, 297 ; in- 
terests of, in Tunis, 320 sqq.; 
isolation of, in Europe, 321 ; 
Bismarck's policy regarding, 
325 ; seeks alliance with Ger- 
many and Austria, 325 ; details 
of negotiations of alliance, 325 ; 
concludes alliance (1882), 325; 
as a member of Triple Alli- 
ance, 326; role of, in alliance, 
327 ; plans of Germany to ex- 
ploit, economically, 327 ; and 
German policy of peaceful 
penetration, 327 ; colonial plans 
of, 334- 



James II (King of England), 31. 

James (W.), The Moral Equiv- 
alent of War by, cited, 344. 

Japan, opened to Western inter- 
course, 191 ; looking to West 
as model, 246. 

Jena, battle of, 131 ; 207 note. 

Jesuits, organisations of, in 
Prussia dissolved, 307. 

Jingoism, see Disraeli. 

Johannet (Rene), Le Principe 
des Nationalites by, cited, 84 
note. 

John Bull, England personified 
as, 176. 

Joseph II (Emperor of Austria), 
33. 

Julius II (Pope), 23. 

Jura Federation, 254. 

Justinian, code of, 57; Pandects 
of, 84. 



Kant, plan of an universal State 

of, 65. 
Kars, capture of, 291, 293, 296. 



Konigsberg, 67. 

Krumirs, 321. 

Kulturkampf, see Bismarck; 

Prussia. 
Kutchuk Kainardji, treaty of 

(1774), 284. 



Labriola (A.), Del Material- 
ismo Storico of, cited, 161 ; 
quoted, 162. 

Lafayette, 37. 

Lafitte (Paris banker), as king- 
maker, 106. 

Laibach (1821), (Congress of), 
95, 104. 

Lamartine, quoted, 86, 138, 174. 

Lasalle, 166, 310. 

Laurent, ttudes sur I'Histoire de 
I'Humanite by, quoted, 211. 

La France Contemporaine, see 
Hanotaux. 

La Gorce, Histoire du Second 
Empire by, quoted 186. 

La Goulette, 321. 

League of Nations (1919), 249 
note. 

Lecky, History of European 
Morals by, quoted 128, 147. 

Legge (James), The Chinese 
Classics, quoted 38 note. 

Legitimacy, doctrine of, 93 sqq.; 
congress held to enforce policy 
of, 95 ; England and policy of, 
95; decline of, 95, 104. 

Leipzig, 131. 

Leo XIII (Pope), 335 note. 

Leopold (Prince), as Hohenzol- 
lern candidate for Spanish 
throne, 205, 206. 

Leopold II (King of the Bel- 
gians) new type of sovereign, 
336; as a capitalist, 336; co- 
lonial plans of, 337 ; African 
policy of, 337 ; as founder of 
African International Associa- 
tion, 337 ; chosen sovereign of 
Congo Free State, 338. 

Le Nouveau Christianisme, see 
St. Simon. 



INDEX 



361 



Les Six Livres de la Republique, 
see Bodin. 

Lettres sur la Philosophie de 
I'Histoire, see Odysse-Barot. 

Leviathan, cited, 52. 

Liberty, nature of, 41 ; politics 
and the idea of, 41 ; economic 
doctrine of, 70 sqq.; as privi- 
lege, 176. 

Life of Oliver Cromwell, see 
Morley. 

Life of Benjamin Disraeli, see 
Buckle. 

Locke, theory of state of, 19, 
30; his Treatise on Civil Gov- 
ernment, cited, 19; relations 
between governing and gov- 
erned as outlined by, 30 ; on 
the will in politics, 50 note; 
constitution of Carolina of, 
cited, 61 note. 

Louis XIV (King of France), 9; 
conception of sovereignty of, 
quoted, 83 and note. 

Louis XVI (King of France), 
summons the States General, 
75 ; during the revolution, 78 ; 
death of, 79. 

Louis XVIII (King of France), 
charter granted by, 91. 

Louis Philippe (King of the 
French), accession of, 106; as 
representative of the Middle 
Class, 106; his juste milieu 
policy, 106, 173; anti-national- 
ist policy of, 144; overthrow 
of, 152, 172. 
London, 7, 67, 178; Communist 
Manifesto issued at, 156; con- 
ference of (1871), 275. 
Luther, 4, 9; political effects of 

work of, 7. 
Luxemburg, 182; incident, de- 
tails of, 203 sqq. 



MachiavelH, 7, 21 ; political doc- 
trines of, 17; theory of State 
of, 23; the Prince of, 17; re- 
vival of doctrines of, after 



1870, 210, 211, 220; ranked 
with Aristotle, 211 ; theories of, 
compared with those of Bis- 
marck, 303; Treitschke on, 
303. 

Macaulay (Lord), quoted, x; 
Essay on MachiavelH of, 
quoted, 223. 

Madagascar, 334. 

Madrid, 7. 

Magenta, battle of, 194. 

Magna Carta, 30. 

Magyars, see Hungary, 

Maistre (Joseph de), quoted, 98. 

Malakoff, fall of the, 186. 

Malta, British troops ordered to, 
266. 

Manchester School, as repre- 
senting Middle Class liberal 
viewpoint, 258. 

Manifesto of the Communist 
Party, see under Marx, also 
Communism. 

Marianne, France as, 176. 

Marmora, Sea of, 284, 291. 

Marshall (Alfred), Principles of 
Economics of, cited, 68 note. 

Marshall Islands, incident of, 
335 ; Papal award respecting, 
335 )■ purchase of. by Germany, 
335- 

Marx (Karl), 100; joint author 
of the Communist Manifesto, 
157; social theories of, 158 
sqq.; influence of Hegel on, 
159, 171 ; Zur Kritik der politi- 
schen Oekonomine, by quoted, 
159, 160; theory of historical 
materialism of, 161 sqq., 213 
note; view of the Reformation 
of, 162; realism of, 165; 
quoted, 167 note; limitations 
of, 170; nationalist bias of, 171 
and note; cited, 213 note; and 
First Internationale, 250, 251 ; 
endorsement of Commune of 
Paris by, 254 note; theories of, 
compared with those of Bis- 
marck, 302 ; method of revolu- 
tion advocated by, 302. 



362 



INDEX 



Mary (Queen of England), 28, 
29. 

Massachusetts, middle class or- 
ganisation of, 61 note. 

Materialism, see Historical Ma- 
terialism. 

Maximilian (Archduke), se- 
lected by Napoleon III to be 
emperor of Mexico, 198; fate 
of, 202. 

Mayence, 203. 

Meaux, 275. 

Mediterranean, 107 ; England 
and the, 278, 283; the eastern, 
280. 

Mexico, condition of, in 1861, 
197; disturbances in, 197; Eu- 
ropean intervention in, 197; 
France declares war on, 197; 
French in, 198; Maximilian, 
emperor of, 199; intervention 
of United States in behalf of, 
200; recall of French troops 
from, 202 ; overthrow of Em- 
pire of, 202. 

Middle Class, term defined, 31 
note ; constitutional govern- 
ment in England, as established 
by, 31 sqq., 60; puritanical na- 
ture of, 31, 60; and progress, 
42 sqq.; constitutional govern- 
ment in United States estab- 
lished by, 60; economic doc- 
trine of, 70 sqq.; and the aris- 
tocracy in England, 71 ; share 
of, in French Revolution 
(1789), 75 sqq.; moderation 
of, 77, 100; as ruling power 
in France, 80, 106; nationalist 
doctrine of, 81 ; effects of 
French revolution on English, 
89; and the Restoration, 97; 
individualism of, 61, 100, 102; 
theory of State of, 65 sqq.; 
the politico-juridic concept of, 
100; industrial movement 
and, 102; economic interests of, 
102 ; gains control of govern- 
ment in France, 106; concept 
of the State of, 120; the tri- 



umph of, see Book I, Chap. X; 
influence of business methods 
on public policy of, 107, 109, 
139; Chartism and the Eng- 
lish, 110, 112; changes in, in 
France, 143; conservatism of, 
145; the suffrage question and, 
145 sqq.; attacked by rising 
Proletariat, 156; proletarian 
view of, 160; Marx and, 162 
sqq.; social legislation of, 167; 
communism and, 167 sqq.; 
dictatorship of, 191 ; mile- 
stones in history of, 226; serv- 
ices rendered by, 226, 236 sqq.; 
class consciousness of, 238; 
John Stuart Mill as repre- 
sentative of, quoted, 239; the 
Nation-State as product of the 
civilisation of, 226, 238, 241, 
248; compared with Aristoc- 
racy and Proletariat, 267 sqq.; 
view of imperialism, 257 sqq.; 
hostility of, towards colonial 
enterprise, 258; abolition of 
aristocratic control by, 269; 
historical position of, 342, 

347- 

Mih-Teih, doctrine of brotherly 
love of, 38 and note. 

Milan, revolt at, 152. 

Mill (John Stuart), quoted, 33, 
236 note; utilitarian doctrines 
of, 127 and note; as typical 
representative of Middle Class, 
quoted 239 and note; opposi- 
tion to annexation of India of, 
258. 

Mirabeau, quoted, 78 note. 

Mirbt, Quellen zur Geschichte 
des Papstums, quoted, 306 
note. 

Mokana, 310 note. 

Moldavia, 187, 188. 

Moltke, 171 note. 

Mommsen, History of Rome of, 
quoted, 27 note, 39 note, 87. 

Monroe Doctrine, 95, 198, 246. 

Montenegro, revolt in, 284, 286; 
independence of, 296. 



INDEX 



363 



Montesquieu, on origin of con- 
stitutional government, 27 ; De 
I'Esprit des Lois of, quoted, 27 
and note, 37, 49 and note, 50, 
66 note ; follows Aristotle, 49 
and note; the politico-juridic 
theory of State summed up by, 
52 ; influence of, on Constitu- 
tion of United States, 53, 63; 
Middle Class influence on, 66 
note. 

Morality, as attribute of the 
State, 26 sqq.; separation of, 
from politics, see Politics. 

More (Sir Thomas), the Utopia 
of, cited, 158; quoted by Bis- 
marck, 310 note. 

Morley (Lord), Life of Oliver 
Cromwell by, quoted, 32. 

Morocco, 324. 

Moscow, 288. 

Murray (James A. H.), 256 
note. 



Naples, 152; Franco-British 
fleet at, 193. 

Napoleon I, 79, 82, 128, 226; 
historical mission of, 83 ; atti- 
tude towards Revolution of, 
83, 85; theory of State of, 83 
note; effect of campaigns in 
Italy and Prussia on, 84; esti- 
mate of role of, 83 and note, 
84; and nationalism, 86, 87, 90, 
93, 123, 124, 138, 185; prestige 
of name of, 123, 173; quoted, 
85 note, 122, I76«; compared 
with Bismarck, 273. 

Napoleon III (Prince Louis Na- 
poleon) Napoleonic Ideas 
written bj^ 83 note, 122; 
quoted, 83; character of, 123; 
intrigues of, 123 sqq.; impris- 
onment of, 124; as president 
of Republic of 1848, 173; 
coup d'etat of, 173; assump- 
tion of imperial dignity by, 
173; Emperor of the French, 
173; nationalist policy of, 175, 



181 ; his relations with Italians 
and Hungarians, 181 ; English 
policy of, 182, 185, 192; his 
hostility towards Austria, 183; 
Russian policy of, 185; his 
share in the Crimean war, 185; 
triumph of, 186; peace policy 
of, 187; at the Congress of 
Paris, 188; Russophile atti- 
tude of, 190; plans of aggran- 
disement of, 189; Italian pol- 
icy of, 193; diplomacy of, 193 
sqq.; his negotiations with 
Alexander II, 194; and Ca- 
vour, 194; and the Plombieres 
Agreement, 194; Italian cam- 
paign of 1859 of, 194; pre- 
eminent in Europe, 196; his 
views on the Polish question, 
197 and note, 198; interven- 
tion in Mexico by, 197, 200; 
his prestige in Europe shaken, 
198; his relations with the 
United States, 200, 202 ; Prus- 
sian policy of, 199, 200, 202; 
political concessions granted by, 
203 ; his part in the Luxem- 
burg incident, 203 sqq.; his re- 
lations with Alexander II, 203, 
204; foresees Pan-German 
plans, 205 and note ; his at- 
tempt to form coalition 
against Prussia, 207 ; plan of 
military concentration against 
Prussia, 207 note; declares war 
on Prussia, 207 ; attitude of 
Russia towards, 207 ; defeat 
and capture of, 208. 

Napoleon (Prince Louis), see 
Napoleon III. 

Napoleonic Ideas, see Napoleon 
III. 

Nationalism, concept of, 3, 13; 
origins of, 80 sqq.; propaganda 
of, by France, 81 ; as political 
factor in France, 81; abstract, 
82 ; Napoleon I as missionary 
of, 83, 85; English viewpoint 
regarding, 89 ; and individual- 
ism, 98, 105; de Maistre's 



364 



INDEX 



view of, 98; in 1830, 105; and 
capitalism, 107, 139; cohesive 
force of, 120; dominant in 
France, 124; spread of, 128; 
effect of, in France, 127, 139; 
in Germany, 132, 138, 140, 
196, 205; in Italy, 128, 196; 
racial theory of, 138, 140, 196, 
206, 246; in Austria, 141; 
transformation of, 144; policy 
of Napoleon III re 175, 181, 
205; in Russia, 183; in public 
life, 176, 180; dominant in 
Europe, 192, 211 sqq.; as a 
routine policy after 1870, 209; 
realism and, 222 ; anti-, 232 
sqq., 254 note; decline of in- 
fluence of, 246, 299; and inter- 
nationalism, 252 ; as a factor 
of decadence, 260; superna- 
tional expansion as an out- 
growth of, 318. 
National Assembly (French), 76, 

77- 

Nation-State, 120; formative 
stage of, 176, 178 sqq.; Napo- 
leon III and, 181, 205, 206; 
cohesive unity of, 179; France 
as a model, 182; evolution of, 
209; theory of the, 218; influ- 
ence of volitional doctrine on, 
220; relation of the individual 
to, 179, 216; as created in the 
image of man, 225 ; as a prod- 
uct of the Middle Class, 226, 
238, 241 ; racial factors in for- 
mation of, 246; and imperial- 
ism, 249; internationalism and, 
249, 251 sqq.; new policy of, 
259; transition of, 259; aim of 
Proletariat to destroy, 270; 
struggle for power of, 277, 
299; maturity of, 298; Bis- 
marck and the, 313; Disraeli 
and the, 313, 318; destructive 
agencies within, 313, 327; civi- 
lising mission of, 323 ; theory of 
exploitation of, 323, 329. 

Navarino, battle of (1827), 105. 

Neo-Platonism, teachings of, 40. 



New England, colonial life in, 57; 
type of settlers of, 58. 

New York, 255. 

Nice, 181, 196. 

Nicholas I (Emperor of Russia), 
nationalist policy of, 183; and 
Poland, 184; renders assist- 
ance to Austria, 184; Turkish 
policy of, 185; the Crimean 
war and, 185; death of, 186. 

Niger, free navigation of, 338. 

Nikolsburg, armistice of (1866), 
200. 

Nile, battle of, 283. 

North German Confederation, 
see Germany. 

Novara, defeat of Italians at, 
152. 



Odysse-Barot, Lettres sur la 
Philosophie de VHistoire by, 
quoted, 233 and note. 

CEdipus at Colonus, see Sopho- 
cles. 

Ollivier, E., Empire Liberal by, 
quoted, 197 note. 

On Liberty, see Mill. 

Opium Trade, attitude of Eng- 
land in, 232 note. 

Ottoman Empire, see Turkey. 

Owen, Communist plans of, 158, 
170. 

Oxford Dictionary, quoted, 256 
and note. 



Palermo, 157. 

Palestine, policing of Holy Places 
in, as pretext for Crimean war, 
185. 

Pandects, of Justinian, 84. 

Pan-Slavic movement cited, 183, 
286; officially taken up by Rus- 
sia, 278; directed from St. 
Petersburg, 278; objects of, 
278. 

Papacy, control of social order 
by, 2, 4; position in Middle 
Ages of, 3; authority of, in 



INDEX 



365 



secular affairs, 3; the Refor- 
mation and, 4; supremacy 
claimed by, 21 ; absolutism of, 
21 ; control of secular and 
spiritual life bj'j 22 ; bull Unam 
Sanctam quoted re. 22 note; 
effects of Reformation on, 8, 
17; position of, in 15th and 
i6th centuries, 22; political 
privileges of, 22 ; territorial 
sovereignty of, 22 ; struggle of, 
with Empire, 40; insurrection 
of 1830, 123; cited, 162, 238; 
question of Papal infallibility 
raised by, 305, 306 and note; 
its relations with Germany 
and Austria, 306 note; and 
the Concordat with France of 
1801, 306 note; end of tem- 
poral power of, 306 and 
note; struggle ofj with Prus- 
sia, 307; details of attitude of, 
during the Kulturkampf, 308; 
Bismarck and, 309, 335 note; 
end of the Kulturkampf, 309; 
reconciliation of, with Prussia, 
324; reestablishment of tempo- 
ral power of advocated, 329. 

Paris, 7, 157, 206, 207, 274; fail- 
ure of revolutionary outbreaks 
at (1848), 152; strike at, 251 
note; the Commune of (1871), 
254 and note. 

Paris, Congress of (1856), gen- 
eral plan of, 187; role of Na- 
poleon III at, 188; Prussia ad- 
mitted to, 187; Russian policy 
at, 188; Russo-French under- 
standing at, 189; terms of 
treaty signed at, 188; Italian 
unity discussed with Napoleon 
III by Cavour during, 191 ; re- 
vision of, 275, 276; treaty of, 
cited, 279. 

Parliament, as repositary of po- 
litical power, 11; struggle of, 
with the crown in England, 28, 
33; effect of revolution of 1688 
on, 28, 31; as supreme author- 
ity, 28, 29; arbitrary powers of, 



32; Blackstone quoted on, 32 
note; extension of authority of, 
32 ; absorption of Scotland by, 
33; abolition of Irish Parlia- 
ment by, 89; reform of (1832), 
107; the Middle Class and the 
electorate of, 145 and note. 
Pascal, on progress, 46 ; Pensees 

sur la Morale by, quoted, 93. 
Peace, economic value of, 332; 
long era of European peace, 
333 ; economic factors of, 333 ; 
doctrine of armed, 333. 
Peking, 192. 
Pennsylvania, proprietary colony 

of, 61 note. 
Pensees sur la Morale, see Pas- 
cal. 
Peoples' Charter, see Chartism. 
Perfectibility, as a corollary of 

progress, see Progress. 
Persia, 38. 

Pessimism, doctrine of, 216; in- 
fluence on politics of, 213; 
Schopenhauer's teaching of, 
216; Hartmann's theory of 
cosmic suicide and, 217; effects 
of, 217; Bourget's review of 
quoted, 261 ; the passing of, 
319- 
Peter Leopold, 33. 
Philosophy of Mind, see Hegel. 
Philosophy of the Unconscious, 

see Hartmann. 
Physiocrats, as founders of eco- 
nomic science, 68 ; influence of, 
on Adam Smith, 69. 
Physiocratie ou Constitution 
Naturelle du Gouvernemcnt le 
plus avantageux du genre hu- 
main, see Dupont de Nemours. 
Piedmont, constitutional reforms 
in, 152; war of, against Aus- 
tria, 152; at Congress of Paris, 
187; role of, in Italy, 191. 
Pius IX (Pope), Encyclical and 
Syllabus of (1864), 305 j sum- 
mons Vatican Council, 305 ; 
attitude re question of infalli- 
bility, 306 note; struggle of. 



366 



INDEX 



with Bismarck, 308; death of, 
308. 

Plato, 38; Republic of, cited, 158. 

Plevna, siege of, 291. 

Plombieres, agreement of, 194. 

Poland, 93> 169; Louis Napoleon 
offered the crown of, 123; ef- 
fect of Italian unity on, 196; 
nationalism in, 184; France 
and, 187, 196; European inter- 
vention in behalf of, 198; atti- 
tude of Napoleon III towards, 
197 sqq. and note; revolt of 
1863 in, 198; France fails to 
give armed assistance to, 198. 

Politica, see Althusius. 

Politico-Economic (Theory of 
State) genesis of, 223 sqq.; 
definition of term, 223 note; 
growth of authority of the 
State due to, 228; effect of, on 
individual welfare, 229-230; re- 
sults of, on diplomacy, 231 ; 
on public policy, 231 ; realism 
of, 235 ; influence of Prole- 
tariat on, 240, 241 ; the State 
as Power based on, 247 sqq.; 
extra-national character of, 

319- 

Politico-Juridic (Theory of 
State), origins of, 13, 47 sqq.; 
nature of, 19, 27; as the State 
fashioned in the image of man, 
19 sqq.; as the basis of consti- 
tutional government, 100; out- 
line of, by Locke, ig, 30; in- 
fluence of Rousseau and Mon- 
tesquieu on, 52 ; positivism and, 
127; as adopted by Germany, 
130; rejected by Communism, 
164; individualist basis of, 223; 
as the contribution of the Mid- 
dle Class, 226 sqq.; decline of, 
218, 257, 329. 

Politico-Theistic (Theory of 
State), 9, 10, II ; as represented 
in monarchical absolutism, 18, 
23; supplanted by juridic the- 
ory, 19 sqq.; abuses of, 19; sur- 
vival of form of, 13; the State 



fashioned in the image of God 
as the basis of, 23 ; Machiavelli, 
as the founder of, 23 ; new ab- 
solutism of the later 19th cen- 
tury compared with, 234 sqq. 
Politics, role of, ix; contrasted 
with religion, 3, 5, 9; effect of 
Reformation, 4, 7 ; revival of 
interest in, 5 ; as principal pre- 
occupation of men, 6; as sup- 
planting religion as the motive 
force in social life, 5, 8; sub- 
stitution of the juridic for the 
theistic basis of, 13; defects of, 
55; linked with economics, 105; 
nature of, 115, 117; complexity 
of, 116; question of maturity 
in, 116 sqq.; and social life, 
118; spread of, 118, 119; in 
Germany, 129 sqq.; historical 
materialism and, 162; new spir- 
it in, 210, 215; separation of 
morals from, 210, 211, note, 
220, 231 ; realism in, 212 sqq. 
222; pessimism and, 216 sqq.; 
partisanship in, 217; influence 
of economics on, 222 sqq.; and 
power, 224; zenith of develop- 
ment of, 234; as a matter of 
compromise, 238; new creed of, 
319; Bismarck and, 303 sqq., 
342; international, 315 sqq.; 
subservient to economics, 329; 
war and, 344 note; and the 
nation-state, 345 ; theories of, 
see also under Althusius, 
Hobbes, Machiavelli, Bodin, 
Locke, Montesquieu, Rous- 
seau, Treitschke. 

Politik, see Bluntschli. 

Politik, see Treitschke. 

Pombal, 33. 

Porte, see Turkey. 

Portugal, inquisition in, 8; con- 
stitutional government in, 128 
note; colonial plans of, 334; 
claims to Congo of, 337 sqq. 

Positivism, see Comte. 

Power, (The State as) new doc- 
trine of, 247 sqq.; Bismarck's 



INDEX 



367 



theory of, 303 ; social aspects of, 
303. 329, 344; new horizons 
opened by, 317. 339, 345; appli- 
cation of doctrine of, 341 sqq.; 
factor of disciplined violence in, 
343; the war function of, 344; 
effect on political practice of, 
345 ; historical function of, 

347- 

Prague, treaty of, 201. 

Prince {The), see Machiavelli. 

Principles of Economics, see 
Marshall. 

Progress, concept of, 6; histori- 
cal review of idea of, 42 sqq.; 
as contribution of Middle 
Class to political theory and 
social practice, 45 sqq., 226; 
positivism and, 125; Marxian 
view of, 162, 213 note; effect 
of evolutionary theory on, 213. 

Proletariat, iig, 126; aims of, 
156; Marxian theory of, 158 
sqq.; first participation in pub- 
lic affairs of, 158; ultimate des- 
tiny of, according to Marx, 
160, 166; domination of social 
order by, predicted, 159; dic- 
tatorship of, 162, 164; revolt of, 
preached, 163; as a distinct so- 
cial unit, 164; effects of rise 
of, on the State, 248; inter- 
nationalism and, 248 sqq.; ef- 
fects of First Internationale 
on, 251 sqq.; struggle of, with 
capitalism, 256; vigor of, 257; 
support of imperialism by, 259; 
compared with aristocracy, 
26S ; class characteristics of, 
268, 299; plan of, to destroy 
Nation-State, 270; mission of, 
271; Bismarck and, 302, 310. 

Property, theory of private, 167; 
abolition of private, proposed 
by communists, 167. 

Proudhon, as founder of Anarchy, 
232; quoted, 232. 

Providence, idea of, 45 and note, 
94 note ; influence of, on polit- 
ical affairs, 48, 236. 



Prussia, in the Holy Alliance, 
94 note; signs agreement of 
Troppau, 95 ; aims at ascend- 
ancy in Germany, 128; the 
Zollverein and, 128; influence 
of Hegel on, 133 sqq.; leader- 
ship of, 136, 140; revival of 
prosperity in, 137; nationalism 
in, 140; political incapacity of, 
141 ; revolution of 1848 in, 153; 
attitude of Frederick William 
IV, in, 153; at Congress of 
Paris, 187; role of, in Ger- 
many, 191 ; plans of expansion 
of, 199; Napoleon III and, 199, 
200; relations of, with Rus- 
sia, 196 sqq., 205; war of, with 
Denmark, 200; annexation of 
Danish Duchies by, 200; war 
of, with Austria, 200; results 
of wars with Denmark and 
Austria in, 201 ; as head of the 
North German Confederation, 
201; aggressive policy of, 204; 
attitude of Europe towards, 
206; war with France of, 207; 
education in, 229 note ; effect of 
rise of, 245, 265; struggle of, 
with Papacy, 305 sqq.; laws 
decreed by, dissolving Jesuit 
organisations, 307 ; role of, in 
the Empire after formation of 
Triple Alliance, 326; purchase 
of railways by, 21 ; economic 
expansion of, 331. 

Psychologic Contemporaine, see 
Bourget. 

Public Opinion, rise of, 35 sqq.; 
in France, 36; cited, 47, 72, 
214, 218, 239; see also Book 
I, Chapter III. 

Pufendorf, 19. 

Puritanism, influence of, in Eng- 
land and America, 32 ; and 
politics of, 32. 



Quebec, battle of, 59. 
Quellen zur Geschichte des Pap- 
stums, see Mirbt. 



368 



INDEX 



Realism, rise of, 2i2; in politics, 
212; term defined, 212 sqq.; 
German definition of, 212; ef- 
fect of science in producing 
vogue of, 213; capitalism and, 
259; Bismarck and, 340. 

Realpolitik, see Realism. 

Recht und Politik, see Schopen- 
hauer. 

Rechtsphilosophie, see Hegel. 

Reform Act (1832) effects of, in 
England, 107. 

Reformation, influence of, 4, 7, 
8, 17, 19, 23, 135, 236, 248; 
political and historical changes 
due to, 13; Marxian interpreta- 
tion of, 162. 

Regency, in France, 35. 

Regionalism, doctrine of, 254 
note. 

Reichstadt (Duke of), 123. 

Reichstadt, meeting at, 286; 
agreement of, 286, 287. 

Reinsurance Treaty, between 
Germany and Russia, 332 ; rat- 
ified by Emperors of Austria, 
Russia, and Germany at Skier- 
nevi^e, 332 note; Bismarck's 
object in concluding, 332; re- 
newal of, 332 note, 341. 

Religion, role of, ix; contrasted 
with politics, 3, 9; supplanted 
by politics, 5, 8, 236; decay of 
ascendancy of, 7, 8; and sci- 
ence, 214. 

Renaissance, 41, 130, 248. 

Renan, quoted, 301 note. 

Restoration, of post-Napoleonic 
period, 92 ; temper of, 93 ; re- 
pressive policy of, 95 ; legiti- 
macy as policy of, 93 ; cited, 
97, 100, 106, 141. 

Revolution: 

(1688) causes and aims of, 
28, 73 ; religious and political 
factors of, 28; supremacy of 
Parliament over Crown af- 
firmed by, 32. 

(1776) nature of, 48; 
French influence on, 59 ; eco- 



nomic nature of, 75 ; causes of 
success of, 75 ; results on politi- 
cal practice due to, 75. 

{1789) political influence 
of, 13; spirit of, 36; ex- 
cesses of, 37; public opinion 
and, 37, 72; causes of, 48, 73; 
influence of American example 
on, 74; nature of, 75 sqq.; 
details of, 78; role of Middle 
Class in, 78; results of, 80, 97; 
question of maturity of ideol- 
ogy of, 119. 

(1830) causes of, 106; po- 
litical aspects of, 106; the 
Middle Class and, 106; effect 
of, in Belgium and Holland, 
107. 

(1848) in France, 152; in- 
fluence of economic factors 
on, 152; the suffrage ques- 
tion in, 152; results of, 152; 
in Italy, 152; demand for con- 
stitutional government as cause 
of, 152; and nationalist strug- 
gle for independence, 152; 
Venetian and Roman Republics 
established as result of, 152; 
collapse of, 152; in Prussia, 
Austria, and Hungary, 1 53; 
failure of, to achieve perma- 
nent results, 153; causes of 
scant success of, in general, 
analysed, 155. 

(1870-71) in France as re- 
sult of disastrous war, 207 ; 
the episode of the Com- 
mune, 208; permanent results 
of, 208. 

Richelieu (Cardinal), 234. 

Right (Declaration and Bill of) 
(1689), 10, 31; provisions of, 
28; effects of, 62; compared 
with Declaration of Rights of 
Man and the Constitution of 
the United States, 115. 

Rights of Man (Declaration of) 
(1789), 10; provisions of, 77; 
historical comparison of, 115. 

Rochambeau, 37. 



INDEX 



369 



Rome, disruption of the empire, 
2; political maturit}' of, 117; 
republic of 1848 at, 152; the 
French* garrison of, 195; 
seized by the Italians, 274; 
cited, 127, 195; Church of, see 
Papacy. 

Romans, persecutions by, 8 ; idea 
of unity among, 39; utilitarian- 
ism of, 39; political character 
of, 117; distinction made by, 
between law and morality, 210 
note. 

Rousseau, 10, 50, 66, 78, 84; 
Contrat Social of, quoted, 51, 
52 note; Discourse on the In- 
equality among Mankind of, 
quoted, 51; theory of, re will 
of all and general will, 50 note, 
150 and note, 219 and note, 
147; volitional doctrine of, 
contrasted with that of Locke 
and Hobbes, 50 note, 52 ; and 
the politico-juridic theory, 52; 
and Declaration of Indepen- 
dence, 53. 

Rumania, creation of, 246; na- 
tional aspirations of, 278; ef- 
fects of Congress of Berlin on 
territory of, 314. 

Russia, forms the Holy Alliance, 
94 and note ; frames the agree- 
ment of Troppau, 95 ; inter- 
venes in Greece, 104; Polish 
insurrection against, 123; as a 
Great Power, 182; Wars of 
Nicholas I, of, 183; Pan-Slavic 
Movement of, 183; Asiatic in- 
terests of, 184, 190; Polish 
policy of, 183, 196; and the 
Crimean War, 184 sqq.; at the 
Congress of Paris, 187 sqq.; in 
the vortex of Western affairs, 
190; Italian policy of, 193 ; ten- 
sion with France over Poland, 
198; and the Luxemburg inci- 
dent, 203; relations of, with 
Prussia, 196 sqq., 205 ; attitude 
of, towards France, 207; as 
World Power, 228 note; 



growth of political conscious- 
ness in, 245 ; forces revision of 
treaty of Paris, 275 ; Bismarck's 
plan of alliance with, 275 ; ad- 
vance in Central Asia of, 266; 
influence in the Balkans of, 
277; threat of, against Con- 
stantinople, 277; Turkish 
policy of, 278; partition of 
Turkey advocated by, 280; as 
champion of the independence 
of Balkan peoples, 284; ad- 
vance on Sea of Marmora by, 
284; Balkan crisis and plans 
of, 285 ; the Reichstadt agree- 
ment of, 286; attitude of, to- 
wards England, 288; mobilisa- 
tion of, 289; treaty of, with 
Austria re Balkans, 290; de- 
clares war on Turkey, 290; 
campaign of, 291 ; victories of, 
291 ; the treaty of San Stef- 
ano of, with Turkey, 292 ; at 
the Congress of Berlin, 296, 
314; and the Austro-German 
Alliance, 316; the Reinsurance 
Treaty of, (1884), 332 and 
note ; renewal of Dreikaiser- 
bund, 332 note; paramount in- 
terest in Asia of, 334. 
Russell (Lord Odo), 286 note. 



Sadowa, battle of, 200; results 

of, 202. 
Samoa, 335. 
Salisbury (Lord), 289; quoted, 

317; 

Salonika, Austrian advance on, 

297. 
San Stefano, treaty of, terms of, 

292 sqq.; revision of, 293, 295. 
Savoy, 81, 181, 196. 
Savoy (House of), 191. 
Schleswig-Holstein, see Danish 

Duchies. 
Schopenhauer, teachings of, 216; 

pessimistic doctrine of, 217; 

Recht und Politik of, quoted, 

217 ; cited, 261. 



370 



INDEX 



Science, effect of development of, 
on history and politics after 
1870, 215 sqq. 

Scotland, Act of Union of 

(1707), 33. 

Sebastopol, siege of, 186, 187. 

Sedan, battle of, cited, 127; re- 
sults of, 207. 

Seignobos, quoted, 95 note. 

Seneca, cited on progress, 43. 

Serbia, national aspirations of, 
278; revolt in, 284; declares 
war on Turkey, 286; indepen- 
dence of, 296. 

Sicily, constitution of (1812), 90; 
revolution in, 152. 

Sidi Saddok (Bey of Tunis), 322. 

Skierneviqe, 332 note. 

Smith (Adam), Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the 
IVealth of Nations, by, 69; 
character of, 69; influence of 
Physiocrats on, 69 ; economic 
theories of, 70; contribution to 
economics of, 71; influence of, 
on politics, 71. 

Socialism, first forecast of, 99 
and note; St. Simon as foun- 
der of, 99; origins of modern, 
99 and note; scientific, see 
Communism; State, 166; Com- 
munist view of, 167; Bismarck 
and, 310 and note. 

Solferino, battle of, 194. 

Sophocles, CEdipus at Colonus, 
of, quoted, 216. 

South America, constitutional 
government in, 64 note. 

Spain, inquisition in, 8; taxation 
in, 10; as a national State, 86; 
constitution of 1812, 90; Holy 
Alliance and, 96; constitutional 
government in, 128 note; in- 
tervention in Mexico by, 197; 
withdrawal from Mexico by, 
197; Hohenzollern candidate 
to throne of, 205, 206; as 
Minor Power, 228 note; inter- 
nationalism in, 255; Marshall 
Islands and, 335. 



Spencer (Herbert), quoted, 224 
note. 

Stanley, African explorer, 337. 

State, see Nation-State, State as 
Power, Theory of State, Super- 
State, etc. 

States General (1789), 75. 

Stewart, 71. 

Stoics, 39. 

Strassburg, 124. 

St. Helena, 85, 124. 

St. Peter, Patrimony of, 22. 

St. Petersburg, cited, 197, 261, 
278. 

St. Simon, socialist doctrine of, 
99; Du Systeme Industrie! and 
Le Nouveau Christianisme, of, 
99 note; cited, 100, 158; rela- 
tion to Positivism of, 125. 

St. Sophia, 278. 

Sudan, 334. 

Suez Canal, construction and 
opening of, 277 ; diversion of 
trade routes through, 278; con- 
trol of, acquired by England, 
281. 

Suffrage, struggle for extension 
of, 148, sqq.; in England, 148; 
in France, 148; value of, 150 
and note; universal, 238. 

Super-Man, 260, 319. 

Super - State, politico - economic 
thesis of, 319 sqq.; Triple Al- 
liance regarded as forming a, 
328, 329, 330; imperialism and, 
327; Bismarck and the, 330 sqq. 

Switzerland, 64 note, 169; as 
Minor Power, 228 note. 

Syria, French interest in, 297. 



Tacitus, 27. 

Talleyrand, 92. 

Tancred, cited re Cyprus, 294 

note. 
Terror (Reign of), 79. 
The Moral Equivalent of War, 

see James. 
Thibaudeau, Histoire des £,tats 

Generaux by, quoted, 81 note. 



INDEX 



371 



Tiers £tat, 75, 76. 

Tocqueville, de, Democracy in 
America by, quoted, 60, 144, 
176. 

Togoland, 334. 

Tonkin, 333. 

Trade-Unions, first legally sanc- 
tioned in England, no; inter- 
national movement and, 250, 
255; strikes supported by, 251. 

Trafalgar, 283. 

Transvaal, 315. 

Treitschke (H. von), PoUt'ik of, 
cited, 211; as the interpreter 
of Bismarck's policy, 303 ; Poli- 
tik of, quoted, 303, 344, and 
note, 346; the Machtlehre of, 

343. 

Triple Alliance, genesis of, at 
Congress of Berlin, 298; for- 
mation of, by Bismarck, 325 
sqq.; role of Italy and Austria 
in, 326 sqq.; significance of, to 
Bismarck, 328; viewed as re- 
vival of Holy Roman Empire, 
326, 328; Bismarck quoted re- 
garding, 326; scope of, 328; 
economic aspects of, 329; as the 
Super-State, 329; viewed as 
conclusion of process of Ger- 
man unity, 328 ; true signifi- 
cance of, 329, 330. 

Triple Entente, 298. 

Troppau (Congress of), 95. 

Tunis, France urged to annex, 
297; condition of, 320; Italian 
interests in, 321 ; the Bey of, 
321; Franco-Italian rivalry in, 
321 ; as scene of first imperial- 
ist comedy, 322 ; details of 
French expedition to, 322 ; ac- 
quisition of, by France, 322; 
Bismarck and, 324. 

Turgot, on progress, 46. 

Turin, 194. 

Turkey, war of Greek indepen- 
dence and, 127; share of, in 
the Crimean War, 184 sqq.; 
and the Balkans, 246; policy 
of England towards, 278 sqq.; 



Russian, German, and Austrian 
plans re, 279 sqq.; default on 
interest on public debt by, 280; 
plan to partition, 280 sqq., 285; 
proposed European interven- 
tion in, 284; plans of, for re- 
forms in the Balkans, 284; 
mobilisation of armies of, 284; 
palace revolutions in, 285, 287; 
insurrection in European prov- 
inces of, 286; Abdul Hamid, 
Sultan of, 287 ; conference of 
Constantinople re 288 ; consti- 
tution granted by, 290; war of, 
with Russia, 290; invasion of, 
by Russians, 291 ; details of 
Russian campaign in, 291 ; ar- 
mistice with Russia, 291 ; the 
peace of San Stefano and, 292 ; 
assistance rendered by England 
to prevent partition of, 292 ; 
cedes Cyprus to England, 293 ; 
at the Congress of Berlin, 296, 
314; future partition of, dis- 
cussed, 317; attitude of, in 
Tunis, 322. 



Umbria, 195. 

TJnam Sanctam (Papal bull) 
quoted, 22 note. 

United States, constitution of, 53, 
115; quoted, 63 note, 78; con- 
stitutional democracy in, 56; 
colonial origin of, 57, 58; Puri- 
tan influence in, 58; character 
of founders of, 58; influence of 
French theories in, 59; strug- 
gle for independence of, 59; 
contribution of English polit- 
ical practice to, 60; definition 
of sovereignty by, 63 ; the Mon- 
roe Doctrine and, 95, 198, 246; 
confronts the Holy Alliance, 
95; opening of Japan by, 191; 
the slavery question in, 192; 
civil war in, 198; and Mexico, 
198, 202, 246; as a Great Pow- 
er, 228 note; public opinion in, 
239; rapid development of, 



372 



INDEX 



after 1875, 246; international 
movement in, 253 ; imperial- 
ism in, 256 note; at conference 
of Berlin, 338 and note. 

Vatican, see Papacy. 

Vauban, 68. 

Venice (Republic of) 1848, 152. 

Venetia, 195; annexed to Italy, 
201. 

Vera Cruz, 199. 

Verona (Congress of), 95. 

Versailles, 208. 

Victoria (Queen of England), 
178, 291, 316 note, 317 note; 
crowned Empress of India, 
266. 

Vienna (Congress of), 92, 93; 
work of, 128. 

Vienna, revolution in, 157; nego- 
tiations at (1855), 187; cited, 
183, 187, 191, 194, 201, 275, 
280, 292, 316. 

Villafranca, 194. 

Virginia, 61 note. 

Wallace (William), Hegel's 
Philosophy of Mind, transla- 
tion of, 133. 

Wallachia, 188. 

War, as expression of national 
will, 221; years of, 233 note; 
political value of, 341 ; peace 
attained through, 344; value of, 
344; the State as a weapon for, 
344; Treitschke on, quoted, 344 
note. 



War of Liberation, in Germany, 
91, 136. 

Washington, 202. 

Waterloo, 122. 

Wealth of Nations, see Adam 
Smith. 

Wellington (Duke of), 107. 

Westminster, 33. 

IVestrninster Review, cited, 224 
note. 

Westphalia (Treaty of), 144. 

Will, Locke on the, 50; law as 
expression of the general, 77, 
78; Hegel's view of, 133, 134; 
Rousseau on the nature of the, 
in politics, 147, 150 and note, 
219; in history, 116, 154, 155 
and note; cited, 148; of the 
people, 173; national, 176, 221, 
224; new political theory of, 
220, 221 ; as power, 221. 

William (King of England), 28, 
29. 

Windthorst, 307. 

Wittenberg, 8. 

Wolsey (Cardinal), 234. 

World War, imperialist epoch 
closed during, 257; 271. 



Young Turks, see Turkey. 



Z Oliver ein, 129, 1 37, 329. 

Zulus, War of, with England, 

315. 
Zur Kritik der politischen Oeko- 
nomine, see Marx. 



